CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* FOIA Suit Relating To Theory That Aberaouf Jdey Is The Anthrax Mailer

Posted by Lew Weinstein on May 3, 2013

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127 Responses to “* FOIA Suit Relating To Theory That Aberaouf Jdey Is The Anthrax Mailer”

  1. DXer said

    This suit seeking FOIA documents relating to Jdey was dismissed with prejudice. I have not yet read the opinion or seen the holding but Jdey is deemed to be at large. It would seem that national security and law enforcement exemptions would be invoked and relied upon. In the FOIA case involving documents relating to Atta and Shukrijumah, both of them are deceased.

  2. DXer said

    I once wrote in a manucript titled “The Third Squad” about the various other candidates for mailing. Elbaneh is worth mentioning given the uncorroborated report that he and El-Shurkijumah were back in the US in 2014.

    I wrote:

    “Buffalo-operative Jaber Elbaneh reportedly was recaptured after having escaped a year ago from a prison in Yemen. Now who is a better candidate for mailer? Elbaneh? Jdey? Elzahabi? Mohammed Junaid Babar? Can any of them be excluded? They all seem like fine candidates, each interesting for different reasons — connections to different players.

    Elbaneh was connected to Khallad Attash, Bin Laden’s bodyguard, who attended the January 2000 planning meeting in Malaysia. The dominant consensus seems to be that Elbaneh never returned to the United States in 2001 and so can be excluded as a candidate for mailer. In June 2001, he had sold property he owned at 20-24 Wilkesbarre Ave., Jaber Elbaneh to Ahmed Umar for $15,000. The week before 9/11 (ending September 7, 2001), Jaber Elbaneh sold the property he co-owned a 28 Wilkesbarre Ave to a relative for $20,000. (He may have acted through his wife and apparently was not present for the closing.)

    Jdey was part of KSM’s “second wave” and disappeared from Montreal about the time of the mailing. Is he in Turkey with his friend Boussara with the prominent ears?

    Elzahabi was coming from Ibn Khattab in mid-August 2001 and had not started his school bus job yet. He filled out the application on September 11, 2001.

    Mohammed Junaid Babar knew the folks in London , such as the one-eyed sheik Abu Hamza, and had arrived from Queens to Lahore by October 30, 2001. But the feds may even offer him witness protection and a new identity, and so they perhaps can exclude him based on his outbound flight.

    Former CIA Director Tenet Tenet says Ayman’s anthrax program was highly compartmentalized at the highest levels. None of these last candidates fit well with this — with compartmentalization over even KSM’s or Hambali’s head.”

    • DXer said

      Years ago, in a manuscript “The Third Squad,” I compared Jdey and Adnan among the various other candidates.

      As to Adnan, I wrote:

      “Jafar the Pilot”

      It was after the “extremely virulent” anthrax was found in Kandahar that, a few days before Christmas 2003, the country returned to “orange” temporarily and brought in the New Year under high alert. Then, in late February 2004, Zawahiri promised another attack on the homeland was coming. This, perhaps overblown threat was embodied in the dimunitive Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah aka Jafar the Pilot.

      Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah was born on August 4, 1975, in Medina, Saudi Arabia to a 16-year-old mother and a 44-year-old Islamic scholar who had headed a mosque in Brooklyn. El-Shukrijumah’s father once translated for the blind sheik. At a trial of defendants charged with conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks in 1995. El-Shukrijumah’s father father appeared on behalf of Clement Hampton El, who was convicted of plotting to blow up the Holland tunnel and the United Nations. The father was the mentor of Bilal Philips who in turn was the mentor of GWU microbiology grad student of Ali Timimi. Adnan’s father had been sent to the Caribbean country of Trinidad and Tobago by the Saudi government as an Islamic missionary. The family lived there until 1983. When his father was transferred to New York City to lead a Brooklyn mosque, the family returned to Saudi Arabia.

      Brooklyn had long been important to the infrastructure in the US for obtaining jihadi recruits. Established in the mid-1980s by Egyptian Mustafa Rahman as a joint venture with Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Al-Kifah (or Struggle) Refugee Center in New York originally recruited and raised funds for Mujahedeen headed for Afghanistan. In Peshawar, the organization was headed by Mohammed Islambouli, the brother of Anwar Sadat’s assissin. In 1993, the group announced it was switching its operations to Bosnia. These “mujahideen” recruitment centers spread throughout the USA, to places such as Portland, Oregon, which opened a branch in October 1994 — and to Boston where Aafia Siddiqui attended Brandeis and MIT. In the mid-1990s, KSM and Islambouli were given safe haven in Doha, Qatar by the religious minister there. Mohammed Islambouli and his plan to attack using the aircraft and other means was the subject of a December 4, 1998 Presidential Daily Brief that the CIA provided President Clinton.

      In 1995, after Adnan had graduated from high school, his father retired from his missionary job as Imam in Brooklyn and the family to Florida, moving the family to Miramar in 1996. The modest retirement home was next door to a small mosque at which the father would preach. For the next two years, Adnan studied computer engineering at Broward Community College, though he did not get a degree. Imam at the mosque next door to his house and Adnan’s Dad often taught at other mosques. One of the mosques he and Adnan would frequent was in Fort Lauderdale — the one across from Franklin Park. It was there that Adnan met Jose Padilla, the ”enemy combatant” charged in connection with a plot to explode a radioactive bomb in the United States. Padilla was arrested en route to meet Adham Hassoun, another worshiper at the mosque.

      The former imam of that mosque, Awad, confirms El-Shukrijumah and Padilla knew each other. Adnan’s father counseled Padilla’s wife when he left to go to Egypt and she sought a divorce. (When the Padillas were divorced in 2001 Jose Padilla gave an address in Egypt.)

      Adnan was responsible at a young age, with his father absent in Brooklyn. The family acknowledges that Adnan had a quick temper. In 1999, Adnan held garage sales and car washes to raise money for Muslim refugees of the war in Bosnia. The fundraising supported Global Relief Fund, which the government has alleged funded terrorist organizations. In May 2001, he went to Saudi Arabia via Trinidad and Panama to sell Islamic goods and trinkets. He didn’t like the permissiveness of American society — he objected to scantily clad women. He wanted to get married. He allegedly was at one or more meetings in the Summer of 2001 in Pakistan at which KSM and Sufaat were present. After 9/11, the FBI began visiting the family home. His mother told him to stay away and not come home. ”I tell him we don’t want to know where he is.” She said the last she knew he was teaching English in Morocco and had gotten married.

      Adnan El Shukrijumah holds a green card but did not become a U.S. citizen. He wasa citizen of Guyana. Saudi Arabia is quite emphatic that he is not a citizen of Saudi Arabia. Officials say he uses a half-dozen aliases and passports, from such countries as Canada, Trinidad and Saudi Arabia.

      He was an an alleged associate of both Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, another key 9/11 plotter. George Tenet, former CIA Director, noted that Ramzi Yousef had a CBRN role. Apparently, Adnan Shukrijumah accompanied Mohammed Atta and another hijacker in visiting an INS office in Miami in May 2001. The INS employee is 75% sure it was him, having commented to a colleague at the time at how good looking the fellow was.

      The Special Branch Trinidad & Tobago Police said they have records that El Shukrijumah was in Trinidad in 2001 and 2002 into 2003. The Express was told: “We have records on him coming and leaving including the fact that he left on a BWIA flight for London in 2001 but on the last occasion he was here we only have records on him coming to Trinidad but none of him leaving.” El Shukrijumah has been associated with the Darul-Uloom Institute, an Islamic institute in Central Trinidad. Part of the problem is that El Shukrijumah has several passports including a Trinidad and Tobago passport and has in the past used several aliases to escape law enforcement agencies. He is known to have Guyanese links. The US authorities also report that he may have been in Canada in 2002 looking for nuclear material for a “dirty bomb.”

      In late May 2004, Jafar allegedly was spotted a Tegucigalpa Internet cafe. According to Honduras security official, he made phone calls to France and the United States. The witness, the owner of the cafe, says he was with two other men, “all badly dressed and bearded,” who spoke English and French. Security Minister Oscar Alvarez claimed Shukrijumah was involved in a plot to disrupt shipping in the Panama Canal.”

      Along with other candidates for mailing, I addressed Jdey.

      I wrote:

      “Was Jdey the Anthrax Mailer?”

      Two letters that have been declassified and posted in Fall 2007 describe his unhappiness living in the West. He seethed with resentment at his inability to find a proper job in Canada. Resenting the Western world, the Americans, the Jews, he found solace in the extremist ideology of al-Qaeda. The uploaded letters are part of the Harmony database maintained by the Combating Terrorism Center, a branch of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

      The first of the two posted letters is undated and addressed to fellow Muslims. Mr. Jdey railed about “the Jewish media” and the failure of Western-educated Arab politicians to lift their countries out of post-colonial poverty.

      “Thank Allah for saving me and guiding me on the right path.” “I found incomparable blessings and peace, especially after I joined jihad.”

      He complained of his difficulties in finding work. “When I arrived in Canada, I searched for work. I found many job opportunities, but the most important were closed. Others were dirty jobs reserved for immigrants.”

      “The social and economical life in North America is a jungle governed by ferocious beasts, represented by Jews and their allies.”

      The letter also says he enrolled in geology at the University of Quebec in Montreal although the FBI offering a $5 million reward once stated he studied biology.

      A second letter also addressed to his Muslim “brothers” is dated December 1999. Jdey wrote: “I pledged to Allah not to abandon the cause of jihad, and to sacrifice myself for the Almighty Allah.” Muslims have always been targeted by “the Jews, the Crusaders and their allies,” he wrote. “They meet in their laboratories (United Nations and black house of America [White House] and others), to cook their poisonous plans.” He quoted Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian-born cleric serving a life sentence in the United States for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bomb attack, urging other Muslims to attack Americans and their allies. “Destroy their economy, burn their companies, destroy their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their airplanes, kill them on the ground, on the sea and in the air.”

      Kenneth J. Dillon is a professional historian, retired foreign service officer, and former Department of State intelligence analyst. He currently works as a medical device entrepreneur, and he is writing a book about scientific detective work. He argues that Jdey was the anthrax mailer. With his permission, I’ll set forth his argument at length. HIs analysis has much to commend it.

      [I then quoted at length from Ken’s analysis from some years ago ] –

      “A top secret Canadian Security Intelligence Service report leaked on August 27, 2004 may provide the missing piece of evidence needed to identify the long elusive Anthrax Mailer.

      According to the article in Canada’s National Post, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a 22-year old Canadian, told interrogators that he had heard from an assistant of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, that the November 12, 2001 crash of American Airlines Flight #587 in New York was the result of an al Qaeda shoe bomb. The bomber was “Farouk the Tunisian”. Newspaper photographs showed him to be Abderraouf Jdey, a 36-year old Montreal-based Canadian of Tunisian origin.

      Jdey is one of the seven al Qaeda terrorists listed in the FBI’s plea for information from the public in May, 2004. He had emigrated to Canada in 1991, gained citizenship in 1995, and then travelled to Afghanistan where he trained as one of the ten substitutes for the 9/11 attackers. According to KSM, Jdey was slated for pilot training and was to be in the second wave of attacks. Jdey recorded a martyrdom statement in a video later found by American forces in Afghanistan. He returned to Montreal in summer 2001.

      A Theory of the Case

      Al Qaeda had a history of interest in biological weapons. There is evidence that the 9/11 attackers had anthrax in their possession during the months preceding September 11, 2001. They were evidently seeking a way to use a cropduster to spread anthrax over an American city. A medical doctor who treated a future hijacker for a skin lesion has stated that the lesion he treated was consistent with one caused by anthrax. A pharmacist reported to FBI that Mohamed Atta, leader of the 9/11 attacks, had sought a remedy for skin irritation on his hands, which were red from the wrists down. An accompanying fellow terrorist sought a remedy for a cough, and terrorist al-Shehhi was reported by a chiropracter who met him in the week before 9/11 to have had pustules on his face and arms, and to have been bending periodically in abdominal distress.

      If the 9/11 attackers possessed anthrax, they would have had to hand it off to another al Qaeda operative before September 11. Otherwise the precious vials of anthrax, the first and only weapon of mass destruction that al Qaeda had ever possessed, would have been wasted.

      But they wouldn’t necessarily trust just any al Qaeda operative to safeguard and perform with the anthrax, and perhaps they knew very few of al Qaeda’s sleepers in North America anyway. They would want to give the anthrax to an operative they knew and trusted, one who would use it to the best effect.

      Abderraouf Jdey appears to have been exactly such a person. He differed markedly from the nine other 9/11 substitutes. He was older, from a different country of origin, with Canadian citizenship, with semi-sleeper status, and with a clear designation as part of the second wave. He had trained in Afghanistan simultaneously with Mohamed Atta. He was well enough educated to have been slated for pilot training. In effect, Jdey can be viewed as the counterpart of Atta, as the leader of the second wave of al Qaeda attacks following 9/11.

      And he had studied biology at the University of Montreal in his late twenties. He was the only al Qaeda operative in North America known to have studied biology. [Note, in his letter he says he studied geology; maybe he studied both].

      So Jdey was the logical person for Atta to hand off the anthrax to. We can also identify the logical time and place for such a transfer to have occurred.

      An especially hard-to-explain anomaly in the hijackers’ story has been why Atta and a fellow hijacker travelled from Boston to Portland, Maine on September 10. Taking a feeder flight from Portland to Boston on the morning of September 11 caused Atta nearly to miss his connection, and he and his companion had to pass through security questioning twice rather than once–at a significant added risk of detection.

      So Atta must have had a reason to go to Portland that outweighed such risks. The most obvious explanation would be that he had an important meeting on a subject that required face-to-face contact, not just a veiled telephone conversation. A transaction with someone coming from the North, arranged for outside of Boston to lessen the risk of surveillance.

      Clearly, Jdey would be a very likely “someone”, and handing over the vials of anthrax would furnish a compelling reason for their otherwise risky meeting. This Portland meeting could also explain the anomaly that the anthrax came in two varieties, one much more sophisticated than the other: these were the two varieties that al Qaeda had acquired from someone who had diverted them at different stages of development from the clandestine national program of a foreign country.

      More Anomalies Resolved

      If Jdey indeed was the recipient of vials of anthrax in Portland, then subsequent events could have followed this course:

      While the 9/11 hijackers had sought access to a cropduster to spread the anthrax over an American city, Jdey presumably saw that receiving training at an American flight school was not in the cards after 9/11. So he had to resort to another method of distributing the anthrax. (Another, perhaps more telling explanation is that it was Atta who had the idea of mailing letters and who provided Jdey with a mailing list of targets. Seeking revenge against specific individuals and organizations seems to have been a very characteristic personality trait of Atta.)

      Jdey decided to mail the anthrax. The first mailings took place in September soon after the 9/11 attacks. The second mailings, to Senators Daschle and Leahy, occurred in October and included ultrahigh-quality anthrax. Driving (or taking a train) hundreds of miles from Montreal to Trenton to mail the letters made sense because it perfectly disguised Jdey’s Canadian base. The presumed trip to Portland indicates that such a long drive to reduce the likelihood of surveillance was a modus operandi of Jdey.

      The anthrax letters do not show any obvious Gallicisms that would betray that they were from a fluent French-speaker, which Jdey presumably was. But they are consistent with a person who has acquired English as a second language, and there is nothing in them that is inconsistent with Jdey as author. In fact, Jdey is a very plausible author of the anthrax letters.

      One of the main characteristics or anomalies of the Anthrax Mailer case has been how remarkably elusive the Mailer was both during his period of activity in autumn, 2001 and thereafter. Despite a massive FBI investigation backed by hundreds of thousands of tips from the American public, the Mailer has succeeded in hiding his tracks. Being based in Canada, contrary to every expectation, would nicely explain his elusiveness during his period of activity.

      The recently leaked Canadian intelligence report from 2002 provides a plausible explanation for the lack of information about Jdey’s whereabouts since then (as well as for the cessation of the anthrax mailings): Jdey committed suicide on Flight #587 on November 12, 2001.

      Why might Jdey be a likely candidate to do this, quite aside from the Jabarah account?

      If he was indeed the Anthrax Mailer, he was a hard-headed man of action. Instead of dreaming about impractical schemes of sowing the anthrax in the skies above a city, he realized that he had to use it before being captured. And in a way (mailing letters) that would minimize the possibility of arrest, which would keep him from fulfilling his pledge to commit suicide in an attack on the enemy. This tactic also enabled him to target the hated Senator Leahy, author of the legislation permitting “renditions” of suspected terrorists to their countries of origin, where they were subjected to torture. (These considerations explain the third anomaly–that al Qaeda would use its first weapon of mass destruction in a manner unlikely to cause mass casualties.)”

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      NOTE:

      On April 20, 2005, the U.S. Government announced a new reward of up to $5 million for information on Jdey.”

      It is not clear Jdey had formal training in biology and there is no indication he had any type of lab-type job. He arrived in Canada in 1991. In a letter he explains that before coming to Canada, he earned a degree in technological architectural engineering and worked in the architectural engineering sector. He apparently only was able to find menial jobs. He then enrolled in the University of Quebec in Montreal to study geology, receiving a degree in physiography after 4 years.

      His correspondence reveals him to be a supporter of blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. In 1999, he writes:

      “I remind you, my brothers, with the advice of our father ‘Omar ‘Abd Al-Rahman (may Allah release him from his capture), about the Americans and their allies. ‘Sever the bond of their assault, tear them to pieces, destroy their economy, burn their companies, destroy their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their airplanes, kill them on the ground, on the sea and in the air (kill them wherever you find them, take them, encircle them and ambush them anywhere you can). Fight those infidels (let them find harshness in you), (fight them, and Allah will punish them with your hands, disgrace them, help you to be victorious over them, heal the breasts of the believers and still the indignation of their hearts, for Allah will turn (in mercy).”

    • DXer said

      In the post I wrote years ago where I discounted Jdey as a candidate because he was connected close enough to the very highest levels of Al Qaeda, wasn’t I wrong? His martyrdom video was found in the rubble Atef’s house for crying out loud. Ayman Zawahiri reported UP the foodchain to Atef on the anthrax program. Thus, it would seem that Jdey also knew Atef in 2001, which looks pretty good on an operative’s resume. The feds started looking for Jdey hard in January 2002.

      “Feds on Lookout for Suspected Terrorist
      July 31

      The FBI has renewed a notice to law enforcement to be on the lookout for suspected terrorist Abderraouf Jdey, a native Tunisian and citizen of Canada.

      The bureau decided to reissue a “be on the lookout,” or BOLO, notice Wednesday for Jdey, who is known to use several aliases.

      It was unclear why the FBI decided to reissue the BOLO now.

      The FBI first told law enforcement to look for Jdey in January 2002, when he was identified as one of five individuals Attorney General John Ashcroft said delivered “martyrdom messages” on videotape, and who were possibly “prepared to commit future suicide terrorist acts.”

      Ashcroft said the five videotapes were found near Kabul, in the rubble of the home of Mohammad Atef, Osama bin Laden’s military chief. Officials believe Atef was killed by a U.S. airstrike in November 2001.

      ‘Extremely Dangerous’

      Jdey was born in Tunisia and arrived in Canada in 1991, obtaining Canadian citizenship in October 1995. His last known address was in Montreal.

      According to one source, the BOLO notice says that, “Jdey should be considered extremely dangerous.”

      In January 2002, the FBI identified Jdey as Al Rauf Bin al Habib Bin Yousef al-Jiddi. Jdey also is said to have used the names Abderraouf Dey, A. Raouf Jdey, Abderraouf Ben Habib Jeday, Abdal Ra’of Bin Muhummed Bin Yousef al-Jadi, and Farouq al-Tunisi. ABCNEWS’ Jason Ryan in Washington contributed to this report.”

  3. DXer said

    Although I favor Adnan El-Shukrijumah as the mailer of the Fall 2001 anthrax letters — and not Jdey — there is no denying that Jdey was part of the planes operation, in touch with the anthrax planners, operational, and disappeared in Fall 2001 from Montreal. The $5 million BOLO was issued jointly for both of them in the Spring of 2003.

    Will the FBI produce long withheld documents about DXer’s anthrax mailing suspect Adnan El-Shukrijumah?
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on April 19, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/will-the-fbi-produce-long-withheld-documents-about-dxers-anthrax-mailing-suspect-adnan-el-shukrijumah/

    In February 2003, the FBI announced that “Jafar the Pilot” (aka Adnan El-Shukrijumah) had entered the country sometime after September 1, 2001
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on September 26, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/09/26/in-february-2003-the-fbi-announced-that-jafar-the-pilot-aka-adnan-el-shukrijumah-had-entered-the-country-sometime-after-september-1-2001/

    Al Hawsawi, who had the anthrax processing documents scanned on his laptop, was closely affiliated with Adnan El-Shukrijumah
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on September 22, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/09/22/al-hawsawi-who-had-the-anthrax-processing-documents-scanned-on-his-laptop-was-closely-affiliated-with-adnan-el-shukrijumah/

    DXer says: Adnan El-Shukrijumah is the anthrax mailer … on or about 9/13/2001, he phoned from KSM’s house to tell his mom he was coming to the US
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on June 6, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/dxer-adnan-el-shukrijumah-is-the-anthrax-mailer-on-9132001-he-phoned-from-ksms-house-to-tell-his-mom-he-was-coming-to-the-us/
    [his mom says he was calling from Trinidad]

    So while El-Shukrijumah is my first choice because he traveled from Kandahar at the time — leaving from the house Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat would stay and from where the vaccinated Yazid Sufaat and assistants had their anthrax lab — Jdey is my second choice.

    The FBI, based on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, says Shukrijumah travelled sometime after September 1, 2001. Shukrijumah was back in Karachi by February 2002, staying with Hawsawi. Hawsawi, KSM’s assistant, had the anthrax processing documents on his laptop. The FBI learned of Shukrijumah’s travel, I believe, from the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah (captured in March 2002) who I believe knew Shukrijumah by an alias on fake travel documents.

    When Professor Dillon first told me the theory a decade ago, however, I thought to myself: “Damn, why didn’t I think of that. It was right there in front of me and I hadn’t noticed.”

    When the background facts of Shukrijumah and Jdey is understood — including the connections to the Brooklyn Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman and hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Mihdhar — the strong need for greater disclosure can better be understood.

    The FBI kept documents from the “Joint Inquiry” and the 911 Commission. Put simply, the public has a right to know.

    By way of another example, if the US is ever attacked with anthrax in another 911, the senior DOJ civil attorneys who failed to preserve the full depositions in Hatfill v. US that they personally defended can be asked whether they really played hide the ball for institutional CYA reasons, just using “national security” and sloppy record-keeping as a cover. A sworn depositions is part of “agency record” under DOJ rules and must be preserved. If only I had such expert counsel as this counsel below in obtaining the full depositions from Hatfill v. US. For him, it would be shooting fish in a barrel.

    Here is the brief filed yesterday. Any formatting errors are mine due to posting on the blog. Five links have been omitted because of a blog limitation ; Lew often is occupied and I try to avoid imposing on him more than I do.

    * Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00532 (RBW)
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 1 of 23
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    KENNETH J. DILLON, * * Plaintiff, * *
    * DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, * * Defendant. * *
    *************
    PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

    Plaintiff Kenneth Dillon (“Dillon”) brought this case against Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)1 failed to properly process his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for records about Zacarias Moussaoui (“Moussaoui”) and Abderraouf Jdey (“Jdey”). (1st Am. Compl., Dkt. #16, ¶¶ 7, 17 (filed Aug. 9, 2013).)2 On 24 July 2014, FBI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, the Court should deny FBI’s Motion or, in the alternative, allow Dillon to conduct discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

    1 Because all counts pertain to FBI, it will be treated as the “Defendant” in this brief to avoid confusion, even though DOJ is legally the only proper party defendant.
    2 Dillon’s First Amended Complaint was actually first filed on 5 July 2013 as an attachment to a motion seeking leave to file it. The Court granted that motion on 9 August 2013.

    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 2 of 23

    Moussaoui and Jdey

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    On 16 August 2001, Moussaoui was arrested in Minneapolis by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) at the request of the FBI Minneapolis Field Office. (See Electronic Communication of 8/18/01 at 6 [hereinafter 8/18/01 EC], attached as Ex. A.) Following his arrest, his possessions, including a laptop computer, were seized and placed in INS storage. (See Memo of 8/24/01 at 3 [hereinafter 8/24/01 Memo], attached as Ex. B.) On 11 September 2001, his laptop and an accompanying floppy disk were searched and inventoried pursuant to a warrant. (See Memo of 12/17/01 at 1-2 [hereinafter 12/17/01 Memo], attached as Ex. C.) The floppy disk contained a manual entitled “Category 11 Applicator Training Manual for AERIAL APPLICATION OF PESTICIDES” (the “Cropdusting Manual”) (See id. at 2.)
    This manual was explicitly included in a list of materials found in his possession in the indictment returned by a grand jury on 11 December 2001. Indictment, Dkt. #1, ¶ 73 (filed Dec. 11, 2001), United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va.), available at [ link omitted] (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014). For unknown reasons, the Cropdusting Manual was removed from the list of materials found in his possession in the superseding indictment. See Superseding Indictment, Dkt. #199, ¶ 71 (filed June 19, 2002), Moussaoui, available at [link omitted] (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014).
    According to former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) senior official Rolf Mowatt- Larssen, Jdey was also detained in the summer of 2001. See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? at 16 (January 2010), available at [link omitted] (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014).
    2
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 3 of 23
    Mr. Mowatt-Larssen did not explicitly state that Jdey was detained at the same time or in the same place as Moussaoui, only that he was detained and that he had biology textbooks in his possession.3 See id. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s paper is the only publicly-available document which references the detention of Jdey, but its specificity and accuracy on other matters, coupled with the author’s impressive credentials,4 should entitle it to a degree of deference by the Court sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Discovery may be appropriate to ascertain the accuracy of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s assertions.
    The First Request
    On 17 July 2011, operating under the false assumption that Jdey and Moussaoui were detained together on 16 August 2001, Dillon filed a FOIA request for documents “related to the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui and detention of Abderraouf Jdey, both al Qaeda operatives, in Minnesota on August 16, 2001.” (See 2d Hardy Decl., Ex. A, Dkt. #28-2 (filed Sept. 8, 2014).) This request specifically requested:
    (1) A full internal report on the arrest/detention. Minimally responsive to this request would be a complete list of the items in the possession of the two men, including the computer disk containing information about crop dusting reportedly in Moussaoui’s possession but not included in the list of items the Department of Justice provided to the court in Moussaoui’s trial; and the entire text on Abderraouf Jdey.
    3 Mr. Mowatt-Larssen has recently confirmed to the undersigned that his statement could be read to mean that Jdey was detained at a different location and different time.
    4 “Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen served over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. Prior to this, he served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various domestic and international posts, to include Chief of the Europe Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counterterrorist Center, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. . . . He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, the George W. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Superior Performance Medal, among others.” Id. at 29.
    3
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    (2) The report of the arrest/detention that was sent to the intelligence community.
    (3) Any other records related to the August 16, 2001 detention of Abderraouf Jdey.
    (2d Hardy Decl., Dkt. #27-2, ¶ 6 (filed July 24, 2014).) On 5 July 2013, before FBI completed its search,5 Dillon clarified the scope of this
    request, by informing FBI’s counsel:
    You may inform your client that Mr. Dillon restricts the scope of Request No. 1170856 to the following records:
    1) All records documenting the items found in the possession of Zacarias Moussaoui on 16-17 August 2001.
    2) All records pertaining to the August 2001 detention which reference cropdusting, cropdusters, or biological or chemical terrorism. This will also include records pertaining to the decision to remove references to cropdusting from the superseding indictment. . . .
    The FBI should perform a CRS search, including cross-references, as well as a search of all records systems, shared drives, and email systems used by the Minneapolis Field Office and FBI Headquarters which are not incorporated into CRS. . . . A simple search of CRS will not be adequate for [this] request, nor will a search which does not include cross-references.
    (Email from McClanahan to Braswell of July 5, 2013, included in Ex. E.) By sending this email, Dillon modified the request in the following five ways:
    • He effectively removed records about Jdey from this request, limiting it to records about Moussaoui.
    • He clarified that the previous request for “a full internal FBI report” was not simply for a single document, but for all records about Moussaoui’s arrest.
    5 “After OIP’s remand, the FBI conducted another search of the CRS, on or about August 1, 2013 . . . .” (Id. ¶ 31.)
    4
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 5 of 23
    • He then limited the scope of the universe of responsive records about Moussaoui to two categories: (a) records documenting the materials found in his possession; and (b) records pertaining to his arrest referencing cropdusting or biological or chemical terrorism.6
    • He specifically singled out records about the decision to remove references to the Cropdusting Manual from the superseding indictment as responsive.
    • He specifically directed FBI to search not only the Central Records System (“CRS”) but also to search “all records systems, shared drives, and email systems used by the Minneapolis Field Office and FBI Headquarters which are not incorporated into CRS.”
    When FBI performed its search, it performed two searches: 1) an automated search of CRS for Moussaoui’s name, limited to main file records (as opposed to cross-references) and apparently limited to records including the 16 August 2001 arrest date (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 31); and 2) a text search of CRS using Moussaoui’s name paired with various other terms, such as “pesticide,” “chemical terrorism,” and “cropdusting” (id.). It also contacted an FBI special agent “with first-hand knowledge of the Moussaoui investigation” (id.) and asked for assistance locating specific records (treating Dillon’s request as a request for individual records and apparently ignoring the 5 July 2013 clarification), and the special agent provided some records (from an unknown records system) and referred to others located in CRS. (Id.) Lastly, FBI appears to have performed a search of several records systems listed in an email sent to its
    6 He clarified in a followup email that FBI should use the keyword “pesticide” as well since that was the word used in the indictment. (Email from McClanahan to Braswell of July 8, 2013, attached as Ex. E.)
    5
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    counsel on 8 January 2014, apparently based on a misconception that that message applied to “Moussaoui and Jdey” (id. at 13 n.10), even though that message was limited to only the second request for records about Jdey (see Email from McClanahan to Braswell of Jan. 8, 2014 (referring to “the Jdey request”), attached as Ex. F). While this final search did fill in some of the holes in FBI’s previous searches, it still did not encompass many of the systems (especially shared drives and email systems) referenced in Dillon’s 5 July 2013 email, nor is it clear whether the CRS text search or this final search were limited to records which explicitly reference the 16 August 2001 arrest date. Most notably, it failed to locate any records created after 27 December 2001, even though any records discussing the decision to remove the Cropdusting Manual from the superseding indictment would not be created until 2002.7
    The Second Request
    On 30 March 2012, Dillon filed a FOIA request for “the entire file on al Qaeda operative Abderraouf Jdey.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 15.) After initially refusing to conduct a search, FBI then conducted a search of CRS for responsive records between 31 May 2013 and 5 June 2013. (Id. ¶ 33.) FBI identified a main file record and several cross-reference records, all of which it claimed were exempt under Exemption (b)(7)(A). (Id.) It subsequently searched other records systems for responsive records in response to Dillon’s 8 January 2014 message (Ex. F), and, although it does not claim that it searched email systems (see 2d Hardy Decl. at 13 n.10), it does state that email records were located and processed (id. ¶ 79(n)).
    7 In fact, FBI identified no records mentioning even the first indictment, even though that indictment (and therefore at least some or the records or correspondence discussing it) explicitly discusses all of the topics responsive to this request. The absence of these records speaks volumes about the inadequacy of a search which does not include emails or records not indexed in CRS.
    6
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 7 of 23
    On 4 March 2014, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, FBI provided Dillon with a draft declaration explaining its searches and withholdings. This draft included the following statements regarding Jdey’s alleged detention, stating:
    • “The FBI was unable to locate any records on the August 16, 2001 arrest of Jdey.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 32 (emphasis added).)8
    • “Plaintiff theorizes that Jdey was arrested in Minnesota on August 16, 2001, alongside Moussaoui . . . . The FBI located no information confirming Plaintiff’s averments.” (Id. at 13 n.9 (emphasis added).)
    • “The FBI was unable to locate any records on the August 16, 2001 arrest of Abderraouf Jdey.” (Id. at 17 n.15 (emphasis added).)
    In response to this draft declaration, the undersigned attempted on 22 April 2014 to confirm that FBI had identified no records confirming that Jdey had been detained at all, asking FBI’s counsel to please address that issue in the filed declaration. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 4/22/14 at 1:54 AM, included in Ex. G.) In a followup email sent later that day, the undersigned further clarified that, according to Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, Jdey was only detained, not arrested. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 4/22/14 at 3:42 AM, included in Ex. G.) On 24 July 2014, FBI filed the 2d Hardy Declaration, which included none of the requested clarifications, and stated in its brief, “Although the FBI located records pertaining to Jdey, none concerned any arrest on August 16, 2001.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. #27, at 6-7 (filed July 24, 2014) (emphasis added) [hereinafter FBI’s Mem.].) The
    8 The language used in the draft declaration is identical to the 2d Hardy Declaration in these instances, so citations are made to the filed version.
    7
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    undersigned again requested clarification on this point from FBI on 6 September 2014 and 25 September 2014. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 9/25/14, included in Ex. G.)
    On 26 September 2014, FBI confirmed that its search for records responsive to Dillon’s second request would have identified any records of an arrest or detention. (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 9/26/14, included in Ex. G.) However, when the undersigned sought confirmation that FBI had located no information about any detention of Jdey, FBI refused to clarify the point, only repeating that it had “located no information that would indicate that Jdey was arrested or detained alongside Moussaoui.” (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 9/30/14 (emphasis added), included in Ex. G.) It is therefore unknown if FBI located records confirming that Jdey was detained at a different location or time.
    There is also a question of fact regarding whether Jdey is currently alive or dead. Dillon maintains that Jdey was killed in a plane crash on 12 November 2001, based on a news story from 2004 quoting a Canadian intelligence report. See Stewart Bell, Montreal Man Downed U.S. Plane, CSIS Told, National Post (Aug. 27, 2004), attached as Ex. H.9 FBI maintains that he is alive and that it has found no records confirming his death (2d Hardy Decl. at 13 n.9), although it admits that its search was incomplete because it could not locate some files (id. at 14 n.14). This is likely a moot point, given FBI’s position that even if he were dead, all the files about him would remain exempt because of other ongoing terrorism investigations (Ex. G at 2), but the dispute is still worth noting. Dillon will not address the legal ramifications of Jdey’s possible death in this brief, but if the Court believes that this issue is probative, Dillon requests an opportunity to conduct appropriate discovery and brief the matter fully.
    9 Ex. H is a copy of the text of this story from another Internet source, as the original story is no longer available on the National Post website.
    8
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    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    FBI does not expressly discuss the statutory background and standard of review in a separate section, instead limiting its discussion of underlying principles to the adequacy of the search (FBI’s Mem. at 3-5) and then addressing specific exemptions separately. While FBI has not actively misrepresented any of the cases it cites in the search discussion, it has creatively styled them to imply something that they do not. Then, it has completely overlooked some of the underlying principles of withholdings, choosing instead to discuss exemption-specific issues in hopes that the Court will not examine the question of whether or not exemptions even apply too closely.
    First, FBI states that “FOIA does not require that an agency search every division or field office on its own initiative in response to a FOIA request when responsive documents are likely to be located in one place.” (Id. at 4-5 (citing Kowalczyk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) and Marks v. DOJ, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978)).) However, this statement, while technically accurate (albeit barely so in the case of the last element), is only correct because of many precise terms. FOIA does not require that an agency search 1) every division or field office 2) on its own initiative in response to a FOIA request when responsive documents are 3) likely to be located in only one place.
    The first clause speaks to how many places an agency must search. It is axiomatic that an agency does not have to search every division or field office, but that does not mean that it does not have to search any. “While there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, the agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Jefferson v. DOJ, 168 F. App’x 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (quoting Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920
    9
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    F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). See also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that “the government is not required to search only the files of the . . . custodians who are ‘most likely’ to have responsive records; it must also search other locations that are reasonably likely to contain records”) (citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68).
    The second clause, even assuming arguendo that the first is accurate, is similarly misleading. A holding that an agency does not have to search multiple locations or systems on its own initiative is a far cry from a holding that it does not have to search them when specifically directed to by the requester while the search is still ongoing. See, e.g., Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n most cases, the FBI need not conduct ELSUR . . . searches when the FOIA requester does not expressly ask it to do so.”) (emphasis added). An agency may not “ignore what it cannot help but know” when faced with “a lead so apparent that the [agency] cannot in good faith fail to pursue it.” Kowalczyk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As apparent leads go, an express clarification from the requester that he wants a particular location to be searched is about as apparent as it gets.
    The third clause ties into the first and disguises FBI’s actual position, namely, that it does not have to conduct a search of all locations and systems reasonably likely to contain responsive records, it only has to conduct a search of locations and systems it determines to be most likely to contain responsive records. This position stands in stark contrast to the controlling case law. See Jefferson, 168 F. App’x at 450 (“While there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, the agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.”) (internal quotation and alteration omitted); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (holding that “the government is not
    10
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    required to search only the files of the . . . custodians who are ‘most likely’ to have responsive records; it must also search other locations that are reasonably likely to contain records”).
    Regarding FBI’s second misleading assertion, it quotes, “Failure to turn up [a specified] document does not alone render a search inadequate.” (FBI’s Mem. at 5 (quoting Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).) More recently, the D.C. Circuit rephrased this idea: “[F]ailure to turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents might exist, does not [by itself] undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search for the records.” Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). However, this does not mean that a court cannot find an agency’s search to be inadequate based in part on its failure to locate certain records. “[E]vidence that relevant records have not been released may shed light on whether the agency’s search was indeed inadequate.” Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (adding that “there may be times when an agency’s inability to retrieve documents known or thought to be in its files is inherently unbelievable”). In other words, not all “claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents” are “purely speculative.” Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For instance, “[w]here specific records . . . are referenced in [agency] documents, it is no longer ‘mere speculation’ that the files exist.” Hall v. CIA, 881 F. Supp. 2d 38, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2012).
    With respect to the burden facing an agency to demonstrate that information is exempt, “An agency cannot meet its statutory burden of justification by conclusory allegations of possible harm. It must show by specific and detailed proof that disclosure would defeat, rather than further, the purposes of FOIA.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977). “An affidavit that contains merely a ‘categorical description of
    11
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    redacted material coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences of disclosure is clearly inadequate.’” PHE, Inc. v. DOJ, 983 F.2d 248, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “[T]he affidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption. The affidavits will not suffice if the agency’s claims are conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping.” Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted). “The [D.C.] Circuit, though expressly disclaiming any attempt to provide ‘an encompassing definition of conclusory assertions,’ noted that ‘it is enough that where no factual support is provided for an essential element of the claimed privilege or shield, the label conclusory is surely apt.’” Jarvik v. CIA, 741 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Senate of P.R. v. DOJ, 823 F.2d 574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
    Additionally, it is well-established that publicly-known information cannot be withheld pursuant to an otherwise valid exemption claim. Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Muslim Advocates v. DOJ, 833 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D.D.C. 2011) (listing cases regarding different exemptions). However, “a plaintiff asserting a claim of prior disclosure must bear the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld.” Id. This Circuit established three criteria for an item to be “officially acknowledged”:
    First, the information requested must be as specific as the information previously released. Second, the information requested must match the information previously disclosed; we noted, for example, that official disclosure did not waive the protection to be accorded information that pertained to a later time period. Third, we held that the information requested must already have been made public through an official and documented disclosure.
    Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990), citing Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133. 12
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 13 of 23
    ARGUMENT
    FBI’s response to Dillon’s requests is insufficient in three areas. First, it performed inadequate searches in both requests. Second, it withheld information from the first request which was not properly exempt. Third, it withheld information from the second request which was not properly exempt.
    As an initial matter, it is important to clarify the scope of Dillon’s challenges. In the interest of judicial economy, Dillon elects not to challenge many aspects of FBI’s argument, although this is not a concession regarding the legal validity of those positions. He is simply limiting the controversy to the records in which he is most interested. Accordingly, this brief is limited to the following challenges:
    • FBI’s failure to search email systems for responsive records about Moussaoui not indexed in CRS;
    • FBI’s failure to search the Minneapolis Field Office or other offices for responsive records not indexed in CRS;
    • FBI’s apparent limitation of the first request to records explicitly mentioning the 16 August 2001 arrest date;
    • FBI’s failure to search for and process records about the Moussaoui indictments; • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(D) to withhold information from pages
    Dillon-6 and Dillon-90; • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(E) to withhold information from pages
    Dillon-8, Dillon-9, Dillon-11, Dillon-18, and Dillon-19;
    13
    I.
    • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(A) to withhold information that Jdey or other targets of investigations would already know (limited to the types of records described in paragraphs 84-88); and
    • FBI’s conclusory invocations of Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(E) to withhold an indeterminate amount of information from the second request.
    FBI CONDUCTED INADEQUATE SEARCHES
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 14 of 23
    Instead of performing adequate searches reasonably designed to yield responsive records, FBI instead unreasonably limited the scope of its searches and apparently construed the requests significantly more narrowly than Dillon intended.
    A. FBI’S FAILURE TO SEARCH EMAIL SYSTEMS WAS UNREASONABLE
    Agencies have a duty to construe the subject material of FOIA requests liberally to ensure responsive records are not overlooked. See Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890. An agency may not “read [a] request so strictly that the requester is denied information the agency well knows exists in its files, albeit in a different form from that anticipated by the requester.” Hemenway v. Hughes, 601 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (D.D.C. 1985). “[A]ll federal agencies should go as far as they reasonably can to ensure that they include what requesters want to have included within the scopes of their FOIA requests.” DOJ, Office of Information and Privacy, OIP Guidance: Determining the Scope of a FOIA Request, FOIA Update, Vol. XVI, No. 3, at 4 (1995). See also Amnesty Int’l USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting CIA’s argument that its search for records about the “attention shake” interrogation technique was adequate because it located no records due to the technique being called the “attention grasp”).
    14
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    As stated above, an agency “cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Jefferson, 168 F. App’x at 450 (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68). While FBI may argue that it did not limit its search to only one record system, it does not and cannot argue that it searched all records systems which are reasonably likely to contain records. Instead, it implies that it does not have to search its email systems because it determined that they were less likely (not unlikely) to contain responsive records. This position, though, is without merit.
    Even assuming arguendo that FBI would not be required to search its email systems on its own initiative for records about one of the Minneapolis Field Offices (and, in fact, FBI’s) most famous cases, FBI’s argument would still not bear up to close scrutiny, since Dillon specifically and unequivocally instructed FBI to search its email systems for responsive records. (See Ex. E.) FBI may take issue with the fact that this direction was not in the original request, but it does not and cannot argue that Dillon provided this scope clarification to it after it completed its search. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 31 (admitting that FBI did not begin, let alone complete, its final search until almost a month after it received this instruction).) In fact, shortly after Dillon sent this message, FBI informed the Court that it took issue with the modifications to the request, arguing that Dillon’s email “change[d] and expand[ed] the scope of the FBI’s search” and promising that it would defend its position in its dispositive motion. (See Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl., Dkt. #15 (filed July 19, 2013).) Despite this promise, neither FBI’s declaration nor its dispositive motion even mentions a) Dillon’s 5 July 2013 email; b) shared drives; c) Minneapolis; or d) emails (with one inapposite exception).10 In other words,
    10 Emails are listed among the types of records withheld from the second request, but not the first. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 79(n).)
    15
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    after receiving an email clearly clarifying that Dillon intended for email systems to be searched for responsive records, FBI:
    1. Publicly stated that the email changed its understanding of the scope of the request;
    2. Performed a new search ignoring the modified scope; and then 3. Neglected to even mention to the Court in its dispositive motion that it had
    received the email. This is not the behavior of an agency committed to performing a good faith search reasonably calculated to locate responsive records. It is the behavior of an agency seeking a litigation advantage to avoid conducting a search it does not want to perform.
    B. FBI OTHERWISE UNREASONABLY RESTRICTED ITS SEARCH
    For the same reason that FBI’s failure to search email systems cannot pass close scrutiny, its failure to search any other offices or systems for records not indexed in CRS (such as files stored on shared drives or local computers) must similarly fail. The Moussaoui case was one of the biggest cases of the year in 2001, and at the time there were serious concerns in and out of the Government about his interest in pesticides and cropdusting. See Indictment ¶¶ 17, 53, 73 (mentioning pesticides three separate times), Moussaoui. Despite this concern, FBI weakly asserts that it only possesses one document—Ex. C—discussing Moussaoui’s possession of the Cropdusting Manual. This glaring omission indicates the presence of one of two problems, neither of which are justifiable under FOIA:
    1. Responsive records are not indexed in CRS, and FBI did not search the appropriate offices and/or systems to locate them; or
    16
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    2. Responsive records are indexed in CRS, but FBI did not locate them because it narrowly interpreted the temporal scope of the request.
    For all the reasons previously discussed, neither of these two scenarios warrants a finding that FBI conducted an adequate search. Either scenario involves an arbitrary limitation on the scope of the search, either in limiting the offices and records systems to be searched or in discarding responsive records that do not fall within a narrow date range.11 Moreover, either scenario would explain why no records of the modifications made to the superseding indictment were located, a clear lead that the agency cannot help but follow, given Dillon’s clearly expressed interest in such information. This response is the opposite of a liberal construction of the request and smacks of “read[ing] [a] request so strictly that the requester is denied information the agency well knows exists in its files, albeit in a different form from that anticipated by the requester.” Hemenway, 601 F. Supp. at 1005.12
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny FBI summary judgment on the adequacy of its searches.
    II. FBI IMPROPERLY WITHHELD INFORMATION ABOUT MOUSSAOUI
    As noted above, Dillon only challenges select exemptions on seven pages responsive to the first request.
    11 The fact that responsive records exist which are not indexed in CRS is plainly demonstrated by the fact that the special agent consulted on this request provided some of them to the FOIA office. In response to this evidence that a CRS search would not be sufficient, FBI should have asked the special agent where those records were located and then searched there.
    12 For similar reasons, the Court should not grant summary judgment regarding the adequacy of FBI’s search for records about Jdey until it learns more about the locations and records systems searched. Because FBI has withheld all information about Jdey (including the number of responsive records), the Court has no way to consider the universe of responsive records in its determination of the completeness of the search.
    17
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    A. EXEMPTION (B)(7)(D)
    FBI withheld information pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(D) on two pages: Dillon-6 (included in Ex. A) and Dillon-90 (included in Ex. B). It justifies both of these withholdings simply by asserting that sources in national security investigations like to remain confidential (see 2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 73). FBI does not attempt to claim that any source allegedly implicated by this information ever requested confidentiality or even showed an interest in it. In fact, absolutely nothing is said about the sources at all; FBI rests its entire argument on the conclusory assertion that every person it interviews in a national security investigation has an implied assurance of confidentiality. (See FBI’s Mem. at 33 (“With respect to investigations of terrorism and national security investigations, the circumstances in which they gave information demonstrates an implied promise of confidentiality.”).)
    Besides being wholly conclusory, this assertion does not match the context of Dillon-6. That page reads, “Pursuant to this, physical surveillance (FISUR) of the Subaru sedan was initiated and [redacted].” (Ex. A at 6.) No mention is made of any source, confidential or otherwise, in the preceding or following paragraphs, and this paragraph appears to simply relate to the results of the surveillance. Such information is not protected by Exemption (b)(7)(D).
    Simply put, FBI has failed to satisfy its burden of proof regarding these withholdings. As another example, Dillon-90 refers to each of the two alleged confidential sources as “a reliable source” (Ex. B at 5), but FBI only claims that each of these sources provided information pursuant to an implied assurance of confidentiality. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 73.) This discrepancy
    18
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    raises the question, if these are sources with whom FBI regularly deals, why was there not an express assurance of confidentiality?13
    B. EXEMPTION (B)(7)(E)
    While FBI’s declaration only asserts Exemption (b)(7)(E) in general for any information withheld from the Moussaoui documents (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 76), FBI subsequently clarified its withholdings by placing each withholding within one of five categories described elsewhere in the context of the Jdey documents. (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 10/1/14, attached as Ex. I.) Accordingly, Dillon then limited his challenge to just the five withholdings identified as “Database Information and/or Printouts.” (See 2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 188; see also Ex. A at 8, 9, 11, 18, 19 (withholdings).)
    These withholdings fail for the same reason as the Exemption (b)(7)(D) invocations; FBI simply has not met its burden to justify them in a non-conclusory fashion. FBI simply argues that these are “database search results located through non-public databases,” while admitting that “local, state, and other federal agencies have access to these databases.” (Id.) According to FBI, the mere fact that these databases are non-public (even though it appears that a large selection of government employees at every level of government has access) by itself renders any search results exempt as “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E).
    There are two major problems with FBI’s position. First, Exemption (b)(7)(E) may only be used to withhold techniques and procedures unknown to the public. See, e.g., Albuquerque Publ’g Co. v. DOJ, 726 F. Supp. 851, 858 (D.D.C. 1989) (ordering agency to explain further why
    13 Exemption (b)(7)(D) was also asserted on page Dillon-83 (Ex. D at 1) to protect the actual identities of these two sources. Dillon chose not to challenge that assertion simply because he
    19
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 20 of 23
    certain techniques are considered unknown to the public); Jaffe v. CIA, 573 F. Supp. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1983) (exemption applies to information regarding “obscure or secret techniques”); Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1082-83 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (exemption is to be applied only to techniques and procedures generally unknown to the public and, absent any explanation from the government, court would not assume that disclosure would result in revelation of investigative techniques which were so unique as to warrant exemption). This case raises the question, exactly how many people can know about something before it is considered “known to the public?” FBI has not explained how a database used by an unknown number of persons, many of which are not part of the federal Government, can still be considered “non-public,” and until it does, the Court cannot simply assume that the database is unique enough to warrant exemption.
    FBI’s withholding also brings this case squarely into an unsettled area of FOIA law, namely, whether “techniques and procedures” require a showing that “disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). FBI grandly argues that no such showing is necessary, implying that this is a settled matter. (FBI’s Mem. at 35.) In making this argument, FBI blithely ignores the wealth of case law holding exactly the opposite. While FBI is correct that many courts in this Circuit and others have held that the requirement that “disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law” applies only to guidelines, many other courts in this Circuit and others have held that this requirement applies to techniques and procedures as well. See generally DOJ, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 7(E) at 1-5 (Apr. 23, 2013), at [link omitted] (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014)
    has no interest in their identities, not because he believes they are legitimately withheld. 20
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 21 of 23
    (surveying cases). This Court previously indicated support for the latter position, see Holt v. DOJ, 734 F. Supp. 2d 28, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Courts have held that information pertaining to law enforcement techniques and procedures properly is withheld under Exemption 7(E) where disclosure reasonably could lead to circumvention of laws or regulations.”), making FBI’s failure to mention the controversy even more puzzling.
    If a showing that the risk of circumvention of the law must be reasonable is required, FBI simply has not made that showing for everything it has withheld. It has stated conclusorily that any information gleaned from these databases is exempt, without explaining why the exact information withheld would allow wrongdoers to circumvent the law. Moreover, it has completely failed to explain why some of the information cannot be segregated to protect the databases, allowing the release of at least a portion of the responsive information. Until it does so, the Court should not grant summary judgment on these withholdings. III. FBI IMPROPERLY WITHHELD INFORMATION ABOUT JDEY
    FBI argues that all information about Jdey, and in fact all information about how much information it has about Jdey, is categorically exempt under Exemption (b)(7)(A) by simple virtue of the fact that it is still conducting terrorism investigations. This argument, no matter how attractive, simply does not hold up under close scrutiny when one considers the question of material fact of whether or not Jdey was detained as Mr. Mowatt-Larssen states.
    As stated above, information cannot be withheld if it has previously been disclosed. In the context of Exemption (b)(7)(A), this general rule can be encompassed by the requirement that, in order to be exempt, information must be of a nature that release of it could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable harm. In this case, the Court must consider whether or not information about Jdey’s detention (assuming it happened) could reasonably be expected to
    21
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 22 of 23
    cause identifiable harm to FBI investigations. Based on FBI’s arguments for why this information is exempt, the answer is no.
    FBI’s primary argument boils down to one simple idea: “Release of information would identify the investigative interest of particular individuals.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 86.) The main problem with this argument is the unavoidable fact that if Jdey was detained, he already knows what happened.14 Release of information about his detention cannot reasonably be expected to assist him in avoiding detection, since he presumably knows what he said and what the agents did. The same would be true for some information about others as well. While the exact nature of information might be exempt, it is no secret that FBI has a file about the people on its Most Wanted List. If Moussaoui is mentioned in any of the Jdey records, that fact is likely not exempt. In none of these circumstances does FBI’s argument that “[r]elease of information would identify the investigative interest of particular individuals” (id.) hold up. FBI argues, “Once subjects become aware of the FBI’s interest in their activities, they will take actions to conceal their activities, elude detection, and/or suppress or fabricate evidence.” (Id. ¶ 88.) This only applies to individuals who do not already know that FBI is interested in their activities, a factor that is not true for those who FBI has openly stated it is seeking.
    FBI’s behavior in this case is a classic case of a kneejerk response to an unusual situation. Dillon concedes that, for the vast majority of people FBI investigates, keeping that fact secret is probably justifiable. There is an exception to every rule, however, and the exception to FBI’s rule is, at the very least, “people on the Most Wanted List.” Until FBI segregates information which would already be known to Jdey or other subjects from the information which would not, the Court should not grant summary judgment to FBI.
    22
    Date:
    October 18, 2014
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 23 of 23
    FBI further invokes a plethora of other exemptions for unknown parts of the withheld records. However, the Court should not consider these arguments until it has ruled on the categorical withholding under Exemption (b)(7)(A). FBI’s stubborn refusal to provide anything approximating a Vaughn index for its withholdings completely deprives Dillon of the ability to intelligently oppose any of the remaining withholdings with any degree of particularity, and, if the Court determines that FBI’s categorical invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(A) is in violation of FOIA, the Court should order FBI to provide significantly greater specificity regarding all of its withholdings under all exemptions.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all contested issues or, in the alternative, order Dillon to perform limited discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
    14 This assumes arguendo that he is still alive as FBI maintains. 23
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Kelly B. McClanahan Kelly B. McClanahan, Esq. D.C. Bar #984704 National Security Counselors 1200 South Courthouse Road Suite 124
    Arlington, VA 22204 301-728-5908 240-681-2189 [fax and email omitted]
    Counsel for Plaintiff

