CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Atta Was Coordinating With Jdey’s Associate Al-Hazmi, First In Fort Lee, NJ In Late August 2001 And Then In Laurel, MD in September 2001 ; Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi Had Been At The Planning Meeting At Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur Condo With Anthrax Planner Hambali And Anthrax Lab Director Yazid Sufaat And Yet The FBI Never Told The Public That Jdey Had Been Detained Along With Moussaoui In August 2001 (With Biology Textbooks) And Then Released

Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 25, 2012

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11 Responses to “* Atta Was Coordinating With Jdey’s Associate Al-Hazmi, First In Fort Lee, NJ In Late August 2001 And Then In Laurel, MD in September 2001 ; Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi Had Been At The Planning Meeting At Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur Condo With Anthrax Planner Hambali And Anthrax Lab Director Yazid Sufaat And Yet The FBI Never Told The Public That Jdey Had Been Detained Along With Moussaoui In August 2001 (With Biology Textbooks) And Then Released”

  1. DXer said

    In considering Jdey’s possible role, it is worth paying heed to the fact that he was an associate of Nawaf Al-Hazmi.

  2. DXer said

    Yazid Sufaat is expected in court on May 6, 2013. Jdey’s associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi had been at the planning meeting Yazid’s Kuala Lumpur condo with anthrax planner Hambali and anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat. Yet the FBI never told the public that Jdey had been detained along with Moussaoui in August 2001 (with biology textbooks and then released.

    Doesn’t FBI Director Mueller want to set forth the background of Jdey’s detention and release rather than leave it to his successor — or even Yazid Sufaat?

  3. DXer said

    Yazid, did you know Jdey? Where is Jdey now?

  4. DXer said

    It is clear that the FBI withheld the information about Jdey.

    It seems equally clear that no good came of it.

  5. DXer said

    Did the FBI tell NYPD intelligence that Jdey had been detained at the same time as Moussaoui and then released?

  6. DXer said

    A sample of Jdey’s handwriting and prose is contained among the Harmony documents at the West Point website.

    Where is Jdey?

    The FBI failed to disclose (for a decade) that Jdey was detained at the same time as Moussaoui and then released.

    Moussaoui had the cropdusting manuals and Jdey had the biology textbooks.

    Can Jdey be excluded as the sender of the Texas hoax “Scooby Doo” letters?

    The Scooby Doo investigators would benefit from the fullest collection of Jdey’s writings for psycholinguistic comparison.

    Jdey would find it hard not to mention the Blind Sheikh Abdel Rahman. Or perhaps he would mention Moussaoui.

    http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Feds-Offer-150000-Reward-for-White-Powder-Sender-151702465.html

  7. DXer said

    http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st_dea_detect_to_protect.pdf

    Environmental Assessment for Bacillus subtilis Particles to Challenge Bio-Detection Sensors in Subway Stations
    Prepared for Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate
    January 12, 2012 Version 15

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    This Environmental Assessment (EA) documents the analysis of the potential effects of a proposal by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) to conduct tests and experiments involving the release of low concentrations of particles at certain stations within the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority’s (MBTA’s) Subway ‘T’ System. No construction, permanent land disturbance, or land use changes would occur with implementation of the Proposed Action or the Alternatives.

    DHS S&T has been developing technologies and sensors needed to rapidly detect a potential biological attack on the Nation’s transportation infrastructure in order to minimize public exposure and strengthen security. To validate the performance of the technologies, it is necessary to perform field tests in a real- world environment. Subway systems provide one of the most challenging and harsh indoor settings that sensors of this nature would be exposed to in real- world deployment, due to the temperature and humidity extremes that often characterize these types of indoor environments. In order to understand the true detection capabilities of the biological sensor networks, challenge tests with a material must be performed. Since a portion of the technologies rely on the detection of genetic or proteinaceous materials to positively identify a particular threat agent, the simulant must be of biological origin. Bacillus subtilis, or B. subtilis, a soil bacterium which is not pathogenic to humans, has been studied extensively for human, animal, and environmental safety, and has ultimately been approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for day of harvest use on produce as a bio-fungicide. For these reasons B. subtilis has been chosen to serve as the particulate material for the proposed tests.

    There are four action alternatives presented in this assessment to evaluate tradeoffs in test procedures, which would either fully or partially meet the needs of DHS S&T; additionally there is a no action alternative, which would involve no particulate releases:

    The first alternative is to conduct an aerosol release of known quantities of B. subtilis within the subway system to demonstrate a positive detection of the material by the sensor network installed in several underground stations. These studies, to be performed at peak operational capacity for trains and passengers, are designed to most closely simulate the conditions that would likely exist in the event of a true bio-terrorist attack.