  4. DXer said

    Although I favor Adnan El-Shukrijumah as the mailer of the Fall 2001 anthrax letters — and not Jdey — there is no denying that Jdey was part of the planes operation, in touch with the anthrax planners, operational, and disappeared in Fall 2001 from Montreal. The $5 million BOLO was issued jointly for both of them in the Spring of 2003.

    Will the FBI produce long withheld documents about DXer’s anthrax mailing suspect Adnan El-Shukrijumah?
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on April 19, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/will-the-fbi-produce-long-withheld-documents-about-dxers-anthrax-mailing-suspect-adnan-el-shukrijumah/

    In February 2003, the FBI announced that “Jafar the Pilot” (aka Adnan El-Shukrijumah) had entered the country sometime after September 1, 2001
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on September 26, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/09/26/in-february-2003-the-fbi-announced-that-jafar-the-pilot-aka-adnan-el-shukrijumah-had-entered-the-country-sometime-after-september-1-2001/

    Al Hawsawi, who had the anthrax processing documents scanned on his laptop, was closely affiliated with Adnan El-Shukrijumah
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on September 22, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/09/22/al-hawsawi-who-had-the-anthrax-processing-documents-scanned-on-his-laptop-was-closely-affiliated-with-adnan-el-shukrijumah/

    DXer says: Adnan El-Shukrijumah is the anthrax mailer … on or about 9/13/2001, he phoned from KSM’s house to tell his mom he was coming to the US
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on June 6, 2014
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/dxer-adnan-el-shukrijumah-is-the-anthrax-mailer-on-9132001-he-phoned-from-ksms-house-to-tell-his-mom-he-was-coming-to-the-us/
    [his mom says he was calling from Trinidad]

    So while El-Shukrijumah is my first choice because he traveled from Kandahar at the time — leaving from the house Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat would stay and from where the vaccinated Yazid Sufaat and assistants had their anthrax lab — Jdey is my second choice.

    The FBI, based on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, says Shukrijumah travelled sometime after September 1, 2001. Shukrijumah was back in Karachi by February 2002, staying with Hawsawi. The FBI learned of his travel, I believe, from the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah (captured in March 2002) who knew Shukrijumah by an alias on fake travel documents.

    When Ken first told me the theory a decade ago, however, I thought to myself: “Damn, why didn’t I think of that. It was right there in front of me and I hadn’t noticed.”

    When the background facts of Shukrijumah and Jdey is understood — including the connections to the Brooklyn Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman and hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Mihdhar, the strong need for greater disclosure can better be understood.

    The FBI kept documents from the “Joint Inquiry” and the 911 Commission. Put simply, the public has a right to know.

    By way of another example, if the US is ever attacked with anthrax in another 911, the DOJ civil attorneys who failed to preserve the full depositions in Hatfill v. US — even though a sworn depositions were part of “agency record” under DOJ rules — can be asked whether they really played hide the ball for institutional CYA reasons, just using “national security” and sloppy record-keeping as a cover.

    * Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00532 (RBW)
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 1 of 23
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    KENNETH J. DILLON, * * Plaintiff, * *
    * DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, * * Defendant. * *
    *************
    PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

    Plaintiff Kenneth Dillon (“Dillon”) brought this case against Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)1 failed to properly process his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for records about Zacarias Moussaoui (“Moussaoui”) and Abderraouf Jdey (“Jdey”). (1st Am. Compl., Dkt. #16, ¶¶ 7, 17 (filed Aug. 9, 2013).)2 On 24 July 2014, FBI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, the Court should deny FBI’s Motion or, in the alternative, allow Dillon to conduct discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

    1 Because all counts pertain to FBI, it will be treated as the “Defendant” in this brief to avoid confusion, even though DOJ is legally the only proper party defendant.
    2 Dillon’s First Amended Complaint was actually first filed on 5 July 2013 as an attachment to a motion seeking leave to file it. The Court granted that motion on 9 August 2013.

    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 2 of 23

    Moussaoui and Jdey

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    On 16 August 2001, Moussaoui was arrested in Minneapolis by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) at the request of the FBI Minneapolis Field Office. (See Electronic Communication of 8/18/01 at 6 [hereinafter 8/18/01 EC], attached as Ex. A.) Following his arrest, his possessions, including a laptop computer, were seized and placed in INS storage. (See Memo of 8/24/01 at 3 [hereinafter 8/24/01 Memo], attached as Ex. B.) On 11 September 2001, his laptop and an accompanying floppy disk were searched and inventoried pursuant to a warrant. (See Memo of 12/17/01 at 1-2 [hereinafter 12/17/01 Memo], attached as Ex. C.) The floppy disk contained a manual entitled “Category 11 Applicator Training Manual for AERIAL APPLICATION OF PESTICIDES” (the “Cropdusting Manual”) (See id. at 2.)
    This manual was explicitly included in a list of materials found in his possession in the indictment returned by a grand jury on 11 December 2001. Indictment, Dkt. #1, ¶ 73 (filed Dec. 11, 2001), United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va.), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/64329/0.pdf (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014). For unknown reasons, the Cropdusting Manual was removed from the list of materials found in his possession in the superseding indictment. See Superseding Indictment, Dkt. #199, ¶ 71 (filed June 19, 2002), Moussaoui, available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr- 00455/docs/66411/0.pdf (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014).
    According to former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) senior official Rolf Mowatt- Larssen, Jdey was also detained in the summer of 2001. See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? at 16 (January 2010), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014).
    2
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 3 of 23
    Mr. Mowatt-Larssen did not explicitly state that Jdey was detained at the same time or in the same place as Moussaoui, only that he was detained and that he had biology textbooks in his possession.3 See id. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s paper is the only publicly-available document which references the detention of Jdey, but its specificity and accuracy on other matters, coupled with the author’s impressive credentials,4 should entitle it to a degree of deference by the Court sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Discovery may be appropriate to ascertain the accuracy of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s assertions.
    The First Request
    On 17 July 2011, operating under the false assumption that Jdey and Moussaoui were detained together on 16 August 2001, Dillon filed a FOIA request for documents “related to the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui and detention of Abderraouf Jdey, both al Qaeda operatives, in Minnesota on August 16, 2001.” (See 2d Hardy Decl., Ex. A, Dkt. #28-2 (filed Sept. 8, 2014).) This request specifically requested:
    (1) A full internal report on the arrest/detention. Minimally responsive to this request would be a complete list of the items in the possession of the two men, including the computer disk containing information about crop dusting reportedly in Moussaoui’s possession but not included in the list of items the Department of Justice provided to the court in Moussaoui’s trial; and the entire text on Abderraouf Jdey.
    3 Mr. Mowatt-Larssen has recently confirmed to the undersigned that his statement could be read to mean that Jdey was detained at a different location and different time.
    4 “Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen served over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. Prior to this, he served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various domestic and international posts, to include Chief of the Europe Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counterterrorist Center, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. . . . He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, the George W. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Superior Performance Medal, among others.” Id. at 29.
    3
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 4 of 23
    (2) The report of the arrest/detention that was sent to the intelligence community.
    (3) Any other records related to the August 16, 2001 detention of Abderraouf Jdey.
    (2d Hardy Decl., Dkt. #27-2, ¶ 6 (filed July 24, 2014).) On 5 July 2013, before FBI completed its search,5 Dillon clarified the scope of this
    request, by informing FBI’s counsel:
    You may inform your client that Mr. Dillon restricts the scope of Request No. 1170856 to the following records:
    1) All records documenting the items found in the possession of Zacarias Moussaoui on 16-17 August 2001.
    2) All records pertaining to the August 2001 detention which reference cropdusting, cropdusters, or biological or chemical terrorism. This will also include records pertaining to the decision to remove references to cropdusting from the superseding indictment. . . .
    The FBI should perform a CRS search, including cross-references, as well as a search of all records systems, shared drives, and email systems used by the Minneapolis Field Office and FBI Headquarters which are not incorporated into CRS. . . . A simple search of CRS will not be adequate for [this] request, nor will a search which does not include cross-references.
    (Email from McClanahan to Braswell of July 5, 2013, included in Ex. E.) By sending this email, Dillon modified the request in the following five ways:
    • He effectively removed records about Jdey from this request, limiting it to records about Moussaoui.
    • He clarified that the previous request for “a full internal FBI report” was not simply for a single document, but for all records about Moussaoui’s arrest.
    5 “After OIP’s remand, the FBI conducted another search of the CRS, on or about August 1, 2013 . . . .” (Id. ¶ 31.)
    4
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 5 of 23
    • He then limited the scope of the universe of responsive records about Moussaoui to two categories: (a) records documenting the materials found in his possession; and (b) records pertaining to his arrest referencing cropdusting or biological or chemical terrorism.6
    • He specifically singled out records about the decision to remove references to the Cropdusting Manual from the superseding indictment as responsive.
    • He specifically directed FBI to search not only the Central Records System (“CRS”) but also to search “all records systems, shared drives, and email systems used by the Minneapolis Field Office and FBI Headquarters which are not incorporated into CRS.”
    When FBI performed its search, it performed two searches: 1) an automated search of CRS for Moussaoui’s name, limited to main file records (as opposed to cross-references) and apparently limited to records including the 16 August 2001 arrest date (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 31); and 2) a text search of CRS using Moussaoui’s name paired with various other terms, such as “pesticide,” “chemical terrorism,” and “cropdusting” (id.). It also contacted an FBI special agent “with first-hand knowledge of the Moussaoui investigation” (id.) and asked for assistance locating specific records (treating Dillon’s request as a request for individual records and apparently ignoring the 5 July 2013 clarification), and the special agent provided some records (from an unknown records system) and referred to others located in CRS. (Id.) Lastly, FBI appears to have performed a search of several records systems listed in an email sent to its
    6 He clarified in a followup email that FBI should use the keyword “pesticide” as well since that was the word used in the indictment. (Email from McClanahan to Braswell of July 8, 2013, attached as Ex. E.)
    5
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 6 of 23
    counsel on 8 January 2014, apparently based on a misconception that that message applied to “Moussaoui and Jdey” (id. at 13 n.10), even though that message was limited to only the second request for records about Jdey (see Email from McClanahan to Braswell of Jan. 8, 2014 (referring to “the Jdey request”), attached as Ex. F). While this final search did fill in some of the holes in FBI’s previous searches, it still did not encompass many of the systems (especially shared drives and email systems) referenced in Dillon’s 5 July 2013 email, nor is it clear whether the CRS text search or this final search were limited to records which explicitly reference the 16 August 2001 arrest date. Most notably, it failed to locate any records created after 27 December 2001, even though any records discussing the decision to remove the Cropdusting Manual from the superseding indictment would not be created until 2002.7
    The Second Request
    On 30 March 2012, Dillon filed a FOIA request for “the entire file on al Qaeda operative Abderraouf Jdey.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 15.) After initially refusing to conduct a search, FBI then conducted a search of CRS for responsive records between 31 May 2013 and 5 June 2013. (Id. ¶ 33.) FBI identified a main file record and several cross-reference records, all of which it claimed were exempt under Exemption (b)(7)(A). (Id.) It subsequently searched other records systems for responsive records in response to Dillon’s 8 January 2014 message (Ex. F), and, although it does not claim that it searched email systems (see 2d Hardy Decl. at 13 n.10), it does state that email records were located and processed (id. ¶ 79(n)).
    7 In fact, FBI identified no records mentioning even the first indictment, even though that indictment (and therefore at least some or the records or correspondence discussing it) explicitly discusses all of the topics responsive to this request. The absence of these records speaks volumes about the inadequacy of a search which does not include emails or records not indexed in CRS.
    6
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 7 of 23
    On 4 March 2014, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, FBI provided Dillon with a draft declaration explaining its searches and withholdings. This draft included the following statements regarding Jdey’s alleged detention, stating:
    • “The FBI was unable to locate any records on the August 16, 2001 arrest of Jdey.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 32 (emphasis added).)8
    • “Plaintiff theorizes that Jdey was arrested in Minnesota on August 16, 2001, alongside Moussaoui . . . . The FBI located no information confirming Plaintiff’s averments.” (Id. at 13 n.9 (emphasis added).)
    • “The FBI was unable to locate any records on the August 16, 2001 arrest of Abderraouf Jdey.” (Id. at 17 n.15 (emphasis added).)
    In response to this draft declaration, the undersigned attempted on 22 April 2014 to confirm that FBI had identified no records confirming that Jdey had been detained at all, asking FBI’s counsel to please address that issue in the filed declaration. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 4/22/14 at 1:54 AM, included in Ex. G.) In a followup email sent later that day, the undersigned further clarified that, according to Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, Jdey was only detained, not arrested. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 4/22/14 at 3:42 AM, included in Ex. G.) On 24 July 2014, FBI filed the 2d Hardy Declaration, which included none of the requested clarifications, and stated in its brief, “Although the FBI located records pertaining to Jdey, none concerned any arrest on August 16, 2001.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. #27, at 6-7 (filed July 24, 2014) (emphasis added) [hereinafter FBI’s Mem.].) The
    8 The language used in the draft declaration is identical to the 2d Hardy Declaration in these instances, so citations are made to the filed version.
    7
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 8 of 23
    undersigned again requested clarification on this point from FBI on 6 September 2014 and 25 September 2014. (See Email from McClanahan to Braswell of 9/25/14, included in Ex. G.)
    On 26 September 2014, FBI confirmed that its search for records responsive to Dillon’s second request would have identified any records of an arrest or detention. (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 9/26/14, included in Ex. G.) However, when the undersigned sought confirmation that FBI had located no information about any detention of Jdey, FBI refused to clarify the point, only repeating that it had “located no information that would indicate that Jdey was arrested or detained alongside Moussaoui.” (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 9/30/14 (emphasis added), included in Ex. G.) It is therefore unknown if FBI located records confirming that Jdey was detained at a different location or time.
    There is also a question of fact regarding whether Jdey is currently alive or dead. Dillon maintains that Jdey was killed in a plane crash on 12 November 2001, based on a news story from 2004 quoting a Canadian intelligence report. See Stewart Bell, Montreal Man Downed U.S. Plane, CSIS Told, National Post (Aug. 27, 2004), attached as Ex. H.9 FBI maintains that he is alive and that it has found no records confirming his death (2d Hardy Decl. at 13 n.9), although it admits that its search was incomplete because it could not locate some files (id. at 14 n.14). This is likely a moot point, given FBI’s position that even if he were dead, all the files about him would remain exempt because of other ongoing terrorism investigations (Ex. G at 2), but the dispute is still worth noting. Dillon will not address the legal ramifications of Jdey’s possible death in this brief, but if the Court believes that this issue is probative, Dillon requests an opportunity to conduct appropriate discovery and brief the matter fully.
    9 Ex. H is a copy of the text of this story from another Internet source, as the original story is no longer available on the National Post website.
    8
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 9 of 23
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    FBI does not expressly discuss the statutory background and standard of review in a separate section, instead limiting its discussion of underlying principles to the adequacy of the search (FBI’s Mem. at 3-5) and then addressing specific exemptions separately. While FBI has not actively misrepresented any of the cases it cites in the search discussion, it has creatively styled them to imply something that they do not. Then, it has completely overlooked some of the underlying principles of withholdings, choosing instead to discuss exemption-specific issues in hopes that the Court will not examine the question of whether or not exemptions even apply too closely.
    First, FBI states that “FOIA does not require that an agency search every division or field office on its own initiative in response to a FOIA request when responsive documents are likely to be located in one place.” (Id. at 4-5 (citing Kowalczyk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) and Marks v. DOJ, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978)).) However, this statement, while technically accurate (albeit barely so in the case of the last element), is only correct because of many precise terms. FOIA does not require that an agency search 1) every division or field office 2) on its own initiative in response to a FOIA request when responsive documents are 3) likely to be located in only one place.
    The first clause speaks to how many places an agency must search. It is axiomatic that an agency does not have to search every division or field office, but that does not mean that it does not have to search any. “While there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, the agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Jefferson v. DOJ, 168 F. App’x 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (quoting Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920
    9
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 10 of 23
    F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). See also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that “the government is not required to search only the files of the . . . custodians who are ‘most likely’ to have responsive records; it must also search other locations that are reasonably likely to contain records”) (citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68).
    The second clause, even assuming arguendo that the first is accurate, is similarly misleading. A holding that an agency does not have to search multiple locations or systems on its own initiative is a far cry from a holding that it does not have to search them when specifically directed to by the requester while the search is still ongoing. See, e.g., Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n most cases, the FBI need not conduct ELSUR . . . searches when the FOIA requester does not expressly ask it to do so.”) (emphasis added). An agency may not “ignore what it cannot help but know” when faced with “a lead so apparent that the [agency] cannot in good faith fail to pursue it.” Kowalczyk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As apparent leads go, an express clarification from the requester that he wants a particular location to be searched is about as apparent as it gets.
    The third clause ties into the first and disguises FBI’s actual position, namely, that it does not have to conduct a search of all locations and systems reasonably likely to contain responsive records, it only has to conduct a search of locations and systems it determines to be most likely to contain responsive records. This position stands in stark contrast to the controlling case law. See Jefferson, 168 F. App’x at 450 (“While there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, the agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.”) (internal quotation and alteration omitted); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (holding that “the government is not
    10
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 11 of 23
    required to search only the files of the . . . custodians who are ‘most likely’ to have responsive records; it must also search other locations that are reasonably likely to contain records”).
    Regarding FBI’s second misleading assertion, it quotes, “Failure to turn up [a specified] document does not alone render a search inadequate.” (FBI’s Mem. at 5 (quoting Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).) More recently, the D.C. Circuit rephrased this idea: “[F]ailure to turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents might exist, does not [by itself] undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search for the records.” Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). However, this does not mean that a court cannot find an agency’s search to be inadequate based in part on its failure to locate certain records. “[E]vidence that relevant records have not been released may shed light on whether the agency’s search was indeed inadequate.” Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (adding that “there may be times when an agency’s inability to retrieve documents known or thought to be in its files is inherently unbelievable”). In other words, not all “claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents” are “purely speculative.” Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For instance, “[w]here specific records . . . are referenced in [agency] documents, it is no longer ‘mere speculation’ that the files exist.” Hall v. CIA, 881 F. Supp. 2d 38, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2012).
    With respect to the burden facing an agency to demonstrate that information is exempt, “An agency cannot meet its statutory burden of justification by conclusory allegations of possible harm. It must show by specific and detailed proof that disclosure would defeat, rather than further, the purposes of FOIA.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977). “An affidavit that contains merely a ‘categorical description of
    11
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 12 of 23
    redacted material coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences of disclosure is clearly inadequate.’” PHE, Inc. v. DOJ, 983 F.2d 248, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “[T]he affidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption. The affidavits will not suffice if the agency’s claims are conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping.” Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted). “The [D.C.] Circuit, though expressly disclaiming any attempt to provide ‘an encompassing definition of conclusory assertions,’ noted that ‘it is enough that where no factual support is provided for an essential element of the claimed privilege or shield, the label conclusory is surely apt.’” Jarvik v. CIA, 741 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Senate of P.R. v. DOJ, 823 F.2d 574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
    Additionally, it is well-established that publicly-known information cannot be withheld pursuant to an otherwise valid exemption claim. Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Muslim Advocates v. DOJ, 833 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D.D.C. 2011) (listing cases regarding different exemptions). However, “a plaintiff asserting a claim of prior disclosure must bear the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld.” Id. This Circuit established three criteria for an item to be “officially acknowledged”:
    First, the information requested must be as specific as the information previously released. Second, the information requested must match the information previously disclosed; we noted, for example, that official disclosure did not waive the protection to be accorded information that pertained to a later time period. Third, we held that the information requested must already have been made public through an official and documented disclosure.
    Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990), citing Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1133. 12
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 13 of 23
    ARGUMENT
    FBI’s response to Dillon’s requests is insufficient in three areas. First, it performed inadequate searches in both requests. Second, it withheld information from the first request which was not properly exempt. Third, it withheld information from the second request which was not properly exempt.
    As an initial matter, it is important to clarify the scope of Dillon’s challenges. In the interest of judicial economy, Dillon elects not to challenge many aspects of FBI’s argument, although this is not a concession regarding the legal validity of those positions. He is simply limiting the controversy to the records in which he is most interested. Accordingly, this brief is limited to the following challenges:
    • FBI’s failure to search email systems for responsive records about Moussaoui not indexed in CRS;
    • FBI’s failure to search the Minneapolis Field Office or other offices for responsive records not indexed in CRS;
    • FBI’s apparent limitation of the first request to records explicitly mentioning the 16 August 2001 arrest date;
    • FBI’s failure to search for and process records about the Moussaoui indictments; • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(D) to withhold information from pages
    Dillon-6 and Dillon-90; • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(E) to withhold information from pages
    Dillon-8, Dillon-9, Dillon-11, Dillon-18, and Dillon-19;
    13
    I.
    • FBI’s invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(A) to withhold information that Jdey or other targets of investigations would already know (limited to the types of records described in paragraphs 84-88); and
    • FBI’s conclusory invocations of Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(E) to withhold an indeterminate amount of information from the second request.
    FBI CONDUCTED INADEQUATE SEARCHES
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 14 of 23
    Instead of performing adequate searches reasonably designed to yield responsive records, FBI instead unreasonably limited the scope of its searches and apparently construed the requests significantly more narrowly than Dillon intended.
    A. FBI’S FAILURE TO SEARCH EMAIL SYSTEMS WAS UNREASONABLE
    Agencies have a duty to construe the subject material of FOIA requests liberally to ensure responsive records are not overlooked. See Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890. An agency may not “read [a] request so strictly that the requester is denied information the agency well knows exists in its files, albeit in a different form from that anticipated by the requester.” Hemenway v. Hughes, 601 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (D.D.C. 1985). “[A]ll federal agencies should go as far as they reasonably can to ensure that they include what requesters want to have included within the scopes of their FOIA requests.” DOJ, Office of Information and Privacy, OIP Guidance: Determining the Scope of a FOIA Request, FOIA Update, Vol. XVI, No. 3, at 4 (1995). See also Amnesty Int’l USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting CIA’s argument that its search for records about the “attention shake” interrogation technique was adequate because it located no records due to the technique being called the “attention grasp”).
    14
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 15 of 23
    As stated above, an agency “cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Jefferson, 168 F. App’x at 450 (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68). While FBI may argue that it did not limit its search to only one record system, it does not and cannot argue that it searched all records systems which are reasonably likely to contain records. Instead, it implies that it does not have to search its email systems because it determined that they were less likely (not unlikely) to contain responsive records. This position, though, is without merit.
    Even assuming arguendo that FBI would not be required to search its email systems on its own initiative for records about one of the Minneapolis Field Offices (and, in fact, FBI’s) most famous cases, FBI’s argument would still not bear up to close scrutiny, since Dillon specifically and unequivocally instructed FBI to search its email systems for responsive records. (See Ex. E.) FBI may take issue with the fact that this direction was not in the original request, but it does not and cannot argue that Dillon provided this scope clarification to it after it completed its search. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 31 (admitting that FBI did not begin, let alone complete, its final search until almost a month after it received this instruction).) In fact, shortly after Dillon sent this message, FBI informed the Court that it took issue with the modifications to the request, arguing that Dillon’s email “change[d] and expand[ed] the scope of the FBI’s search” and promising that it would defend its position in its dispositive motion. (See Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl., Dkt. #15 (filed July 19, 2013).) Despite this promise, neither FBI’s declaration nor its dispositive motion even mentions a) Dillon’s 5 July 2013 email; b) shared drives; c) Minneapolis; or d) emails (with one inapposite exception).10 In other words,
    10 Emails are listed among the types of records withheld from the second request, but not the first. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 79(n).)
    15
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 16 of 23
    after receiving an email clearly clarifying that Dillon intended for email systems to be searched for responsive records, FBI:
    1. Publicly stated that the email changed its understanding of the scope of the request;
    2. Performed a new search ignoring the modified scope; and then 3. Neglected to even mention to the Court in its dispositive motion that it had
    received the email. This is not the behavior of an agency committed to performing a good faith search reasonably calculated to locate responsive records. It is the behavior of an agency seeking a litigation advantage to avoid conducting a search it does not want to perform.
    B. FBI OTHERWISE UNREASONABLY RESTRICTED ITS SEARCH
    For the same reason that FBI’s failure to search email systems cannot pass close scrutiny, its failure to search any other offices or systems for records not indexed in CRS (such as files stored on shared drives or local computers) must similarly fail. The Moussaoui case was one of the biggest cases of the year in 2001, and at the time there were serious concerns in and out of the Government about his interest in pesticides and cropdusting. See Indictment ¶¶ 17, 53, 73 (mentioning pesticides three separate times), Moussaoui. Despite this concern, FBI weakly asserts that it only possesses one document—Ex. C—discussing Moussaoui’s possession of the Cropdusting Manual. This glaring omission indicates the presence of one of two problems, neither of which are justifiable under FOIA:
    1. Responsive records are not indexed in CRS, and FBI did not search the appropriate offices and/or systems to locate them; or
    16
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 17 of 23
    2. Responsive records are indexed in CRS, but FBI did not locate them because it narrowly interpreted the temporal scope of the request.
    For all the reasons previously discussed, neither of these two scenarios warrants a finding that FBI conducted an adequate search. Either scenario involves an arbitrary limitation on the scope of the search, either in limiting the offices and records systems to be searched or in discarding responsive records that do not fall within a narrow date range.11 Moreover, either scenario would explain why no records of the modifications made to the superseding indictment were located, a clear lead that the agency cannot help but follow, given Dillon’s clearly expressed interest in such information. This response is the opposite of a liberal construction of the request and smacks of “read[ing] [a] request so strictly that the requester is denied information the agency well knows exists in its files, albeit in a different form from that anticipated by the requester.” Hemenway, 601 F. Supp. at 1005.12
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny FBI summary judgment on the adequacy of its searches.
    II. FBI IMPROPERLY WITHHELD INFORMATION ABOUT MOUSSAOUI
    As noted above, Dillon only challenges select exemptions on seven pages responsive to the first request.
    11 The fact that responsive records exist which are not indexed in CRS is plainly demonstrated by the fact that the special agent consulted on this request provided some of them to the FOIA office. In response to this evidence that a CRS search would not be sufficient, FBI should have asked the special agent where those records were located and then searched there.
    12 For similar reasons, the Court should not grant summary judgment regarding the adequacy of FBI’s search for records about Jdey until it learns more about the locations and records systems searched. Because FBI has withheld all information about Jdey (including the number of responsive records), the Court has no way to consider the universe of responsive records in its determination of the completeness of the search.
    17
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 18 of 23
    A. EXEMPTION (B)(7)(D)
    FBI withheld information pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(D) on two pages: Dillon-6 (included in Ex. A) and Dillon-90 (included in Ex. B). It justifies both of these withholdings simply by asserting that sources in national security investigations like to remain confidential (see 2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 73). FBI does not attempt to claim that any source allegedly implicated by this information ever requested confidentiality or even showed an interest in it. In fact, absolutely nothing is said about the sources at all; FBI rests its entire argument on the conclusory assertion that every person it interviews in a national security investigation has an implied assurance of confidentiality. (See FBI’s Mem. at 33 (“With respect to investigations of terrorism and national security investigations, the circumstances in which they gave information demonstrates an implied promise of confidentiality.”).)
    Besides being wholly conclusory, this assertion does not match the context of Dillon-6. That page reads, “Pursuant to this, physical surveillance (FISUR) of the Subaru sedan was initiated and [redacted].” (Ex. A at 6.) No mention is made of any source, confidential or otherwise, in the preceding or following paragraphs, and this paragraph appears to simply relate to the results of the surveillance. Such information is not protected by Exemption (b)(7)(D).
    Simply put, FBI has failed to satisfy its burden of proof regarding these withholdings. As another example, Dillon-90 refers to each of the two alleged confidential sources as “a reliable source” (Ex. B at 5), but FBI only claims that each of these sources provided information pursuant to an implied assurance of confidentiality. (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 73.) This discrepancy
    18
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 19 of 23
    raises the question, if these are sources with whom FBI regularly deals, why was there not an express assurance of confidentiality?13
    B. EXEMPTION (B)(7)(E)
    While FBI’s declaration only asserts Exemption (b)(7)(E) in general for any information withheld from the Moussaoui documents (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 76), FBI subsequently clarified its withholdings by placing each withholding within one of five categories described elsewhere in the context of the Jdey documents. (See Email from Braswell to McClanahan of 10/1/14, attached as Ex. I.) Accordingly, Dillon then limited his challenge to just the five withholdings identified as “Database Information and/or Printouts.” (See 2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 188; see also Ex. A at 8, 9, 11, 18, 19 (withholdings).)
    These withholdings fail for the same reason as the Exemption (b)(7)(D) invocations; FBI simply has not met its burden to justify them in a non-conclusory fashion. FBI simply argues that these are “database search results located through non-public databases,” while admitting that “local, state, and other federal agencies have access to these databases.” (Id.) According to FBI, the mere fact that these databases are non-public (even though it appears that a large selection of government employees at every level of government has access) by itself renders any search results exempt as “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E).
    There are two major problems with FBI’s position. First, Exemption (b)(7)(E) may only be used to withhold techniques and procedures unknown to the public. See, e.g., Albuquerque Publ’g Co. v. DOJ, 726 F. Supp. 851, 858 (D.D.C. 1989) (ordering agency to explain further why
    13 Exemption (b)(7)(D) was also asserted on page Dillon-83 (Ex. D at 1) to protect the actual identities of these two sources. Dillon chose not to challenge that assertion simply because he
    19
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 20 of 23
    certain techniques are considered unknown to the public); Jaffe v. CIA, 573 F. Supp. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1983) (exemption applies to information regarding “obscure or secret techniques”); Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1082-83 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (exemption is to be applied only to techniques and procedures generally unknown to the public and, absent any explanation from the government, court would not assume that disclosure would result in revelation of investigative techniques which were so unique as to warrant exemption). This case raises the question, exactly how many people can know about something before it is considered “known to the public?” FBI has not explained how a database used by an unknown number of persons, many of which are not part of the federal Government, can still be considered “non-public,” and until it does, the Court cannot simply assume that the database is unique enough to warrant exemption.
    FBI’s withholding also brings this case squarely into an unsettled area of FOIA law, namely, whether “techniques and procedures” require a showing that “disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). FBI grandly argues that no such showing is necessary, implying that this is a settled matter. (FBI’s Mem. at 35.) In making this argument, FBI blithely ignores the wealth of case law holding exactly the opposite. While FBI is correct that many courts in this Circuit and others have held that the requirement that “disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law” applies only to guidelines, many other courts in this Circuit and others have held that this requirement applies to techniques and procedures as well. See generally DOJ, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 7(E) at 1-5 (Apr. 23, 2013), at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide13/exemption7e.pdf (last accessed Oct. 18, 2014)
    has no interest in their identities, not because he believes they are legitimately withheld. 20
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 21 of 23
    (surveying cases). This Court previously indicated support for the latter position, see Holt v. DOJ, 734 F. Supp. 2d 28, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Courts have held that information pertaining to law enforcement techniques and procedures properly is withheld under Exemption 7(E) where disclosure reasonably could lead to circumvention of laws or regulations.”), making FBI’s failure to mention the controversy even more puzzling.
    If a showing that the risk of circumvention of the law must be reasonable is required, FBI simply has not made that showing for everything it has withheld. It has stated conclusorily that any information gleaned from these databases is exempt, without explaining why the exact information withheld would allow wrongdoers to circumvent the law. Moreover, it has completely failed to explain why some of the information cannot be segregated to protect the databases, allowing the release of at least a portion of the responsive information. Until it does so, the Court should not grant summary judgment on these withholdings. III. FBI IMPROPERLY WITHHELD INFORMATION ABOUT JDEY
    FBI argues that all information about Jdey, and in fact all information about how much information it has about Jdey, is categorically exempt under Exemption (b)(7)(A) by simple virtue of the fact that it is still conducting terrorism investigations. This argument, no matter how attractive, simply does not hold up under close scrutiny when one considers the question of material fact of whether or not Jdey was detained as Mr. Mowatt-Larssen states.
    As stated above, information cannot be withheld if it has previously been disclosed. In the context of Exemption (b)(7)(A), this general rule can be encompassed by the requirement that, in order to be exempt, information must be of a nature that release of it could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable harm. In this case, the Court must consider whether or not information about Jdey’s detention (assuming it happened) could reasonably be expected to
    21
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 22 of 23
    cause identifiable harm to FBI investigations. Based on FBI’s arguments for why this information is exempt, the answer is no.
    FBI’s primary argument boils down to one simple idea: “Release of information would identify the investigative interest of particular individuals.” (2d Hardy Decl. ¶ 86.) The main problem with this argument is the unavoidable fact that if Jdey was detained, he already knows what happened.14 Release of information about his detention cannot reasonably be expected to assist him in avoiding detection, since he presumably knows what he said and what the agents did. The same would be true for some information about others as well. While the exact nature of information might be exempt, it is no secret that FBI has a file about the people on its Most Wanted List. If Moussaoui is mentioned in any of the Jdey records, that fact is likely not exempt. In none of these circumstances does FBI’s argument that “[r]elease of information would identify the investigative interest of particular individuals” (id.) hold up. FBI argues, “Once subjects become aware of the FBI’s interest in their activities, they will take actions to conceal their activities, elude detection, and/or suppress or fabricate evidence.” (Id. ¶ 88.) This only applies to individuals who do not already know that FBI is interested in their activities, a factor that is not true for those who FBI has openly stated it is seeking.
    FBI’s behavior in this case is a classic case of a kneejerk response to an unusual situation. Dillon concedes that, for the vast majority of people FBI investigates, keeping that fact secret is probably justifiable. There is an exception to every rule, however, and the exception to FBI’s rule is, at the very least, “people on the Most Wanted List.” Until FBI segregates information which would already be known to Jdey or other subjects from the information which would not, the Court should not grant summary judgment to FBI.
    22
    Date:
    October 18, 2014
    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 33 Filed 10/18/14 Page 23 of 23
    FBI further invokes a plethora of other exemptions for unknown parts of the withheld records. However, the Court should not consider these arguments until it has ruled on the categorical withholding under Exemption (b)(7)(A). FBI’s stubborn refusal to provide anything approximating a Vaughn index for its withholdings completely deprives Dillon of the ability to intelligently oppose any of the remaining withholdings with any degree of particularity, and, if the Court determines that FBI’s categorical invocation of Exemption (b)(7)(A) is in violation of FOIA, the Court should order FBI to provide significantly greater specificity regarding all of its withholdings under all exemptions.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all contested issues or, in the alternative, order Dillon to perform limited discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
    14 This assumes arguendo that he is still alive as FBI maintains. 23
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Kelly B. McClanahan Kelly B. McClanahan, Esq. D.C. Bar #984704 National Security Counselors 1200 South Courthouse Road Suite 124
    Arlington, VA 22204 301-728-5908 240-681-2189 fax Kel@NationalSecurityLaw.org
    Counsel for Plaintiff

  5. DXer said

    http://www.torontosun.com/2014/10/11/quebec-jihadist-may-return-to-canada-to-carry-out-terrorist-attacks-source-close-to-csis

    Quebec jihadist may return to Canada to carry out terrorist attacks: Source close to CSIS

    NORMAND LESTER, SPECIAL TO QMI AGENCY

    FIRST POSTED: SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2014

    MONTREAL — Abderraouf Jdey, a Quebec jihadist wanted by the FBI to the tune of $5 million, is among the Canadian terrorists abroad who authorities fear may return home to carry out attacks, a source close to CSIS told QMI Agency.

    The FBI has offered a $5-million reward for any info leading to Jdey, a Tunisian-born Montrealer suspected of attempting to commit terrorist attacks in Canada and the U.S.

    Last seen in Montreal in November 2001, he’s currently believed to be fighting in Somalia with al-Shabaab, an extremist Islamic militia linked to al-Qaida.

  6. DXer said

    With respect to Ken’s theory that Jdey (rather than El-Shukrijumah) is the anthrax mailer, Ken’s briefing is due today in the federal court litigation. Next DOJ will reply.

    I suppose Ken’s national security FOIA counsel could have fun with the new claim that the DOJ lost the sworn depositions of the FBI Director, Attorney General, lead investigator etc. in connection with the civil suit brought relating to the largest criminal investigation in history. Taxpayers ponied up $5.8 million, as I recall.

    It’s a little hard to learn from history if you lose the inconvenient documents.

    It’s not like I asked for the civil depositions in Hatfill v. US by Fellows and Linscott that DOJ shredded.

    Attorneys fees will be due under FOIA. I’m licensed in both DC and New York and so have my choice of venue.

    Any litigant yearns for an easily proved withholding or destruction of documents.

    • DXer said

      The September 24, 2014 letter to me from James M. Kovakas, Senior Supervisory FOIA Counsel states:

      “This is the response of the Civil Division, Department of Justice (DOJ) to your April 23, 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a copies [sic] of various depositions in the case Stephen Hatfill United States [sic]. You requested the depositions of Dwight Adams, John Ashcroft, Timothy Beres, Gary Boyd, Tom Carey, Edward Cogswell, James Fitzgerald, Bradley Garrett, Van Harp, Steven Hatfill, Roscoe Howard, Kenneth Kohl, Richard Lambert, Robert Mueller, Robert Roth, Daniel Seikaly and Debra Weierman. Your request was received April 23, 2104 and assigned control number 145-FOI-13112.”

      “I directed your request to the Federal Programs Branch and the Torts Branch as those offices would most likely maintain the documents you requested. Searches in those offices identified the depositions of Bradley Garrett, Van Harp, Richard Lambert and Debra Weierman. We found no depositions of the other individuals listed in your request. Therefore, as for those individuals we have no records.”

      “After reviewing the four identified depositions, I determined that the documents should be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and direct response to you. All future communications regarding these documents should be directed to: David M [H]ardy, Chief, Record Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester VA 22602-4843.”

    • DXer said

      The Civil Division settled for $5.8 million but did not preserve the civil depositions that they provably had. I just got off the telephone with Attorney Kovakas who confirms that the Civil Division did not maintain or preserve the listed depositions. It took the DOJ 6 months to check with the attorneys who handled the litigation. (The DOJ Civil FOIA Attorney is misguided in suggesting that he does not know whether the depositions actually were taken).

      While the DOJ shredded the Fellows and Linscott deposition, the DOJ CIvil Division reports that it also cannot find and did not keep the civil depositions of

      John Ashcroft [United States Attorney General],
      Robert Mueller [FBI Director],
      Roscoe Howard [United States Attorney],
      Kenneth Kohl [lead AUSA],
      Dwight Adams [head of FBI science lab],
      Robert Roth [lead investigator],
      Daniel Seikaly [lead prosecutor],
      Steven Hatfill [defendant paid $5.8 million],
      and others.

      I only have excerpts of the civil depositions — such as when the lead prosecutor Seikaly pled the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination numerous times. (They are linked below)

      I am advised by my intelligence source to seek the full depositions.

      When I pointed out to Attorney Kovakas that a failure to preserve and share records is what leads to a failure to connect the dots, he said that was a matter of speculation.

      Of course, the entire purpose of seeking to get people on the same page is to avoid the need for speculation.

      James is very well-spoken and highly experienced. The DOJ is very well-served by him if the goal is avoid production of documents through the shredding and failure to maintain records — rather than giving effect to the spirit of FOIA by furthering government accountability and transparency.

      If the spirit of FOIA were being promoted, upon the referral of the four depositions to the FBI, DOJ Civil would have asked if the FBI had the other depositions. After taking 6 months to say that the dog ate their homework, Attorney Kovakas says I can ask the FBI — which has an average response of a year or two or three on the simplest request relating to Amerithrax.

      It’s all about CYA inside the Beltway. The GAO should obtain the full civil depositions in Hatfill and not countenance delay or withholding of documents.

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

      The September 24, 2014 letter to me from James M. Kovakas, Senior Supervisory FOIA Counsel states:

      “This is the response of the Civil Division, Department of Justice (DOJ) to your April 23, 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a copies [sic] of various depositions in the case Stephen Hatfill United States [sic]. You requested the depositions of Dwight Adams, John Ashcroft, Timothy Beres, Gary Boyd, Tom Carey, Edward Cogswell, James Fitzgerald, Bradley Garrett, Van Harp, Steven Hatfill, Roscoe Howard, Kenneth Kohl, Richard Lambert, Robert Mueller, Robert Roth, Daniel Seikaly and Debra Weierman. Your request was received April 23, 2104 and assigned control number 145-FOI-13112.”

      “I directed your request to the Federal Programs Branch and the Torts Branch as those offices would most likely maintain the documents you requested. Searches in those offices identified the depositions of Bradley Garrett, Van Harp, Richard Lambert and Debra Weierman. We found no depositions of the other individuals listed in your request. Therefore, as for those individuals we have no records.”

      “After reviewing the four identified depositions, I determined that the documents should be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and direct response to you. All future communications regarding these documents should be directed to: David M [H]ardy, Chief, Record Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester VA 22602-4843.”

      Here are partial excerpts from the depositions:

      https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2010/01/30/amerithrax-depositions/

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 1

      testimony of Dwight Adams, John Ashcroft, Timothy Beres, Gary Boyd (SAIC), Tom Carey

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 2

      testimony of Edward Cogswell, Barbara Comstock, Mark Corallo, Deborah Daniels, Darrell Darnell, Arthur Eberhart, James Fitzgerald

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 3

      testimony of Bradley Garrett, Stephen Guillot, Van Harp, Steven Hatfill

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 4

      testimony of Tracy Henke, Roscoe Howard, Michael Isikoff, Daniel Klaidman, Kenneth Kohl

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 5

      testimony of Michael Kortan, Nicholas Kristof, Richard Lambert, Allan Lengel

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 6

      testimony of Tony Loci, Robert Mueller, Peter Mueller, Virginia Patrick, Channing Phillips, James Reynolds

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 7

      testimony of Brian Ross, Robert Roth, Daniel Seikaly

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 8

      testimony of Bryan Sierra, James Stewart, Rex Stockham, Vic Walter, Debra Weierman

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 9

      newspaper articles

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 10

      discovery responses

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 11

      miscellaneous exhibits, including but not limited to internal FBI documents

      Amerithrax depositions … Vol 12

      miscellaneous materials

  7. DXer said

    Dr. Dillon has shared the first batch of these documents produced by the FBI in the ongoing litigation pending in the District of Columbia.

  8. DXer said

    Thanks to the determined prodding by Dr. Kenneth Dillon and Attorney Kelly Brian McClanahan, of National Security Counselors in Arlington, VA — and the continuing efforts of the hardworking FBI FOIA personnel — the FBI has identified voluminous additional documents relating to Jdey that require processing.

    If you want someone to successfully appeal a claimed FOIA exemption that lacks merits, Attorney McClanahan is the one to call. We will know more in the coming months and after studying the DOJ’s Vaughn Declaration.

    We can only hope that the DOJ recognizes the value of transparency and the sharing of information. A failure to connect dots most often results from a FAILURE to share information.

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 20 Filed 11/01/13 Page 1 of 3

    KENNETH J. DILLON,
    Plaintiff,
    v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

    UUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    Civil Action No. 13-00532 (RBW)
    Defendant.

    JOINT PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

    Defendant, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (“FBI”), by and through its undersigned counsel, and Plaintiff Kenneth Dillon, hereby jointly submit the following proposed schedule for further proceedings in this Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case. As mentioned in defendant’s October 4, 2013 unopposed motion to stay, defendant has identified additional records in need of review and processing since defendant’s August 26, 2013 release letter. The volume of these additional records is significant, and complicated by the fact that the FBI’s position is that much of the material is subject to Exemption 7(A) but must be carefully reviewed for the application of any underlying exemptions as well. Accordingly, the parties suggest the following schedule be entered:

    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 20 Filed 11/01/13 Page 2 of 3

    (1) By March 3, 2014, the FBI will complete processing the additional information located, address all withholdings of information responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request in a Vaughn declaration and provide the completed Vaughn declaration to plaintiff;

    (2) Starting December 2, 2013, and on January 3, 2014, and February 3, 2014, the FBI will release to plaintiff all non-exempt information reviewed during the preceding month or, if the FBI concludes that no reviewed information can be released, inform plaintiff of such; and

    (3) By March 21, 2014, plaintiff will inform the FBI of the exemptions asserted and/or categories of information that plaintiff no longer seeks to challenge through further litigation; and

    (4) By April 4, 2014, the FBI will file its dispositive motion; and

    (5) By May 5, 2014, plaintiff will his opposition to the FBI’s dispositive motion; and

    (6) By May 23, 2014, the FBI will file its reply brief. Respectfully submitted,

    RONALD C. MACHEN JR. D.C. BAR # 447889 United States Attorney

    SO ORDERED: DATE:
    DANIEL F. VAN HORN, D.C. BAR # 924092 Chief, Civil Division

  9. DXer said

    Dr. Vahid Majidi states:

    “The FBI did investigate and interviewed everyone that had come into contact with the hijackers and this inquiry did not result in identification of an accomplice …”

    Dr. Majidi seems not to know that in addition to El-Shukrijumah being an accomplice of Atta, Jdey was seen with Atta. I think it was at Nabil Al-Marabh’s uncle’s apartment.

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      The top CIA analyst has said Jdey was detained at the same time as Moussaoui (he doesn’t say where) but was released.

      Dr. Majidi, is that true?

  10. DXer said

    http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2013/09/auditor-foia-ombudsman-should-be-more-aggressive/70152/

    MORE AGGRESSIVE OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY FOIA COMPLIANCE IS NEEDED, GAO SAYS

    The government ombudsman for evaluating agencies’ compliance with the Freedom of Information Act should be more aggressive, a congressional auditor said on Tuesday.

    The four-year-old Office of Government Information Services, or OGIS, should be more proactive and comprehensive in suggesting improvements to proposed FOIA regulations and in assessing agencies’ compliance with current law, the Government Accountability Office said.
    OGIS has begun developing a standard methodology for reviewing agency FOIA compliance but should establish a timeline for when that methodology will be complete, GAO said.

    OGIS, which was established inside the National Archives and Records Administration in 2009, has provided comments on proposed FOIA regulations at 18 of 99 agencies that administer FOIA so far, GAO said.
    The ombudsman is also tasked with mediating disputes between agencies and the journalists, researchers and members of the public who make FOIA requests. GAO praised OGIS for successfully resolving about two-thirds of those disputes in a way that saved the government time, money and possibly litigation. The ombudsman should have firmer goals for its mediation efforts, however, GAO said.

    A slate of OGIS recommendations to improve FOIA performance governmentwide were stalled at the White House’s Office of Management and Budget for over a year before being released in April 2012 amid pressure from Senate Judiciary Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., and ranking member Sen. Charles Grassley, R–Iowa.

    Legislation pending in the House would allow OGIS to report directly to Congress without passing its recommendations through the White House. The bill, which would also beef up other government transparency initiatives, was sponsored by House Oversight and Government Reform Chairman Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Calif., and that committee’s ranking member Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Md.

  11. DXer said

    I have had the FOIA documents relating to Moussaoui uploaded at the URL below. It can be quickly downloaded in full. The site has very heavy traffic. Other locations are forthcoming. There are something like 67 pages.

    Other websites that may upload the documents include FAS Secrecy, Government’s Attic and ProPublica. It makes for a more efficient use of government resources if such documents are widely disseminated and so I encourage you to forward them to whoever may be interested. Given that I see no support in the documents for the statement in the Harvard WMD report by the former top CIA analyst, I encourage Dr. Dillon to contact the author and ask him to explain the discrepancy.

    Was the reference just a mistake?

    http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fbi-moussaoui.pdf

    If so, I will have to delete one of my favorite graphics.

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      Dr. Dillon writes:

      “This FBI release is only the first, interim one. They are searching for more documents and promised to release them by late October.”

      I am very glad there is such expert FOIA counsel representing Ken — counsel that has such pertinent experience with the exemptions being invoked.

    • DXer said

      This tool titled “Barking Owl” could be used to automatically search all FOIA websites for words containing “anthrax” or “Qaeda” or “Qaida.” The scraper goes to all PDFs on a website and notes any additions or changes that contain the searched term. The names of relevant Al Qaeda personnel (e.g., “Jdey” or “Shukrijumah” could similarly be searched.

      Dan Schultz, former Mozilla foundation fellow at Boston Globe is now here at Newhouse. He was at a meeting at Syracuse Media offices where Barking Owl was presented. Dan tells me that he expects that an interesting tool titled Hyperaudio will be in beta in October.

      https://github.com/thequbit/BarkingOwl

      Barking Owl came out of the need presented at a Hacks and Hackers Rochester (#hhroc) meet-up in Syracuse, NY. A journalist expressed his need for a tool that would assist him in looking for key words within PDFs posted to town websites, such as meeting minutes.

      – Website scrapper
      This tool is pointed to a website, and returns information about the PDF documents it finds there

      – Web portal to scrapped data
      This presents a simple web app to interface to the data found by the website scraper

  12. DXer said

    Dr. Dillon writes:

    “Attached is the first release by FBI in the Moussaoui/Jdey FOIA case. I promised the court that I would put the documents released on CASE CLOSED.”

    I am leaving on a boat in a few minutes and cannot avoid getting on board — and then being incommunicado, even underwater, for the day while I build a seawall around an island. But I am very excited and appreciative of the efforts of Dr. Dillon, Lew, the expert FOIA attorney and non-profit organization, and all the FOIA personnel who have worked to “get people on the same page.” I appreciate that even the overworked David Hardy is merely trying to apply standards to numerous, wide-ranging facts.

    I especially appreciate federal courts and their clerks for embracing and making real the “rule of law.”

  13. DXer said

    Although I have ventured Adnan El-Shukrijumah is the anthrax mailer, here is a rough cut and paste of Dillon’s Amended Complaint relating to his theory that Jdey is the anthrax mailer. Any glitches or errors are mine due to my hasty use of “Select All” feature.

    Case 1:13-cv-00532-RBW Document 14-1 Filed 07/05/13

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    KENNETH J. DILLON
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00532 (RBW)

    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    *************
    FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

    Plaintiff Kenneth J. Dillon brings this action against Defendant Department of Justice pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq., as amended (“FOIA”), the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

    JURISDICTION

    1. This Court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

    VENUE

    2. Venue is appropriate under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

    PARTIES

    3. Plaintiff Kenneth J. Dillon is a U.S. citizen and is a resident of the District of Columbia.
    above.

    4. Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(e), and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Plaintiff which are the subject of this action.

    5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) are DOJ components. Because the records requested by Plaintiff which are the subject of this action are FBI records, FBI will be treated henceforth as the “Defendant” even though, according to law, DOJ is the proper party defendant (and is identified as such in the caption).

    FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (CONSTRUCTIVE RECORDS DENIAL – 1170856)

    6. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in all paragraphs set forth

    7. On 17 July 2011 Plaintiff submitted to FBI a FOIA request for certain records about the August 2001 detention and arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui and the detention of Abderraouf Jdey. FBI acknowledged receipt of this request on 11 January 2012 and assigned it Request No. 1170856.

    8. On 11 January 2012 FBI denied Plaintiff’s request on the basis of Exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) and refused to conduct a search for responsive records.

    9. On 10 February 2012 Plaintiff appealed FBI’s determination to OIP.

    10. On 11 May 2012 OIP remanded Plaintiff’s request to FBI for a search for responsive records.

    11. On 29 April 2013 FBI informed Plaintiff that it was invoking a blanket exemption on the basis of Exemption (b)(7)(A) for records about Jdey. This letter referenced Request No.
    1170856-001, which is a derivative request of Request No. 1170856. However, this letter made no mention of the responsive records about Moussaoui.

    12. Upon information and belief, FBI is still processing Request No. 1170856 as it pertains to records about Moussaoui.

    13. In the interest of judicial efficiency, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted instructions to FBI’s counsel on 5 July 2013 limiting the scope of Request No. 1170856. The instructions read, in pertinent part:
    You may inform your client that Mr. Dillon restricts the scope of Request No. 1170856 to the following records:

    1) All records documenting the items found in the possession of Zacarias Moussaoui on 16-17 August 2001.
    2) All records pertaining to the August 2001 detention which reference cropdusting, cropdusters, or biological or chemical terrorism. This will also include records pertaining to the decision to remove references to cropdusting from the superseding indictment. . . .

    The FBI should perform a CRS search, including cross-references, as well as a search of all records systems, shared drives, and email systems used by the Minneapolis Field Office and FBI Headquarters which are not incorporated into CRS. . . . A simple search of CRS will not be adequate for [this] request, nor will a search which does not include cross-references.

    14. As of this writing, FBI has not issued a final determination regarding Plaintiff’s request. As twenty working days have elapsed without a substantive determination, Plaintiff has exhausted all required administrative remedies.

    15. Plaintiff has a legal right under FOIA to obtain the information he seeks, and there is no legal basis for the denial by FBI of said right.

    16. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in all paragraphs set forth

    17. On 30 March 2012 Plaintiff submitted to FBI a FOIA request for “FBI’s entire file on al Qaeda operative Abderraouf Jdey.” FBI acknowledged receipt of this request on 3 April 2012 and assigned it Request No. 1187039.

    18. On 3 April 2012 FBI denied Plaintiff’s request on the basis of Exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) and refused to conduct a search for responsive records.

    19. On 10 April 2012 Plaintiff appealed FBI’s determination to OIP. 20. On 26 September 2012 OIP affirmed FBI’s determination. 21. Upon information and belief, FBI is now claiming that all records responsive to
    this request are blanketly exempt under Exemption (b)(7)(A). 22. Plaintiff has a legal right under FOIA to obtain the information he seeks, and
    there is no legal basis for the denial by FBI of said right. Refusing to perform a search based on a blanket exemption when only some of the responsive records would be exempt is a violation of FOIA.

    PRAYER FOR RELIEF

    WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kenneth J. Dillon prays that this Court:

    (1) Order the Federal Bureau of Investigation to perform a search for records responsive to Request No. 1187039.

    (2) Order the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide all records responsive to both requests to him as soon as practicable;

    (3) Order preliminary and permanent injunctive and/or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;

    (4) Award reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees as provided in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), or any other applicable law;

    (5) Expedite this action in every way pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a); and (6) Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. July 5, 2013
    Respectfully submitted,

    /s/ Kelly B. McClanahan

  14. DXer said

    There is an Amended Complaint in this FOIA suit that I haven’t seen yet. I am advised that an attorney at a national security non-profit, who is experienced in FOIA cases, is now handling the matter with Ken having moved abroad. With the FBI now invoking the national security exemption, an experienced FOIA counsel will be able to chart a course based on the most recent precedent.

    FBI ordered to explain withholding of documents
    Bob Egelko
    Published 5:59 pm, Tuesday, July 2, 2013

    A federal judge has ordered the FBI to explain its refusal to release documents about its surveillance of the Occupy movement in Northern California, saying general claims of “national security” and “law enforcement” aren’t enough.

    In response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union, the FBI provided 13 pages of documents in September and withheld 24 pages, citing privacy, security, law enforcement concerns and “the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”

    On Monday, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston of San Francisco said the FBI’s explanations were not specific or detailed enough to justify nondisclosure.

    For example, she said, the FBI said it withheld some documents because they were collected for law enforcement purposes, to assist local police agencies and aid in investigations of “crimes and terrorism.” But she said the FBI did not identify the laws it was enforcing or explain how release of the documents would interfere with any current investigation.

    The FBI also said one document, if released, would threaten “serious damage to the national security” by disclosing intelligence-gathering methods and an assessment of one source’s “penetration of a specific target.” But Illston said the FBI had failed to explain how any such disclosures would affect national security.

    The judge also said one document the FBI released, about a November 2011 protest at the Port of Oakland, contained evidence that the agency hadn’t searched all of its files for surveillance records.

    In that document, the FBI said it had contacted police in Stockton to “share intelligence” about Port of Oakland demonstrators, an indication that the bureau had something to share, Illston said. But she said none of the documents, including those the FBI withheld, contained intelligence about protesters in Oakland, information that presumably is stored elsewhere.

    Illston ordered the FBI to provide more specific information within 30 days. She may review some documents privately before deciding whether the ACLU should see them.

    ACLU attorney Linda Lye said she hopes the ruling “will lead to the shining of much-needed light on the FBI’s surveillance of the Occupy movement.”

    • DXer said

      This docket may be incomplete.

      Filing Date # Docket Text

      6/20/2013 9 Memorandum in opposition to re 8 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 06/20/2013)

      6/3/2013 8 MOTION for Summary Judgment by KENNETH J. DILLON (td, ) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

      5/30/2013 7 ORDER. In accordance with the attached order, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint proposed briefing schedule for the filing of dispositive motions on or before June 26, 2013. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on May 30, 2013. (lcrbw1, ) (Entered: 05/30/2013)

      5/28/2013 6 ANSWER to Complaint by FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.(Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/28/2013)

      5/13/2013 5 NOTICE of Appearance by Marina Utgoff Braswell on behalf of FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Braswell, Marina) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

      5/8/2013 4 MOTION for Order compelling defendant FBI to abide by the law and make an answer to complaint by KENNETH J. DILLON (td, ) (Entered: 05/10/2013)

      5/9/2013 3 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION served on 4/26/2013 (td, ) (Entered: 05/10/2013)

      4/23/2013 2 MOTION for CM/ECF Password by KENNETH J. DILLON (td, ) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

      4/16/2013 1 COMPLAINT against FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ( Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 4616055680) filed by KENNETH J. DILLON. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(zmr, ) (Entered: 04/23/2013)

  15. DXer said

    The FBI has filed an answer and a revised response to Ken Dillon’s FOIA request — changing the exemption from privacy under (b)(6) — absent proof that Jdey is dead — to law enforcement/national security under (b)(7). From a filing by Ken, I understand that Judicial Watch is giving some guidance. I won’t backseat drive except to say that given Josh M. of the LA Times says Adnan El-Shukrijumah spent 1 week each in Washington, New York and Montreal in 2001. Thus, non-FOIA inquiries in Montreal might be fruitful both as to Jdey and El-Shukrijumah. If I get to go to Montreal next month, I’ll at least stop and introduce myself to the waiters at Boussora’s favorite restaurant. There is also a $5 million reward for Boussora.

    Anything I’ve ever gotten under FOIA — which has been a lot (thousands of pages at no cost) — was due to the kindness and hard work of strangers.

    For example, I am reminded of the brilliant initiative shown by JB Petro and David Relman in arranging through DIA to make key documents available through FOIA in the context of publishing a SCIENCE article. I don’t ever recall seeing anything quite like it and I am forever indebted to their innovative approach to getting people on the same page.

    Ken, according to a filing, is leaving the country. I wish him well in his travels — it has been an honor to know such a well-mannered academic and analyst. Personally, I see no way around (b)(6) and (b)(7) in the context of a $5 million BOLO, even though I personally credit the intel and Ken’s view that Jdey is dead. The FBI should exercise its discretion and at least release the documents relating to Jdey’s detention at the same time as Moussaoui and release. It does not interfere with any national security investigation — and merely mitigates the inevitable charge that the withholding is all about CYA.

  16. DXer said

    Former Senator Graham has explained that classified documents contradict the FBI’s investigation in Florida. Relatedly, newly Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents state than an informant, Wissam Hammoud, says that al-Hilji once introduced him to Adnan El Shukrijumah.

    Now given that the FBI says it did not know who El-Shukrijumah was until KSM was captured in March 2003, the FBI’s position is consistent with the family not being known to be connected to the hijackers. The FBI hadn’t yet figured out who was working with the hijackers.

    Adnan was not a hijacker as such — he later was understood as the “next Atta.” Given the FBI says it did not even know who he was until March 2003, then the significance of his connection to the al-Hilji family should be revisited. Of course, if the FBI didn’t even figure out who he was — even though numerous detainees were describing him — fat chance they could ever discover he was a prime candidate for anthrax mailer (even better than Jdey).

    Relatedly, the GAO should consider that El-Shukrijumah, according to the report in the 911 Commission report, was with Atta and a colleague at the immigration office in January 2001 when Atta submitted his paperwork.

    Might El-Shukrijumah have filled in Atta’s paperwork? Are we sure that the writing is Atta’s handwriting rather than El-Shukrijumah? (More exemplars would clarify this).

    This morning I called a private detective from Florida closely following El-Shukrijumah. He does not know of handwriting exemplars for this Adnan El-Shukrijumah, who I have ventured as a great prospect for anthrax mailer.

    A key piece of proof relating to an Adnan as mailer hypothesis is KSM’s instruction to El-Shukrijumah to get ready to travel. See secret detainee assessment that is uploaded.

    El-Shukrijumah, like my sometimes Facebook Friend anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat, was living with KSM in Kandahar. At some point, KSM instructed El-Shukrijumah to get ready to travel. KSM was startled when he was told the instruction still existed — protocol was to destroy such evidence. And KSM is not an easy guy to fluster — and so this planned trip might have been important.

    Qahtani, the intended 20th hijacker, places Adnan at KSM’s house at September 13, 2001. See secret detainee assessment report. Adnan was very experienced at faking necessary travel documents and had a number of legitimate passports — meanwhile, as the FBI is quick to emphasize, the FBI did not know El-Shukrijumah was an Al Qaeda operative, moving footloose and fancy free in Florida. The FBI was too busy helping the Administration avoid any embarrassment to Prince Bandar. I’ve known of Prince Bandar since the days he paid for the 100 combat helicopters to Saddam, complete with quick release mechanism for pesticides. Prince Bandar met at a Benihana restaurant and planned it with Sarkis Soghanalian. There is a tape and transcript. And so trust me that a lot happens behind the scenes that you don’t read about in the newspaper.

    It is quite ridiculous that the FBI is being allowed to hide documents relating to Shukrijumah — all for political reasons.

    El-Shukrijumah is now the head of Al Qaeda’s external operations.

    At the nuts-and-bolts level, the GAO should also obtain the FBI’s handwriting comparison for Atta, Adnan El-Shukrijumah, Jdey and Bruce Ivins.

    An FBI agent once told me that the FBI thinks that printing such letters can be very useful — even probative.

    Okay, if that is the FBI’s view of handwriting forensics, well, then let’s see the handwriting comparison.

    (I agree as to cursive but not printing — but no matter). I would agree that Bruce Ivins’ handwriting looks nothing like the Fall 2001 anthrax letters.

    Let’s turn to this evidence rather than hearing tall tales from former counselors channeled through the USG’s consulting psychiatrists — like Bruce Ivins’ first counselor — who thought she was controlled by an alien who had put a microchip in her buttt.

    http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/13/10656262-classified-documents-contradict-fbi-on-post-911-probe-of-saudis-ex-senator-says?lite

    Classified documents contradict FBI on post-9/11 probe of Saudis, ex-senator says

    Former Florida Sen. Bob Graham, who co-chaired Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has seen two classified FBI documents that he says are at odds with the bureau’s public statements that there was no connection between the hijackers and Saudis then living in Sarasota, Fla.
    “There are significant inconsistencies between the public statements of the FBI in September and what I read in the classified documents,” Graham said.


    Whether the 9/11 hijackers acted alone, or whether they had support within the U.S., remains an unanswered question — one that began to be asked as soon as it became known that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens. It was underlined when Congress’s bipartisan inquiry released its public report in July 2003. The final 28 pages, regarding possible foreign support for the terrorists, were censored in their entirety — on President George W. Bush’s instructions.

    ***

    The FBI-led investigation a decade ago focused on Abdulaziz al-Hijji and his wife, Anoud, who moved out of their home in the upscale, gated community of Prestancia, near Sarasota, and left the country in the weeks before 9/11. The couple left behind three cars and numerous personal belongings, such as furnishings, clothes, medicine and food, according to law enforcement records. After the 9/11 attacks, a concerned neighbor contacted the FBI.

    ***

    Al-Hijji, who now lives and works in London, recently called 9/11 “a crime against the USA and all humankind” and said he was “saddened and oppressed by these false allegations.” He also said it was “not true” that Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers visited him at his Sarasota home.
    The FBI has backed up al-Hijji. After initially declining to comment, the bureau confirmed that it did investigate but said it found nothing sinister. Agents, however, have refused to answer reporters’ specific questions about its investigation or its findings about the Prestancia gate records.

    ***

    “At no time during the course of its investigation of the attacks, known as the PENTTBOM investigation, did the FBI develop credible evidence that connected the address at 4224 Escondito Circle, Sarasota, Florida, to any of the 9/11 hijackers,” wrote records section chief David M. Hardy.

    Newly released Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents, however, state that an informant told the FBI in 2004 that al-Hijji had considered Osama bin Laden a “hero” and may have known some of the hijackers. The informant, Wissam Hammoud, also said al-Hijji once introduced him to Adnan El Shukrijumah, an ex-Broward County resident and suspected al-Qaida operative on the FBI’s Most Wanted list.

  17. DXer said

    • DXer said

      The fellow detained in Montreal for the train terror plot, Chiheb Esseghaier, was known by his neighbors for using his barbecue grill once inside and filling the place with smoke. He said it was too windy outside.

      He also was known for filling the place with smoke upon using all 4 burners. He said he was drying a shirt.

      Now in the past, the plotters in Operation Bojinka — a plot to bring down a bunch of planes with bombs — were discovered only because the apartment filled with smoke while they were preparing the explosives. I vaguely recall that the plan was to bring 11 airliners down simultaneously. KSM’s nephew Ramzi Youssef was involved in the plot but escaped. What do the forensics show in connection with the defendant’s Montreal apartment?

      Chemistry – Operation Bojinka

      http://www.chemistrydaily.com/chemistry/Project_Bojinka‎

      Philippine authorities say that Operation Bojinka was developed by alleged Al-Qaida ….. was started when Abdul Hakim Murad started a chemical fire in the kitchen sink in Suite … The smoke came when water was poured on to douse the fire.

      • DXer said

        Did Chicheb Esseghaier meet Jdey in Iran in June 2011? Both had lived in Montreal. Both are from Tunisia. There is a $5 million BOLO for Jdey. Did he meet Boussora? there is also a $5 million BOLO for Boussora. Even assuming for the sake of argument Jdey brought down Flight 587, as Ken Dillon suggests (and is also reported in hearsay reports by Al Qaeda operatives), note that it did not have to be by a shoebomb such as used by Richard Reid. Indeed, as I vaguely recall, the test run in Bojinka involved detonation by use of an altimeter. I think Kacynzki used a similar device in his early failed attempted to bring down a United Airlines flight. And so finding that Jdey is alive will not serve to debunk Dillon’s brilliant hypothesis that Jdey was the mailer (He first shared it with me almost a decade ago and I knew then he was on to something).. As I’ve said, I’ve suggested that alternatively maybe El-Shukrijumah was the mailer — El-Shukrijumah was living with KSM about the same time as Al Qaeda lab director Yazid Sufaat (who was working with virulent anthrax contrary to unfounded arguments to the contrary). But my hypothesis runs up against the claim by the report by the 20th hijacker Qahtani that El-Shukrijumah was at KSM’s house on September 13, 2001. This is why I have urged that the FBI or Army make public the memo by KSM instructing Jdey to get ready to travel — so that we can see the date that Jdey was expected to travel. Jdey was expert at falsifying passports, visas etc. I think confusion has stemmed from the trip made by Sufaat, Hambali etc. to Karachi to buy laboratory equipment. Those analysts are overlooking the large amount of equipment that had been moved to Kandahar in May 2001. The September 2001 mailings were small scale and did not require more equipment than Sufaat already had by June 2001. In email and chat with me, Sufaat does not deny Al Qaeda’s responsibility for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings. He tells me he could work magic. Now charged with terrorism, his next court date is May 17, 2013. You will want to see the half dozen affidavits that have been provided to defense counsel.

        http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

  18. DXer said

    Colin Frieze notes on twitter that the suggestion of a bacteria plot by Ahmed Abassi was aspirational in the extreme.

    U.S. officials: Train terror suspect suggested bacteria plot
    COLIN FREEZE
    The Globe and Mail
    Published Thursday, May. 09 2013,

    Defence R&D Canada has long experience with being ready for an anthrax threat. For example, there is the declassified September 10, 2001 Canadian “Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters”
    http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA399955

    If it were otherwise, Canada has considerable expertise in addressing the threat.

    After a January 2001 anthrax threat, a Canadian research team undertook to assess the risk. The report titled “Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters” issued September 2001. The Canadian study found considerable exposure to those in the room resulted when such a letter was opened. Bacillus globigii spores (in dry powder form) were donated by the US Department of Defense (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah). Stock concentration powder was -1 x 10 11 cfu/gm. The anthrax sent to the Senators had a smaller particle size –tending toward a uniform 1 micron, subject to clumping that easily broke apart. Bacillus globigii (BG) spores are routinely used as a simulant for Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores. “The letter was prepared by putting BG spores in the center of a sheet of paper, folding it over into thirds, placing the folded sheet into the envelope and sealing using the adhesive present on the envelope. The envelope was then shaken to mimic the handling and tumbling that would occur during its passage through the postal system.” The aerosol, produced by opening the BG spore containing envelope, was not confined to the area of the desk but spread throughout the chamber. Values were almost as high at the opposite end of the chamber, shortly after opening the envelopes. 99% of the particles collected were in the 2.5 to 10 µm size range. The report explained: “In addition, the aerosol would quickly spread throughout the room so that other workers, depending on their exact locations and the directional air flow within the office, would likely inhale lethal doses. Envelopes with the open corners not specifically sealed could also pose a threat to individuals in the mail handling system.”

    More than 80% of the B anthracis particles collected on stationary monitors were within an alveolar respirable size range of 0.95 to 3.5 µm. Thus, the simulant performed very well. Those who continue to argue that the Daschle product was so advanced beyond what the US could do are mistaken. The CIA and CSIS apparently feared that the Vanguards of Conquest would use the good stuff. Al Qaeda anthrax lab director, Yazid Sufaat, before being charged recently with terrorism, told me on Facebook that he could perform magic.

    The CIA knew EIJ intended to use anthrax — from the proclamations of Jaballah’s friend, the captured military commander Mabruk and Jaballah’s brother-in-law’s former law partner al-Zayat. Authorities knew Al Qaeda was getting technical assistance from scientists — and that many of the senior Egyptian leaders had advanced or technical degrees. The specifications provided by Dugway perhaps involved treated fumed silica and a spraydryer (with a last critical step reserved to be done at Dugway) may have been based on what Al Qaeda might send with a little help from their friends.

    Canadian officials explained they e-mailed the study to the CDC soon after reports of the discovery of anthrax at the American Media Inc. headquarters in Florida. The e-mail, however, was never opened, reports the lead CDC anthrax investigator, who regrets that he never read the email. “It is certainly relevant data, but I don’t think it would have altered the decisions that we made.” At one point, about 2,000 CDC employees were working on the anthrax matter. This Canadian report was perhaps the single most important scientific data point for the CDC to take into account. It certainly was one of the most important reports for the FBI to take into account.

    Bail was denied by decision on October 5, 2001. Then highly potent anthrax was sent the next day just as had been promised. But Ayman apparently had returned to the target of his greatest interest — rather than a Canadian immigration minister, he and Shehata and their colleagues targeted the minister who oversaw the Department of Justice and appropriations to Egypt and Israel, and who gave his name (”the Leahy Law”) to the law that permits continuing appropriations to Egypt in the face of allegations of torture. Zawahiri never makes a threat he doesn’t intend to try to keep.

    Bill Patrick, who often worked with George Mason University students in northern Virginia, had written a report in 1999 for a consultant SAIC at the request of Dr. Steve Hatfill. As one bioterrorism expert commented about the report: “Anytime you pick something up like this, and it seems to layout the whole story for you months or years before the fact, your immediate response is to step back and say ‘whoa, something may be going on here. “Our attacker may very well have used this report as something of a — if not a template, then certainly as a rule of thumb.”

    The Canadian experiments in 2001 showed that if anthrax spores were finely powdered, a letter could release thousands of lethal doses of the bacteria within minutes of being opened. Furthermore, large amounts of material leaked out of sealed envelopes even before they were opened. By then, more than two dozen federal government employees knew of the Canadian studies, which showed that a real anthrax threat letter was a far more dangerous weapon than anyone had believed. Within days, a dozen more people were informed of the now highly relevant experimental findings. Over the course of the next decade, one FBI investigative squad was focused on people who may have known of the study — such as William Patrick’s friend, Dr. Steve Hatfill. Another squad would be focused on the usual suspects and their friends. For the next seven years, the investigation would be shrouded in great secrecy.

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

  19. DXer said

    Terror suspect discussed killing up to 100,000 with bacteria: documents

    Read more: http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/terror-suspect-discussed-killing-up-to-100-000-with-bacteria-documents-1.1274380#ixzz2SzkvogWw

    Malaysian Yazid Sufaat, who told his wife he was working for a Taliban medical brigade when years ago he went to Afghanistan, got the job of anthrax lab director instead of Rauf. Yazid Sufaat tells me by Facebook chat that what he did was for the love of Islam. He says that the plan “is on the way.” He explains that he was part of the Malaysian biological weapons program before that country signed the nonproliferation treaty. He did not tell interrogators because he felt he had been betrayed by his country.

    The CIA has known of Zawahiri’s plans to use anthrax since July 1998, when the CIA seized a disc from Ayman Zawahiri’s right-hand, Ahmed Mabruk, during his arrest outside a restaurant in Baku, Azerbaijan. At the time, Mabruk was the head of Jihad’s military operations. Mabruk was handed over to Egyptian authorities. A close associate and former cellmate in Dagestan in 1996, Mabruk was at Ayman’s side while Ayman would fall to his knees during trial and weep and invoke Allah. Their captors reportedly did not know the true identity of the prisoners. After Mabruk’s capture in Baku, Azerbaijan, the CIA refused to give the FBI Mabruk’s laptop. FBI’s Bin Laden expert John O’Neill, head of the FBI’s New York office, tried to get around this by sending an agent to Azerbaijan to get copies of the computer files from the Azerbaijan government. The FBI finally got the files after O’Neill persuaded President Clinton to personally appeal to the president of Azerbaijan for the computer files. FBI Special Agent Dan Coleman would later describe the laptop as the “Rosetta Stone of Al Qaeda.” O’Neill died on 9/11 in his role as head of World Trade Center security. He died with the knowledge that Ayman Zawahiri planned to attack US targets with anthrax — and that Zawahiri does not make a threat that he does not intend to try to keep.

    • DXer said

      At the time, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (”DTRA”) set up a program at Lawrence Livermore to combat the Bin Laden anthrax threat. The CIA also snatched Egyptian Al-Najjar, another senior Al Qaeda member (a shura or policy-making council member). Al-Najjar reportedly had been working for the Egyptian intelligence services. Al-Najjar confirmed Ayman’s intent to use anthrax as a weapon against US targets in connection with the detention of militant islamists in a sworn lengthy confession. Even Zawahiri’s friend, Cairo lawyer Montasser al-Zayat, the blind sheik’s attorney, announced in March 1999 that Bin Laden and Zawahiri were likely to resort to the biological and chemical agents they possessed given the extradition pressure senior Movement leaders faced. That week, and thoughout that year, Al-Zayat was in touch by telephone with US Post Office employee Sattar and Islamic Group leaders about the group’s strategy to free the blind sheik. An islamist who had been a close associate of Zawahiri later would explain that Zawahiri spent a decade and had made 15 separate attempts to recruit the necessary expertise to weaponize anthrax in Russia and the Middle East.

      EIJ military commander Mabruk was in regular contact with Mahmoud Jaballah, who was in Toronto beginning May 1996. Although Mabruk changed his location every few months, Jaballah kept aware of his whereabouts through his contacts with Jaballah’s brother-in-law Shehata. Shehata was in charge of EIJ’s “special operations.” When Mabruk was arrested and imprisoned in Dagestan along with Zawahiri, Jaballah was told on December 13, 1996 that Mabruk was “hospitalized.” That was code for “in jail” and, for example, is the code used by Zawahiri in emails on the same subject. Jaballah raised funds for Mabruk’s release and coordinated these collection efforts with Shehata. Indeed, it was Jaballah’s brother-in-law Shehata who brought the money to Dagestan to arrange for Zawahiri’s and Mabruk’s release.

      Correspondence between Mabruk and Jaballah in 1997 reported on Jaballah’s recruitment efforts. Mabruk, EIJ’s military commander, was pleased. Jaballah confirmed with Shehata and Mabruk his view of the reliability of the individuals he had recruited. His reported that his recruits were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Zawahiri and the Vanguards of Conquest sought to recreate Mohammed’s taking of mecca by a small band through violent attacks on Egyptian leaders.

      The cause of the Egyptian militants had suffered a serious setback with the murder of tourists at Luxor. After the public relations debacle of Luxor, and after the August 1998 US embassy bombings, al-Qaeda actively sought religious and legal opinions from Movement scholars around the world who might help rationalize the killing of innocents.