    The second alternative is to conduct an aerosol release of nonviable (killed) B. subtilis particles for testing the sensors during revenue hours. The killed material, because it is no longer an active biological substance, is considered as a particulate or dust nuisance. This alternative would alter the test material, but not the test conditions or the test release as described in Alternative 1.

    The third alternative is to conduct an aerosol release of nonviable (killed) B. subtilis spores for testing sensors during non-revenue hours for the subway. The trains would be operated to mimic a peak schedule, but no passengers would be present in the stations. This alternative would alter the test conditions, but not the test material or release as described in Alternative 2.

    The fourth alternative would be the direct injection of viable B. subtilis spore aerosol into a single sensor during operational hours for the subway, and capture all of the test material within the sensor such that it does not enter the subway station environment at all. This alternative would not alter the proposed test material, but would alter the test release and conditions as described in Alternative 1.

    Due to the potential human health and safety risks posed by the presence of sensitive populations, to include immune-compromised riders during operational hours, the aerosolization of viable spores to challenge the biosensor system, as outlined in Alternative 1, is not recommended. Implementing the use of nonviable material, as outlined in Alternatives 2 and 3, will ensure the health and safety of all subway riders including sensitive populations without compromising the results of the testing activities. Alternative 4 presents no potential adverse human health or safety impacts; however the procedure as outlined does not fulfill the purpose of the aerosol tests.

    The indirect environmental effects caused by the potential exposure of terrestrial wildlife by movement of the material out of subway tunnels and into the open air were also evaluated. The environmental consequences posed by any of the alternatives as outlined will not have an adverse effect on terrestrial wildlife.

    In accordance with Executive Order 12898, analysis of the environmental effects must also include effects on minority communities and low-income communities, when such analysis is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
    (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. section 4321 et esq. Overall, populations using the subway as well as those living in and around the effected subway stations do not disproportionally represent minority and low-income populations; implementation of alternatives has no adverse impact on resources, human health or the environment.

    As a commercial biofungicide, the B. subtilis test material has undergone rigorous studies to evaluate the potential health effects and safety of the material for the general public, workers and environments surrounding the commercial use, and no adverse health effects from low level exposure to B. subtilis in healthy populations have been documented. The quantity of material proposed for these tests is well below the dose rates for the toxicology testing of these biofungicides and the reported results provide a conservative comparison. Therefore, Alternative 1 would be the preferred test condition to provide the most realistic challenge to the system. However, taking into account any health-
    related concerns over the potential presence of immune-compromised individuals, young children or elderly, or asthma sufferers who are sensitive to dust particle loads, the use of the nonviable material during non-revenue hours described in Alternative 3 is the Proposed Action for these tests.

  8. DXer said

    Did Jdey ever seen Moussaoui in his Scooby Doo boxer shorts? :0)

    Oh, wait, the FBI doesn’t know where Jdey is and yet claimed to be able to exclude him as mailer.

    http://articles.nydailynews.com/2006-04-09/news/18329435_1_t-shirt-hijacking-ralph-lauren

    Terrorist Dressed To Kill In High Style

    BY TRACY CONNOR DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER
    Sunday, April 09, 2006

    Boxers or briefs, you wonder? No tighty whities in this guy’s closet, though the Scooby-Doo boxers might seem a bit incongruous.

  9. DXer said

    Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law
    Editor-in-Chief: Sutton, Victoria
    Ed. by Sherwin, Brie

    BioIntel: Leveraging Information to Prevent Biological Weapons Attacks

    Mustin, Jeff

    Citation Information: Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law.Volume 2, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 2154-3186, DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1020, March 2012

    Publication History: Published Online: 10/04/2012

    Identifying and assessing biological weapons (“BW”) programs has been a fatal flaw in the United States defense posture since the Cold War. From the time when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the technology used to build BW proliferated worldwide, the BW threat has become more immediate, however the ability to identify hostile BW programs and assess their capabilities has received little attention. This paper seeks to identify ways to leverage information that might prevent a BW attack on the United States. It begins by looking at historical trends in the failure to assess, continues with a brief analysis of the intelligence collection cycle, and then looks to tailor the cycle to meet this unique threat.

  10. DXer said

    Both the hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui met and stayed at Yazid Sufaat’s condo in planning to attack the US. What does Mr. Sufaat say about the meetings at his KL condo? What details can he share?

  11. DXer said

    Why Shouldn’t I Work for the NSA? (Good Will Hunting)

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