      A February 1999 letter signed by “Army of Suicidals Group 66, Bin Laden Militant Wing” threatened anthrax attacks against Westerners if they stayed in Yemen beyond a 11-day ultimatum ending February 27, 1999. Investigators considered a possible connection to the attempted extradition to Yemen of the London-based Egyptian Islamic preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri. Memos in the Spring of 1999 from Zawahiri to Egyptian Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda’s military commander, and former Cairo police sergeant, indicate that Ayman was a close student of the USAMRIID anthrax program. He believed that the Koran instructed that a jihadist should use the weapons used by the crusader. “What we know is that he’s always said it was a religious obligation to have the same weapons as their enemies,” former CIA Bin Laden unit counterterrorism chief Michael Scheuer once explained.

      The most senior Vanguards of Conquest leader in North America was Mohammad Mahjoub. Mahjoub had known Essam Mohamed Hafez Marzouk. Marzouk had trained the 1998 embassy bombers. Marzouk was one of those picked up in Azerbaijan in August 1998. For a time, Marzouk had lived in Canada in British Columbia. After initially denying he knew Marzouk, Mahjoub testified in 2001 that earlier he had lied and said he knew and had been in contact with him. Canadian Vanguards member Jaballah claimed that Mahjoub was in regular contact with Marzouk.

      87 of the 107 defendants in the 1999 “Returnees from Albania” trial in Cairo were Vanguards members. Mahjoub was convicted in absentia and sentenced to 15 years. The group swore that it would seek revenge in retaliation for the convictions in that case.

      In early February 2001, the CIA briefed President Bush on what was known about Al Qaeda’s anthrax plans. The bail for Vanguards of Conquest #2 Mahjoub was denied on October 5, 2001. The anthrax mailer then sent especially deadly anthrax to the people in the symbolic position of appropriations to Egypt and Israel and the rendering of senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Egyptian Islamic Group leaders.

  20. DXer said

    The recent story in the news about the highly educated supporters of jihad is reminiscent of Ali Al-Timimi.

    The top CIA analyst, in a Harvard WMD report, claims that Jdey was detained at the same time as Moussaoui but released. Thus, especially after the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings, it was surprising that they should continue to allow Ali Al-Timimi work alongside the DARPA-funded Ames anthrax researchers. Authorities knew Ali Al-Timiim was coordinating with Bin Laden’s sheik Al-Hawali and they were discussing aiding Zacarias Moussaoui’s defense. The United States government knew that Al Qaeda was seeking to use anthrax as a weapon against US targets.

    A laptop evidencing Al Qaeda’s intent on weaponizing anthrax had been seized in Baku in July 1998. Two months later, Dr. Ken Alibek, then Program Manager, Battelle Memorial Institute, testified before the Joint Economic Committee on the subject of “Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy” about the proliferation of know-how. Dr. Alibek noted that “[t]here are numerous ways in which Russia’s biological weapons expertise can be proliferated to other countries.” Indeed. Sometimes such proliferation is funded by DARPA and any student who wanted to apply to work in the building could submit an application. One applicant accepted was this Salafist preacher seeing signs of the coming day of judgment and the inevitable clash of civilizations. He had been mentored by the sheik named in Bin Laden’s declaration of war in 1996. In 1999, Al-Timimi had a high security clearance for work for the Navy. His father worked at the Iraqi embassy.

    Dr. Alibek testified before the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism again in May 2000 about the issue of proliferation of biological weapons. He explained: “Terrorists interested in biological weapons are on the level of state-sponsored terrorist organizations such as that of Osama bin Laden; on the level of large, independent organizations such as Aum Shinrikyo; or on the level of individuals acting alone or in concert with small radical organizations.”

    Dr. Alibek in 2003 told me he knew Ali was a hardliner. At one point, he described Ali to me as a fanatic. Dr. Alibek explained to the Congressional Committee in May 2000: “When most people think of proliferation, they imagine weapons export. In the case of biological weapons, they picture international smuggling either of ready-made weapons material, or at least of cultures of pathogenic microorganisms. However, this area of proliferation is of the least concern. Even without such assistance, a determined organization could obtain virulent strains of microorganisms from their natural reservoirs (such as soil or animals), from culture libraries that provide such organisms for research purposes, or by stealing cultures from legitimate laboratories.” American Type Culture Collection, the largest microbiologist depository in the world, co-sponsored Ali’s bioinformatics program. Dr. Alibek explained: “The proliferation issue is particularly complex for biological weapons. In many cases, the same equipment and knowledge that can be used to produce biological weapons can also be used to produce legitimate biotechnological products.”

    By 2001, Al-Timimi was allowed access to the American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”), the most diverse microbiological repository in the world and allowed to work alongside staff at the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense. The Center for Biodefense personnel were working under the largest biodefense award in history. Delta (avirulent) Ames was supplied by NIH and work with virulent Ames was done at Southern Research Institute in Frederick, Maryland under a subcontract.

    The lead FBI scientist, Jason Bannan, was the collection scientist for the bacteriology division at ATCC to which Ali Al-TImimi had unfettered access. No vetting was done in allowing access to the largest microbiological collection in the world.

    Al-Timimi had supervised Cairo-based militants writing for the Pittsburgh-based Assirat and then for IANA. One of them, Kamal Habib, was the founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a friend of Ayman Zawahiri. The Cairo-based writers Kamal Habib and Gamal Sultan approached the blind sheik Abdel Rahman about starting a political party in early 1999. On March 1 and 2, 1999, Lynne Stewart and translator Yousry visited Abdel Rahman in prison in Rochester, Minnesota and relayed the proposal. On March 6, 1999, the first press reports about anthrax appeared quoting the blind sheik’s Cairo lawyer, Montasser al-Zayat, and two key detainees in a massive trial al-Zayat was defending. Attorney Zayat and the two defendants explained that Ayman likely was going to use anthrax against US targets to retaliate against the rendering and detention of the Egyptian militants.

    On March 9, 1999 following the visit in prison at which the political idea had been proposed, Abdel Rahman issued a statement rejecting a proposal that the Islamic Group form a political party in Egypt. That day, the Islamic Group military commander Mustafa Hamza spoke with the blind sheik’s liaison, US Post Office employee Abdel Sattar. The next month, the Blind Sheik’s publicist Sattar spoke with Taha, the IG head close to the Taliban and Bin Laden, in a three-way call with Cairo attorney Al-Zayat. Sattar also spoke on the telephone with Vanguards of Conquest spokesman Al Sirri (based in London). From the beginning, the weaponization of anthrax for use against US targets was inextricably linked to the detention of senior militant Egyptian leaders, including the blind sheik. The Administration continues to be confused on such a basic point — and the talking points were rewritten so as to avoid the fact that the protest in front of the embassy in Benghazi had been organized by Muhammad al-Zawahiri to protest the detention of the Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman.

    Ayman Zawahiri’s brother Muhammad was rendered to Cairo in April 1999. Mamdouh Ismail, Al-Zayat’s co-founder of a key reform party, represented the Al-Zawahiri family in connection with Muhammad’s rendition and detention. Ayman Zawahiri and Muhammad’s sister, Heba, a Pharmacology Professor at Cairo Medical, were concerned that he might be mistreated by Egyptian security services. A recent graduate from the same department, Tarek Hamouda, soon was working alongside Bruce Ivins with virulent Ames at Ft. Detrick.

    Bruce Ivins had supplied the virulent Ames strain of anthrax to Ann Arbor researchers. One of the researchers, Dr. Hamouda, obtained his PhD in microbiology from Cairo Medical in 1994. He and his wife came to the United States to settle that year. By 1998, he was working on a DARPA-funded project involving nanoemulsions and a biocidal cream. In December 1999, he and two colleagues travelled to a remote military installation in Utah, Dugway, to test its effectiveness in killing aerosolized anthrax surrogates. An April 2001 report describing testing at Dugway concluded that the best performing decontamination agents were from University of Michigan, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL). The FBI first was faxed the 16 pages describing the research on March 2005.

    If we don’t learn from history, we are bound to repeat it.

    • DXer said

      On March 14, 2001, former USAMRIID deputy commander Ames researcher Charles L. Bailey and famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek filed a patent application for a process to treat cell culture with hydrophobic silicon dioxide. Dr. Bailey was in Room 156B of GMU’s Discovery Hall at the Center for Biodefense. Ali Al-Timimi, an associate of radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali, considered to be Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, was a graduate student who worked in the same building. Ali Al-Timimi was the most celebrated speaker of the charity Islamic Assembly of North America (”IANA”). The IANA website had published the fatwa “Provision of Suicide Operations,” dated June 19, 2001, that stated: “The mujahid [or warrior] must kill himself if he knows this will lead to killing a great number of the enemies or demolishing a center vital to the enemy or its military forces. In this new era, this can be accomplished with the modern means of bombing or bringing down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses.” On August 26, 2001, IANA’s website http://www.islamway.com published a propaganda statement that encouraged individuals to join arms against the West titled “An Invitation to Jihad,” stating that “[t]he mujahid brothers will accept you with open arms and within a period of two weeks you will be given commando training and will be sent to the frontline.”

      In mid-December 2001, the US arrested US-based Al Qaeda biochem operative Ali Al-Marri, who had arrived on September 10, 2001 and was nominally a student living in Macomb, Illinois. Al-Marri had lived in Macomb the previous summer and had traveled to New York City to join with UK operative Dhiren Barot to case NYC helicopters and financial institutions. Authorities had learned of calls he made from Illinois to KSM’s assistant al-Hawsawi. He had the imam at the local mosque store the computer in his basement and then ship it to Washington.

      Beginning December 2001, Ali Al-Timimi was on GMU staff and paid $70,000 a year. Officials learned of communications between Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s spiritual adviser, radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali. Al-Timimi’s attorney, for example, says that Al-Timimi and Al-Hawali spoke on September 16, 2001 and September 19, 2001. They later spoke in coordinating a letter to members of Congress on the first anniversary of the anthrax letters to the Senators and helping Moussaoui with his defense.

      In March 2002, a crude biological weapons site was found in Afghanistan. U.S. forces discovered a site near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that appeared to be an Al Qaeda biological weapons lab under construction. Zawahiri’s plan, evidenced in the documents found previous in the Fall, was to move the location of the lab every 3 months.

      In February 2011, the National Academies of Sciences reported:

      “In December 2010-January 2011, the FBI first made available to the Committee “AMX Weekly Science Updates” and a newly de-classified document that described the collection and analysis of environmental samples from an undisclosed site outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for the presence of B. anthracis Ames (FBI/USDOJ, 2011, FBI Documents, WFO Report). This work was performed as part of the anthrax letters investigation. Few details were made available to the committee.

      At least three sample collection missions were conducted by the FBI and/or partners from the intelligence community at an overseas site because of information about efforts by Al Qaeda to develop an “anthrax program” (FBI/USDOJ, 2011). In May 2004, the FBI and partners from the intelligence community visited an overseas location at which they had been told an anthrax program had been operating, and brought back swab and swipe samples to the United States. None of the samples grew B. anthracis after incubation in culture media. However, three swab samples were reported as positive for B. anthracis and for B. anthracis Ames-specific sequences by PCR, including swabbings from the outside of an unopened medicine dropper package, a sink, and a sink drain hose. Repeat testing of these three positive samples as part of a group of 15 blinded samples, including soil samples, water blanks and non Ames Bacillus species, again yielded positive results for two of the three same samples (and for none of the other samples).

      However, not all replicates of the DNA extracts from the positive samples gave positive results. Apparently, an earlier collection mission to this site, prior to May 2004, by others in the intelligence community had also yielded samples with positive PCR results for B. anthracis
      DNA and negative culture results. As a result of these findings, a third collection mission was conducted in November 2004 and this time large portions of the site were returned intact to the United States, including the entire sink, drain, and associated plumbing that had been the source of the positive March 2004 samples. These items were extensively sampled, and again tested for both viable B. anthracis and for B. anthracis DNA. This time, according to the June 2008 declassified document, all the tests were negative (FBI Documents, WFO Report).
      The committee was provided only fragmentary information about and limited primary data from this work and received them very late in our study. We consider these data to be inconclusive regarding the possible presence of B. anthracis Ames at this undisclosed overseas site. Several scientific and technical issues should be explored in more detail, such as the performance characteristics of the assays, whether or not the assays were validated for use with these sample types, the degree to which samples or sample locations gave repeatedly positive results, interpretation of inconsistent positive results, whether or not the Ames genetic mutations in the anthrax letters were detected in any of these overseas samples, and the natural distribution of B. anthracis strain types in this overseas geographic region.”

      As he described to ABCNEWS, Dr. Alibek and other scientists in March 2002 took lie detector tests. He had to answer questions including “Did you do it?” and “Do you know who did it?” Alibek reports that he passed the test. Although Dr. Alibek offered his services to the FBI Director in a letter, the response was that they already had a large group working on it. In late June 2002, quoting unnamed law enforcement officials, the Associated Press reported that up to 200 polygraph tests had been given to current and former employees of the Battelle Institute and of Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, where scientists have developed a powdered form of anthrax for testing biological defense systems. It was Dugway that provided the simulant used in testing after the 2001 threat letter relating to the detention of Mahjoub, the former manager of Bin Laden’s farm in Sudan. The DARPA-funded Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey had both worked for Battelle as consultants. Dr. David Franz advises that in 2001, if a researcher wanted to test a biodefense project, if it was inside, it could be done at either West Jefferson, Ohio facilty or at the Dugway facility managed by Battelle in Utah. But if it was an outside testing, it would be done in Utah. I didn’t think to ask him about Southern Research Institute which was using virulent Ames, according to the press release and Dr. Alibek, pursuant to a multimillion dollar subcontract.

      In August 2002, Afghan police found a store of chemicals in a house in Kabul formerly occupied by a Saudi non-governmental organization, the WAFA Humanitarian Organization. Local media reports called it a terrorist laboratory. “Some containers and documents have been found by the police authorities,” a spokesman for international peacekeepers said. One local report said that the discovery included 36 types of chemicals, explosive materials, fuses, laboratory equipment and some “terroristic guide books.” It said the laboratory was found in a residence in the diplomatic area of Kabul in a building that had been used by an Arab national who headed the group prior to 9/11. WAFA was a militant supporter of the Taliban. Documents found in WAFA’s offices in Afghanistan revealed that the charity was intimately involved in assassination plots against U.S. citizens as well as the distribution of “how to” manuals on chemical and biological warfare. U.S. officials have described WAFA as a key component of Bin Laden’s organization.

      In 2002, a man named Singh tried to purchase over the internet a wireless video module and a control module for use in an unmanned aerial vehicle (”UAV”). He chose an airborne video system with a camera and transmitter able to transmit video images from a UAV back to a receiver from as far as 15 miles away. The video camera could be used in military reconnaissance and in helping aim artillery and other weaponry across enemy lines. Singh placed his order from England, but the company was unable to confirm Singh’s overseas credit card. Two young men from Northern Virginia, Chapman and Khan, who were among the group later known as the “Virginia Paintball Defendants,”assisted him in completing the purchases. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later explained, the pair “attended the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia where Ali Timimi, a primary lecturer, spoke of the necessity to engage in violent jihad against the enemies of Islam and the ‘end of time’ battle between Muslims and non-Muslims.” In the summer of 2002, Singh visited Virginia, staying first with one of them and then with the other. Ali Timimi was unindicted co-conspirator number 1 in the Virginia Paintball Case, and was only later identified by Prosecutors (and then separately indicted).

      Ali Timimi drafted a letter from dissident Saudi sheik Hawali dated October 6, 2002. He had it hand delivered it to every member of the US Congress just before their vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Although drafted by Al-Timimi, the letter was sent from Bin Laden’s sheik al-Hawali and warned of the disastrous consequences that would follow an invasion of Iraq. Rm 154A in George Mason’s Discovery Hall (down from former USAMRIID head Dr. Bailey in Rm 156B) would be Victor Morozov’s room number when he first assumed Timimi’s phone number in 2004 (and before he moved to a newly constructed, adjacent building). Morozov was the co-inventor with Dr. Bailey of the related cell culture process under which the silica was removed from the spore surface. A faculty member who would consult with Ali suggests that it instead was Rm. 154B, in the middle of the office suite. It was hugely negligent to allow a supporter of the salafist-jihadists to share a suite with the leading DARPA-funded Ames anthrax researchers. Jason Bannan, the collection scientist for the Bacteriology Division at the ATCC, which shared the GMU facilities, became the chief scientist in Amerithrax — and the public never heard any of this.

    • DXer said

      The lead investigator at the time, Agent Lambert, explained at deposition in the civil suit brought by Steve Hatfill that after recurring leaks, the Amerithrax investigation was compartmentalized into three squads over his strong objection to FBI Director Mueller. He was afraid that as the result of the compartmentalization, investigators would not be able to connect the dots.

      In Northern Virginia, GMU microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi had been questioned by the FBI agent and Secret Service agent in connection with WTC 1993. Al-Timimi was a graduate student and employee in bioinformatics at George Mason University who shared a department fax with famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID deputy commander and anthrax researcher Charles Bailey. On February 26, 2003, authorities searched Ali Al-Timimi’s townhouse. The Washington Post later summarized: “The agents reached an alarming conclusion: ‘Timimi is an Islamist supporter of Bin Laden’ who was leading a group ‘training for jihad,’ the agent wrote in the affidavit. The FBI even came to speculate that Timimi, a doctoral candidate pursuing cancer gene research, might have been involved in the anthrax attacks.”

      That same morning, they arrested Sami al-Hussayen, who funnelled money from Saudi Arabia to the Islamic Assembly of North America and maintained websites for radical Saudi Sheiks who inspired Bin Laden. Sami al-Hussayen was in regular contact with Sheik al-Hawali. At the same time they searched Ali Al-Timimi’s townhouse, in Virginia and arrested Sami al-Hussayen in Moscow, Idaho, the FBI searched the home of two PhD level food production experts. One was in Moscow, Idaho and one was in Syracuse, New York.

      100 agents came to Syracuse, NY that day as part of “Operation Imminent Horizon” and simultaneously interviewed 150 people. The animal geneticist and food researcher in Syracuse, Ismail Diab, mixed with silica in making animal feedstuffs. Dr. Diab was not questioned. He had been in Syracuse in Fall 2001 but then returned to Pullman, Washington until the FBI began investigating there in August 2002. At the same time, the FBI interviewed and searched the apartment of Sami’s friend Nabil Al-Baloushi, a doctoral student in food engineering at the University of Idaho. His PhD thesis in 2003 on drying had 350 pages of drying coefficients.

      Authorities trumpeted checks years earlier exchanged between the Syracuse, NY charity with GRF and BIF as if important evidence. Help The Needy was a dba and spin-off affiliated with the Ann Arbor-based Islamic Assembly of North America. Sami was President of the Muslim Student Association and Nabil Albaloushi was Vice-President. Nabil’s 350-page thesis was filled with charts relating to drying coefficients that may have made the FBI think that they had found someone who was cutting edge in drying technique. The fact that Battelle ran the nearby Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (”PNNL”), which granted access to facilities to Washington State University students and shared library facilities with WSU, may have made the FBI peevish about access to cutting-edge drying or aerosol technology.

      The Pakistan government, at a press conference, announced that Khalid Mohammed, Al Qaeda’s #3, was captured on March 1, 2003. According to the Pakistan government officals, Mohammed allegedly was hiding in the home of the Pakistani bacteriologist Dr. Abdul Qadoos Khan. The family of the bacteriologist claimed that KSM was not there at the home upon the early March raid but had been captured at a different location.

      Handwritten notes and files on a laptop seized upon the capture of KSM, Al Qaeda’s #3, included a feasible anthrax production plan using a spray dryer and addressed the recruitment of necessary expertise. Although the details of the documents on Mohammed’s computer may (or may not) point to possible difficulties in aerial dispersal, they are consistent with the product used in the anthrax mailings. Al Qaeda had both the means and opportunity. Mohammed told his interrogators that Moussaoui was not going to be part of 9/11 but was to be part of a “second wave.” KSM explained that Moussaoui’s inquiries about crop dusters may have been related to the anthrax work being done by US-trained biochemist and Al Qaeda operative, Malaysian Yazid Sufaat. Zacarias Moussaoui once told the judge at his trial in a filing that he wants “anthrax for Jew sympathizer only.” Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s sheik al-Hawali spoke by telephone about how they might help in connection with Moussaoui’s defense.

      In early March 2003, a man named Saud Memon, who was in the textiles business, was captured in South Africa. He had fled there after Daniel Pearl was killed on his property. Memon reportedly gave information on Al Qaeda’s anthrax work that he allegedly was helping to finance. After four years in detention at an undisclosed location, he was left in front of his home in Karachi on April 28, 2007 in very poor health. He died a couple weeks later. The cause of death was reported to be meningitis and tuberculosis. Memon’s lawyer said he had been in the custody of Pakistani intelligence officials.

      Bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan was charged along with his son, Ahmed, for harboring the fugitives. As of March 28, 2003, he was in a hospital for a cardiac problem and had been granted “pre-arrest bail.”

      A man named Muklis Yunos, who reportedly received training on use of anthrax as a biological weapon in Afghanistan according to Philippine intelligence reports, was arrested on May 25, 2003. He reportedly cooperated with authorities over a bucket of spicy Kentucky Fried Chicken. Yunos had been Hambali’s right-hand man and was in charge of special operations of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (”MILF”).

      In early June 2003, a Central Intelligence Agency (”CIA”) report publicly concluded that the reason for Mohammed Atta’s and Zacarias Moussaoui’s inquiries into cropdusters was for the contemplated use in dispersing biological agents such as anthrax. It had long been known Osama Bin Laden was interested in using cropdusters to disperse biological agents (since the testimony of millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam). An early September 2003 Newsweek article included a rumor by a Taliban source that at a meeting in April 2003 Bin Laden was planning an “unbelievable” biological attack, the plans for which had suffered a setback upon the arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He had been captured the previous month in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Tenet in his May 2007 At The Center Of The Storm wrote: “And in early 2003, al-Qaida canceled a planned cyanide attack on the New York City subway, Al-Zawahiri recalled the operatives in New York because ‘we have something better in mind.’” Tenet noted that the CIA still does not know what al-Zawahiri meant but adds that the cyanide attack ‘was not sufficiently inspiring’ for al-Qaida.”

      The attorney for White House staffer Scooter Libby revealed that Libby in July 2003 was preoccupied with many national security issues, including the possibility al-Qaida had brought anthrax into the United States. President Bush had first nicknamed him “Germ Boy” after his office in the Spring 2001 took charge of the issue of the possibility of an WMD attack using biological weapons.

      Anthrax lab coordinator Hambali was arrested in August 2003 in the quiet city of Ayuttullah, Thailand, which is about half way between Bangkok and Chang Mai. He was sent to Jordan. In an unconfirmed report by author Ronald Suskind, in Autumn 2003, extremely virulent (but unweaponized) anthrax reportedly was found at a house in Kandahar — after regional operative Hambali was harshly interrogated. Sufaat’s two principal assistants — Barq and al-Sudani —
      were also captured in 2003 and are in custody. They had been assisting Sufaat prior to 9/11. Judging from his comments in a March 2012 interview, his assistants apparently were PhDs.

      Sufaat had been part of the Malaysian biological weapons program. I have asked him if he was involved in the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings and he pleads the Fifth Amendment — but does not deny it. Now charged with terrorism, his next court date is May 17, 2013.

      In connection with defending a civil rights claim by former USAMRIID scientist Steve Hatfill, the FBI described the anthrax probe as “unprecedented in the FBI’s 95-year history.” By late November 2003, agents had spent 231,000 hours. The head of the investigation said that the investigation was “active and ongoing” and said agents’ time was divided between checking into individuals who might be connected to the attacks and a scientific effort to determine how the spores themselves were made using “cutting-edge forensic techniques and analysis.”

      In mid-April 2004, Patrick Hughes, Lieutenant General (Retired), Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, Homeland Security Department testified before the 9/11 Commission. He explained that interrogations and other evidence revealed that Al Qaeda wanted to strike the US with a nonconventional weapon, most notably anthrax.

      Palestinian Marwan Jabour had gone to Pakistan as a student. In May 2004, he was arrested by authorities in Lahore, Pakistan. “He was in touch with top Al Qaeda operational figures and was strongly linked to Al Qaeda chemical and biological efforts and had provided
      some funding for an Al Qaeda [biological weapons] lab,” one anonymous counterintelligence official was quoted in the press as saying. After dinner with a Professor at Lahore University, some men on the street approached him and asked him about his friend, before forcing him into a car. The men also arrested the Professor and another friend who had joined them for dinner. The men took them to the local station of the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (”ISI”).

      In a statement issued June 16, 2004, the 9/11 Commission Staff concluded that “Al Qaeda had an ambitious biological weapons program and was making advances in its ability to produce anthrax prior to September 11. According to the 2004 statement by the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to the 911 Commission, al Qaeda’s ability to conduct an anthrax attack is one of the most immediate threats the United States is likely to face.” On August 9, 2004, it was announced that in the Spring of 2001, a man named El-Shukrijumah, also known as Jafar the Pilot, who was part of a “second wave,” had been casing New York City helicopters. Photographs from a seized computer disc included the controls and the locks on the door between the passengers and pilot. In a bulletin, the FBI noted that the surveillance might relate to a plot to disperse a chemical or biological weapon.

      The first inhalational anthrax victim in New York City, Kathy Nguyen, had died at Lenox Hill Hospital in Manhattan, where a former BIF employed worked as an intern and then as a resident in internal medicine. She worked in the stockroom of a nearby hospital that was a subsidiary of Lenox Hill. In late June 2004, when US authorities much later charged the doctor with immigration violations, he was represented by Stanley L. Cohen, the partner of the blind sheik Abdel-Rahman’s lawyer Lynne Stewart. Faraj lived in Brooklyn where he had moved in 1999 from Falls Church.

      Attorney Cohen recently was indicted on tax charges in June 2012 in Syracuse, New York that he says were related to suspicions relating to terrorism. Cohen represented Ismail Royer a central figure in the Virginia Paintaball case involving Ali Al-Timimi.

      Authorities had received information, for example, from at least one detainee at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that there was an anthrax storage facility in the Kabul area. Amerithrax Agents checked the Kabul area in May 2004 but came up empty. The Washington Post explained that “[b]ecause the deadly letters contained the Ames anthrax spores, manufactured in the United States, authorities entertained the possibility that they had been removed from a U.S. lab and transported overseas.” Then in November 2004, on further information, agents spent several weeks unsuccessfully searching an area in the Kandahar mountains, several hundred miles outside of Kabul. In 2005, an internal report was prepared summarizing the status of the investigation.

      On March 31, 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, in its “Report to the President of the United States,” concluded “al-Qai’da’s biological program was further along, particularly with regard to Agent X [anthrax], than pre-War intelligence indicated. The program was extensive, well-organized, and operated for two years before September 11, but intelligence insights into the program were limited. The program involved several sites around Afghanistan. Two of these sites contained commercial equipment and were operated by individuals with special training.”

      In June 2005, President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf told CNN in a filmed interview: “These people were involved in the .. production of anthrax.” That year, FBI agents visited Asia, Africa and Afghanistan in the course of the Amerithrax investigation. In the opening argument of the Uzair Paracha trial in November 2005, the Assistant United States Attorney claimed that MIT graduate Aafia Siddiqui was willing to help with an anthrax attack. She had been associated with the Maktab Khidmat (Bureau of Services) branch in Boston, which in 1993 was renamed Care International.

      The hyped intentional leaks about Steve Hatfill distracted the world’s press attention. A federal district court judge hearing a civil rights claim against the Department of Justice stated there was not a “scintilla of evidence” against Hatfill. The CIA continued to work quietly building a case that the anthrax mailings were an international plot. Some argued that a US-based Al Qaeda operative is behind the earlier Fall 2001 anthrax mailings in the US, and that the mailings served as a threat and warning — intended to deter invasion of Afghanistan.
      Princeton islamist scholar Bernard Lewis explained that while islamists may disagree about whether killing innocents is sanctioned by the laws of jihad, extremists like Zawahiri agree that notice must be given before biochemical weapons are used. “The Prophet’s guidance,” says Michael Scheuer, an al-Qaeda analyst retired from the CIA who once headed its Bin Laden unit, “was always, Before you attack someone, warn them very clearly.”

      The anthrax mailings followed the pattern of letters they sent in January 1997 to newspaper branches in Washington, D.C. and New York City, as well as symbolic targets. The letter bombs were sent in connection with the detention of the blind sheik Abdel Rahman and those responsible for the earlier World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

  21. DXer said

    The accused Canada train terrorists discussed an alternative scheme — using deadly bacteria to kill 100,000 people rather than bomb a railroad between Toronto and Penn Station, federal prosecutors said Thursday. The Mounties stopped the plot — and now the suspect, Ahmed Abassi, was charged secretly last week in an immigration scam, though further charges are expected, prosecutors said.

    Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/accused-canada-train-terrorists-discussed-deadly-bacteria-attack-article-1.1340312#ixzz2SvNbEj5w

    Other suspects are under surveillance, according to one article. Mr. Abassi arrived in Canada from Tunisia on a student’s visa in 2010. He then arrived here in the US in mid-March.
    Both indictments are short on details. For example, as for the NYC operative, where was he before he come to the US? Tunisia? What AQ folks does he know abroad? Abassi was a Tunisian Montrealer in AQ? Let’s cross our fingers and hope he came from a meeting with anthrax mailings suspect Jdey and his sidekick Boussora, and both of them are indicted as well. Okay, or let’s hope it turns out that Abassi was sent by El-Shukrijumah or Saif Adel. With respect to the NYC subway plot a few years ago, authorities slow-played and it was a year before we first heard about El-Shukrijumah.

    • DXer said

      http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/third-train-plot-suspect-did-not-enter-us-from-canada-kenney/article11852922/?cmpid=rss1

      A third rail terror plot suspect arrested in the United States last month did not enter that country from Canada, the Harper government says.

      Immigration Minister Jason Kenney made this known Friday to beat back suggestions in the United States that he entered the U.S. via Canada – a sensitive topic because U.S. politicians and commentators frequently paint their northern neighbour as a risky source of terrorists.

      Mr. Kenney, speaking at a policy announcement in Mississauga, Ont., confirmed in response to a media question that Ahmed Abassi – a one-time student in Canada – had returned to Tunisia and was subsequently denied a visa to return to Canada.

      Comment: This increases the possibility that he saw Jdey or Boussora, both former Montrealers from Tunisia.

    • DXer said

      The third suspect, arrested in NYC, was a graduate student studying nanoparticles. What was the mentioned paper about?

      http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/05/10/toronto_terror_plot_third_man_arrested_had_difficulty_returning_to_canada_from_tunisia.html

      Abassi — a Tunisian national said by fellow students to have been a graduate student in engineering at Université Laval — has not been on campus for several months, according to one student, but was known to some as a religious and outspoken man.

      ***
      Marriage records obtained by the Star show that Abassi, aged 26, was married last summer in a civil ceremony in Quebec City and was living with his wife and a relative of his wife in a downtown second floor apartment located across the street from a Catholic church.

      ***
      According to online university records, Abassi was studying chemical engineering and appears to have recently co-authored a paper on nanoparticles; a LinkedIn profile that matches his name said he studied nanotechnology at the National Engineering School at Sfax, in Tunisia.

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      Did I mention that Bruce Ivins gave virulent Ames to a former Zawahiri associate involved in research relating to nanobiology?

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      I emailed Professor Zourob in RIyadh to confirm that Mr. Esseghaier did not have access to virulent anthrax — but it is 2 a.m. in Riyadh.

    • DXer said

      Abassi’s co-researcher, Bousselham Echchahed, who I believe is a distinguished professor rather than classmate, has published on molecular sieves. I don’t know what Abassi’s research concerned.

      Third Via Rail suspect was denied entry into Canada: Kenney – The …
      http://www.theglobeandmail.com › News › Politics
      6 hours ago – Laval University professor Bousselham Echchahed told The Globe and Mail that for several weeks Mr. Abassi had been in contact with his …

      Iron-modified MCM-48 Mesoporous Molecular Sieves

      David Graham Nicholson, Bousselham Echchahed, Arild Moen
      0 Reviews
      American Chemical Society, 1997 – 4 pages

      http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/fbi-arrests-quebec-student-linked-to-via-terror-suspect/article11843949/

      BI arrests Quebec student linked to Via terror suspect
      COLIN FREEZE RHÉAL SÉGUIN
      TORONTO and QUEBEC — The Globe and Mail
      Published Thursday, May. 09 2013, 10:17 PM EDT

      At Quebec City’s Laval University this spring, Ahmed Abassi was conspicuous by his absence. The science student from Tunisia had missed an important presentation he was to give about nanoparticles.

      “He never made it … so I had to give the presentation for him,” Bousselham Echchahed … recalled in an interview at a mosque on Thursday. “He left to go back home on his honeymoon in December. I haven’t seen him since.” …

      As portrayed by U.S. authorities, Mr. Abassi and Mr. Esseghaier were loose-lipped plotters, more aspirational terrorists than operational ones. Prosecutors say they never took concrete steps toward turning their conspiracies into reality but frequently argued about which kinds of attacks were best.

      Mr. Esseghaier, who faces several terrorism charges in Canada, is said by U.S. authorities to have favoured a plot against passenger train. Mr. Abassi allegedly “told the [FBI undercover officer] that while Esseghaier’s plans were good, the time was not right,” reads a U.S. court document, adding that he “had suggested an alternative plot contaminating the air or water with bacteria in order to kill up to 100,000 people.”

      U.S. authorities were not able to gather sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Abassi with participating in a terrorist conspiracy. Instead, he is accused of a form of immigration fraud.

      Some students at Laval University said Mr. Abassi, who went to Tunsia for his honeymoon this winter, had been having trouble getting a visa to return to Canada. He first arrived in Canada as a student in 2010, not long after Mr. Esseghaier came on similar credentials. Intelligence sources suggest the two men had been monitored ever since they got to Canada.

      Police say Mr. Esseghaier took terrorist training overseas and may have had interactions with al-Qaeda members in Iran.

      Mr. Abassi has no known history of such travels, but the FBI says he admitted under questioning that he radicalized Mr. Esseghaier years ago.

      • DXer said

        All this science stuff goes over my head but the co-researcher in 1999, the distinguished professor, seems to have published Influence de l’incorporation du fer et du titane sur la structure de silices poreuses cristallisées ou mésostructurées

        Which I believe may sort of mean Influence of incorporation of iron and titanium on the structure of silicas porous crystallized or mésostructurées.

      • DXer said

        http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/third-via-rail-suspect-was-denied-entry-into-canada-kenney/article11852922/

        Bousselham Echchahed, a research assistant at Laval University’s faculty of science and engineering, told The Globe and Mail that for several weeks Mr. Abassi had been in contact with his research director, professor Trong-On Do, who was anxious for the student to get a Canadian visa and complete his degree.

        Mr. Abassi was scheduled to make a presentation on nanoparticles and oxidation at the annual conference of Association canadienne-française pour l’avancement des sciences or ACFAS at Laval University this week. …

        “I didn’t know Ahmed on a personal level. I answered his questions about the research project and helped him whenever I could. Every Friday he would go and pray and that is all I know about him,” Mr. Echchamed said.

      • DXer said

        One-pot solvothermal synthesis of mixed Cu-Ce-Ox nanocatalysts and their catalytic activity for low temperature CO oxidation
        Author(s)
        MRABET Driss ; ABASSI Ahmed ; CHERIZOL Robenson ; …
        Abstract
        One-pot solvothermal method has been developed for the synthesis of high-surface area Cu-Ce-Ox binary nanocatalysts with various Cu contents in the presence of oleylamine as capping agent. The obtained binary nanocatalysts were characterized by different techniques including XRD, H2-TPR, TEM, BET and XPS. The influence of Cu contents on their catalytic performance for the CO oxidation was also studied. Our results revealed that the Cu-Ce-Ox binary nanocatalysts show the better catalytic activity compared to those of the conventional Cu-Ce-Ox, bare nano-CeO2 and nano-CuO catalysts. This is ascribed to mutual interaction and synergistic effect between copper oxide species and cerium oxide. Among the obtained nanocatalysts, the Cu-Ce-Ox nanocatalyst with 5.6wt% Cu (noted as 5.6-Cu-Ce-Ox) exhibits the best catalytic activity; the 50% CO conversion can be reached at 55 C. H2-TPR profiles show two reduction peaks at low and high temperatures for these catalysts, which could be attributed to the reduction of highly dispersed CuO on the CeO2 surface and the bulk-like CuO species, respectively. Using the one-pot solvothermal synthesis developed in this study, 6-8 wt% Cu content is needed for the high catalytic activity for the CO oxidation at low temperature.
        Publisher
        Elsevier
        Identifier
        ISSN : 0926-860X
        Source
        Applied catalysis. A, General (Print) Y. 2012, vol. 447-448, pages 60-66 [7 pages] [bibl. : 47 ref.]
        Language
        English

    • DXer said

      Ahmed Abassi abstract

      http://www.acfas.ca/evenements/congres/programme/81/200/230/c

      16 h 00
      Ahmed ABASSI Université Laval, D. MRABET, B. ECHCHAHED, T.-O. DO
      Effet de la morphologie des nanoparticules de CeO2 et ZrxCe(1-x)O2 sur l’activité catalytique dans l’oxydation de CO 

      (Cacher le résumé)
      La synthèse de nanoparticules de l’oxyde de cérium CeO2 et de l’oxyde mixte ZrxCe(1-x)O2 avec une morphologie contrôlée a été réalisé. Les différentes morphologies telles que; nanocubes, nanobarres et nanopolyèdre ont été obtenues dépendant des conditions de synthèse. Ensuite sur ces nanoparticules, nous avons effectué un dépôt à la surface de nanoparticules d’or.

      Ces catalyseurs ont été caractérisés par différentes méthodes (DRX, XPS, TEM, BET) et ont fait l’objet d’essais catalytiques pour l’oxydation de CO. Les résultats montrent que les nanocatalyseurs sous forme de cube donnent un meilleur résultat que ceux des nanobarees et nanopolyèdres. Ceci s’explique par le fait que leur surface spécifique supérieur et la préférence des nanocluster d’or à se déposer sur la face (100) de nanocubes. Ce résultat est corroboré par les énergies d’activation.

      À fin d’améliorer l’activité et la stabilité de ce type de nanocatalyseurs, on a substitué une partie du cérium par le zirconium. Le résultat des tests catalytique montre que la limite de substitution ne peut excéder 10% Zr. Au-delà de ce taux, la conversion de CO est nettement inférieure à celle du nanocatalyseur à base de nanocubes CeO2simple.

      

    • DXer said

      His wife and co-authors express surprise.

      http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/05/10/ordinary-student-was-considered-a-security-risk-before-he-was-connected-to-alleged-via-rail-terror-plot/
      But at the Université Laval campus where he was pursuing a graduate degree, he seemed like a typical student to Driss Mrabet. Mr. Mrabet said he had often crossed paths with Mr. Abassi in the chemical engineering laboratory in early 2012. …

      Court records show that Mr. Abassi applied for a marriage licence in Quebec City in 2012. Le Soleil reported that his wife, also from Tunisia, remains in Quebec City. “I am in shock,” the woman, whose name was not published, told the newspaper. “I didn’t suspect anything. I don’t understand what’s going on.”

      Bousselham Echchahed worked in the same lab as Mr. Abassi for about a month and helped show him the ropes. He said Professor Trong-on Do informed him this year that Mr. Abassi was in Tunisia and had been refused a visa to return to Canada. “He asked me whether I had any idea why, and I said I didn’t know why.”

      Mr. Mrabet, who is completing a doctorate in chemical engineering, co-authored a paper on catalysis with Mr. Abassi. He said he had not seen him for a year and was surprised to hear his name in the news. “I wondered how this could be,” he said. “But of course when you don’t know someone, it is impossible to imagine what he is thinking.”

    • DXer said

      Who did Mr. Esseghaler meet in Iran? Saif Adel? Shehata? Islambouli?

      Canada train plot suspect traveled to Iran: U.S. officials | Reuters
      http://www.reuters.com/article/…/us-arrests-iran-idUSBRE93O1D320130425‎

      Apr 25, 2013 – Chiheb Esseghaier, a Tunisian-born doctoral student, traveled to Iran on a trip that was directly relevant to the investigation of the alleged plot, …

      What were the seminars Mr. Esseghaler was attending in New York City?

      http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/canada-arrests-profiles-idINDEE93O0GA20130425

      In Tunisia, Esseghaier’s parents told Reuters that their son was innocent.

      “My son is a human being and could not kill an ant. He is the victim of a security crackdown carried out by Canada against religious people to convince people that the Boston incident will not be repeated in Canada,” his father Mohamed Rashad Esseghaier said.

      “My son is a genius. He has accomplished excellent medical research. He attended seminars in New York. I am proud of him.”

      His friends in Tunisia said he was easily swayed. “It was easy to influence him; he has a weak personality,” one friend, Meriam Sassi, told Reuters. “He could not differentiate between the truth and a joke.

      Esseghaier’s profile on the networking site LinkedIn is in keeping with the professional focus of the site.

      It lists him as the co-author of six academic papers and an attendee at conferences across North America, noting that he obtained a Tunisian master’s degree in industrial biotechnology and studied at Quebec’s Universite de Sherbrooke before INRS.

      Until earlier this week, the profile had one unusual feature. It displayed the black and white flag of al Qaeda’s wing in Iraq instead of a profile picture.

      By Tuesday, LinkedIn had removed the flag, the emblem of the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella group of al Qaeda-linked insurgents. A LinkedIn spokesman said the rules of the site say profile pictures must be of the person.

      Attempts by Reuters in the Middle East to reach the Islamic State of Iraq were not successful.

      A co-author of one of Esseghaier’s academic papers had little insight into the Tunisian.

      “It appears that we shared co-authorship in a journal article dealing with biosensors for diagnostics,” Carlos Suarez, from Washington State University, told Reuters by email.

      “I was quite shocked to find out that I was somehow associated with this person. However, despite sharing co-authorship I’ve never met this guy before and I don’t know who he is.”

      MONTREAL MOSQUES

      Esseghaier, listed as homeless in court papers after his arrest, was known both at a neighborhood mosque in Montreal, and at a larger place of worship that the Pentagon once identified as a place where Islamic extremists were recruited.

      “I knew him as a normal Muslim, but I don’t know what happened after,” one man said as he exited midday prayers at the unassuming Cote-des-Neiges mosque, behind a simple storefront in a multicultural Montreal neighborhood.

      A second worshipper said he had seen Esseghaier on Saturday as he looked at accommodation ads at the Assuna Annabawiyah Mosque. The mosque is the only one in North America on a classified Pentagon list of nine mosques where al Qaeda members had recruited, helped or trained.

      The New York Times published the Pentagon document, called “Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants,” in April 2011, and said the document helped U.S. military analysts assess what risk detainees at its Guantanamo Bay prison might pose.

      The Pentagon declined to discuss classified assessments.

      Abdel Salam Elmenyawi, president of the Assuna Annabawiyah Mosque, said he had never heard of Esseghaier before he was arrested.

      Asked to comment on the Pentagon threat matrix report, he said: “This is such total nonsense.”

      U.S. law enforcement and national security officials said on Thursday they believed Esseghaier traveled to Iran within the past two years on a trip directly relevant to the investigation of the alleged plot. Canadian police have said the two men received “direction and guidance” from “al Qaeda elements in Iran,” though they say there is no sign of Iranian government involvement with the suspects.

      • DXer said

        http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCABRE94810620130509?pageNumber=3&virtualBrandChannel=0

        U.S. national security sources close to the investigation said that they believe one or more of the plotters were in contact with a network of low- to middle-level al Qaeda fixers and “facilitators” based in the town of Zahedan, close to Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, that moves money and fighters through Iran to support its activities in South Asia.

        Comment:

        Apparently the defendant did not meet Islambouli, Shehata or Saif Adel — they would not fit with the description “low- to middle-level al Qaeda fixers and “facilitators” based in the town of Zahedan, close to Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Islambouli, Shehata or Saif Adel are all senior, upper level.

      • DXer said

        Esseghaier apparently travelled to Zahedan, Iran in June 2011. He was back in school in the Fall.

        http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/erratic-behaviour-put-via-terror-suspects-on-radar/article11589762/?service=mobile

        “He cannot even kill a mouse. So what about planning to kill people?” Mr. Esseghaier’s mother, Raoudha, told a Globe and Mail reporter, at the family’s middle-class home in Tunis.

        If her son really were a terrorist, she asked, would authorities have let him travel the world? Just two weeks ago “he told us he was in New York,” she said, explaining how the family keeps in touch through Skype.

        ***

        His parents say that, two years ago, he stopped his studies to roam the world. In 2011, he travelled to Iran, possibly in search of a bride, his parents said. “I don’t remember where exactly in Iran,” said Mohamed Esseghaier, the father.

        The timing of this journey is significant.

        This week, Reuters reported that authorities believe Mr. Esseghaier could have had interactions with extremists in Zahedan, Iran, in June of 2011.

    • DXer said

      Who is the FBI spying on in Quincy?
      http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/quincy/2013/05/photos_prove_suspicious_aircra.html

      This is non-stop each night (when it is not overcast). The target(s) of the surveillance likely know they are being watched given the loud plane at all hours of the night — and now there has been considerable publicity.

      Indeed, the Quincy fellow being quoted (as if a citizen) about plane flying overhead every night is a recently arrested meth cook. He reportedly faces 30 years.

      Drug suspect on bond, arrested for drug charges again : Weather …
      http://www.connecttristates.com/weather/story.aspx?id=869669‎

      But who are the suspects under surveillance in the matter involving Ahmed Abassi?

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

      • DXer said

        Stupid question:

        Could FLIR camera technology using thermal imaging find a 40 lb. square chest of gold coins? Perhaps if exposed to the sun (and even if not), it has a differential temperature and a geometric shape that stands out in nature.

        I was thinking we should get NASA to point its satellites toward Yellowstone (using magnetic sensors). They have used technology like just north of Yellowstone looking for Lewis & Clark’s estimated 100 lbs. of metal remaining from a collapsible built they left buried. But commercially available FLIR technology perhaps would work to locate a square chest of gold coins. The plane would only be looking away from structures.

        We just need a small plane, pilot and FLIR technology. The seller of FLIR cameras, used most famously recently in connection with the picture of the young man in Boston hiding in the boat, might love the idea and loan use of the FLIR for free.

        Right now, for example, the FBI is circling Quincy, MA each night round-the-clock looking for a meth lab to pop up.

        Another stupid question: Are flights restricted over Yellowstone?

        Forrest Fenn, who hid the chest, had long been a pilot himself. If you are looking for a fun vacation, I recommend Yellowstone. From videos, it looks magnificent.

      • DXer said

        http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/a-buzzing-sound-in-the-massachusetts-sky-evokes-drone-fears/275779/

        A Buzzing Sound in the Massachusetts Sky Evokes Drone Fears
        The Atlantic-22 hours ago

        Americans understand why the unexplained plane in Quincy is making its residents uneasy, and sympathize with them, whether they’re less …

        Comment:

        While empathy on the issue of drones is a good thing — empathy always is — when we have a helicopter circling here it is a good thing. It means that law enforcement is acting quickly and effectively to catch violent criminals who just robbed a place.

        If not intended to avoid another meth lab popping up in an abandoned building in Quincy — like happened about the time the flights started — then such flights could just as well be looking for the signatures of a makeshift lab used to prepare chemicals for an explosion. FBI surveillance experts are well-paid and can distinguish between subtle differences in signatures.

        In either event, the background noise likely is similar to a lawn mower early Sunday morning.

        Folks should be glad that the lawn is getting mowed while you sleep in.

      • DXer said

        Compare

        FBI too quiet on Quincy planes
        By Lawrence Harmon | GLOBE STAFF MAY 17, 2013
        http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/05/16/fbi-too-quiet-quincy-planes/0h9EObhcoQvh41WxdpAHZM/story.html

        “The less the agency shares about its use of aerial surveillance, the more people are likely to fear that they will become the target of FBI fishing expeditions, especially with advances in drone technology. Infrared and see-through imaging have great value in tracking potential terrorists and other malefactors. But they also raise the specters of voyeurism, automated law enforcement, and pervasive invasions of privacy.

        Special agent Greg Comcowich of the Boston FBI office said that the agency follows strict guidelines, including the securing of warrants based on probable cause, whether conducting its investigations on land or in the air. But general surveillance of people and vehicles in public spaces entails no such requirements.”

        with

        NYC artist’s secret photos of neighbors raise privacy issues; for …
        Fox News-3 hours ago
        NYC artist’s secret photos of neighbors raise privacy issues; for some, … of art that are now on display — and for sale — in a Manhattan gallery.
        http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2013/05/17/nyc-artist-secret-photos-neighbors-raise-privacy-issues-for-some-line-crossed/

        Comment:

        I’ve mentioned that the recently arrested alleged meth cook dealer was the fellow in the earlier Globe article whose sleep was disturbed. The concern might be that another meth lab might pop up in an abandoned building. (And meth labs are dangerous posing a risk to public safety).

        Putting aside broader concerns related to privacy — such as whether thermal imaging captures people copulating on film — I think if that were the reason for the flight, any meth cook has already been sufficiently chastened and deterred.

        I’ve proposed on a different blog that the same FLIR technology be used in Yellowstone National Park looking for heat differential relating to Forrest Fenn’s chest of gold coins. You can be sure the government will object even in the absence of FAA NOTAMS (flight restrictions). They would point to the right of the buffalo to be free of the harassment of the buzzing of the planes.

        For the same reason FAA has flight restrictions on drone flights for noncommercial uses everywhere — and in many places like DC it is banned altogether. I can’t fly my drone near structures or people. If it comes across a person, it needs to turn and go in the other direction.

        These are the sorts of factors that need to be balanced in any governmental endeavor — such as inconvenience to residents to make needed repairs to a bridge.

        The media reporting is all part of a healthy process while the best balance is explored.

      • DXer said

        Wow! Dunce hat for me! Someone points out that Michael G. quoted in the FBI plane story is from Quincy, MA — whereas the Michael G. arrested in that article in early May is from Quincy ILLINOIS.

        So it looks like the FBI plane is not looking for a meth lab but is conducting some sort of other surveillance.

  22. DXer said

    The thesis adviser of the Tunisian recently arrested in Montreal was an expert on anthrax detection. The thesis advisor, long time professor at the university, went missing last November.

    Mystery deepens around Montreal suspect – Montreal Gazette

    Apr 25, 2013 – But no one at the INRS could say where Esseghaier, 30, lived, …

    The one person who might have been able to say more about him was his thesis adviser, Mohammed Zourob, Martineau said. “And we don’t know where he is.”

    After being described as a “rising star” of nanotechnology by the INRS and others for his work developing a paper-based diagnostic for infectious diseases, Zourob left the INRS last November. For confidentiality reasons, Martineau could not say why he left, though she added it had nothing to do with Esseghaier or his arrest.

    Read more: http://www.montrealgazette.com/technology/Mystery+deepens+around+Montreal+suspect/8291316/story.html#ixzz2SuAiYpDY

    Comment: Your mission, should you decide to accept it, is to find the PhD thesis advisor , expert on anthrax detection, of the Montreal terror defendant.

    • DXer said

      The thesis adviser of the Tunisian recently arrested in Montreal was an expert on the detection of bacteria.

      http://www.google.com/search?site=&source=hp&q=Mohammed+Zourob++anthrax+detection&oq=Mohammed+Zourob++anthrax+detection&gs_l=hp.3…1750.5431.0.5688.20.13.0.0.0.0.233.917.1j3j2.6.0…0.0…1c.1.12.hp.brTdcubrhYk

      The thesis advisor, long time professor at the university, left the University last November for undisclosed reasons. What does Professor Zourob say with respect to his PhD student’s access to bacterial pathogens? Did he have any access?

      Here are his publications on pubmed.

      http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Mohammed+Zourob

      Mystery deepens around Montreal suspect – Montreal Gazette

      Apr 25, 2013 – But no one at the INRS could say where Esseghaier, 30, lived, …

      The one person who might have been able to say more about him was his thesis adviser, Mohammed Zourob, Martineau said. “And we don’t know where he is.”

      After being described as a “rising star” of nanotechnology by the INRS and others for his work developing a paper-based diagnostic for infectious diseases, Zourob left the INRS last November. For confidentiality reasons, Martineau could not say why he left, though she added it had nothing to do with Esseghaier or his arrest.

      Hitting close to home
      Two men drawn by the opportunities and comforts Canada offers now stand accused of a terror plot
      by Charlie Gillis, Martin Patriquin, Nicholas Köhler, Michael Friscolanti, and Nick Taylor-Vaisey on Saturday, April 27, 2013

      ***

      Also charged was Chiheb Esseghaier, a Tunisian-born Ph.D. student from Montreal who seemed an equally improbable candidate to wage jihad in the Great White North: blessed with smarts and ambition, the 30-year-old had parlayed his work in a Université du Québec nanotechnology lab into conference appearances across North America. He had published papers proposing new methods for detecting prostate cancer, HIV and other diseases in people and animals. Both men have denied the charges against them.

      In a picture posted on his thesis adviser’s website, Chiheb Esseghaier looks as happy as his fellow Ph.D. students crowded around him. Wearing a black T-shirt, brown sandals and black capri pants with blue cuffs, Esseghaier smiles from behind a pair of small, black-rimmed glasses and a great bushy, moustache-less beard. Skinny, young and seemingly unconcerned by personal appearances, he looks every bit the typical Ph.D. student cliché.

      He acted like a typical Ph.D. student, too—on paper anyway. Born in Tunis, Tunisia, Esseghaier received an engineering degree in industrial biology from Tunisia’s Institut national des sciences appliquées et de technologie in 2007. He received his master’s one year later, and by the time he was 28 Esseghaier had been accepted to Université de Sherbrooke, located in Quebec’s Eastern Townships region. He lived in a one-room apartment on Galt Street—Sherbrooke’s main drag—and published his research, most of it relating to the study of analytic devices known as biosensors, in several academic journals.

      It was his move to Institute national de la recherche scientifique, Quebec’s premier scientific research facility associated with Université du Québec, where Esseghaier really began to shine. In 2010, at just 28, he joined Biosensor BioMEMS Bionanotechnology Lab, an INRS laboratory run by a University of Cambridge-trained bio-engineer named Mohammed Zourob. Known colloquially as “BBBL” amongst its students, Zourob’s class was a cloistered group of hand-picked students specializing in the study of nanotechnology and biosensors. In total, there were 16 Ph.D. students studying under Zourob.

      Along with a fellow Ph.D. student, Zourob and Esseghaier published two papers, on biosensors and early prostate cancer detection, in 2012. As of last year, anyway, Esseghaier apparently wasn’t deemed enough of a danger to travel by plane to America. With Zourob, Esseghaier went to a conference in California last summer. But on at least one other conference trip, to Mexico in May 2012, the CBC reported two undercover surveillance officers trailed him on the Air Canada flight to Cancun. While on that flight, according to the network, Esseghaier was involved in an altercation with a female flight attendant after going to the washroom.

      In March, less than a month before his arrest, Esseghaier published a paper on HIV detection, along with Zourob and the same Ph.D. student, in the journal Biosensors and Bioelectronics. According to an INRS professor, Zourob left the university last fall. Zourob didn’t respond to an interview request. His BBBL website went dark in the hours following news of Esseghaier’s arrest.

      Esseghaier’s analytical ways couldn’t contain a stubborn religious streak, however. He reportedly ripped down posters around the INRS campus in Varennes, northeast of Montreal, saying the images offended him. He also complained of the dearth of on-campus prayer rooms. He openly railed against paying taxes in Canada, saying that to do so meant de facto support for the country’s military presence in Afghanistan. A neighbour of his in Sherbrooke told La Presse that he could hear Esseghaier wailing in prayer through the walls, especially at night.

      Then there is the matter of his LinkedIn page. Above a list of his educational feats and myriad published articles was a white-on-black image emblazoned with a white circle and Arabic lettering. It is thought to be the emblem with which the Prophet Muhammad sealed his letters. It is also the so-called “black flag” used by the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq’s political arm. The emblem disappeared from the page within 24 hours of Esseghaier being taken into custody.

      Esseghaier was then flown from Saint-Hubert Airport on Montreal’s South Shore to Toronto for interrogation, only to be flown back less than 24 hours later for his appearance in Montreal. Roy, who called the hearing a “formality” shortly before appearing before Labelle, explained that because Esseghaier was arrested without a warrant, he had to be remanded in front of a judge in the province in which he was arrested. Just before his brief court appearance ended, however, Esseghaier addressed the judge and asked to speak. “All the conclusions were made from facts and words that are but appearances,” he said, speaking softly but quickly. “We cannot make these conclusions from against me . . . ” at which point Labelle cut him off—one day Esseghaier will have his chance to tell his side of the story. …

      Whatever the truth, the details will trickle out. They always do.

    • DXer said

      Recipients of the 2012 Strategic Project Grant and Strategic Network Grant Competitions

      Mohammed Zourob
      Development of low-cost, rapid and highly sensitive DNA-based biosensor for routine monitoring of emerging organic compounds in water

      Mohammed Zourob was Esseghaier’s thesis advisor. Esseghaier was dismissive of the idea of contaminating water with bacteria when suggested by an Al Qaeda operative in NYC.

      Was Mr. Esseghaier going to be working on this project relating to monitoring water contaminants with his co-author and thesis advisor?

      New York Daily News
      Terror suspect discussed killing up to 100000 with bacteria …
      CTV News-16 hours ago
      Abassi said he suggested contaminating the air or water with bacteria in order to kill up to 100,000people, but “Esseghaier was dismissive of …

      From a cursory google, Professor Mohammed Zourob, the terror defendant’s co-author and thesis advisor was consultant for BioPhage Pharm in Montreal, QC. At some point, he seems to have been the Director of the BioPhage Biosensor Division. What years?
      Did Esseghaier ever have access to virulent anthrax?

      Biophage and Biopolymer Engineering Sign Joint Agreement to Develop … of a variety of biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, plague and brucellosis.
      Biophage Pharma Inc.
      http://www.biotherapharma.com/press/biowarfare.htm

      This partnership will seek to develop an alternative or adjunctive approach to antibiotics or vaccines through the enhancement of the innate immune defense system against infections.

      The preclinical results of experiments performed by Biophage have demonstrated that Biopolymer’s immune modulator products can prevent the fatal outcome of anthrax infection in a significant number of animals. This research will be made public following publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals and presentation at upcoming scientific conferences. Further animal testing in small and large animals is required to optimize the pharmaceutical applications of these immune modulators for the prevention and treatment of a larger number of biological weapons threats.

      “Biophage has been involved in this field since 1996, when it received its first contract from Defence Research Establishment Suffield, Alberta. Biophage has developed the tools and the expertise to assess novel approaches to the management of biowarfare agents. ”

      Biophage is located at the Biotechnology Research Institute in Montreal and now has 23 employees including a team of 19 scientists. Through an active R&D program and a disciplined growth strategy,

    • DXer said

      A group photo of BIOSENSOR BIOMEMS BIONANOTECHNOLOGY including the defendant is here. Can the group members tell the public about the lab’s work and whether Chicheb had access anywhere to virulent anthrax?

    • DXer said

      Someone took the webpage down for Zourob’s lab upon the PhD student’s arrest. For someone who was dismissive of contaminating water with a bacterial contaminant, he certainly came from a lab that had deep expertise on the subject.

      His education is listed as follows:

      Chiheb Esseghaier

      B.Eng in industrial biology (2007),
      National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology, Tunis
      MSc in Biotechnology (2008),
      National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology, Tunis

      Current project: Plasmonic biosensing platforms

      Here is is from 2012.

      http://web.archive.org/web/20120426002133/http://zourob-lab.ca/

      Here are some excerpts:

      News and Announcement

      January 3rd, 2012:

      We are gladly informing that our grandchallenge canada proposal has been accepted recently. Please see the video presentation of our proposal on “Electricity-free device for infectious disease diagnosis in poor resource settings”

      [Click above to see the presentation uploaded to Google-Youtube Inc.]

      January 2nd, 2012:

      “Biosensors and Bioelectronics” journal has accepted our paper on E.Coli detection using biochip;

      Microfluidic electrochemical assay for rapid detection and quantification o fEscherichia coli,
      M. Safavieh, M. U. Ahmed, M. Tolba, M. Zourob, Biosensors and Bioelectronics. 31 (1) 523-528, 2012.

      January 1st, 2012

      Happy New Year 2012 to you all.

      October 12th, 2011:

      Mohammadali Safavieh (Babak) wins Poster Award at Lab-on-a-Chip World Congress 29-30th September 2011, South San Francisco, California, USA

      “Electrochemical Microfluidic Biosensor for E.coli Detection”
      M. Safavieh, M.U. Ahmed, M. Zourob; INRS-EMT, University of Quebec’
      Award Sponsored by eposters.net.

      Congratulations Mohammedali Safavieh! INRS-EMT, University of Quebec

      The Professor’s research interests:

      RESEARCH INTERESTS:
      http://web.archive.org/web/20120505190209/http://www.zourob-lab.ca/research.html

      Professor Zourob joined INRS-ÉMT in September 2010 to develop a multidisciplinary research program in biosensing and bionanotechnology. His present research focuses on the following themes:

      (1) Development of micro/nano-sensing platforms for various chemical and bio-analytes, including optical, electrochemical, mass-sensitive and magnetic sensing mechanisms.

      (2) Development of various robust, low-cost, easy-to-produce recognition receptors such as DNA aptamer, peptide/protein domain, molecularly imprinted polymers (MIPS), bacteriophage and other bioproducts.

      (3) Integration of recognition receptors within novel micro/nano-sensing platforms; Engineering of “smart” molecular targeting moieties for in vivo molecular imaging and diagnostic.

      (4) Development of novel lab-on-a-chip system, leading to next-generation sensing devices for biomedical and environmental applications.

      His publications:

      PUBLICATIONS

      RESEARCH ARTICLES

      (2011)

      7. Integrated biosensing platform for Listeria detection using endolysin as recognition receptors, M. Tolba, M. U. Ahmed, F. Eichenseher, M. Loessener, M. Zourob, 2011, Biosensors and Bioelectronics (submitted)

      6. Microfluidic electrochemical assay for rapid detection and quantification ofEscherichia coli, M. Safavieh, M. U. Ahmed,M. Tolba, M. Zourob, Biosensors and Bioelectronics. 31 (1) 523-528, 2012.

      5. Highly sensitive biosensor for microcystin detection. A. Ng, R. Chinnappan, C. Tlili, M. Zourob, 2011. The Analyst (submitted)

      4. Array of nanowire biosensors for cancer detection, R. Elshafey, I. Statikina, C. Tlili, A. Abulrob, M. Zourob 2011. The Analyst (submitted)

      CONFERENCES

      (2011)

      4. 2nd International Conference on Bio-Sensing Technology 2011″Integrated and rapid biosensing platform for Listeria detection using endolysin as recognition receptors” M. Tolba, M. U. Ahmed, JM Leossoner, M. Zourob, 10-12 October 2011, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.


      2. 94th Canadian chemical Society Conference “Integrated Isothermal amplification and electrochemical detection of Escherichia coli using disposable electrode”, M. Safavieh, M. U. Ahmed and M. Zourob, Montreal June 5 – 9, 2011.

      1. 94th Canadian chemical Society Conference “A Novel Approach for Separation of Bacteria from Complex Samples for Biosensing Applications”, E. Sokullu, A. Ng, M. Tolba, M. Zourob, Montreal June 5 – 9, 2011.

      BOOKS

      Principles of Bacterial Detection: Biosensors, Recognition Receptors and Microsystems

      Recognition Receptors in Biosensors

      Optical Guided-wave Chemical and Biosensors I

      Optical Guided-wave Chemical and Biosensors II

      Biological Microarrays; Methods and Protocols Series:
      Methods in Molecular Biology

      BOOK CHAPTERS

      ****

      Professor Zourob has a very distinguished resume.

      BSc in Chemistry 1997
      MSc in Chemistry 1999
      Ph. D. from Department of Instrumentation and Analytical Science (DIAS)-
      University of Manchester 2003
      Post-doctoral Fellow: DIAS, University of Manchester 2003-2004
      Post-doctoral Fellow: School of Materials Science, University of Manchester 2004-2005
      Post-doctoral Fellow: Institute of Biotechnology, University of Cambridge 2005-2006
      Director of the Biosensors Division at Biophage Pharma Inc 2006-2009
      Director of R&D at GDG environment Ltd 2009-2010
      Associate Professor at INRS-EMT since September 2010

      Chiheb Esseghaier

      B.Eng in industrial biology (2007),
      National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology, Tunis
      MSc in Biotechnology (2008),
      National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology, Tunis

      Current project: Plasmonic biosensing platforms

      http://web.archive.org/web/20120505190204/http://www.zourob-lab.ca/members.html

      • DXer said

        The fellow couldn’t afford rent and apparently was living on the street, in the subway. I hope the change in behavior for which he was arrested wasn’t being homeless.

        http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/04/25/chiheb-esseghaier-neighbour_n_3157848.html

        Montreal’s La Presse newspaper reported that the Tunisian man was evicted from that apartment in December. Another man in the building told The Canadian Press that Esseghaier simply had to leave because he couldn’t afford the rent, which one neighbour pegged at about $500 a month. …

        The cabbie [his roommate with whom Esseghaier didn’t get along], he added, told him Esseghaier dragged an old mattress that had been left for garbage collection into the apartment to use as a bed.

        Michel said he helped clean up the unit after Esseghaier moved out. The mattress and the apartment, he said, were full of bugs.

        Esseghaier, who does not hold Canadian citizenship, is a biotechnology expert who was performing doctoral studies in nanosensors at a Montreal-area university.

    • DXer said

      Zourob left the INRS in November 2012, and has apparently gone to Saudi Arabia. ***

      As for Esseghaier’s research, Martineau made a point of saying that it had “nothing to do with why he was arrested.”

      ***

      Andrew Kirk, interim dean of engineering at McGill University, who does similar research. Biosensors can also detect very low concentrations of what they are measuring, which can enable early detection.

      Kirk said that one application of biosensors is to detect biological warfare. “It has a defensive application, not an offensive one,” he said on Tuesday.

      Read more: http://www.montrealgazette.com/Suspect+committed+research+school+says/8285592/story.html#ixzz2SvE0NP1M

    • DXer said

      I believe Professor Zouroub can be reached at the King Abdulla Institute for Nanotechnology, King Saud University, Riyadh.

      Real-time electrochemical detection of pathogen DNA using electrostatic interaction of a redox probe
      Minhaz Uddin Ahmed,*ab Sharifun Nahar,a Mohammadali Safavieha and Mohammed Zourob*ac
      Show Affiliations
      Analyst, 2013,138, 907-915
      DOI: 10.1039/C2AN36153A
      Received 17 Aug 2012, Accepted 17 Nov 2012
      First published online 19 Nov 2012

      *
      Corresponding authors
      a
      Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique (INRS) – Énergie Matériaux Télécommunications (EMT), 1650 Boulevard Lionel-Boulet, Varennes, Canada
      b
      Faculty of Science, University of Brunei Darussalam, Jalan Tungku Link, Gadong, BE 1410, Brunei Darussalam

      Tel: +6732463001
      c
      King Abdulla Institute for Nanotechnology, King Saud University, Riyadh 11451, PO Box 2455, Saudi Arabia
      E-mail: mzourob.c@ksu.edu.sa ;

  23. DXer said

    Instead, doesn’t the evidence point to Adnan El-Shukrijumah the Fall 2001 anthrax mailer? After the mailings, El-Shukrijumah lived with Al-Hawsawi, KSM’s assistant who had the anthrax spraydrying documents on his laptop.

    The FBI undercover informant working El-Shukrijumah’s mosque in 2001 says the FBI told him to target some 19-year-old wannabe — the easier target — rather than the secretive El-Shukrijumah and Atta.

    The informant’s report Illustrates that hindight is 20/20. But minimizing and concealing what is known about El-Shukrijumah’s whereabouts in 2001, his connections to Atta and the anthrax planners, and the fact he was casing targets for KSM in NYC and DC in 2001, is wrong.

    Blaming the fragile Bruce Ivins who committed suicide is even more wrong. The AUSAs concealed the information and documents about his work with the 52 rabbits in the first week in October 2001 — making it look like he had no reason to be in the lab.

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    September 11th Attacks Could Have Been Stopped- FBI Al Qaeda Double Agent Elie Assaad
    http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/taxonomy/term/8620

    • DXer said

      KSM’s detainee assessment that has been leaked confirms that KSM tasked El-Shurkijumah with casing targets across the US in 2001.

      “(S/AfF) Panama Canal: Detainee claimed he tasked US citizen and al-Qaida
      operative Jafar al-Tayar aka (Adnan el Shukrijumah) to conduct surveillance on the PanamaC anal as part of an ev_e^ntupalal n to detonateo ne or two explosive-laden ships transiting the waterway.” Detainee said Jafar al-Tayar was given a more general tasking in 2001 of spottinga snd conducting surveillance of potentialt targets across the US.”

    • DXer said

      The SECRET NOFORN 20311208 detainee assessment for KSM explains the context:

      “(S/A{F) In August 2001, detainee had conversations with Muhammad Atef, and learned that al-Qaida was pursuing the development of anthrax related technologies to use in operations. Abu Harith al-Malaysi aka (Abu Haris) asked detainee in the summer of 2001 to move crates containing biological laboratory equipment from Karachi to Kandahar. This further convinced detainee of an al-Qaida effort to produce anthrax.a0 After his discussions with Muhammad Atef,

      detainee said he assumed the special laboratory near Tamak Farm was related to anthrax development efforts and the equipment he was asked to transfer from Karachi to Kandahar, circa May 2001, was for that laboratory.4l
      . (S//I{F) Detaineew as presenti n CNN videotapes showing al-Qaida’s
      chemical testing on dogs and was reportedly in regular consultations with noted poison and explosives expert Abu Khabab al-Masri.a2

      . (S/AIF) Immediately prior to the fall of Kandahar in late 2001, JI member
      Yazid Sufaat stayed at detainee’s home for six days. Yazid told detainee he was developing anthrax for al-Qaida, and was happy in his work. Yazid was giving biology lessons to two al-Qaida operatives detained Abu Bakr al-Filistini aka (Samir Hilmi al-Barq)a nd al-Hud al-Sudani.a3 When detainee queried Yazid about the danger of his research Yazid indicated there was little to worry about since he (Yazid), Bakr, and al-Hud all had anthrax vaccines. As al-Qaida was leaving Afghanistan,Yazid planned to reinstitute the anthrax program in Pakistan.aa

    • DXer said

      I’ve asked Yazid Sufaat the strain that was harvested in early June 2001. Pictured in a brown slurry in a glass container. He complimented the question but declined to answer. The handwritten label was written in English. The word “harvested” was spelled “harvisted” as a I recall.

    • DXer said

      KSM valued El-Shukrijumah for his ease in travelling to the United States. A fellow from Maryland, Majid Khan, who joined Al Qaeda in 2002, described KSM contemplated use of Jaffar al-Tayyar (El-Shukrijumah) in a plot to poison reservoirs in Upstate New York.

      SECRET / NOFORN 20330613 detainee assessment relating to Majid Khan states:

      “○ (S//NF) Detainee stated KU-10024 wanted to use Jaffar al-Tayyar,32 Zuhayb, and two to three unknown African-American Muslim converts who were training in Afghanistan to conduct the attacks against the gas stations. Detainee claimed KU-10024 was interested in using individuals with US status to assist with this operation, but would not necessarily use detainee to conduct the attack.33

      􀂃 (S//NF) KU-10024 tasked detainee to conduct research to support unspecified poisons attacks against US water reservoirs.35

      ○ (S//NF) KU-10024 discussed plans to target the infrastructure of the US. KU-
      10024 stated he wanted to target water reservoirs and water treatment plants in the US. KU-10024 had not worked out the details of this plan and admitted determining the appropriate contaminant would require further research. KU-10024 was interested in having detainee work on the water supply project, as well as a project targeting nuclear reactors.36

      32 TD-314/35571-03, Analyst Note: Detainee met Tayyar at the Baba Afridi’s guesthouse in Karachi.
      33 TD-314/17995-03, Analyst Note: Jaffar al-Tayyar is assessed to be Adnan G. al-Shurkrijumah who is sought by the FBI in connection with possible terrorist threats against the US. The term “US status” is assessed to refer to
      those individuals, US citizens or foreigners, who have a valid and legal purpose for traveling to and within the US, and who could do so with relative ease and without raising the suspicions of US authorities. See TD-314/85346-06.

    • DXer said

      The SECRET NOFORN 20331030 detainee assessment of Qahtani, the intended “20th hijacker” who unsuccessfully tried to get into the country in early August 2001, says he saw Padilla and Adnan El-Shukrijumah at KSM’s house on September 13, 2001.

      “Detainee stated he visited KU-10024’s house approximately 13
      September 2001, during which he saw suspected “dirty-bomb” plotters Jose Padilla, ISN US0US-010008DP (US-10008); and Adnan al-Shukrijumma aka (Jafar al-Tayyar).26”

    • DXer said

      The July 7, 2008 SECRET NOFORN detainee assessment of Abdu Ali Sharqawi states

      “Al-Hadrami also had knowledge of the individuals suspected of being responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, and al-Hadrami provided information about the attacks to detainee.30)

      30 IIR 6 034 0040 07

    • DXer said

      oThe July 7, 2008 SECRET NOFORN detainee assessment of Abdu Ali Sharqawi 20330707 further states

      “(S//NF) Detainee knows Adnan el-Shukrijummah, aka (Jaffar al-Tayyar), a suspected al-Qaida operative. Detainee stated he initially met Shukrijummah in Bosnia in 1995, and then saw him in Saudi Arabia in 1997 during a pilgrimage. Detainee later met Shukrijummah in Pakistan or Afghanistan between August 2001 and January 2002. The FBI suspects that Adnan el-Shukrijummah was trained to operate as a terrorist organizer and field commander on the same level as the 11 September 2001 terrorist Muhammad Atta.45”

      45 TD-314/17874-03, IIR 6 105 0013 04

    • DXer said

      In a letter on a laptop from someone who had access to operational communications, KSM instructed El-Shukrijumah to be ready to travel. When asked about the letter, KSM was surprised the letter still existed because protocol called for destruction of such evidence. That letter should be disclosed — its date should be made public.

      The May 30, 2008 SECRET FORN 20330530 Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah states:

      “(S//NF) KU-10024 [KSM] indicated detainee had direct access to operational
      communications. In another letter recovered during the Karachi raids, KU-10024 instructed YM-10013 for travel. When KU-10024 [KSM] was confronted with the letter during a custodial interview, he was surprised that the letter existed, as detainee was supposed to destroy important documents and correspondence.38 (Analyst Note: KU-10024’s comment indicates that detainee had access to operation planning and coordination through his handling of the correspondence. It is probable that Jafar
      al-Tayyar (Tayyar is Arabic for pilot) was involved in an operational planning
      utilizing the data from the hard drives recovered during the safe house raid.)

      Now in counterintelligence analysis — as in true crime analysis — this letter from KSM is what they call a potential smoking gun. It is way more probative than the semen stained panties that the FBI mistakenly thought was evidence in its “Ivins Theory.”

      Amerithrax represents the greatest failure in the history of counterintelligence
      — partly because the threat is still ongoing and Adnan El-Shukrijumah is in charge of external operations for Al Qaeda and intent on attacking the United States.

      Adnan’s brother Nabil still lives with his mom at the family homestead next to the same mosque where Atta and El-Shukrijumah prayed. Nabil, although he shares Adnan’s views, might be able to review the detainee assessment reports and confirm whether Adnan travelled pursuant to KSM’s instruction. Adnan’s sister is a nurse in Alberquerque and could also.

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      Poisons researcher Abu Khattab also was associated with Jafar the Pilot (Adnan El-Shukrijumah). A BOLO and reward for $5 million was issued along with the BOLO for Aafia Siddiqui and Jdey, the fellow that was detained at the same time as Moussaoui (and we learned a decade later was released).

      Here is a letter Jafar the Pilot (Adnan El-Shukrijumah) wrote Abu Khattab:

      Peshawar Islamic Center
      In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful Praise to the Lord of worlds and peace to the Imam of Mujahdeen, Prophet Muhammad, as well as to his companions. Dear Abu Khabab: Salaam, God’s mercy and blessings to you. Happy Ramadan Holiday. May God accept your fasting. Dear Brother: I would like to advise you that Zubair (Zubayr) is a member of our group. He is from Qatar, trained in Al-Badr Camp, and intends to go to Kashmir. But because of snow over there, he could not go, so we appeal to you to accept him. He is trustworthy, and we hope that you can help him take a vocational training course. You have a lot of new things [trades that Zabair may be trained to do]. Thanks,

      Yours truly, Ja`far At-Tayyar (Al-Tayyar) [At-Tayyar means the pilot]

    • DXer said

      As noted above, Adnan El-Shukrijumah reportedly was at KSM’s home in Kandahar on September 13, 2001, according to the detainee assessment report of Qahtani, the intended 20th hijacker.

      Now precisely when precisely did Yazid Sufaat spend the six days at KSM’s home?

      The SECRE T // NOFORNI // 2O3II2O8 detainee assessment of KSM states:

      “Yazid Sufaat stayed at detainee’s home for six days. Yazid told detainee he was developing anthrax for al-Qaida, and was happy in his work. Yazid was giving biology lessons to two al-Qaida operatives, detained Abu Bakr al-Filistini aka (Samir Hilmi al-Barq) and al-Hudal-Sudani.a3 When detainee
      queried Yazid about the danger of his research Yazid indicated there was little to worry about since he (Yazid), Bakr, and al-Hud all had anthrax vaccines. As al-Qaida was leaving Afghanistan,Yazid planned to reinstitute the anthrax program in Pakistan. TD-3t41t9304-03”

    • DXer said

      Did Yazid Sufaat get the anthrax vaccine from Najmut Tariq? Did El-Shukrijumah and his father know Najmut Tariq from Brooklyn?

      The detainee assessment of Saifullah A. Paracha ( S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331117 ) states:

      (S//NF) The diary contained contact information for Najmut Tariq, a possible al- Qaida anthrax operative residing in New York. The name Tariq also appeared in a document recovered from an al-Qaida safe house in Pakistan along with a notation for
      the anthrax vaccine. Another al-Qaida associate identified Tariq as a businessman in the pharmaceutical industry.38

      (S//NF) Detainee stated he has known Tariq since 1969, prior to detainee’s travels to the US. Tariq lived in Nazimabad, PK, detainee’s village, and they both attended the Mahmoomadin Mosque. Detainee stated he last spoke with Tariq in Karachi, PK, in early July 2003.39 Detainee added Tariq is a member of Jamiat Islami and is a pharmacist in the US with stores in Boston and New York City. Tariq was also close to Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the leader of Jamiat Islami.40

      (S/NF) Information linking Tariq to anthrax and biological weapons was found on a calendar belonging to Arif Qasmani, a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) member and associate of senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016).41

    • DXer said

      Yazid Sufaat’s argument that he developed anthrax in defense is crock and belied by the documentary evidence relating to the reasons for Dr. Ayman’s development of anthrax as a weapon for use against US targets.

      http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/192563

      “I am Yazid Sufaat. I am not going to hide myself, my face, my name. Why should I? I am handsome, no?” asked the 48-year-old Johor native, laughing.

      Yazid, who crossed the Pakistan-Afghan border on learning of the Sept 11, 2001 attacks on the US, said he trained as a militant for six months under the one-time most wanted man in the world.

      When Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance forces in November 2001, it was Osama who advised him to leave the war-torn country and return when “we have won back Afghanistan”.

      “At that time I thought, if they catch me out here, I would be heading to Guantanamo. If I go home, it’s only ISA. …

      “My wife didn’t believe I would be arrested, so I said let’s cross the border and see. We crossed Bukit Kayu Hitam (Thai-Malaysian border) and I was arrested,” he said of the December 2001 incident.

      He used his experience in running a pathology laboratory to train staff at the hospital and to set up a laboratory next to the hospital in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.

      It was at this laboratory that he was accused of having developed biological weapons – something which he terms “the so-called project”.

      Initially hesitant to reveal what went on in the lab, which he claims he started before Sept 11, 2001 and was bombed out following the World Trade Centre attacks, Yazid let out that it was a defence strategy.

      “Of course (there was research), we are scientists (laughs). We have to do it, but the lab wasn’t that sophisticated. It was bare bones, that was what we could manage. We do what we can and leave the rest to Allah.

      “If (the other side) use ‘bugs’, you must understand that bug in detail so we can counter any biological weapon that they use. You must know your enemy,” he said.

    • DXer said

      Al Qaeda anthrax lab tech says he had been part of Malaysian Armed Forces biological weapons program
      http://www.freemalaysiakini2.com/?p=21471

      Excerpt

      A biological warfare programme

      Among the longest-serving ISA detainees in history, Yazid, currently under travel, asset and arms deals sanctions imposed by the United Nations, believes his incarceration has to do with his “expertise”.

      Trained as a biochemist on a government scholarship in the United States, this top student of the Royal Military College who retired as a captain with the army was part of a biological warfare programme under the Defence Ministry.

      Osama Laden, Yazid was hesitant to reveal details about the government’s “secret” programme which was later scrapped, describing it “a long story”.

      “When they (the police) first took me in, I didn’t tell them (about the government programme). I didn’t want them to know, didn’t want the liability to fall on the government, to pass the buck to someone else.

      “Finally, they managed to get a report from their ‘friend’ and they wanted me to clear things up. I didn’t want to clarify (anything), so they took my wife in,” said the father of four.

      His wife, Sejahratul Dursina @ Chomel Mohamed, was held under ISA for two months and after this was placed under a movement restriction order for six years.

      “If you want to be released from ISA, just follow what they say and admit to all the charges… I refused to do so and they kept me for seven years… because I don’t want to sing (Negara-ku).

      “I don’t want to sing. Why should I (when) the country had betrayed me?” Yazid asked.

      ***

      The other two individuals linked to 9/11 who stayed in the Sungai Long condominium were Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi – two of five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which slammed into the Pentagon.

      The duo, according to the United Nations, had stayed at Yazid’s condominium in January 2000 to attend what the UN termed an “al-Qaeda conference” in Kuala Lumpur.

      “I was not there. At that time I was in Pakistan and Afghanistan, building a hospital there,” Yazid said.

      Next to the hospital, he said, was a laboratory where he is accused of developing biological weapons – an accusation not levelled at him during his detention under the ISA, but earning him the moniker “Anthrax CEO”.

      Favourite bugs

      CBS News reported that US intelligence doubts that Yazid developed the anthrax strain, while a leaked Guantanamo Bay document posted on Wikileaks noted that a Yemeni detainee said Yazid had “poor lab techniques”.

      But Yazid said that he was in fact “successful” in developing some “bugs”, but the laboratory was destroyed when the Northern Alliance forces bombed Kandahar.

      “I can still find (anthrax) if I want to, but what for? It has no commercial value. Anthrax is only good for sabotaging, it cannot kill.

      “It’s not my favourite bug, anyway. I’d rather use bacteria or virus yang betul-betul(really) hit you and give you one or two hours before you die.”

    • DXer said

      Soraya Yazid, Yazid’s loving daughter, reports this week that “Bapak already lost 10kgs [22 lbs.] in 3 months.”

      I haven’t yet seen the half a dozen or so affidavits that were given the defense a week or two ago — so I don’t know the evidence he faces in connection with the current charge.

      But my thought is that if he addresses the issues forthrightly he and his counsel can face head-on the issue:

      what’s the difference between supplying arms to the rebels (as some countries are doing) and serving the rebels tea at your cafe and sharing religious views?

      Moreover, I think if he addressed the issue of the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings forthrightly — and explained how Adnan El-Shukrijumah left with the anthrax laden letters to mail (if that in fact is the case) —
      then perhaps not only will Yazid’s substantial assets be unfrozen but I would think his questioners could be eligible for the $5 million (US) reward. That’s $15 million ringgit.

      If he doesn’t want to speak of any third party, he could simply identify the genetic strain he was using. (Testing suggests it was Ames). See David Relman’s article in SCIENCE.

      In email and chat, Yazid Sufaat told me he would answer any questions and let people judge.

      Well, now’s the time. Given the lack of remorse and rehabilitation he has shown in the past, if found guilty of the current charge, it may weigh against him at sentencing depending on Malaysian law.

      It’s time to discover the Allah that does not celebrate the murder of innocent civilians.

    • DXer said

      I have quoted the secret report indicating that Jdey lived with Al-Hawsawi (with the anthrax spraydrying documents on his laptop) in Spring 2002 in Karachi safehouses. I also have quoted the secret report indicating that KSM tasked Jdey with casing targets in the US in 2001 — and with both Jdey and Yazid Sufaat staying with him at his home in Kandahar, KSM had instructed Jdey to stand ready to travel.

      But a related question, still unanswered is whether Jdey joined Dhiren Barot (Al-Hindi) and his colleagues while casing NYC and NJ financial targets during the two months that Al-Hindi (Dhiren Barot) was living with his cousin Meeta for two months in 2001.

      At one point, Al-Hindi and his colleagues were joined by US biochem operative Al Al-Marri. Al-Marri was being handled by KSM and was in contact with Al-Hawsawi. In mid-December 2001, the US arrested US-based Al Qaeda biochem operative Ali Al-Marri, who had arrived on September 10, 2001 and was nominally a student living in Macomb, Illinois. Al-Marri had lived in Macomb the previous summer and had traveled to New York City to join with UK operative Dhiren Barot to case NYC helicopters and financial institutions. Authorities had learned of calls he made to KSM’s assistant al-Hawsawi from Illinois. The key to the Amerithrax solution possibly hinges on where he had his computer sent after casing NYC locations. He had the imam at the local mosque store the computer in his basement and then ship it to Washington. Beginning that month, Ali Al-Timimi was on GMU staff and paid $70,000 a year. He shared a suite and fax with the leading DARPA-funded Ames anthrax researchers.

      At some point, officials learned of communications between Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s spiritual adviser, radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali. Al-Timimi’s attorney, for example, says that Al-Timimi and Al-Hawali spoke on September 16, 2001 and September 19, 2001. They later spoke in coordinating a letter to members of Congress on the first anniversary of the anthrax letters to the Senators and helping Moussaoui with his defense. Montreal cell member Jdey, according to the top CIA fellow, was detained at the same time as Moussaoui and was released. HIs whereabouts are unknown.

      In March 2002, a crude biological weapons site was found in Afghanistan. U.S. forces discovered a site near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that appeared to be an Al Qaeda biological weapons lab under construction. Zawahiri’s plan, evidenced in the documents found previous in the Fall, was to move the location of the lab every 3 months. The plan was to paint the walls of the labs so that they could be decontaminated and the traces of anthrax be destroyed by insecticide. It is seriously wrong for the FBI not to provide to GAO the evidence relating to the intel about Al Qaeda’s efforts to decontaminate its labs and destroy evidence.

      There was no scientific evidence that implicated Dr. Ivins at all. Thus, to frame the issue about the reliability of the evidence that didn’t point to Ivins in the first place is a serious waste of resources. For example, on the genetics, the 4 morphs had only winnowed the field by about half — from about 700 to 300 who had access. Big whoop. It is an outrage that this would have been presented as evidence of access to Ames pointing to Dr. Ivins rather than all 300 equally (and that is just the number at USAMRIID).

      http://www.amerithax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      The press stories explained that it was the arrest of KSM on or about March 1, 2003 that brought clarity to the identity and importance of the identity of Jafar al Tayyar (Adnan El-Shukrijumah) and the importance that he be located. Along with Jdey, he was part of an operational clique that threatened to be the “second wave.”

      The Pakistan government, at a press conference, claimed that Khalid Mohammed, Al Qaeda’s #3, was captured on March 1, 2003. According to the Pakistan government officals, Mohammed allegedly was hiding in the home of the Pakistani bacteriologist Dr. Abdul Qadoos Khan. Handwritten notes and files on a laptop seized upon the capture of KSM, Al Qaeda’s #3, included a feasible anthrax production plan using a spray dryer and addressed the recruitment of necessary expertise. Although the details of the documents on Mohammed’s computer may (or may not) point to possible difficulties in aerial dispersal, they are consistent with the product used in the anthrax mailings. Al Qaeda had both the means and opportunity. Mohammed told his interrogators that Moussaoui was not going to be part of 9/11 but was to be part of a “second wave.” KSM explained that Moussaoui’s inquiries about crop dusters may have been related to the anthrax work being done by US-trained biochemist and Al Qaeda operative, Malaysian Yazid Sufaat. Zacarias Moussaoui once told the judge at his trial in a filing that he wants “anthrax for Jew sympathizer only.” Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s sheik al-Hawali spoke by telephone about how they might help in connection with Moussaoui’s defense.

      In early March 2003, a man named Saud Memon, who was in the textiles business, was captured in South Africa. He had fled here after Daniel Pearl was killed on his property. Memon reportedly gave information on Al Qaeda’s anthrax work that he allegedly helping to finance. After four years in detention at an undisclosed location, he was left in front of his home in Karachi on April 28, 2007 in very poor health. He died a couple weeks later. The cause of death was reported to be meningitis and tuberculosis. Memon’s lawyer said he had been in the custody of Pakistani intelligence officials. Memon’s name is not on the final official lists of Guantanamo captives issued on May 15, 2006. The Wall Street Journal also quoted an unnamed Pakistani official who said that Memon for a time was held in the American Bagram Theater detention facility.

      Bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan was charged along with his son, Ahmed, for harboring the fugitives. As of March 28, 2003, he was in a hospital for a cardiac problem and had been granted “pre-arrest bail.”

      A man named Muklis Yunos, who reportedly received training on use of anthrax as a biological weapon in Afghanistan according to Philippine intelligence reports, was arrested on May 25, 2003, and cooperated with authorities over a bucket of spicy Kentucky Fried Chicken. Yunos had been Hambali’s right-hand man and was in charge of special operations of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (”MILF”).

      In early June 2003, a Central Intelligence Agency (”CIA”) report publicly concluded that the reason for Mohammed Atta’s and Zacarias Moussaoui’s inquiries into cropdusters was for the contemplated use in dispersing biological agents such as anthrax. It had long been known Osama Bin Laden was interested in using cropdusters to disperse biological agents (since the testimony of millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam). An early September 2003 Newsweek article included a rumor by a Taliban source that at a meeting in April 2003 Bin Laden was planning an “unbelievable” biological attack, the plans for which had suffered a setback upon the arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He had been captured the previous month in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Tenet in his May 2007 At The Center Of The Storm wrote: “And in early 2003, al-Qaida canceled a planned cyanide attack on the New York City subway, Al-Zawahiri recalled the operatives in New York because ‘we have something better in mind.’” Tenet noted that the CIA still does not know what al-Zawahiri meant but adds that the cyanide attack ‘was not sufficiently inspiring’ for al-Qaida.”

      The attorney for White House staffer Scooter Libby revealed that Libby in July 2003 was preoccupied with many national security issues, including the possibility al-Qaida had brought anthrax into the United States. Was the FBI Amerithrax Task Force aware of all the secret documents bearing on El-Shukrijumah’s important operational role — and the fact that he lived with the fellow who had the anthrax spraydrying documents on his laptop? How was the Task Force able to exclude El-Shukrijumah if he is able to travel around the world undetected? Similarly, how was the Task Force able to exclude Jdey if it does not know where he was in 2001 after he was released (after being detained at same time as Moussaoui)?

    • DXer said

      It was FBI Director Mueller’s decision to compartmentalize the investigation that led to stovepiping and contributed to the failure of analysis.

      Former lead investigator Lambert explained his objection to FBI Director Mueller’s decision to compartmentalize the three squads:

      “What would happen is that essentially wall or stovepipes would occur among the three squads investigating the case.”

      Now — fast forward to 2013 — the impediment to analysis is due to the FBI’s continued withholding of material documents from the GAO.

      Selectivity in the production of documents is the death of sound analysis.

      The GAO needs to speak to the key paralegal that managed the database of Amerithrax documents and have the paralegal walk the GAO researchers through the documents yet to be produced. Batestamp numbers and indexing — and the computerization of the records — makes document control a simple matter. All continued withholding and delay is willful.

      If history is a guide, there will be severe consequences if things are not set on the right course immediately with all withheld documents promptly produced.

      There are no secrets.

    • DXer said

      Terror suspect describing klling up to 100,000: with bacteria: documents. May 9, 2013
      http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/terror-suspect-discussed-killing-up-to-100-000-with-bacteria-documents-1.1274380

      Now the fellow detained in connection with the train plot in Canada was from Montreal. He was a Tunisian. He lived in Montreal. Both Jdey and Boussora were Tunisian. Both lived in Montreal. Below in this thread is listed the address Jdey lived, and the Boussora’s favorite restaurant. There is a $5 million reward for information leading to their capture. Elsewhere I recently posted the names of the Montreal cell led by Slahi and the name of a roommate of Jdey. We need the experts on Canadian terror like Colin Frieze and Stewart Bell to tell us more. Esseghaier was a PhD, student. But he was the one dismissive of the brainstormed suggested by the Tunisian guy in NYC paling around with FBI undercovers.

    • DXer said

      Can Chiheb Esseghaier tell us about his fellow countrymen Jdey and Boussora?

      Canada rail bomber suspect Chiheb Esseghaier rants against court in bail hearing

      Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/rail-bomb-suspect-rants-court-article-1.1326535#ixzz2StcViySa

      Jail would actually be a step up for Esseghaier, who has reportedly been living in the Montreal subway.

      That’s a comedown from an earlier description of Esseghaier by the Tunisian embassy, which called him a “brilliant PhD student.”

      The “Hatfill Theory” was part of the same unstoppable train wreck as the “Ivins Theory.” There was a change of cars (investigators), but it was the same flawed train of reasoning and the investigators never overcame the earlier truncated emphasis of the investigation.
      Posted on May 10, 2011
      https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/?s=Unstoppable

    • DXer said

      Current
      phD student at INRS
      Graduate researcher at Université de Sherbrooke
      Researcher at IPEST, Tunis
      Education
      INSAT de Tunis
      Connections
      4 connections
      Chiheb Esseghaier’s Summary

      Publications :

      – G. Suaifan, C. Esseghaier, A. Ng, M. Zourob, Wash-less and highly sensitive assay for prostate specific antigen detection, Analyst 2012, 137, 5614-5619.
      – C. Esseghaier, A. Ng, M. Zourob, A novel sensitive layer for rapid HIV-1 protease detection using magnetic bead mediation, Biosens. & Bioelectron. 2013, 41, 335–341
      – C. Esseghaier, S. Helali, H. Ben Fredj, A. Telili, A. Abdelghani, Polypyrrole–neutravidin layer for impedimetric biosensor, Sens. Actuators. B, 2008, 131, 584-589.
      – M. G. Silva, S. Helali, C. Esseghaier, C. Suarez, A. Oliva, A. Abdelghani, An impedance spectroscopy method for the detection and evaluation of Babesia bovis antibodies in cattle, Sens. Actuators B, 2008, 135, 206-213.
      – C. Esseghaier, Y. Bergaoui, H. ben Fredj, A. Tlili, S. Helali, S. Ameur, A. Abdelghani, Impedance spectroscopy on immobilized streptavidin horseradish peroxidase layer for biosensing, Sens. Actuators B, 2008, 134, 112-116.
      – H. Ben Fredj, S. Helali, C. Esseghaier, L. Vonna, L. Vidal, A. Abdelghani, Labeled magnetic nanoparticles assembly on polypyrrole film for biosensor applications, Talanta 2008, 75, 740-747.

      Conferences :

      – 14th Canadian Semiconductor Technology Conference, Hamilton 2009.
      – 22th World Congress on Biosensors, Cancun 2012.
      – Photonics North Conference, Montreal 2012.
      – TechConnect World Conference, Santa Clara 2012.

      • DXer said

        I don’t think Esseghaier’s graduate works relates in a way useful for use of bacteria in an an attack. His best defense would be that he and his colleague were train watchers. There are people who are fascinated with watching passing trains and do it regularly. But if through his connections he could share information what he knows about Jdey and Boussora — even if he has just heard it on the Tunisian jihadist grapevine — that would be helpful. The colleague in NYC talked to investigators for a week without a lawyer and so maybe someone shared some scuttlebutt about Jdey and Boussora.

    • DXer said

      This reporter says Tunisian Esseghaier went to receive overseas training. (Where?) His conversations with Abassi were recorded in NYC by an undercover apparently. When they discussed anthrax, did they discuss former Rosemont (Toronto neighborhood) resident, fellow-countryman Jdey?

      The FBI had been trailing Abassi since his arrival in the U.S. in March. Their terrorist task force included an undercover agent who, according to documents, recorded hours of conversations with Abassi in which he spilled plans for terrorist acts in U.S. and abroad.

      Among Abassi’s plans was to kill up to 100,000 people by “contaminating the air or water with bacteria,” according to the documents.

      “In conversations with the undercover agent, Abassi also claimed to have “radicalized” Esseghaier, a fellow Tunisian national and an engineer who studied at Quebec’s Université de Sherbrooke.

      “What Mr. Abassi didn’t know was that one of his associates, privy to the details of his plan, was an undercover FBI agent,” said FBI Assistant Director George Venizelos.

      According to a former lab mate at Université Laval, students are making the connection that the man arrested in the U.S. was a former student, a science grad student that studied chemical engineering.

      Students at the Quebec university were “making the connection on Facebook” that this was the same young man who was known as keen to start political discussions, the colleague, who did not want to be named, told the Star.

      The colleague said Abassi was Muslim and “very, very” religious.

      “There are some Muslim girls at the university. And he would say ‘why are you Muslim, but you’re not wearing the (hijabs)?” the fellow student said.

      According to the documents, Abassi and Esseghaier met in New York City while under surveillance.

      After being radicalized by Abassi, Esseghaier “went on to receive overseas training and plotted to engage in terrorist activity in the West,” documents show.

      Canadians officials arrested Jaser and Esseghaier on April 22, saying the two had been plotting to derail a New York to Toronto passenger train.

      http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/05/09/toronto_terror_plot_tunisian_charged_by_us_with_visa_fraud_tied_to_terrorism.html

    • DXer said

      http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/04/23/esseghaier-jaser-charges-public-prosecutor.html

      He worked in bionanotechnology. He worked in the Biosensors, BioMEMS and Bionanotechnology lab (BBBL), INRS

      Born in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, Mr. Esseghaier studied engineering and industrial biology there before moving to Canada for studies at Sherbrooke University, according to a profile on the lab’s website. He has been in Canada on a student visa.

      He joined the INRS’s Biosensor BioMEMS Bionanotechnology Lab in late 2010, doing a PhD focused on developing optical and electrochemical biosensors.

      A website for the lab, headed by Prof. Mohammed Zourob, was quickly erased from the Internet after the news broke Monday, but much of it remained available in a cached form.

      Stupid question: Is Professor Mohammed Zourob whose website was erased the Mohammed Zourob who wrote so articulately about anthrax detection?

      Principles of Bacterial Detection: Biosensors, Recognition Receptors, and …
      edited by Mohammed Zourob, Souna Elwary, Anthony P. F. Turner

    • DXer said

      Is this the same expert from that lab, the head guy, who deleted the website, upon the new Canadian terror defendant Chiheb Esseghaier’s arrest? Did the defendant work with him? Did he work on the same subject? Stupid question: Did the defendant have access to anthrax?

      Another stupid question: Did Chiheb Esseghaier ever meet Jdey overseas? Did he ever meet Adnan El-Shukrijumah overseas?

      I’m told Mohammed Zourob has deleted his website but I’ll and have to confirm things and, if so, grab its cache.

      Mohammed Zourob writes in his treatise:

      Bacterial contamination of food and water resources, as well as the increasing incidence of nosocomial infections, has us on our toes, looking for ways of recognizing these elements. In addition, the recent and growing threats to personal and territorial securities make this task even more urgent.
      Therefore, accurate assessment of the state of current technologies is a prerequisite for undertaking any course of action towards future improvements. In particular, development of new detection and identification technologies for the plethora of bacterial agents has become increasingly important to scientists and to regulatory agencies. In recent years, there has been much progress in the field of bacterial agents detection, resulting in the development of more accurate, fast, analyte-specific, robust, and cost effective techniques by incorporating emerging technologies from various disciplines.
      Principles of Bacterial Detection: Biosensors, Recognition Receptors and Microsystems presents a significant and up-to-date review of various integrated approaches for bacterial detection by distinguished engineers and scientists. This work is a comprehensive approach to bacterial detection, presenting a thorough knowledge of the subject and an effective integration of disciplines in order to appropriately convey the state-of the-art fundamentals and applications of the most innovative approaches.

      The book consists of four parts. The first part (Chapters 1–4) is an introduction to pathogenic bacteria and sampling techniques and provides an overview of the rapid microbio- logical methods. The second part (Chapters 5–20) describes the different transducers used for bacterial detection. It covers the theory behind each technique and delivers a detailed state- of-the-art review for all the new technologies used. The third part (Chapters 21–29) covers the different recognition receptors used in the latest methods for the detection of bacteria. It describes in detail the use of immunoassays, nucleic acids, oligonucleotide microarrays, carbohydrates, aptamers, protein microarrays, bacteriophage, phage display, and molecular imprinted polymers as recognition elements. The fourth part (Chapters 30–36) covers the different microsystems used for detection/identification and bacterial manipulations, mainly bacteria lysis in microfluidics, PCR in microfluidics, dielectrophoresis, ultrasonic manipulation techniques, and mass spectrometry.

      We anticipate that the book will be helpful to academicians, practitioners, and professionals working in various fields, including biomedical sciences, physical sciences, microsystems engineering, nanotechnology, veterinary science and medicine, food QA, bioter- rorism and security as well as allied health, healthcare and surveillance. Since the fundamentals are also reviewed, we believe that the book will appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students who study in areas related to bacterial detection.

      Mohammed Zourob …
      June 2008

      http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-0-387-75113-9%2F1.pdf

    • DXer said

      The expert on anthrax detection was the defendant’s thesis advisor.

      Mystery deepens around Montreal suspect – Montreal Gazette
      http://www.montrealgazette.com/technology/Mystery…/story.html

      Apr 25, 2013 – But no one at the INRS could say where Esseghaier, 30, lived, … been able to say more about him was his thesis adviser, Mohammed Zourob, …

  24. DXer said

    I argue in the thread below that Adnan El-Shukrijumah is a far stronger candidate for mailing than Jdey.

    Even crediting the startling and curious report by the former CIA top analyst report that Jdey was detained at the same time as Moussaoui but then released, El-Shukrijumah is a stronger suspect as the mailer. For starters, Jdey was said in the report to be with El-Shukrijumah. If Jdey had been detained, he would have been “damaged goods” and there would have been no reason to compromise an important operation such as the mailing of anthrax laden letters. So if anything his detention arguably works against concluding he is the mailer rather than in favor of it.

    But not only was El-Shukrijumah known to be in travelling around the US — DC and NYC, for example — in 2001 — casing targets for KSM, but after the anthrax mailings he was hiding out with the man with the anthrax spraydrying documents on his laptop, Al-Hawsawi. Al-Hawsawi’s assistant. Now the information comes in a secret documetn NOFORN. Which means no foreigners may view it. Oh, go ahead. I won’t tell.

    It’s the leaked SECRET//NO FORN//20311208 interrogation of Al-Hawsawi.

    (S/A{F) Detainee is closely affiliated with Muhammad Essagh Sher Muhammad
    Khan aka (Jafar al-Tayar). (Analyst Note: Jafar al-Tayar is currently on the FBI’s most
    wanted list.)

    o (S/A{F) PK-1461 claimed detainee was a student of Jafar al-Tayar.a6

    o (S/A{F) Detainee identified a photo of Adnan el-Shukri Jumah as resembling
    Tayar when detainee last saw him in Apil 2002. Detainee and Tayar had also shared
    two Karachi safe houses from February until April 2002.47

    http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

    • DXer said

      FBI Sources: New Al Qaeda Global Commander Lived In Brooklyn
      El Shukrijumah Spent 15 Years In NYC, Fla.; DHS Concerned
      August 6, 2010 11:44 PM
      http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/08/06/new-al-qaida-leader-first-to-have-called-u-s-home/

      Comment: Rep. Peter King has focused in the past, in 2010, on El Shukrijumah in terms of the current threat he poses.

      Maybe Congressman King could use his position to make public a timeline of his whereabouts in 2001, the public could better assess El-Shukrijumah’s history during the period he was tasked by KSM to case targets in NYC and DC.

      • DXer said

        I believe before 911 in 2001 FBI agents may have repeatedly visited El-Shukrijumah’s home looking for him in connection with a different investigation of someone at the same mosque. But that’s what the FBI does — they investigate criminals. So the FBI very often will have had contact with people who then do bad things. It rarely should dominate an analysis. It does not support unwarranted inferences.

        Instead, the important thing is the documentary evidence of El-Shukrijumah’s whereabouts throughout 2001.

        Consider by analogy the Isabella Gardner art heist mystery involving the $500 million treasure hunt. The news will break upon his sentencing on Thursday of this week.

        The key is to reconstruct the whereabouts of the people through documentary evidence.

        In 1992-1993, when Robert Gentile was being handed a painting from a different heist by Robert Guarente in Maine, he had a used car business called CLIFFORD MOTORS in South Windsor, CT, pop. 25,000.

        Rather than the company by the same name in CT Secretary of State records, I’m advised by my researcher from S. WIndsor, a long-time resident, that it may have been as small car place near entrance to 291 on Route 5 aka John Fitch Blvd close to East Hartford line.

        Now the reason I am interested in Mr. Gentile’s connection to the business is that it was 1992 was when the state authorities rejected Merlino’s and Turner’s offer to trade the paintings for dropping the cocaine distribution charges. They suddenly had paintings that they were stuck with.

        The FBI is thinking that the paintings made it to Connecticut and possibly some even to Philly. Up until 1992 Gentile had been in the business of laying concrete slabs.

        So while I have uploaded a picture of the concrete slab in Maine at Guarente’s residence that I think the FBI should move or break apart,

        http://photos.syracuse.com/yourphotos/2013/03/isabella_gardner_art_heist.html

        … I also like his place of business in South WIndsor.

        http://www.mapquest.com/#b834a869889be4e3611b6cf7

        Look for a concrete slab — but remember, like Forrest Fenn says, no digging.

        If the FBI does find the paintings, it will only be to their credit.

        We only wish the FBI well in solving these difficult mysteries.

      • DXer said

        In the $5 million reward, Adnan El-Shukrijumah protests that her son is innocent. (She spouts the same nonsense as the mother of the Boston bombers).

        In 2001/2002 she was claiming he was teaching english in Morocco. When the FBI kept coming to the house in 2001, she told him not to come home, wherever he was. What we need is the $5 million reward to motivate people to provide information as to his whereabouts in 2001.

        Given he had a terror summit in 2004 with Al-Hindi, one question that arises is whether Adnan was with Al-Hindi casing the NYC and NJ targets. Al-Hindi stayed in New Jersey for 2 months at his cousin Meeta’s house. What does Adnan’s cousin Meeta say? Her husband? What does Al-Hindi’s aunt say? $5 million is the reward for Adnan but $25 million is the reward for thwarting the next 911.

        By analogy, with respect to the $5 million reward for Isabella Gardner, the wonderful woman Lynn at Hartford Truck Rental in South WIndsor believes it was the place bulldozed last year across the Route 291 & Route 5 interchange from them.

        Just up from the intersection Rte. 291 and Rte. 5 in South Windsor, near where I think Gentile had his car business Clifford Motors, is the STAR DUST LOUNGE. Now Mr. Gentile’s mob nickname was “The Cook.”

        So you go to the waitress in the joint who looks like she’s been there 25 years, and ask: “Do you know The Cook?”

        For inspiration, read Robert Parker’s 2012 Spenser novel LULLABY and study Spenser’s work in lower Southie tracking down dope peddlers “Moon” and “Pepper” at a local tavern.

        p.s. Bring Hawk.

      • DXer said

        Creating a timeline of Adnah El-Shukrijumah’s wherabouts is fraught with difficulty due to the unreliability of witness identifications.

        According to this AP report, however, US and Panamian officials have confirmed that Adnan was in Panama for 10 days in April 2001.

        Associated Press Worldstream

        May 25, 2005 Wednesday

        Honduras joins terror alert labeled false alarm

        BYLINE: DIEGO MENDEZ; Associated Press Writer

        SECTION: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

        In the only known confirmed case, U.S. and Panamanian officials said Saudi
        native and alleged top al-Qaida operative Adnan El Shukrijumah was in Panama for
        10 days in April 2001, five months before the Sept. 11 attacks.

        Honduran officials last year reported that two witnesses said they had seen
        Shukrijumah at an Internet cafe in the capital, Tegucigalpa. However, U.S.
        officials say the suspect almost certainly was never there, and local officials
        eventually backed away from the report.

    • DXer said

      One of the difficulties with creating a timeline for El-Shukijumah over the past decade and a half is that sometimes they are based on eyewitness identifications — and eyewitness identifications are very often mistaken.

      But this looks like a useful 2005 summary of some sources that can be assessed — the linked citations are hyperlinked in the report.

      Immigration and Terrorism
      Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel
      http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.html

      By Janice Kephart September 2005

      “Janice L. Kephart is former counsel to the September 11 Commission and an author of 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. She has testified before Congress and made numerous appearances in print and broadcast media.
      Research used in preparing portions of this report was conducted with the assistance of (former) select staff of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Josh Lefkowitz, Jacob Wallace, and Jeremiah Baronberg.”

      “Born in Saudi Arabia,82 Adnan El-Shukrijumah, aka “Jafar the Pilot,” has spent 15 years in the United States (mostly in South Florida), speaks fluent English, and has been employed as a teacher.83 El-Shukrijumah trained with Jose Padilla to partner in the dirty bomb plot,84 helicopter plots, and the New York and New Jersey financial infrastructure plots discovered in the summer of 2004. A Department of Homeland Security document quoted in Newsweek states that “KSM has identified Adnan el Shukrijumah, a Saudi born permanent U.S. resident alien, as an operative with standing permission to attack targets in the United States that had been previously approved by Osama Bin Ladin.”85 FBI Director Robert Mueller called him “a trained operative who poses an operational threat to the United States”86 who the FBI considers to be armed and dangerous.87

      In late 2000 or early 2001, El-Shukrijumah was under investigation for his relationship to Imran Mandhai, convicted in Florida of conspiring to bomb a National Guard armory, power stations, Jewish businesses, and Mount Rushmore prior to 9/11.88 Mandhai was associated with Hakki Cemal Aksoy, convicted in 2002 for firearms violations and asylum fraud and in whose apartment bomb making manuals and notes were found. El- Shukrijumah had previously applied for naturalization, but the INS interior enforcement office in Miami noticed that the application was fraudulent. The INS agents working the case met with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Miami, and even discussed seeking a search warrant for El-Shukrijumah’s residence. Without further information linking El-Shukrijumah to terrorist activity, the matter was dropped.89

      As an LPR, El-Shukrijumah easily traveled to and from attended training camps in Afghanistan,90 where he was most likely schooled by Ramzi Binalshibh, famous for his role as emissary between KSM and 9/11 ring leader Mohamad Atta.91 El-Shukrijumah is a skilled bomb maker and a Florida-trained pilot,92 and authorities have found a document that ties him (via one of his aliases) to the Oklahoma flight school where Zacarias Moussaoui trained.93 He may have been friendly with Atta as well, as I describe an immigration officer’s witnessing of receiving a request for help with travel documents in May 2001 from El-Shukrijumah on behalf of Atta and likely another 9/11 pilot in 9/11 and Terrorist Travel.94

      According to Attorney General John Ashcroft, El-Shukrijumah “scouted sites across America that might be vulnerable to terrorist attack.”95 In addition to surveilling high-profile targets in New York’s financial district,96 El-Shukrijumah surveilled the Panama Canal.97 Back in the United States, he was also involved in an aborted plot with Jose Padilla to blow up apartment buildings in the United States.98 He was also likely Padilla’s first partner in the dirty bomb plot, but differences between them ended the joint venture.

      There are also reports that El-Shukrijumah attempted to procure radioactive material from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario.99 In March 2004, El-Shukrijumah attended a terrorist summit in Pakistan and met with a number of key al Qaeda members, including Abu Issa Al-Hindi, Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, and Mohammed Babar.100 Recently he has been spotted in Mexico.101 He reportedly met with members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang (known as MS-13) in Honduras, although Interpol denies the existence of evidence of such a meeting.102 In September 2004, the Aviation and Security Association reported, “An alert airline crewmember saw and then confronted a suspicious acting person at Kansai International Airport in Japan. El Shukrijumah was this suspicious person.” However, law enforcement was not notified.103

      Reporting indicates that since El-Shukrijumah fled the United States after 9/11, he has tried to get back into the United States using various passports.104 He has a Guyanese passport, but may also hold passports from Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Trinidad.105 However, unless authorities made a decision to permit Shukrijumah his freedom for law enforcement or intelligence reasons, or know that he did manage to enter the United States on one of these passports undetected and law enforcement knows about it, I do not place much credence in these reports.”

      83 “Remarks of FBI Director Robert Mueller on the Summer Terrorist Threat.” May 26, 2004. See also video clip of El-Shukrijumah on the FBI’s website.

      84 Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Leader Identified in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot.” The Washington Times. Oct. 5, 2004.

      85 Evan Thomas, “Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within.” Newsweek, June 23, 2003.

      86 “Remarks of FBI Director Robert Mueller on the Summer Terrorist Threat.” May 26, 2004.

      87 http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elshukrijumah.htm . Accessed July 11, 2005.

      88 “Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla.” June 1, 2004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm . Accessed Aug. 31, 2004. See also Timothy Burger, Viveca Novak, Michael Weisskopf and Tim Padgett, “The Making of the FBI’s ‘Most Dangerous’.”Time. Apr. 7, 2003.

      89 Email from former INS Supervisory Special Agent Bill West, August 29, 2005.

      90 Timothy Burger, Viveca Novak, Michael Weisskopf and Tim Padgett, “The Making of the FBI’s ‘Most Dangerous’.” Time. Apr. 7, 2003.

      91 Jerry Seper, “FBI Steps Up Hunt for Pakistani.” The Washington Times. Apr. 2, 2003.

      92 Josh Meyer, Greg Krikorian, and William C. Rempel, “Quiet Investigation Centers on Al Qaeda Aide in New York.” Los Angeles Times. Sept. 3, 2004.

      93 Dan Eggen and Manuel Roig-Franzia, “FBI on Global Hunt for Saudi Al Qaeda Suspect.” The Washington Post. Mar. 21, 2003.

      94 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Franklin, TN: Hillsboro Press, Sept. 2004, at pp.30-31.

      95 “Remarks of FBI Director Robert Mueller on the Summer Terrorist Threat.” May 26, 2004.

      96 Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Leader Identified in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot.” The Washington Times. Oct. 5, 2004.

      97 Evan Thomas, “Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within.” Newsweek, June 23, 2003.

      98 “Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla.” June 1, 2004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm. Accessed Aug. 31, 2004. Note: The two worshipped at the same mosque. See: Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Leader Identified in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot.” The Washington Times. Oct. 5, 2004.

      99 “Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla.” June 1, 2004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm. Accessed Aug. 31, 2004.

      100 Elaine Shannon and Tim McGirk, “What is this Man Plotting?” Time. Aug. 23, 2004. See also Josh Meyer, Greg Krikorian and William C. Rempel, “Quiet Investigation Centers on Al Qaeda Aide in New York. Los Angeles Times. Sept. 3, 2004.

      101 Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Leader Identified in ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot.” The Washington Times. Oct.5, 2004. A March 21, 2003 The Washington Post article placed Shukrjumah in Morocco. Dan Eggen and Manuel Roig-Franzia, “FBI on Global Hunt for Saudi Al Qaeda Suspect.” The Washington Post. Mar. 21, 2003.

      102 Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Seeks Ties to Local Gangs.” The Washington Times. Sept. 28, 2004. This is not the first report tying al Qaeda to Latin American gangs. For example, a previous report that “al Qaeda members are working with Mexican organized crime groups, such as drug-trafficking organizations, in an attempt to enter the United States covertly” (Bill Gertz, “Terrorists Said to Seek Entry to U.S. Via Mexico.” The Washington Times, April 7, 2003).

      103 http://www.as-sa.org/terroralert.html . Accessed July 11, 2005.

      104 “Remarks of FBI Director Robert Mueller on the Summer Terrorist Threat.” May 26, 2004.

      105 Tennessee Bureau of Investigations: FBI-JTTF Websitehttp://www.tbi.state.tn.us/Fugitives/JTTF/shukrijumah.htm

    • DXer said

      http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=125×86841

      Florida FBI investigated Atta associate [El-Shukrijumah, who I’ve suggested as the anthrax mailer] in spring 2001

      This is a simple story of the FBI initiating a terrorist plot to blow up Mount Rushmore, training the terrorists and, at the same time, letting an associate of Mohamed Atta (who now has a USD 5 million bounty on his head) slip through their fingers.

      It starts in late 2000 when a spy wannabe called Howard Gilbert, who was really a Canadian Jew but posed as a convert to Islam called Sayif Ullah (in English: Sword of Allah), started attending the Darul Uloom mosque in Pembroke Pines, South Florida on behalf of the FBI, which paid him around USD 6,000 for his work. He was supposed to report on and infiltrate radical Islamist groups there, but it turns out he was just the sort of agent provocateur your mother always warned you about. He claimed to be a firearms expert and gave some sort of “impassioned speech about the Palestinian struggle”, after which a teenager called Imran Mandhai approached him and they formed a terrorist cell. They roped in a friend of Mandhai’s called Shuyeb Mossa Jokhan, but the FBI wanted Gilbert to wear a wire and testify in court, which he refused to do (also asking for more money), as it would compromise his career as an exciting spy. Is this beginning to sound familiar yet?

      Anyway, the FBI fired Gilbert and replaced him with another informer called “Mohamed the bomb maker”, who continued to string the the kids along. The FBI informers gave them a bomb-making manual, firearms instruction, hand-to-hand combat training and God knows what else. They plotted to blow up a few power stations, a National Guard armoury, Jewish business (to spark race riots) and the aforementioned Mount Rushmore. In 2002 the FBI got bored and decided to bring the kids in, Mandhai got twelve years and Jokhan got five. The ratio of FBI informers to actual plotters was 2:2 and it was the guys from the FBI who were making all the running, so maybe five years for Jokhan, who dropped out after less than four weeks, was a little on the harsh side.

      Up to here it’s just an everyday FBI sting, but the interesting thing is that the Darul Uloom was also attended by a guy called Adnan El Shukrijumah, who, it seems, was known to be fairly radical. His father, Gulshair El Shukrijumah was the imam at another South Florida mosque and had interpreted for the blind sheikh and known some of the other 1993 WTC plotters – he even testified at the trial for the defence, as a character witness Clement Hampton-El (aka Dr. Rashid), who had attended El Shukrijumah’s Brooklyn mosque (Brooklyn, eh?), before the El Shukrijumahs moved to Florida when the head of the family retired. The plotters approached junior as a person likely to be up for a spot of jihad, but he said no. It’s not clear why he said no (because he’s still at large), maybe he pegged Gilbert and Mohamed as likely FBI agents (Mohamed was apparently not very devout), maybe he realised that Mandhai was just a kid and would never accomplish anything, or maybe he was too busy plotting to anthrax the East Coast and helping Mohamed with the raid on Manhattan.

      Now it turns out that Adnan El Shukrijumah was a major-league Al Qaeda operative. Check out the FBI’s most wanted terrorists site, he’s only three places behind the ubiquitous Abu Musab Al Zarqawi:
      http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/waronterror
      The price on his head is USD 5 million:
      http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/wanted_capture
      His nickname is “Jafar the Pilot” and he is supposed to have learned to fly, presumably somewhere in Asia as he does not have a US-recorded pilot’s licence. After the bounty was announced he was seen all over the place: in Colorado, in Canada, buying a sandwich in Tampa, plotting to cross the US-Mexican border with the El Salvador narcomafia (the family is from Saudi, but his “basic” passport is Guyanese, where his father worked as a sort of missionary), plus the usual stuff with Elvis and Lord Lucan. However, at the time in spring 2001, the FBI (allegedly) didn’t know this, they merely noted he had lied on his green card application regarding a prior arrest and filed his name.

      Judging by most of the media reporting about him, even though Shukrijumah is often dubbed the “next Atta”, “new Atta” or “Atta’s successor”, and they lived a couple of miles from each other in South Florida, it would seem he never actually knew Atta or any of the other hijackers. However, he did. There is a very strange story on pages 22-23 of Terrorist Travel (don’t forget to read the endnote on pages 40-41) about how Atta and Shukrijumah were seen together at the Miami District Immigration Office on 2 May 2001. Briefly, Atta had wrongly received eight months’ stay when he entered the US in January (should have been only six), but another person who he was with in Miami had (correctly) received six months; Shukrijumah went with them to try and get an additional two months for the other guy, but in the end the inspector ended up taking two months away from Atta (meaning he had to leave the US in July), after which Atta thanked her politely (!). The inspector was pretty sure the handsome one was Shukrijumah and also checked his immigration status (legal resident who had worked in south Florida), which matched Shukrijumah’s.

      Points to take away.
      (1) If the FBI just arrested its own informers, we’d probably be a whole lot safer.
      (2) So, in addition to having the same mailing address as the blind sheikh (and obtaining fake ID from an associate of the mailbox owner), the hijackers also knew his interpreter’s son – what sort of reading does this give on your coincidence-o-meter? Don’t forget that, according to Colonel Shaffer’s lawyer, at least one of Able Danger’s charts, and possibly more, “featured a photograph of Mohammed Atta and had him linked through associational activities to the blind Sheik and others operating in or around Brooklyn, New York.”
      http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1606&wit_i
      Isn’t the connection to Shukrijumah what a police officer would call “a clue”? Shouldn’t it, like, have been investigated, by the FBI and the 9/11 Commission? Wouldn’t it be a good idea to identify his co-conspirators in Florida and, say, bring them to justice? And yet it’s buried in a single endnote to a subsidiary report…

    • DXer said

      When things had not worked out with informant Howard Gilbert, the FBI brought in Elie Assaad, an experienced informant from Lebanon. Mr. Gilbert died in 2004. What can Elie Assaad contribute to El-Shukrijumah’s whereabouts in 2001?

      http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Whistleblowers/911-ringleader-mohammed-atta-stopped-fbi-informant/story?id=8540605#.UYnF5M1cr5M

      FBI Informant Says Agents Missed Chance to Stop 9/11 Ringleader Mohammed Atta

      By BRIAN ROSS (@brianross) and VIC WALTER
      Brian Ross Investigative Unit
      Sept. 10, 2009

      On the eve of the eight year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, an FBI informant who infiltrated alleged terrorist cells in the U.S. tells ABC News the FBI missed a chance to stop the al Qaeda plot because they focused more on undercover stings than on the man who would later become known as 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta.

      In an exclusive interview to be broadcast tonight on ABC World News with Charles Gibson and Nightline, former undercover operative Elie Assaad says he spotted and became suspicious of Atta in early 2001, when he was sent by the FBI to infiltrate a small mosque outside Miami. Atta was there with Adnan Shukrujuman, an al Qaeda fugitive who now has a $5 million U.S. reward on his head.

      “There was something wrong with these guys,” Assaad, a 36-year-old Catholic native of Lebanon who pretended to be an Islamic extremist, says.

      According to Assaad, Shukrujumah, whose father ran the mosque, invited the undercover FBI operative to meet him at his home, but the FBI told him to stay away. Instead, Assad says the agency assigned him to set up and sting what he calls wannabe terrorists, ending any hope of infiltrating the real al Qaeda terrorists.

      Former national security official Richard Clarke, now an ABC News consultant, said the case is “yet another example of the way the system broke down prior to 9/11.”

      “If the system had worked,” Clarke said, “we might have been able to identify these people before the attacks.”

    • DXer said

      NBC discussion of BOLO for Shukrijumah –

      P. WILLIAMS: No, I don’t think it is, Brian. It is more connected with getting
      out the word as soon as agents discovered how important this man is.

      Now, let me go through this with you. He is thought to be a top al Qaeda
      operative in the U.S. who could be involved in planning further attacks against
      the U.S. And the information we have comes from a nationwide law enforcement
      bulletin that’s just been sent out today to the nation’s law enforcement
      departments. You know law enforcement. It’s called a BOLO: Be on the lookout.

      And the man is identified as Adnan El Shukrijumah. He is 27 years old. He is
      thought to be from Yemen or possibly Guyana in Africa. But law enforcement
      authorities fear that he is, in essence, another Mohamed Atta, the man who was
      thought to be the top planner of the 9/11 attacks.

      Now, this bulletin says that the U.S. has information indicating that he may be
      involved in al Qaeda terror activities and may pose an imminent threat to U.S.
      interests or persons worldwide. And they are equally concerned about attacks not
      only in the United States, but against Americans or American interests overseas.
      They don’t know where he is. And they don’t know whether these attacks could be
      here or could be overseas.

      Now, having said that, this bulletin, this BOLO bulletin, says there is no
      specific threat attributed to him. It’s not like they’ve uncovered some specific
      plan. It’s rather they have discovered that he is a key al Qaeda planner. Now,
      the FBI is learning more about this man and has just recently discovered how
      important he may be.

      For example, Brian, he is thought it be a trained pilot. And, as a matter of
      fact, one of his Arabic nicknames is Jafar the pilot. U.S. authorities believe
      he was in the United States after September 11, but they don’t know where he is
      now. They don’t know how long he was here, how he got here, how he left. They’re
      not sure, or even whether he left.

      But they put a very high priority out on finding him, because El Shukrijumah is
      thought to be a pivotal figure in any further plans to attack the U.S. And
      investigators tell us, this information has been verified by talking to captured
      al Qaeda operatives who have been interrogated by the U.S.

    • DXer said

      In sorting out press reports of sightings, here is a SECRET cable that was leaked. An alleged unconfirmed sighting in Honduras was imagined to be Adnan en route to Panama.

      As a general rule of thumb, though, Al Qaeda operatives on the move often will lie to their family where they are going. (In addition, even when they do know where the operative is, the families will lie to protect their loved ones).

      Reference id aka Wikileaks id #18284  
      Subject Honduran Security Minister Alleges Senior Al-qaida Operative Visted Honduras
      Origin Embassy Tegucigalpa (Honduras)
      Cable time Thu, 1 Jul 2004 00:19 UTC
      Classification SECRET

      S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001467

      SIPDIS

      FBI FOR SIOC AND ITOS/TGU
      STATE FOR S/CT, INR/IAA, NEA, AND CA
      STATE FOR INR/TIPOFF
      STATE FOR DA/IP/WHA AND DS/ICI/ITA
      STATE FOR WHA/PPC AND WHA/CEN

      E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2029
      TAGS: PTER, ASEC, KVPR, PINR, KJUS, KCRM, PGOV, CVIS, HO
      SUBJECT: HONDURAN SECURITY MINISTER ALLEGES SENIOR AL-QAIDA
      OPERATIVE VISTED HONDURAS

      REF: A. PANAMA 1372

      B. PANAMA 1515
      C. TEGUCIGALPA 1046
      D. 06/09/04 RSO TEGUCIGALPA-PANAMA LEGATT-DS/IP/WHA
      EMAIL

      Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Palmieri;
      reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

      1. (S) Summary: On June 29, Honduran Minister of Public
      Security (MOPS) Oscar Alvarez told the Honduran press senior
      Saudi Al-Qaida operative, Adnan Gulshair El-Shukrijumah, had
      been spotted in Honduras but has since left the country.
      MOPS Alvarez alleged that El-Shukrijumah was seen in an
      internet cafe before heading to Panama. These reports are
      uncorroborated and premature, although Post believes there
      may exist a possibility that El-Shukrijumah recently visited
      Honduras. In conjunction with Honduran authorities, RSO has
      been tracking the internet cafe lead and a separate possible
      sighting, in an effort to confirm El-Shukrijumah had, in
      fact, been to Honduras. However, MOPS Alvarez’s public
      comments, partly based on a Panamanian newspaper report he
      had recently read, will complicate this effort. End Summary

      2. (S) On June 29, Honduran Minister of Public Security
      (MOPS) Oscar Alvarez told the Honduran press that senior
      Saudi Al-Qaida operative, Adnan Gulshair El-Shukrijumah had
      been spotted in Honduras but has since left the country.
      MOPS Alvarez alleged that El-Shukrijumah was cited in an
      internet cafe before heading to Panama, where he allegedly
      might be working on a plan to attack the Canal. Prior to
      these allegations, El-Shukrijumah’s presence in Panama had
      been highly suspected (ref A and B).

      3. (S) RSO has been tracking two separate possible sightings
      (ref D) of El-Shukrijumah in Honduras. The first report
      concerned two American TDYers who had a possible sighting of
      El-Shukrijumah on June 2, 2004. The reported sighting
      occurred at approximately 12:15 pm when both TDY personnel
      were eating lunch at a Subway sandwich shop located a few
      blocks from the Embassy. While eating, they noticed two men
      enter the shop. Both men appeared to be of Arab extraction.
      The men had entered together and appeared to be friends.
      According to the TDY personnel, while standing in the
      sandwich line both men noticed the American sitting in the
      nearby booth eating. At this point, both subjects started
      whispering amongst themselves and looking at the Americans.
      The older subject seemed very nervous and impatient. The TDY
      personnel noted that both subjects were carrying laptop bags
      strapped over their shoulders. The older subject’s bag had a
      Microsoft emblem, plus he was wearing a fanny pack in front.
      (Note: These TDY personnel were both technicians who work
      with computers and other related equipment. End Note.)

      4. (S) The TDY personnel stated that neither subject appeared
      to be fluent in Spanish when ordering their food, appearing
      to struggle a little with the language. As the Americans
      were leaving the sandwich shop, they noticed the older
      subject was paying for his food with a grayish silver-colored
      visa card and also appeared to have some form of Honduran ID
      in his other hand. The TDYers came back to the Embassy and
      reported to their supervisor that they had seen two Arab
      males acting strangely in the Subway sandwich shop. At the
      time they reported this contact, neither was aware of the
      look-out for El-Shukrijumah. The two then reported to the
      RSO after they saw the photo of El-Shukrijumah in the local
      paper. They both believed that the younger subject had a
      strong resemblance to El-Shukrijumah.

      5. (S) The second incident allegedly occurred at an
      unidentified internet cafe in Tegucigalpa soon after the FBI
      poster identifying El-Shukrijumah as a wanted terrorist
      suspect was released. This is the report that MOPS Alvarez
      shared with the Honduras press. While it should not be
      dismissed out of hand due to the nature of the incident, RSO
      has not/not been able to confirm or corroborate any of the
      details of this alleged incident. RSO notes, however, that
      the physical description of the internet cafe sighting of the
      two suspects resembles the description of the individuals
      seen at the Subway shop by the American TDYers
      6. (S) Comment: MOPS Alvarez’s remarks regarding
      El-Shukrijumah’s presence in Honduras are premature and
      unsubstantiated. He acknowledged later that his comments
      that El-Shukrijumah was en route to Panama and might be
      planning to attack the Canal, were based on a newspaper
      article he read last weekend while visiting Panama. While it
      is possible El-Shukrijumah visited Honduras recently, Post
      can not/not confirm this. RSO is continuing to investigate
      and Post will report via septel any further confirmed
      evidence of El-Shukrijumah’s alleged presence. MOPS
      Alvarez’s public comments, however, were unconstructive and
      could possibly hamper this effort. End Comment.

    • DXer said

      The 9/11 Commission Terrorist Travel report released in August 2004 found that on May 2, 2001, Mohamed Atta visited the INS office in Miami with two other persons in an attempt to obtain a visitor visa status extension approval. The INS inspector who interviewed Atta and the others reported to the 9/11 Commission that she was “75 percent sure” one of the men who accompanied Atta was El-Shukrijumah:

      “In regard to the identification of Atta’s companions, the inspector identified two of three. She said all three had olive skin tone and dark features. She told the Commission she would never forget Atta, whom she told a colleague was “an ugly man, he looked like a bulldog.” The companion who first spoke to the inspector, she recalled “was a great looking kid,” which she also mentioned to a colleague. When the FBI’s Most Wanted photo of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah appeared on the inspectors’ bulletin board after September 11, and after the FBI interviewed her, the inspector says she told her supervisor at the port that she was “75 percent sure” that she could identify the man who was with Atta as Shukrijumah. In checking Shukrijumah’s immigration status, she learned that he was a legal resident and had worked in south Florida. Information about the September 11 plot has not to date associated Shukrijumah with the plot. However, Shukrijumah is considered a well-connected al Qaeda operative, otherwise known as “Jafar the Pilot” and he is still wanted by the FBI. Shukrijumah’s father is a well known imam in South Florida,

      having testified on behalf of Sheik Rahman during his trial for the conspiracy to destroy New York landmarks in June 1993. The inspector cannot recall what the third companion looked like, and did not recognize any of the photos of other hijackers shown to her. The Commission, however, believes that Jarrah may have been one of Atta’s companions. He was the only hijacker who matched the facts as told by the inspector, that Atta’s “friend” had come back in January and received a six month stay. It is also known that Jarrah was with Atta later that day, driving north to get a Florida driver’s license. See immigration inspector of Mohamed Atta on May 2 interview (Mar. 25, 2004).”

    • DXer said

      http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030407/7terror.htm

      A Hunt for `The Pilot’
      The FBI says he’s an `imminent threat.’ But where is he?

      By Chitra Ragavan
      Posted 3/30/03

      The global advisory issued by the FBI in late March gave no hint of the many twists and turns that led the bureau to Adnan Gulshair El Shukrijumah. But there was no doubting the urgency of the plea for help. Senior FBI officials tell U.S. News that they believe El Shukrijumah, 27, is a “grave danger” to the United States. As a result, the officials say, the FBI, the CIA, and several foreign intelligence services have begun a worldwide search for the elusive young man who once resided in South Florida and is known to carry multiple passports. “We are very worried,” says a U.S. official. “Wherever he is in the world, we think he might be a key al Qaeda operative targeting U.S. interests.”

      On March 19, intelligence and law enforcement officials conclusively identified El Shukrijumah–described by one counterterrorism specialist as possibly the next Mohamed Atta, the lead 9/11 hijacker. Top-tier al Qaeda detainees, including the alleged key planner of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, helped make the identification, government officials say. “We can’t possibly overstate,” a U.S. intelligence official said, “the value that Khalid Shaikh Mohammad has been to us.”

      A wide array of other intelligence information and sources indicate that El Shukrijumah may have been asked by al Qaeda to lead a new “suicide squad,” like that led by Atta. The Saudi Arabia-born El Shukrijumah is also suspected of having ties to former Chicago gang member Jose Padilla, now being detained as an “enemy combatant” because authorities believe he wanted to detonate a “dirty bomb” on American soil. Law enforcement officials are not sure what exactly El Shukrijumah may be planning, but they say he could target gas stations, fuel trucks, subway systems, trains, or bridges. “Our No. 1 priority,” Larry Mefford, assistant director of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, told U.S. News, “is to find sleeper cells if they exist. If El Shukrijumah were to be in the U.S., he would possibly be in that category.”

      The story of the hunt for El Shukrijumah is a tale of cryptic tips, false leads, and wasted time and effort. But it also offers a rare glimpse into the twilight world of terrorists that law enforcement officials must penetrate in order to prevent another major attack on America.

      The story starts in 2001. El Shukrijumah appeared as a blip on the FBI’s intelligence radar screen in March of that year, after special agents in Miami used an informant to penetrate a local mosque. The agents were interested in a man named Imran Mandhai, who frequented the mosque. The informant recorded Mandhai repeatedly vowing to create a jihad cell, consisting of 25 or 30 men, including El Shukrijumah. The cell, Mandhai said, would target electric substations, Jewish institutions, a National Guard armory, even Mount Rushmore. “It was no secret that [El Shukrijumah] was pretty radical,” says a federal law enforcement source, “and that Mandhai thought he would be interested in what they were doing.”

      But El Shukrijumah was suspicious. He declined to join the jihad plans, correctly surmising that the feds were on to Mandhai. But they were more worried about keeping tabs on Mandhai and his coconspirator, Shueyb Mossa Jokhan, than they were about El Shukrijumah. During this period, family members say, El Shukrijumah was attending Broward Community College and working as a freelance computer technician. The only thing the feds had on El Shukrijumah, sources say, was a lie on his green-card application regarding a prior arrest. So his name went into a file, and that was that.

      After September 11, the FBI intensified its pursuit of Mandhai and Jokhan. They were indicted in the spring of 2002. Mandhai was convicted of conspiracy to destroy U.S. property; Jokhan testified against him. Both are now serving multiyear sentences. The FBI agents had not forgotten about El Shukrijumah, however. Agents visited his family’s home in a Fort Lauderdale suburb six times, but he was never there. Family members say he had left home in May 2001 for Trinidad, where his father once worked for the Saudi Arabian government. According to a federal law enforcement source, Mandhai told the feds he saw El Shukrijumah as late as July 2001.

      Either way, he was nowhere to be found. Then, last May, U.S. intelligence and military officials began posing an urgent question to al Qaeda detainees who were being interrogated at foreign prisons and secret CIA and military facilities abroad. Whom, the officials asked, would al Qaeda pick to lead the next big attack against U.S. targets? Intelligence sources tell U.S. News that several of the detainees provided the same answer: “Jaffar Al-Tayyar.” That’s an al Qaeda nom de guerre. It translates roughly to “Jaffar the Pilot.” The detainees said they had met “the Pilot” during al Qaeda training exercises in Afghanistan. Intelligence officers scrambled, showing the detainees photos of hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives. Several detainees identified a man who looked like El Shukrijumah. It wasn’t–but it would take months before the FBI and CIA teams realized it. “We were pursuing a lead,” says one official, “that in the end turned out to be a dead end. We found out we were after the wrong person.”

      Family affair. The hunt for El Shukrijumah didn’t end, however. Given the detainees’ information about Jaffar the Pilot, it only intensified. And slowly, strands of information began to filter into the FBI, the CIA, and other foreign intelligence agencies. They pointed in a new direction, allowing investigators to narrow the search. Two weeks ago, the search turned up a new name–and a new photograph. But investigators still were not sure. The crucial moment didn’t come until Khalid Shaikh Mohammad corroborated the investigators’ hunch. El Shukrijumah, he said after being shown a photograph, was Jaffar the Pilot. The FBI issued its “be on the lookout” warning for El Shukrijumah.

      The bureau’s counterterrorism specialists say they now see him in a dangerous new light but still have many questions. They want to know more about ties he may have to other convicted or alleged terrorists, including Padilla, the accused enemy combatant who used to live near Fort Lauderdale, not far from El Shukrijumah’s family home. Padilla was arrested last May, about the same time investigators started asking detainees about other alleged al Qaeda operatives. Authorities are also curious about El Shukrijumah’s possible ties to Adham Amin Hassoun, a fellow mosquegoer who has been held under extreme secrecy in legal limbo on immigration violations at a federal detention facility near Miami since last June. An immigration judge found that Hassoun had plotted to commit an assassination, provided material support to terrorist groups, and was a member of an Islamic fundamentalist group whose leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, was convicted of plotting to bomb key New York landmarks. The judge said Hassoun also tried to recruit Egyptian “jihad fighter” Mohammed Yousseff, a friend of Padilla’s, and that Hassoun had ties to charitable groups with alleged links to terrorist groups like Hamas. Hassoun says he is innocent. …

    • DXer said

      Al-Qaida Mastermind Rose Using American Hustle

      by DINA TEMPLE-RASTON
      October 11, 2010
      http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130434651

      First of four parts

      A video opens with an ordinary young man standing in front a blackboard in a Florida community college classroom. He’s about to embark on a rite of passage that everyone remembers and most everyone hates: the five-minute oral presentation.

      There are jumper cables on the table in front of him. He touches them nervously before he smiles, introduces himself, and dives right in.

      “Hi, um, I’m Adnan,” he looks down at his index cards for support, “and today we are going to learn how to jump-start a car.”

      It was 1997. The man in the video is Adnan Shukrijumah, thought to be the highest-ranking American in al-Qaida. Intelligence officials believe he is 9-11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s successor, and since he left Florida in the spring of 2001, has made it his life’s work to attack America.

      Shukrijumah is one of a growing number of Americans who are showing up in key positions in al-Qaida and its affiliate groups, presenting a new challenge for law enforcement. They are enemies who are not only familiar with America, but also deeply understand it.

      VIDEO: Adnan Shukrijumah Gives Class Presentation At Broward College
      [video src="http://static.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/adnangelshukrijumah/adnan.mp4" /]

      As it turns out, that videotape — a shaky, badly lit film catching Shukrijumah on film 13 years ago — ended up as a crucial piece of evidence in a terrorism plot directed at the U.S. last year: a plan to bomb transportation targets around New York City.

      The suspect in that case, a longtime American resident named Najibullah Zazi, had traveled to Afghanistan in hopes of fighting U.S. forces there. He was convinced by an American al-Qaida operative there to follow a different path: return to the U.S. and strike there instead.

      Zazi told authorities that said he didn’t know the operative’s name; he could only provide a vague description of what he looked like and the fact that he spoke perfect English. An FBI agent showed him the videotape of the student explaining how to jump-start a car.

      Zazi identified Shukrijumah as the al-Qaida operative who had directed him to attack the New York City subways. (Earlier this year, Zazi pleaded guilty to terrorism charges connected to the subway bombing plot.)

      In the video, Shukrijumah hardly looks lethal. Instead, he is thin and small, a little over 5 feet tall, wearing a button-down shirt and blue jeans. His hair is short and his beard close-cropped.

      A Pakistani man in Peshawar holds a matchbox with picture of Shukrijumah in 2006. Shukrijumah is wanted in connection with several terrorist plots and has a $5 million bounty on his head.

      “First you keep your car running … which is this with the happy battery,” he says, pointing to a cube he’s drawn on the blackboard to represent a fully charged car battery. It has a big smiley face on it. The dead battery is drawn with a frown.

      Shukrijumah ends the presentation with a small bow.

      In Florida, Blending In

      Adnan Shukrijumah was born in 1975 and grew up in Trinidad and Saudi Arabia. His father was a religious scholar who was hired by the Saudi government to open mosques around the world. He opened one in Brooklyn. Later, he worked at one in Florida. Typically, he would travel to these cities and leave his wife and growing family behind.

      It wasn’t until the 1990s that Shukrijumah got his first taste of America. It began with occasional visits to Brooklyn and then, eventually, a move with the rest of the family — his mother and five brothers and sisters — to Florida when Adnan was a teenager.

      The oral presentation in the video was for an English class at Broward College, a sprawling campus about 11 miles from Miami, where he took classes for several years.

      David Armstrong, the president of Broward College, says Shukrijumah was a chemistry major at the school some 12 to 14 years ago and never graduated.

      On a recent morning, Armstrong is standing outside the Broward student center. Most of the students are working on laptops, oblivious to the school president’s presence. Armstrong says literally every country in the world is represented by Broward’s student body, so Shukrijumah would have blended right in.

      Shukrijumah registered under the name Jumah El-Chukri and enrolled in chemistry, computer science and English language classes. Armstrong says he was a pretty good student. And until a couple of months ago, few had put together that Jumah El-Chukri, the community college chemistry major, and Adnan Shukrijumah, the al-Qaida operative, were one and the same.

      In fact, Shukrijumah’s presence at Broward had become a bit of an urban myth. Rivka Spiro handles media for the college, and years ago, she heard about a student who might have been a terrorist.

      “When I first got here, people were telling me about the college, and one of my colleagues said we have in our past a student who was alleged to be a terrorist,” Spiro says. “She told me, ‘Just so you know.’ ”

      Urban myth met reality when a Broward professor stumbled on the Shukrijumah videotape and gave it to the FBI last year. The bureau didn’t really have any specific use for it until last fall, when Shukrijumah was implicated in the subway bombing plot.

      The ‘Elvis Of Al-Qaida’

      Joe Billy is the former assistant director of the counterterrorism division at FBI headquarters in Washington. He was one of the people responsible for tracking al-Qaida operatives like Shukrijumah. Billy thinks Shukrijumah is particularly dangerous because he chooses his operatives so carefully.

      “Shukrijumah has always understood the importance of choosing operatives who know their targets,” Billy says. “His philosophy has been, even years ago, to select and use operatives who come from the area they hope to launch attacks against,” he adds. “And I think his strategies now are being employed more so than they have in years past.”

      And it isn’t just Najibullah Zazi who is an example of this. That strategy is showing up across the board, as homegrown terrorist attacks in the U.S. have spiked in the past year. Terrorist groups had been having so much trouble getting operatives into the United States that they have decided to find people here who can vault over that hurdle. Zazi was a permanent resident who could come into the U.S. without raising red flags.

      Shukrijumah himself is an embodiment of that strategy: He is a naturalized American, and U.S. intelligence says his No. 1 goal is to find ways to attack the U.S. — the place that, for a time, was his adopted home.

      Shukrijumah lived for years in Miramar, Fla., with his mother, Zurah Adbu Ahmed, shown here in August 2010. She says her son is too sickly — he suffers from asthma — to be a terrorist, and that she has not had contact with him in years.

      Law enforcement officials worry about Shukrijumah in particular because he has been able to travel anywhere and slip in and out of countries like a ghost melting through a wall.

      Part of the reason is his physical appearance. His father is from Guyana and his mother is from Yemen. In short hair, he looks Hispanic. Put a beard on him, and he could pass for a Saudi or South Asian.

      What’s more, he speaks nearly perfect English. He has a U.S. Social Security card and Florida driver’s license.

      For years, FBI agents heard about an al-Qaida operative known only as the “South American” — it turned out to be Shukrijumah.

      Today, among intelligence officials, he’s known as the Elvis of al-Qaida. That’s because, like Elvis, there have been unsubstantiated sightings of him all over the world. And, to continue the metaphor, it seems law enforcement always gets there after he has left the building. Even the FBI’s Billy can’t be entirely sure that Shukrijumah hasn’t come back to the U.S.

      “I don’t believe he’s been here,” he says. “And if he has been here, then he has been successful at eluding and continuing to elude.”

      ‘Getting Into The American Dream Life’

      Shukrijumah’s mother is somewhat easier to find. Zurah Adbu Ahmed still lives in the same one-story house behind a gas station and highway that she shared with her son all those years ago in Miramar, Fla. She is a tiny woman, less than 5 feet tall, with a birdlike frailty and sweet brown eyes. She declined to go on tape because, in her words, everyone had already made their mind up about her son anyway.

      There has been a lot of speculation about why Adnan Shukrijumah joined forces with al-Qaida. His father was, rather famously, the interpreter for Sheik Abdul Rahman — the blind sheik who was convicted of planning the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. Officials say that connection was just a coincidence.

      Shukrijumah’s mother says her son never spent time with his father in New York. She and her children had been left behind in Trinidad and Saudi Arabia.

      She says her son isn’t a terrorist. She says he is just too sickly — he has asthma. She says she hasn’t heard from him in years.

      About three miles from the Shukrijumah house in Florida, there’s an Islamic Center called the Darul Uloom Institute. It is run by Sheik Shafayat Mohammed, a heavyset, jovial man from Trinidad. He hired Adnan Shukrijumah’s father — who is now deceased — as a religious instructor years ago. And he says Adnan was allowed to lead prayers at the mosque.

      “He was really a nice, well-mannered boy,” Mohammed says. “I must admit that by 199 percent, he was really liked by everybody.”

      Adnan had a sense of humor, a certain charisma, and as the son of a mosque elder, people naturally looked up to him.

      Mohammed says Adnan wasn’t radical or even remotely anti-American. In fact, he was just the opposite.

      “You could see that there was in him that desire to enjoy cars, to enjoy the American dream and the American life,” says Mohammed. “So at one point in time, maybe a couple of years after he came, you could see him getting into the American dream life.”

      That’s about the time, in 1996, that Shukrijumah signed up for classes at Broward. He started selling used cars and learning how to fix computers. He did whatever he could to hustle new jobs and make money.

      Transformed By Afghanistan Trip

      And then, one day, Adnan Shukrijumah just disappeared, Mohammed says.

      Friends and relatives say he went to Afghanistan in the fall of 1998 or early 1999, about the time when the Taliban was consolidating its hold on the country.

      Many young Muslims from around the world were going to Afghanistan at the time — partly out of religious duty and partly motivated by the adventure of it all. It is unclear what inspired Shukrijumah.

      What is clear is that when he came back, Shukrijumah was different, Mohammed says.

      “He got a little more stern, a little more firm, a little more hard in his practices and his beliefs,” he says.

      And they argued about religion, something they had never done before. Shukrijumah objected to some of the more progressive practices in the mosque.

      Intelligence officials say Shukrijumah had been to an al-Qaida camp. Because of his asthma, he had been relegated to washing dishes and doing menial work. Then, in much the same way he hustled jobs in Florida, he worked his way up. He learned to handle AK-47s and automatic weapons. He studied topography and clandestine surveillance and explosives.

      Because he had several passports, he could travel easily. Mohammed remembers after Shukrijumah returned to Florida he would disappear for weeks at a time. Officials say the trips were scouting missions for al-Qaida.

      “Before 9-11 he disappeared totally,” says Mohammed. “Last we saw him around here was May of 2001.”

      After that, officials say there were sightings of him everywhere: Trinidad, Saudi Arabia, Germany. But officials never seemed to get to any of these places in time to capture him.

      Now, all Shukrijumah leaves in his wake are terrorism plots. Officials say he was behind the 2004 foiled plot against financial targets in New York and New Jersey. He was tangentially tied to the plot to try to ignite fuel lines at John F. Kennedy airport in 2007. And then he resurfaced in last year’s subway plot.

      He has been indicted in the Zazi case, and the U.S. government has placed a $5 million bounty on his head. Officials believe he has set his sights on one goal: to launch a successful attack against the country where he once lived.

      • Roberto said

        Transformed By Afghanistan Trip

        And then, one day, Adnan Shukrijumah just disappeared, Mohammed says.

        Friends and relatives say he went to Afghanistan in the fall of 1998 or early 1999, about the time when the Taliban was consolidating its hold on the country.

        Many young Muslims from around the world were going to Afghanistan at the time — partly out of religious duty and partly motivated by the adventure of it all. It is unclear what inspired Shukrijumah.

        What is clear is that when he came back, Shukrijumah was different, Mohammed says.

        “He got a little more stern, a little more firm, a little more hard in his practices and his beliefs,” he says.

        And they argued about religion, something they had never done before. Shukrijumah objected to some of the more progressive practices in the mosque.

        Boy doesn’t that sound familiar…

    • DXer said

      Former Miramar man now runs al-Qaida, FBI says. Not true, his mother says
      August 6, 2010| By Lisa J. Huriash, Sun Sentinel
      http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-08-06/news/fl-al-qaida-mother-20100806_1_al-qaida-leaders-adnan-g-el-shukrijumah-khalid-sheik-mohammed

      MIRAMAR — A federal fugitive and former Broward Community College student who lived in this South Florida city with his mother and five siblings has become head of global operations for the Islamic terror network al-Qaida, according to the FBI — a worrisome development that may make U.S. targets more vulnerable.

      The FBI told The Associated Press that it marks the first time a person so intimately familiar with American society has been put in charge of planning attacks, and that Adnan G. El Shukrijumah’s new position puts him in regular contact with al-Qaida’s senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden. El Shukrijumah is thought to be the only al-Qaida leader to have held permanent U.S. resident status, or a green card.

      It’s not true,” his mother, Zurah Adbu Ahmed, told the Sun Sentinel on Friday when told of the FBI’s latest findings. She paused. “I don’t know. But I don’t think it’s true. He’s a kind, loving, caring boy.”

      She hasn’t heard from her son, now 35, in many years, Adbu Ahmed said.

      The FBI first accused El Shukrijumah of being an al-Qaida conspirator in 2003, saying in the late 1990s he became convinced that he must participate in “jihad,” or holy war, to fight perceived persecution against Muslims in places like Chechnya and Bosnia. That reportedly led to training camps in Afghanistan where he underwent basic and advanced training in the use of automatic weapons, explosives, battle tactics, surveillance and camouflage.

      The United States is offering a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.

      His mother said his intense feelings about Islam and frustration with the excesses of American society including “drugs, alcohol, a love for sex, and clubs” have been misunderstood. She said El Shukrijumah, the first-born of her six children, opposes Americans “invading” Muslim countries, and disagrees with U.S. policies “in the Islamic world.” But that “doesn’t make him a terrorist,” she said.

      Now a grandmother of eight, Adbu Ahmed said she has tried to persuade FBI agents repeatedly that her son hasn’t called her in years.

      In an interview with the AP, Miami-based FBI counterterrorism agent Brian LeBlanc said El Shukrijumah has taken over a position once held by Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was captured in 2003.

      “He’s making operational decisions, is the best way to put it,” LeBlanc, the FBI’s lead El Shukrijumah investigator, told the AP. “He’s looking at attacking the U.S. and other Western countries. Basically through attrition, he has become his old boss.”

      According to the FBI, El Shukrijumah and two other al-Qaida leaders were part of an “external operations council” that designed and approved terrorism plots and recruits, but the two counterparts were killed in U.S. drone attacks, leaving El Shukrijumah as the de facto chief and Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s successor.

      El Shukrijumah’s mother, speaking in the neat living room of her house in a lower-middle-class Miramar neighborhood, said her family moved here in 1995 from Brooklyn. They came to the United States from Saudi Arabia, where her son was born. Her husband, a native of the South American nation of Guyana, brought the family to Broward County after becoming leader of a local mosque. When he died in 2004, he was known throughout South Florida, the Caribbean and New York as an Islamic scholar and teacher.

      “We love America, we love Americans, we find a lot of good in them,” Adbu Ahmed said. She said her son attended BCC and focused on computer science and chemistry courses. He got a job assembling telephone components at a Motorola factory, she said, but wanted something more and flew to the Caribbean island of Trinidad a week before Sept. 11, 2001, to look into business opportunities involving selling shoes wholesale.

      • DXer said

        http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/03/world/fg-manhunt3

        FIVE YEARS AFTER

        Officials hunting virtually full time for a Florida computer technician see him as the ultimate `sleeper agent’ in the post-9/11 world.
        September 03, 2006
        Josh Meyer | Times Staff Writer

        CHARLIEVILLE, Trinidad and Tobago — Five years ago, as 19 Al Qaeda operatives in the United States put the finishing touches on what would become the Sept. 11 attacks, a frail, asthmatic computer engineer from South Florida paid a visit to this tiny Muslim enclave where he’d lived as a boy.
        Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el Shukrijumah, then 25, kept a low profile over the course of the week. He hung out with a small circle of devout older men who were leaders of the local Islamic community. They prayed in mosques, went fishing and enjoyed long walks and leisurely dinners, recalled one of the hosts, Imtiaz Mohammed.

        Shukrijumah spoke fondly of his father, an influential Islamic scholar and Charlieville community leader two decades earlier. He also spoke of his family life in Miramar, Fla., his computer technician business and his travels to the Middle East and other exotic locales.

        But Shukrijumah said nothing about why he was in Trinidad, nor what his plans were, acquaintances here say.

        Two years later, the FBI put out an urgent all-points bulletin for Shukrijumah, depicting him as one of Al Qaeda’s most well-trained, intelligent and deadly operatives. He was described as the ultimate “sleeper agent,” intent on attacking the U.S., possibly with weapons of mass destruction.

        Law enforcement officials and terrorism experts now believe Shukrijumah is one of several young, street-smart leaders of Al Qaeda handpicked by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, to keep the terrorist network alive and humming in the face of U.S.-led efforts to unravel it.

        To be sure, the FBI’s record on identifying terrorist plotters since Sept. 11 includes some widely publicized failures. In some cases, law enforcement officials have alleged that suspects were centrally involved in plots, only to back off those assertions when cases moved toward court.

        And officials concede that there is much they do not know about Shukrijumah, including what he was doing in Trinidad. Within days of the alert in March 2003, agents arrived on the island looking for him, but he was long gone.

        Terrorism authorities both inside and outside the government say they believe Shukrijumah is a major Al Qaeda figure, and the hunt for him is intense, with an FBI team tracking him virtually full time. So far, their quarry has remained elusive.

        Whereas Al Qaeda’s core followers are young, poor and relatively uneducated, Shukrijumah has attended college and is comfortable with technology. He’s also a naturalized U.S. citizen whose appearance would allow him to pass as Latino, Indian or Middle Eastern and who speaks English with no discernible accent, officials say.

        That background makes Shukrijumah especially threatening, counter-terrorism authorities say. He is dangerous “because he is so trusted in the organization and because he has traveled in the Western world and is familiar with its customs and procedures,” said Joseph Billy Jr., assistant FBI director for counter-terrorism.

        Shukrijumah is believed to be “the guy who was reared to replace” Mohammed as an Al Qaeda senior trainer, facilitator and propagandist, playing a central role in the development of hundreds of the network’s future soldiers, said Sajjan Gohel, director for international security at the London-based AsiaPacific Foundation. “He is part of Al Qaeda Stage 2.” The foundation consults on terrorism assessment for governments.

        Shukrijumah has not been charged with a crime, but federal grand juries in Virginia and South Florida are hearing evidence about his activities.

        Agents working on the investigation were reluctant to provide many details because of those probes, but the FBI does say that Shukrijumah trained at an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan before Sept. 11. There, he learned to handle AK-47s, M-16s, Uzis and other automatic weapons and studied topography, communications, camouflage, clandestine surveillance and explosives, including C-4 plastic charges, dynamite and mines, they say.

        The FBI believes Shukrijumah used that training to fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

        Investigators also believe he was present at a meeting of Al Qaeda leaders in March 2004 near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where it appears attendees discussed upcoming terrorist operations in Europe and the United States.

        But much of Shukrijumah’s life remains a mystery. And the search for him has been through a maze of false leads and vague glimmers.

        An Intriguing Lead

        The hunt for Adnan Shukrijumah began with a mysterious character called “the South American.”

        A year after the Sept. 11 attacks, interrogators were desperately trying to determine what other plots might be in the works, and where.

  25. DXer said

    Let’s first more fully visit Ken Dillon’s theory that Jdey was the anthrax mailer — notwithstanding my argument below that as between Jdey and El-Shukrijumah, El-Shukrijumah is the more likely candidate for mailer.

    Two letters that have been declassified and posted in Fall 2007 describe Jdey’s unhappiness living in the West. He seethed with resentment at his inability to find a proper job in Canada. Resenting the Western world, the Americans, the Jews, he found solace in the extremist ideology of al-Qaeda. The uploaded letters are part of the Harmony database maintained by the Combating Terrorism Center, a branch of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

    The first of the two posted letters is undated and addressed to fellow Muslims. Mr. Jdey railed about “the Jewish media” and the failure of Western-educated Arab politicians to lift their countries out of post-colonial poverty.

    “Thank Allah for saving me and guiding me on the right path.” “I found incomparable blessings and peace, especially after I joined jihad.”

    He complained of his difficulties in finding work. “When I arrived in Canada, I searched for work. I found many job opportunities, but the most important were closed. Others were dirty jobs reserved for immigrants.”

    “The social and economical life in North America is a jungle governed by ferocious beasts, represented by Jews and their allies.”

    The letter also says he enrolled in geology at the University of Quebec in Montreal although the FBI offering a $5 million reward once stated he studied biology.

    A second letter also addressed to his Muslim “brothers” is dated December 1999. Jdey wrote: “I pledged to Allah not to abandon the cause of jihad, and to sacrifice myself for the Almighty Allah.” Muslims have always been targeted by “the Jews, the Crusaders and their allies,” he wrote. “They meet in their laboratories (United Nations and black house of America [White House] and others), to cook their poisonous plans.” He quoted Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian-born cleric serving a life sentence in the United States for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bomb attack, urging other Muslims to attack Americans and their allies. “Destroy their economy, burn their companies, destroy their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their airplanes, kill them on the ground, on the sea and in the air.”

    Kenneth J. Dillon is a professional historian, retired foreign service officer, and former Department of State intelligence analyst. He currently works as a medical device entrepreneur, and he is writing a book about scientific detective work. He argues that Jdey was the anthrax mailer. With his permission, I’ll set forth his argument at length — although it does not have the benefit of his more recent thinking. HIs analysis has much to commend it even though my money is not on Jdey.

    In Ken’s theory, a top secret Canadian Security Intelligence Service report leaked on August 27, 2004 may provide the missing piece of evidence needed to identify the long elusive Anthrax Mailer.

    According to the article in Canada’s National Post, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a 22-year old Canadian, told interrogators that he had heard from an assistant of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, that the November 12, 2001 crash of American Airlines Flight #587 in New York was the result of an al Qaeda shoe bomb. The bomber was “Farouk the Tunisian”. Newspaper photographs showed him to be Abderraouf Jdey, a 36-year old Montreal-based Canadian of Tunisian origin.

    Jdey is one of the seven al Qaeda terrorists listed in the FBI’s plea for information from the public in May, 2004. He had emigrated to Canada in 1991, gained citizenship in 1995, and then travelled to Afghanistan where he trained as one of the ten substitutes for the 9/11 attackers. According to KSM, Jdey was slated for pilot training and was to be in the second wave of attacks. Jdey recorded a martyrdom statement in a video later found by American forces in Afghanistan. He returned to Montreal in summer 2001.

    A Theory of the Case

    Al Qaeda had a history of interest in biological weapons. There is evidence that the 9/11 attackers had anthrax in their possession during the months preceding September 11, 2001. They were evidently seeking a way to use a cropduster to spread anthrax over an American city. A medical doctor who treated a future hijacker for a skin lesion has stated that the lesion he treated was consistent with one caused by anthrax. A pharmacist reported to FBI that Mohamed Atta, leader of the 9/11 attacks, had sought a remedy for skin irritation on his hands, which were red from the wrists down. An accompanying fellow terrorist sought a remedy for a cough, and terrorist al-Shehhi was reported by a chiropracter who met him in the week before 9/11 to have had pustules on his face and arms, and to have been bending periodically in abdominal distress.

    If the 9/11 attackers possessed anthrax, they would have had to hand it off to another al Qaeda operative before September 11. Otherwise the precious vials of anthrax, the first and only weapon of mass destruction that al Qaeda had ever possessed, would have been wasted.

    But they wouldn’t necessarily trust just any al Qaeda operative to safeguard and perform with the anthrax, and perhaps they knew very few of al Qaeda’s sleepers in North America anyway. They would want to give the anthrax to an operative they knew and trusted, one who would use it to the best effect.

    Abderraouf Jdey appears to have been exactly such a person. He differed markedly from the nine other 9/11 substitutes. He was older, from a different country of origin, with Canadian citizenship, with semi-sleeper status, and with a clear designation as part of the second wave. He had trained in Afghanistan simultaneously with Mohamed Atta. He was well enough educated to have been slated for pilot training. In effect, Jdey can be viewed as the counterpart of Atta, as the leader of the second wave of al Qaeda attacks following 9/11.

    [Note: As I explain below, this fits Jafar the Pilot as well.]

    And he had studied biology at the University of Montreal in his late twenties. He was the only al Qaeda operative in North America known to have studied biology.

    [Note: I have no reason to think Jdey had any proficiency in biology relevant to processing anthrax; OTOH Yazid Sufaat reports he had been a former member of a state’s secret biological weapons program].

    So Jdey was the logical person for Atta to hand off the anthrax to. We can also identify the logical time and place for such a transfer to have occurred.

    [Note: To the contrary, the logical person for Atta to hand off anthrax to would be El-Shukrijumah who was in Florida, seen with Atta, and then travelling around the US shortly after 911.]

    An especially hard-to-explain anomaly in the hijackers’ story has been why Atta and a fellow hijacker travelled from Boston to Portland, Maine on September 10. Taking a feeder flight from Portland to Boston on the morning of September 11 caused Atta nearly to miss his connection, and he and his companion had to pass through security questioning twice rather than once–at a significant added risk of detection.

    So Atta must have had a reason to go to Portland that outweighed such risks. The most obvious explanation would be that he had an important meeting on a subject that required face-to-face contact, not just a veiled telephone conversation. A transaction with someone coming from the North, arranged for outside of Boston to lessen the risk of surveillance.

    Clearly, Jdey would be a very likely “someone”, and handing over the vials of anthrax would furnish a compelling reason for their otherwise risky meeting. This Portland meeting could also explain the anomaly that the anthrax came in two varieties, one much more sophisticated than the other: these were the two varieties that al Qaeda had acquired from someone who had diverted them at different stages of development from the clandestine national program of a foreign country.

    [Note: A trip to Portland is not a connection to Jdey]

    More Anomalies Resolved

    If Jdey indeed was the recipient of vials of anthrax in Portland, then subsequent events could have followed this course:

    While the 9/11 hijackers had sought access to a cropduster to spread the anthrax over an American city, Jdey presumably saw that receiving training at an American flight school was not in the cards after 9/11. So he had to resort to another method of distributing the anthrax. (Another, perhaps more telling explanation is that it was Atta who had the idea of mailing letters and who provided Jdey with a mailing list of targets. Seeking revenge against specific individuals and organizations seems to have been a very characteristic personality trait of Atta.)

    Jdey decided to mail the anthrax. The first mailings took place in September soon after the 9/11 attacks. The second mailings, to Senators Daschle and Leahy, occurred in October and included ultrahigh-quality anthrax. Driving (or taking a train) hundreds of miles from Montreal to Trenton to mail the letters made sense because it perfectly disguised Jdey’s Canadian base. The presumed trip to Portland indicates that such a long drive to reduce the likelihood of surveillance was a modus operandi of Jdey.

    The anthrax letters do not show any obvious Gallicisms that would betray that they were from a fluent French-speaker, which Jdey presumably was. But they are consistent with a person who has acquired English as a second language, and there is nothing in them that is inconsistent with Jdey as author. In fact, Jdey is a very plausible author of the anthrax letters.

    One of the main characteristics or anomalies of the Anthrax Mailer case has been how remarkably elusive the Mailer was both during his period of activity in autumn, 2001 and thereafter. Despite a massive FBI investigation backed by hundreds of thousands of tips from the American public, the Mailer has succeeded in hiding his tracks. Being based in Canada, contrary to every expectation, would nicely explain his elusiveness during his period of activity.

    The recently leaked Canadian intelligence report from 2002 provides a plausible explanation for the lack of information about Jdey’s whereabouts since then (as well as for the cessation of the anthrax mailings): Jdey committed suicide on Flight #587 on November 12, 2001.

    Why might Jdey be a likely candidate to do this, quite aside from the Jabarah account?

    [But Jabarah’s account in no way implicates for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings; it implicates him via the hearsay report from Abdelrahman in the tragic Flight 587 crash].

    If he was indeed the Anthrax Mailer, he was a hard-headed man of action. Instead of dreaming about impractical schemes of sowing the anthrax in the skies above a city, he realized that he had to use it before being captured. And in a way (mailing letters) that would minimize the possibility of arrest, which would keep him from fulfilling his pledge to commit suicide in an attack on the enemy. This tactic also enabled him to target the hated Senator Leahy, author of the legislation permitting “renditions” of suspected terrorists to their countries of origin, where they were subjected to torture. (These considerations explain the third anomaly–that al Qaeda would use its first weapon of mass destruction in a manner unlikely to cause mass casualties.)

    [Note: Phrases like “hard-headed man of action” in no way advances analysis; Jafar the Pilot is a hard-headed man of action.]

    ***

    On April 20, 2005, the U.S. Government announced a new reward of up to $5 million for information on Jdey.”

    [Note: A $5 million reward is also offered for Jdey. I believe they issued on the same day.]

    It is not clear Jdey had formal training in biology and there is no indication he had any type of lab-type job. He arrived in Canada in 1991. In a letter he explains that before coming to Canada, he earned a degree in technological architectural engineering and worked in the architectural engineering sector. He apparently only was able to find menial jobs. He then enrolled in the University of Quebec in Montreal to study geology, receiving a degree in physiography after 4 years.

    His correspondence reveals him to be a supporter of blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. In 1999, he writes:

    “I remind you, my brothers, with the advice of our father ‘Omar ‘Abd Al-Rahman (may Allah release him from his capture), about the Americans and their allies. ‘Sever the bond of their assault, tear them to pieces, destroy their economy, burn their companies, destroy their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their airplanes, kill them on the ground, on the sea and in the air (kill them wherever you find them, take them, encircle them and ambush them anywhere you can). Fight those infidels (let them find harshness in you), (fight them, and Allah will punish them with your hands, disgrace them, help you to be victorious over them, heal the breasts of the believers and still the indignation of their hearts, for Allah will turn (in mercy).”

    [Note: Jafar the Pilot (El-Shukrijumah) was a big supporter of the Blind Sheik also. His father testifed at the character witness for one of the defendants in that trial in which the Blind Sheik was involved.

    In short, nothing points to Jdey over El-Shukrijumah. Even that curious, wholly unsourced report by the top CIA fellow who went to Harvard talks about Jdey being at McMasters with Moussaoui says El-Shukrijumah was there.

    Now next let’s consider the unconfirmed report that — contrary to Ken’s theory — that Jdey and pointy-eared Boussora were seen entering Turkey in 2002.

    • DXer said

      The last public report suggests that Jdey is alive. If Flight 587 was brought down by Al Qaeda (and specifically by Jdey) perhaps it was by means other than a shoebomb.

      Police seek bin Laden’s men
      HDN | 2/14/2002 12:00:00 AM |

      Turkish police have discovered that two Tunisian-born people suspected of being connected to Sept. 11 perpetrator Osama bin Laden, have entered Turkey, Anatolia news agency reported. The police have launched investigations to capture Abderraouf Jdey

      Turkish police have discovered that two Tunisian-born people suspected of being connected to Sept. 11 perpetrator Osama bin Laden, have entered Turkey, Anatolia news agency reported.
      The police have launched investigations to capture Abderraouf Jdey (37) and Abdelaziz Boussora (38), who are considered to be suicide activists. Jdey is reported to have entered Turkey via the Edirne Kapikule Border Gate on Jan. 24, while Boussora is thought to have entered Adnan Menderes Airport on Dec. 28, 2001. Jdey and Boussora are said to have been carrying Canadian passports in addition to their Tunisian passports. The police have also determined that they have not yet left Turkey.
      The Police General Directorate sent a written warning to the police directorates of 81 provinces highlighting these people, so that necessary measures can be taken.

      Fox News explained on February 2002:

      “Last week there were Turkish news reports that two Tunisian-born Canadians suspected of links with the Al Qaeda network might be in Turkey.

      Newspapers identified the two men as Abderraouf Jdey and Abdelaziz Boussora. Jdey is reportedly an alias for Al Rauf bin Al Habib Bin Yousef al-Jiddi, who was recently identified by the United States as one of five men whose video-recorded messages promising to carry out suicide attacks were found amid rubble in Afghanistan.

      Turkish security officials said they were investigating the reports. U.S. and Canadian embassy officials said they were aware of the reports but offered no further information.

      Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/02/20/turks-al-qaeda-men-planning-israel-attack/#ixzz2SSxPxJKF

      Jdey studied biology at the University of Montreal and attended the Assunna Mosque in Montreal. There is no indication that FBI is hiding the fact that Jdey studied biology.

      http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=abderraouf

    • DXer said

      On the merits, won’t the FBI simply now come forward with justification for withholding under (b)(7), the exemption for law enforcement? After suggesting a delay is required while the NY FBI FIeld Office searches for documents made difficult to access by the flooding in Sandy, won’t the FBI simply rely on a bullet proof claim under (b)(7)? The complaint’s ad damnum re the request for the $2 million would fall to a motion to strike as not authorized under FOIA — but might the FBI go directly to a motion to dismiss based on the (b)(7) exemption for documents relating to a law enforcement/ national security matter?

    • DXer said

      Now as between Jdey and Jafar (El Shukrijumah), note that it was El-Shukrijuah who was in New York City in the 2001 was casing helicopters and NYC’s financial district — along with the Prudential Building in Newark, New Jersey.

      El-Shukrijumah’s buddy was Al-Hindi. Evan Kohlman reports that “one of the best accounts of the jihad in Kashmar is the book Army of Madinah in Kashmir written by “Esa al-Hindi”. He quotes Al-Hindi: “Running … straight into the enemy ranks on a well-worn battlefield is a noble and admirable action, but it needs to be complemented by all other fields of the battle arena for a successful operation… [including] Physical warfare, Drug warfare, Germ warfare, Chemical warfare, [and] Sabotage warfare.’ ”

      http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2011/04/27/19/us9ku-010024dp.source.prod_affiliate.91.pdf

      According to 9/11 mastermind KSM,

      “Detainee said Jafar al-Tayar (El-Shukrijumah was given a general tasking in 2001 of spotting and conducting surveillance of potential targets across the US.”

      Abu Zubaydah, for his part, says:

      • Abu Zubaydah first identified Adnan Shukrijumah by the alias Jafar al-Tayar and described him as an al-Qaeda operative tasked for attacks inside the United States.
      • He may have Saudi, Canadian, Guyanese and Trinidadian passports.
      • He speaks Arabic, Urdu, Spanish and English with an American accent.
      • The U.S. government is offering a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.

      If Jdey was detained and then released in the Summer of 2001, might that have been the reason he contacted KSM and pulled out of the Planes Operation?

      In contrast, El Shurkijumah in early 2001 was casing targets in NYC and New Jersey. As between Jdey and El-Shukrijumah, isn’t El-Shukrijumah a far stronger candidate for mailing? What evidence is there that Jdey has ever even been to New Jersey? El-Shukrijumah on the other hand was there in 2001 — just 43 or so miles from the mailbox. And what he was doing was looking for targets for 911 mastermind KSM. … whereas Jdey had told KSM that he was pulling out. (He would have ample reason to pull out if it is true that he was detained like the top CIA fellow claims).

      Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/oct/5/20041005-013052-7047r/#ixzz2STHCkU00

      In terms of checking out that local fellow ordering at Subway, Jafar the Pilot is only 5’4″.

  26. DXer said

    The Department of State video notes that Jdey has a scar on his forehead.

    • DXer said

      Questions for Mr. Dillon (which I will email to him):

      1) What was his address in Montreal in Fall 2001? I am going to Montreal this summer and would be glad to take tourist photos of you if you get me addresses.

      2) I believe he lived in an apartment building. Who was nearest his apartment? What do those tenants say about Jdey?

      3) What classes did he attend and when? Who were his classmates? What do they say?

      4) Have you searched news articles in French? Have you searched newspaper articles in Tunisia? If not, I would ask that you do that asap,

      5) According to one report he and Boussora, the fellow with the pointy ears and pituitary gland condition, were seen in Turkey in 2002. Did you search for newspaper articles in Turkey about that report or about the search for Jdey?

      6) I believe you once served in Turkey for the State Department. Is that correct? I am counting on you telling us of any news articles about the report and he and Boussora were seen entering Turkey in 2002.

      7) At one point the FBI BOLO noted he studied biology. But then that reference was deleted. Can you provide links or citations to BOLO with the reference to biology and then its deletion?

      8) What mosque did he attend? Who do other attendees at the mosque — those who knew him — say?

      9) As I recall, the top former CIA person says that Jdey was arrested at the same time as Moussaoui — with Moussaoui and Jdey traveling together from Canada. (I have uploaded the excerpt). But when was Moussaoui ever in Canada? Stupid question: would Moussaoui’s passport reflect travel to Canada by a stamp? Is his passport an exhibit uploaded there?

      10) Don’t we have a timeline establishing instead that Moussaoui travelled from Oklahoma City? To include Moussaoui’s telephone bills? Where on Moussaoui’s telephone bills is there any call reflecting contact with Jdey? (I have uploaded the bill).

      11) Who was the Abdel-Rahman who Stewart Bell reports told Jabarah that Jdey brought down Flight 587? Was Abdel-Rahman his brother? Is he still alive?

      12) Am I right that there is no evidence of travel by Jdey to New Jersey on the dates of mailing?

      13) Am I right there is no physical evidence that Jdey was the mailer? Isn’t just your theory based on an inferences? That’s all an “Ivins Theory” is — speculation heaped upon inference, with contradicting information withheld from public view.

      14) It seems that there is hearsay evidence that Jdey brought down Flight 587. Based on what Jabarah says Abdel-Rahman told him. Jabarah himself was highly connected — to OBL, Zawahiri, KSM, and Hambali. What does Hambali say about Jdey? What does KSM say about Jdey? What do they say about Flight 587? In his long list of claimed exploits, did KSM claim responsibility for Flight 587?

      15) The FBI has said that all the passengers are accounted for — that is, they know who got on Flight 587 and Jdey was not among them. Has the NTSB or FBI released documents showing the names of passengers and where they sat? I understand there would be seats of particular interest based on learning about Al Qaeda’s plan to bring down planes with shoe bombs — where were an AQ operative likely sit. Are the passengers in those rows accounted for?

      16) Have you read the NTSB report on Flight 587? What does it say about the suggestion that it was brought down by a shoebomb?

      17) Are there FOIA documents relating to Flight 587 online?

      18) Are there books about the Flight 587 tragedy?

      19) I went to Dominican Republic not long after on holiday. Were a majority of people on the flight returning residents of Dominican Republic rather than tourists?

      • DXer said

        Heer is a story on the subject by Stewart Bell from 2004:

        November 2001 plane crash (A A flight 587) Queens, NY was AL QAIDA operation

        Stewart Bell National Post ( CANADA)

        August 27, 2004

        A captured al-Qaeda operative has told Canadian intelligence investigators that a Montreal man who trained in Afghanistan alongside the 9/11 hijackers was responsible for the crash of an American Airlines flight in New York three years ago.

        Canadian Security Intelligence Service agents were told during five days of interviews with the source that Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian citizen also known as Farouk the Tunisian, had downed the plane with explosives on Nov. 12, 2001.

        The source claimed Jdey had used his Canadian passport to board Flight 587 and “conducted a suicide mission” with a small bomb similar to the one used by convicted shoe bomber Richard Reid, a “Top Secret” Canadian government report says.

        But officials said it was unlikely Jdey was actually involved in the crash, which killed 265 people and is considered accidental. The fact that al-Qaeda attributed the crash to Jdey, however, suggests they were expecting him to attack a plane.

        “We have seen no evidence of anything other than an accident here,” said Ted Lopatkiewicz, spokesman for the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. “There has been no evidence found, from what I can tell — at least that’s been relayed to us — that there was any criminality involved here. It appears, at least the evidence we have, is that a vertical fin came off, not that there was any kind of event in the cabin.”

        Jdey, 39, came to Canada from Tunisia in 1991 and became a citizen in 1995. Shortly after getting his Canadian passport, he left for Afghanistan and trained with some of the Sept. 11 hijackers, according to the 9/11 commission in the United States.

        He recorded a “martyrdom” video, but was dropped from the 9/11 mission after returning to Canada in the summer of 2001. The planner of the World Trade Center attack, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, claims Jdey was recruited for a “second wave” of suicide attacks.

        The FBI issued an alert seeking Jdey’s whereabouts in 2002. John Ashcroft, the U.S. Attorney-General, told a news conference in May that Jdey was one of seven al-Qaeda associates “sought in connection with the possible terrorist threats in the United States.”

        The information on Jdey’s alleged role in the plane crash is contained in a memo on captured Canadian al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. The Canadian government memo was written in May, 2002, and was based on information provided by a “source of unknown reliability.”

        Jabarah is a 22-year-old from St. Catharines who allegedly joined al-Qaeda and convinced Osama bin Laden to give him a terror assignment. He was tasked with overseeing a suicide-bombing operation in Southeast Asia, but was caught and has since pleaded guilty in the United States.

        The report, which was sent to the Philippine National Police intelligence directorate, recounts what Jabarah said he was told about the U.S. plane crash by Abu Abdelrahman, a Saudi al-Qaeda member who was working for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

        “In discussions, Abu Abdelrahman mentioned AL QAIDA was responsible for the assassination of Massoud, the Northern Alliance leader,” the report says. “According to the source, Abu Abdelrahman added that the 12 November 2001 plane crash (btb American Airlines flight 587) in Queens, New York was not an accident as reported in the press but was actually an AL QAIDA operation.

        “Abu Abdelrahman informed Jabarah that Farouk the Tunisian conducted a suicide mission on the aeroplane using a shoe bomb of the type used by Richard Reid …. ‘Farouk the Tunisian’ was identified from newspaper photographs as being identical to Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian citizen who had resided in Montreal.”

        Jabarah was initially suspect of the claim about Jdey, but he later believed it after he saw the same information on a “mujahedin Web site,” the report says.

      • DXer said

        The top former CIA person, in a report on WMD published by Harvard, says that Jdey was detained at the same time as Moussaoui. He says Moussaoui had been at McMasters with Jdey and El-Shukrijumah.

        Thus, although Moussaoui’s French passport shows no evidence of travel to Canada, maybe the place to start is to identify the dates of sightings of El-Shukrijumah at McMasters.

        The FBI and CIA failed to disclose that Jdey was detained ( with biology textbooks) at the same time as Zacarias Moussaoui and then released.
        Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 25, 2012
        https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2012/01/25/the-fbi-and-cia-failed-to-disclose-that-jdey-was-detained-with-biology-textbooks-at-the-same-time-as-zacarias-moussaoui-and-then-released/

        There is also a $5 million reward for El-Shukrijumah.

        Ken, on what basis do you for example, suggest Jdey as the mailer over El-Shukrijumah? Was he also whereabouts unknown and on the move on the dates of mailing? When was he at McMasters with Moussaoui and Jdey?

      • DXer said

        Adnan, for example, is an associate of Atta and the handwriting of the mailed letters is in the handwriting of Atta.

        https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2012/01/22/gao-should-obtain-a-copy-of-the-fbis-handwriting-analysis-comparing-the-letters-to-attas/

        El-Shukrijumah aka “Jafar the Pilot” was an associate of Atta and Jdey. Given Adnan was known to be in the US but Jdey was not, why do you favor Jdey as a possible mailer over Adnan?

        The best candidate for mailer, of course, is someone proximate to the mailbox or who provably traveled to the location on those dates. Jdey does not qualify for either.

        In comparison, Dr. Ivins had an alibi in spades once the timeline was understood.

        http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

        Here is the Wiki on Adnan that discusses both Adnan and Jdey.

        http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=adnan_shukrijumah_1

        May 2, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Atta and Possibly Jarrah Seen with Al-Qaeda Operative in Miami Immigration Office

        Adnan Shukrijumah.[Source: FBI]
        Mohamed Atta, Adnan Shukrijumah, and another man go to the Miami District Immigration Office to request a visa extension for the third man, whose identity is not known but who is believed to be Ziad Jarrah. The man received only a six-month visa, while Atta received one for eight months after returning from Europe in January 2001 (see January 10, 2001). The inspector rejects the request, and instead decides that Atta was given an incorrect length of stay and rolls back his visa’s expiry date to July 9, 2001. Atta is quiet and polite throughout and even thanks her at the end, despite his visa having been shortened by two months. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 22-3 ]

        Shukrijumah – After 9/11, both Mohamed Atta and Adnan Shukrijumah are identified by the immigration officer as two of the men who visited her office. Upon seeing Shukrijumah’s photo, she will say that she is “75 percent sure” it is him, and will provide a description that matches his profile. At this time, Shukrijumah is being investigated by the FBI and is thought to be a well-connected al-Qaeda operative (see November 2000-Spring 2002, (Spring 2001), April-May 2001, and March 21, 2003 and After). Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also attend a Florida mosque run by Shukrijumah’s father (see 2000-2001). An FBI informant sees both Atta and Adnan Shukrijumah at the mosque in early 2001, but he is unable to get close to them (see Early 2001).

        In the History Commons article on Adnan, it states: “After 9/11, it is known that [Jdey] leaves Canada in November 2001.”

        There is no evidence that Jdey was in the US in September or October 2001. OTOH, there is evidence, that Adnan was in the US, wasn’t there? What were his precise dates of travel to Trinidad and Tobago. They don’t provide an alibi, do they?

        July-September 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Travels around US and to Canada and Trinidad

        In the weeks before 9/11, an associate of the 9/11 hijackers, Adnan Shukrijumah, travels around the US, visiting New York, Washington, and Chicago, as well as Montreal in Canada, for about a week each. (Nabil al-Marabh, a militant linked to the 9/11 attacks, is likely in Toronto, Canada, for most of this time period (seeJanuary 2001-Summer 2001 and Shortly Before July 11, 2001).) According to the FBI, he is scouting potential terrorist targets. Shukrijumah then visits his childhood home, Charlieville in Trinidad and Tobago, for a week, around the date of the attacks. Shukrijumah lives near the hijackers in Florida in 2001 and is apparently seen with Mohamed Atta (see 2000-2001 and May 2, 2001). He was also investigated by the FBI in the spring of 2001, as it thought he might be involved in terrorism (see (Spring 2001) and April-May 2001). [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/3/2006]According to neighbors of his parents, Shukrijumah is still seen in Florida until March 2003.

      • DXer said

        Adnan El-Shukrijumah is alleged to have received assistance from American neuroscientist Aafia Siddiqui. Aafia reports she spent 6 months at the Karachi technical institute researching anthrax as a biological weapon at the request of her second husband, KSM’s nephew, one of the 9-11 plotters. An AUSA has said in federal district court that she was prepared to assist in an anthrax attack if asked.

        Adnan’s BOLO first issued in Spring 2003. Jdey and Aafia were also sought at the same time. The present Wanted listing for Adnan El-Shukrijumah states:

        Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction; Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization; Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization; Receiving Military-Type Training From a Foreign Terrorist Organization; Conspiracy to Commit an Act of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries; Attempt to Commit an Act of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries; Use of Destructive Device

        http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/adnan-g.-el-shukrijumah

        El Shukrijumah occasionally wears a beard. He has a pronounced nose and is asthmatic.

        Adnan G. El Shukrijumah was indicted in the Eastern District of New York in July of 2010 for his alleged role in a terrorist plot to attack targets in the United States and the United Kingdom. The charges reveal that the plot against New York City’s subway system, uncovered in September of 2009, was directed by senior Al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was also directly related to a scheme by Al-Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United States. El Shukrijumah is thought to have served as one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda’s external operations program.

        The Rewards For Justice Program, United States Department of State, is offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading directly to the capture of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah.
        SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

        2004 spokesman on Adnan El-Shukrijumah. “He is believed to be one of the most dangerous cell leader below the leadership of al-Qaeda who plans to hurt the United States,” Art Werge, spokesman for the FBI in El Paso, said.

        It seems it is possible is that the former CIA fellow saying Jdey was detained and released is just mistaken. Maybe whoever prepared the timeline in the report was referring to the fellow who drove Moussaoui from Oklahoma City. He was known to have been detained and then released. Maybe Moussaoui facts were mixed up with McMasters facts. Given the former CIA fellow never responded to inquiries, it seems just as likely that his unsourced report, an outlier, is mistaken.

        In any event, I see nothing that makes Jdey more likely than El-Shukrijumah as the mailer. Indeed, it is suggested by one report that El-Shukrijumah traveled to the NYC and DC area in 2001 although I need to locate those reports.

        But why would you favor Jdey as the mailer over the blind sheik subtilis expert who was calling the WTC 1993 bomber’s telephone number up to the hour of the Blind Sheik’s arrest?

        Subtilis was a contaminant found in the mailed anthrax. The subtilis expert Walied Samarrai lived 6 miles from the mailbox. I first emailed him with questions in 2003 but he did not respond. The first inquiry related to the reason for the silica.

        Laurie Mylroie in a 2001 book described a “Waly Samar” who was a microbiologist connected to the WTC 1993 participants based on phone records. Was he the subtilis expert allegedly connected to Al Qaeda’s anthrax program that the FBI reports it was able to confidently exclude (in adjudging Dr. Ivins the sole culprit)? Did “Waly Samar” live in Trenton in 2001? Who does “Waly Samar” think is responsible for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings?

        Posted by Lew Weinstein on April 30, 2011
        https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/04/30/laurie-mylroie-in-a-2001-book-described-a-waly-samar-who-was-a-microbiologist-connected-to-the-wtc-1993-participants-based-on-phone-records-was-he-the-subtilis-expert-allegedly-connected-to-al/

      • DXer said

        Isn’t Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah a much better candidate for mailer than Jdey if it is true that he was at a meeting with anthrax lab tech Yazid Sufaat and KSM in Pakistan in Summer 2001? Would Yazid — if we ask pretty please and extradite him to the US — admit Adhan was the mailer?

        Indeed, did Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah know Walied Samarrai,the subtilis expert associated with the WTC bombers? Adnan had lived in Brooklyn and his dad was a character witness in the blind sheik Abdel-Rahman’s trial.

        It was after the “extremely virulent” anthrax was found in Kandahar that, a few days before Christmas 2003, the country returned to “orange” temporarily and brought in the New Year under high alert. Then, in late February 2004, Zawahiri promised another attack on the homeland was coming. This, perhaps overblown threat was embodied in the dimunitive Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah aka Jafar the Pilot.

        Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah was born on August 4, 1975, in Medina, Saudi Arabia to a 16-year-old mother and a 44-year-old Islamic scholar who had headed a mosque in Brooklyn. El-Shukrijumah’s father once translated for the blind sheik. At a trial of defendants charged with conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks in 1995. El-Shukrijumah’s father father appeared on behalf of Clement Hampton El, who was convicted of plotting to blow up the Holland tunnel and the United Nations. The father was the mentor of Bilal Philips who in turn was the mentor of GWU microbiology grad student of Ali Timimi. Adnan’s father had been sent to the Caribbean country of Trinidad and Tobago by the Saudi government as an Islamic missionary. The family lived there until 1983. When his father was transferred to New York City to lead a Brooklyn mosque, the family returned to Saudi Arabia.

        Brooklyn had long been important to the infrastructure in the US for obtaining jihadi recruits. Established in the mid-1980s by Egyptian Mustafa Rahman as a joint venture with Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Al-Kifah (or Struggle) Refugee Center in New York originally recruited and raised funds for Mujahedeen headed for Afghanistan. In Peshawar, the organization was headed by Mohammed Islambouli, the brother of Anwar Sadat’s assassin. In 1993, the group announced it was switching its operations to Bosnia. These “mujahideen” recruitment centers spread throughout the USA, to places such as Portland, Oregon, which opened a branch in October 1994 — and to Boston where Aafia Siddiqui attended Brandeis and MIT. In the mid-1990s, KSM and Islambouli were given safe haven in Doha, Qatar by the religious minister there. Mohammed Islambouli and his plan to attack using the aircraft and other means was the subject of a December 4, 1998 Presidential Daily Brief that the CIA provided President Clinton.

        In 1995, after Adnan had graduated from high school, his father retired from his missionary job as Imam in Brooklyn and the family to Florida, moving the family to Miramar in 1996. The modest retirement home was next door to a small mosque at which the father would preach. For the next two years, Adnan studied computer engineering at Broward Community College, though he did not get a degree. Imam at the mosque next door to his house and Adnan’s Dad often taught at other mosques. One of the mosques he and Adnan would frequent was in Fort Lauderdale — the one across from Franklin Park. It was there that Adnan met Jose Padilla, the ”enemy combatant” charged in connection with a plot to explode a radioactive bomb in the United States. Padilla was arrested en route to meet Adham Hassoun, another worshiper at the mosque.

        Adnan was responsible at a young age, with his father absent in Brooklyn. The family acknowledges that Adnan had a quick temper. In 1999, Adnan held garage sales and car washes to raise money for Muslim refugees of the war in Bosnia. The fundraising supported Global Relief Fund, which the government has alleged funded terrorist organizations. In May 2001, he went to Saudi Arabia via Trinidad and Panama to sell Islamic goods and trinkets. He didn’t like the permissiveness of American society — he objected to scantily clad women. He wanted to get married. He allegedly was at one or more meetings in the Summer of 2001 in Pakistan at which KSM and Sufaat were present. After 9/11, the FBI began visiting the family home. His mother told him to stay away and not come home. ”I tell him we don’t want to know where he is.” She said the last she knew he was teaching English in Morocco and had gotten married.

        Adnan El Shukrijumah holds a green card but did not become a U.S. citizen. He was a citizen of Guyana. Saudi Arabia is quite emphatic that he is not a citizen of Saudi Arabia. Officials say he uses a half-dozen aliases and passports, from such countries as Canada, Trinidad and Saudi Arabia.

        He was an an alleged associate of both Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, another key 9/11 plotter. George Tenet, former CIA Director, noted that Ramzi Yousef had a CBRN role. Apparently, Adnan Shukrijumah accompanied Mohammed Atta and another hijacker in visiting an INS office in Miami in May 2001. The INS employee is 75% sure it was him, having commented to a colleague at the time at how good looking the fellow was.

        The Special Branch Trinidad & Tobago Police said they have records that El Shukrijumah was in Trinidad in 2001 and 2002 into 2003. The Express was told: “We have records on him coming and leaving including the fact that he left on a BWIA flight for London in 2001 but on the last occasion he was here we only have records on him coming to Trinidad but none of him leaving.” El Shukrijumah has been associated with the Darul-Uloom Institute, an Islamic institute in Central Trinidad. Part of the problem is that El Shukrijumah has several passports including a Trinidad and Tobago passport and has in the past used several aliases to escape law enforcement agencies. He is known to have Guyanese links. The US authorities also report that he may have been in Canada in 2002 looking for nuclear material for a “dirty bomb.” Note the timeline relating to McMasters does not square with the former CIA person’s claim in the Harvard report. Adnan was sighted at McMasters in 2002, not Summer 2001.

      • DXer said

        “The FBI said El Shukrijumah’s whereabouts are unknown, but it is believed that he was in the United States shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks.”

        FBI Hunts ‘Al Qaeda Field Commander’
        http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90755&page=2#.UYabmc1cr5M

        Sources described El Shukrijumah as an al Qaeda field commander who trained under alleged terror financier Ramzi Binalshibh. They told ABCNEWS that the 27-year-old lived for years in Florida, and was identified by captured al Qaeda attack planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Binalshibh and Mohammed are both in U.S. custody in undisclosed locations.

        Mohammed also said that El Shukrijumah had been sent to the United States to carry out an operation, probably via Canada, sources said. He also may be linked to a so-called dirty bomb plot in which American Jose Padilla has been accused, they said.

        The FBI said El Shukrijumah’s whereabouts are unknown, but it is believed that he was in the United States shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks.

      • DXer said

        In 2002, the FBI was secretly pursuing a hot “Franklin Park” lead as it related to Adnan El-Shukrijumah. On the return address, Greendale School the anthrax letters had purported to be in Franklin Park. “School” was known code to refer to Ayman Zawahiri’s group.

        A hunt for “the Pilot” – US News & World Report
        http://www.usnews.com › Home › Nation & World‎


        Mar 30, 2003 – The FBI agents had not forgotten about El Shukrijumah, however. Agents visited his family’s home in a Fort Lauderdale suburb six times, but he …

        In late 2002, it was announced that authorities were urgently seeking a Florida pilot El Shukrijumah, who worshiped at this same Fort Lauderdale mosque across from Franklin Park — the city park not the locality — and had possible ties to Adham Hassoun. The pilot El Shukrijumah is said to be at the level of Mohammed Atta and is thought to have been associated with Aafia Siddiqui, an MIT-trained biologist. Aafia Siddiqui reportedly also has a yet-undisclosed connection to Adham Hassoun. Mohammed Atta lived 11 miles away from this mosque across from Franklin Park, where these members of the Egyptian Islamic Group worshiped. Holy Cross hospital –where Dr Tsonas treated Flight 93 hijacker Ahmad al-Haznawi for a suspicious leg lesion that he and other experts think was due to cutaneous anthrax — is only 7 miles from the mosque. Is it all a coincidence? Possibly. Certainly, it is speculative and the relevant information is classified.

        Given that using the same address helps the second recipient receiving the letter to identify it and avoid opening it, the perp would have no reason to use the same “Franklin Park” address unless he was communicating something and wanted to draw attention to it.
        El Shukrijumah according to a senior Bush official spent time in Norman with the hijackers. According to another uncorrobborated source, he actually stayed with the fellow who went to bond Al-Attas out of the INS detention center.
        Remember: Given that using the same address helps the second recipient receiving the letter to identify it and avoid opening it, the mailer would have no reason to use the same address unless he was communicating something and wanted to draw attention to it.

        Padilla, the former Broward man suspected of plotting to explode a ”dirty bomb” to spread radiation in the United States, worshipped at a Broward County mosque, Masjid Al-Iman, in Fort Lauderdale. That mosque was across the street from Franklin Park. Padilla was a former gang member who converted to islam while in South Florida and became an extremist while in Egypt beginning in 1998. He attended al Azhar University in Egypt and started a family there after leaving his American wife. In 1999, Padilla left for Pakistan. Authorities detained him May 8, 2002 when he got off a plane at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. The FBI has found no ties between Padilla and the September 11 hijackers, even though several of them had lived in Broward County.
        While in Pakistan, Padilla had reported to KSM, the al Qaeda’s No. 3 leader who had anthrax production documents on his laptop when he was arrested. It appears that in April 2002, Khalid Mohammed dispatched Padilla to the United States, with several thousand dollars for a mission to disperse a radiological device that was still in the thinking stage. He was placed in a military brig in North Carolina and has been held incommunicado, forbidden from contacting his family or attorney. Shortly before leaving for the US from Pakistan in June 2002, Padilla was staying with Al Qaeda’s military commander Mohammed Atef, the former Cairo police sergeant, who Ayman reported to about Project Zabadi.

        A Padilla acquaintance, Adham Hassoun, was detained in June 2002 in Sunrise by federal agents. His home had been searched in November 2001 but authorties had laid back, not arresting him and hoping surveillance would lead to insights. Hassoun once served as distributor of a magazine published in Australia advocating Muslim holy war and was associated with one or more charities accused by the Bush administration of funding terrorists. Padilla reportedly had contacted Hassoun from overseas and was apparently en route to meet Hassoun when he was arrested. Investigators monitored the communication between Padilla and Hassoun and arrested Hassoun after he was called by a reporter from Miami about his acquaintanceship with Padilla. State records indicate that he was the Florida registered agent of the Chicago-based Benevolence International Foundation. The leader of the mosque across from Franklin Park was Awad, the Florida representative of Holy Land Foundation.

        Hassoun had established Benevolence International Foundation in Plantation, Florida in 1992. In 1993, the headquarters was moved to Chicago area. A man named Mohammed Loay Bayazid was its president in 1993 and 1994. He was arrested while visiting Northern California in December 1994 along with Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law. Bayazid, according to authorties, had been looking to purchase enriched uranium for Bin Laden. Thus, things had quickly come full circle for BIF to once again be involved in an investigation relating to Al Qaeda’s attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

        This speculation underscored the importance of finding the Florida “Jafar the Pilot.” El Shukrijumah reportedly was seen in Canada looking for nuclear material for a dirty bomb. Operatives named El-Maati and Anas al-Liby may have been there also. A man thought to be El Shukrijumah was spotted by a witness lin Hamilton, Ontario, in the role of a student at McMaster University, which has a 5-megawatt research reactor. U.S. officials believe El Shukrijumah was in Hamilton seeking to obtain radioactive material in preparation for planned simultaneous attacks.

        There was a detailed description at a June 1, 2004 press conference of Padilla’s plot and his relationship with Jafar the Pilot by a senior DOJ official. The official also described Padilla’s relationship with Atef, Zubaydah, KSM, and Ramzi Binalshibh. He emphasized that there is an urgent need to find Adnan (Jafar)

        As between Jafar and Jdey, isn’t Jafar a better candidate for mailer?

      • DXer said

        He rented a C$217 monthly apartment in Rosemont–La Petite-Patrie near Montreal and attended the EI-Sunna (or Assunah) Mosque in Montreal.

        Hickerson, Colin. Boston Globe, “US wary of ‘time bombs’ waiting to strike from north”, February 4, 2003
        http://www.freedominion.com.pa/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=6473

        Jiddi arrived in Canada in the early 1990s, entering the country using false identity papers. Nonetheless, he was rewarded with citizenship in 1995, and carries a legitimate Canadian passport that expires in 2004. He occupied a $217-a-month apartment in a rundown east Montreal neighborhood where many shop signs are written in Arabic and the spiced fragrance of North African cooking wafts from tiny storefront restaurants and cafes.

        He had no obvious employment, according to neighbors, and was often visited late at night by men of ”Middle Eastern” appearance, among them Boussora.

        The two are thought to have flown to Europe in November, as investigations into Al Qaeda’s Canadian connection intensified in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police executing scores of search warrants in cooperation with the FBI.

        http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abderraouf_jdey.htm

        • Jdey departed Canada in 1999 and received combat training and experience in Afghanistan through 2000. He engaged in fighting against the Afghan Northern Alliance and authored a suicide letter stating his intention to become a martyr for jihad. During this time, Jdey also appeared in a well-known martyrdom video that was later found in an al-Qa’ida leader’s house in 2001.
        • Following a return to the Montreal area in 2001 in which Jdey associated with extremists, Jdey left Canada. His whereabouts since then have been unknown. He was last identified as potentially being in Turkey in early 2002.2,4

        • Jdey was either slated to be part of the 9-11 attacks (according to a recovered letter by Saif al-Adel or assigned to a series of second-wave attacks (according to KSM).
        • Possibly trained with 9-11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi, Mohamed Atta and Khalid al-Mihdhar.3

      • DXer said

        Jdey lived at Rosemont at 7687 22nd Ave. in Montreal The DOJ issued the first BOLO for Jdey in January 2002.

        Attorney General Transcript
        News Conference – Identity of Suspected Terrorist
        Friday, January 25, 2002
        http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/012502transcriptofsuspectedterrorist.htm

        1/28/02

        http://www.canada.com/montreal/montrealgazette/story.asp?id=ED3C0C91-CCFD-4
        370-A197-59572C773F3C}
        ‘Martyr’ lived quietly
        Neighbours were clueless as to Al-Qa’ida connection

        MELANIE BROOKS and SARAH STAPLES
        Montreal Gazette

        Sunday, January 27, 2002

        The life of a man who swore to die for Al-Qa’ida played out in Rosemont
        under the noses of neighbours who saw him as a harmless and quiet student.
        Al Rauf bin Al Habib Bin Yousef al-Jiddi, 36, who appears in an Al-Qa’ida
        video swearing to become a martyr in Osama bin Laden’s war against the West,
        lived in a small apartment building at 7687 22nd Ave.

        Most of the people in the four-storey building are neighbours in the ways
        neighbours are; they know each other’s names, say hello in the stairwell,
        borrow sugar if they need it. But al-Jiddi, who lived in apartment No. 6,
        kept mainly to himself, and spoke to no one.

        He paid $350 a month for his sparsely furnished apartment, with a large
        kitchen and a small balcony overlooking the back yard.

        His bedroom opened into his living room; when he woke up, he would have had
        a clear view of the preschool across the street. In the summertime, he would
        have enjoyed shade from a large tree just outside his front window.

        He may have had a roommate.

        But he moved out sometime last summer, before two planes hijacked by
        terrorists toppled the World Trade Centre and the world’s sense of security.

        Neighbours say he may still have friends in the area, but if he does, they
        aren’t talking.

        Several nights a week, several heavily built men of Arab descent, most
        appearing to be in their 30s, would walk up the three flights of stairs to
        al-Jiddi’s apartment.

        It was not a party; there was no music, no laughter. The men inside spoke
        loudly in Arabic, having discussions that would last into the morning.

        Then, they would leave.

        Carlos Jacobs lives in apartment No. 3, one floor below. He could hear the
        men, but didn’t think much of it. No one else in the building spoke Arabic,
        so no one knew what they were talking about.

        Most people assumed they were international students; many people in the
        neighbourhood are in Canada on student visas, or are recent immigrants.

        The shops lining the main street only three blocks away, Jean-Talon, boast
        Arabic script on their signs – Algerian names, Tunisian names. After
        al-Jiddi moved, the neighbours forgot about him – until several days ago,
        when the United States released his photograph, along with a videotape and a
        letter, all found in Kabul, in a bombed-out wreck that was once the home of
        one of Osama bin Laden’s right-hand men, Mohammed Atef.

        On the tape, al-Jiddi appears with four other men and delivers what appears
        to be a martyrdom message from a would-be suicide bomber.

        In the letter, al-Jiddi is even more clear: he pledges to give his life in
        the battle against “infidels.” And on Friday, U.S. officials announced to
        the people of Montreal that this would-be terrorist had lived among them.

        There is a new person living in al-Jiddi’s old apartment, or perhaps it is
        his old roommate. Friday night, after the world learned through CNN that
        al-Jiddi used to live in Montreal, the old pattern started up again.

        Men Went Upstairs

        About five Arab men went upstairs and began to speak loudly in Arabic.
        Jacobs’s fiancee, Stephanie Babuseaux, was at home downstairs, and listened.

        “I saw this man’s picture on the news,” she said yesterday. “That makes me a
        bit scared to think someone like that was living here.”

        Just down the street is a small mosque. The people there say al-Jiddi never
        prayed there. It is a progressive mosque, where the imam adheres to a more
        moderate interpretation of Islam.

        Al-Jiddi came to Canada from Tunisia in 1991 and became a Canadian citizen
        in 1995. He has a Canadian passport, good until 2004. Prime Minister Jean
        ChrÈtien says the man is no longer in Canada. U.S. officials say he isn’t
        here, either. In the meantime, the residents of 22nd Ave. just hope he
        doesn’t come home.

        Across the city, not far away, the man wanted by U.S. officials as
        al-Jiddi’s co-conspirator kept a low profile, and was remembered only
        because of his prominent ears. Faker Boussora, 37, frequented Le Soleil, a
        small Tunisian restaurant on the corner of Ontario St. and St. Laurent
        Blvd., where he usually ordered his favourite meal: the Merguez sandwich
        special, which comes with a drink, and is popular among students because
        it’s cheap – only $5.50.

        Boussora, who is also of Tunisian descent, first started going to the
        cafeteria-style restaurant two or three years ago. Many Tunisians come
        there, said one nervous employee, because they miss the food from their
        homeland.

      • DXer said

        Jdey is reported in French press to have returned to Montreal after the 9/11 attacks and was seen until November 2001.
        http://www.radio-canada.ca/…/016-al-djiddi-montreal.asp

        Youssef al-Djiddi serait revenu à Montréal après le 11 septembre
        Mise à jour le lundi 28 janvier 2002, 21 h 02 .

        L’un des deux Canadiens d’origine tunisienne identifiés par Washington comme membres présumés du réseau Al-Qaida a été aperçu à Montréal en novembre dernier, rapporte dimanche le quotidien La Presse. Youssef al-Djiddi, l’un des cinq membres présumés d’Al-Qaida apparaissant sur une cassette vidéo récemment diffusée par Washington, serait revenu à Montréal après les attentats du 11 septembre et aurait été aperçu dans la ville jusqu’en novembre, ajoute le journal, citant des témoins anonymes.

        L’homme, âgé de 36 ans, a été qualifié vendredi d’«extrêmement dangereux» par le ministre américain de la Justice, John Ashcroft. Al-Djiddi avait immigré au Canada en avril 1991 muni d’un visa émis à Rabat, au Maroc. Il a obtenu la nationalité canadienne en 1995.

        La vidéo a été retrouvée dans les ruines de la maison de Mohamed Atef, un haut responsable d’Al-Qaida qui aurait été tué en novembre lors frappes américaines en Afghanistan. On peut y voir cinq membres présumés du réseau d’Oussama ben Laden. Quatre des cinq individus apparaissant sur la vidéo étaient connus de Washington. L’identité d’Al Djiddi n’a en revanche été révélée que vendredi. Washington a par ailleurs annoncé vendredi être à la recherche d’un autre Canadien d’origine tunisienne, Faker Boussora, décrit comme un associé d’Al-Djiddi.

      • DXer said

        Montreal Gazette Saturday, February 16, 2002
        Mystery surrounds ‘Raouf’
        Montrealer seen as key link between local terror cells, bin Laden camps

        WILLIAM MARSDEN and NICOLAS VAN PRAET

        ***

        Nothing much is known about Boussora. He regularly took the 80 bus alone on Park
        Ave. He attended the as-Salam mosque at Ontario St. and St. Laurent Blvd.,
        according to Ismael Safti, an area grocer. He arrived in Canada in 1992 on a
        student visa and obtained an immigrant visa through the Canadian consulate in
        Detroit in August 1995.

  27. DXer said

    Abderraouf Jdey. [Source: FBI]

    A candidate 9/11 hijacker named Abderraouf Jdey is possibly arrested and then released in the US around this time, although details remain very murky.

    CIA Officer’s Curious Report – In 2010, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen will write a public report for the Harvard Kennedy School entitled, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Mowatt-Larssen was a CIA official from 1982 to 2005, and was head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) for a time. Around the time of 9/11, he was the head of the CTC’s weapons of mass destruction branch (see 1982, Early October-December 2001, and November 2005). In a timeline in Mowatt-Larssen’s report, there is this entry for Summer 2001: “Detention of Abderraouf Yousef Jdey, a biology major with possible interest in biological and nuclear weapons, who traveled with Zacharias Moussaoui from Canada into the United States. Moussaoui is detained with crop duster manuals in his possession; Jdey had biology textbooks. Earlier, they attended McMaster University in Canada, along with Adnan Shukrijumah.” This entry is very curious, because although the report is said to be based entirely on publicly sourced material, there has been no public information about Jdey’s arrest or link with Moussaoui, and the footnotes to the entry do not mention these things either. [MOWATT-LARSON, 1/2010 ]
    Jdey’s 9/11 Connection – In late 1999, Jdey may have attended an advanced training course in Afghanistan also attended by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see Late 1999). He may also have been instructed by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed at the same time as hijacker Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin-al-Shibh. A letter recovered from a safe house in Afghanistan in late 2001, apparently written by al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel, says that Jdey was originally meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers. A videotape of Jdey pledging to be a martyr was also discovered in mid-November 2001 in Afghanistan, in the wreckage of al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef’s house (see November 15-Late December 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 527]

    Jdey Is Highly Wanted After 9/11 – Jdey was born in Tunisia, but became a Canadian citizen in the mid-1990s. After 9/11, it is known that he leaves Canada in November 2001. In January 2002, the US government will announce they are seeking him. In 2005, the FBI will announce a $5 million reward for him. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/26/2002; CBC NEWS, 5/27/2004; REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, 4/2005]
    Mystery Is Unresolved – If Mowatt-Larssen is correct and Jdey was arrested before 9/11, this would have been a vital opportunity to stop the 9/11 plot, and if he was connected with Moussaoui, that would dramatically change the circumstances of Moussaoui’s arrest. It would also mean there would had to have been a cover-up of Jdey’s arrest in the years since 9/11.

    Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Saif al-Adel, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohamed Atta, Abderraouf Jdey, Adnan Shukrijumah, Khalid Almihdhar, Mohammed Atef, Ramzi bin al-Shibh

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    • DXer said

      Jdey had been travelling with Faker Ben Abdelaziz Boussora. Mr. Boussora has very distinctive ears. Some might say they look pointed. “Boussora has protruding ears and is believed to have a serious pituitary gland illness.”

      The FBI push could be directed to doctors who prescribe the drugs with his pituitary gland illness typically use. “He may suffer from a serious illness and be in extremely poor health, resulting in weight loss and altered physical appearance.”

      He also is also known as Abu Yusif al-Tunisi.

      Boussora is a Tunisian national with extensive connections to radical Islamic extremism. He is an al-Qaida trained operative with declared intentions of becoming a suicide martyr. Boussora is an associate of Tunisian terror suspect Abderraouf Jdey, and the two may have traveled together in the past.

      Boussora left his native Tunisia in 1988 to reside in France. He departed France in 1991 and immigrated to Montreal, Canada, traveling back and forth from Canada to Tunisia frequently during the 1990’s. Boussora gained Canadian citizenship in 1999 and while in Canada attended the Assunna Mosque in Montreal.

      Boussora departed Canada in 1999 and may have made more than one trip to Afghanistan during the 1999-2000 timeframe. He received training from al-Qaida while in Afghanistan, and subsequently returned to Canada.

      Authorities remain concerned that Boussora may attempt to return to Canada or the United States to plan or participate in a terrorist attack.

      Just as a push to find Whitey Bulger’s companion led quickly to his arrest, perhaps a push to find Boussora would turn up Jdey.

      With advances in technology maybe artificial recognition programs would turn him up at a border crossing such as a place like Turkey or Tunisia.

      It may seem a needle in the haystack but think of this needle as a GPS tracker on Jdey because of Boussora’s altered physical appearance and pointed ears.

      He and Jdey, according to one unconfirmed report, were seen crossing into Turkey in 2002. The evidence relating to that crossing should be made public pursuant to Ken Dillon’s FOIA request.

      Wanted
      Information leading to the location of
      Faker Ben Abdelaziz Boussora
      Up to $5 Million Reward

      http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=Faker&language=english

  28. DXer said

    I wrote about Yazid Sufaat’s role in Al Qaeda’s anthrax program and the role that Jabarah could play in resolving the Amerithrax mystery on January 19, 2004.

    This is useful background both to this federal court complaint under FOIA and in understanding the context of Yazid Sufaat’s May 6, 2013 hearing (Monday).

    “Yazid Sufaat’s Role in Al Qaeda’s Anthrax R&D Program

    Posted by Ross on Monday January 19, 2004

    Participants at a key meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 included regional Al Qaeda operative Hambali, two of the 9/11 hijackers (Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almidhar), Cole planner Tawfiq bin Attash, and others. According to some reports, Khalid Mohammed was also there. Tawfiq Bin Attash was a long time Bin Laden operative. The Yemeni first went to Afghanistan in 1989. He came to lead Bin Laden’s bodyguards and was an intermediary between Bin Laden and those who carried out the bombing of the Cole in October 2000. Khalid Almihdhar, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was from Saudi Arabia but was a Yemeni national. Almihdhar was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.

    Zacarias Moussaoui was alleged to have received his money from Yazid Sufaat, under the cover of a company managed by his wife named Infocus Tech, an importer of US computer software and hardware. Sufaat, who was arrested upon returning from Afghanistan to Malaysia where he had been serving in a Taliban medical brigade, graduated from California State University, Sacramento in 1987. He received a bachelors degree in biological sciences, concentrating on clinical laboratory technology, with a minor in chemistry. Sufaat joined the Malaysian army, where he was a lab technician assigned to a medical brigade. After five years, he left the service with the rank of captain and worked for a civilian laboratory. In August 1993, he set up his own company, Green Laboratory Medicine.

    After authorities found a letter signed by Yazid Sufaat purporting to authorize Zacarias Moussaoui as its marketing representative, they went looking for Sufaat. But by then, Sufaat had left for Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to his wife, he went to Pakistan in June 2001 because he wanted to do his doctorate in pathology at the University of Karachi. According to his wife, Sejarhtul Dursina, “He had planned to set up a medical support unit in Afghanistan, near Kandahar.” (Kandahar is where Al Qaeda established its anthrax lab.) Dursina had attended Sacramento State with him. It was her mother who encouraged Yazid’s religious studies.

    According to Malaysian officials, Sufaat merely was a foot soldier who provided housing and false identification letters and helped obtain explosives. “I would put it this way: If Hambali [Al Qaeda’s point man in Southeast Asia] was the travel agent, Sufaat was the guy at the airport holding up the sign.” Sufaat admits to having purchased 4 tons of ammonium nitrate to build a truck bomb for the Singapore cell. The ammonium nitrate eventually was found buried throughout the grounds of a plantation.

    The Malaysian officials report that they believe that Sufaat had no knowledge of what the hijackers who stayed at his condominium or Zacarias were planning. At a minimum, however, the established facts relevant to the Amerithrax investigation show that in the Summer and Fall of 2001 an Al Qaeda supporter who had assisted in the 9-11 operation — and who was a lab technician working with anthrax — was in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Was he the fellow perceived as Filipino who the journalist met in Afghanistan in the Fall of 2001 bragging about his ability to manipulate anthrax? The authorities may not think so given the comments of Malaysian officials and Sufaat’s attorney’s description of the 30-minute FBI interrogation (where they mainly wanted to know how he knew Zacarias). The U.S. has asked for his extradition in connection with hosting of the two 9/11 hijackers, but at last report, Malaysia had refused.

    The connection between the folks in Karachi and the operatives in Kuala Lumpur was clarified and confirmed by the arrest in May 2002 of Mohammed Monsour Jabarah. This young man told interrogators that the codeword for Americans was “White Meat,” suggesting unclean pork. He was a go-between Khalid Mohammed in Karachi and Hambali in Kuala Lumpur. He delivered the money for the bombing attacks planned for Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Arrested in March 2002, he had joined Al Qaeda in May 2001.

    In his interrogation, the Catholic-schooled youth, said that KSM had asked him to “go to Malaysia to meet with individuals who were planning an operation against the US and Israeli embassies in the Philippines.” Osama Bin Laden, with whom he met, valued the youth for his clean Canadian passport and fluency in English. KSM told the young man that he must leave Karachi to deliver the money to Hambali, Al Qaeda’s point man in Southeast Asia and the military chief for Jemiah Islamiyah, before September 11. He flew out to deliver the money on September 10, 2001.

    Hambali earlier had met with Mohammed Mansour Jabarah in Karachi in August 2001. Jabarah is cooperating and is available to testify in an Amerithrax prosecution. Documents relating to Jabarah’s brother’s role were found in May 2003 upon a raid in Riyadh that foiled an attempt that preceded the bombing of several residential compounds. The picture of his home in St. Catherines, Ontario, bringing to mind the movie “Arlington Road” about the terrorist who lived next door.

    Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. His wife, Lee, an ethnic Chinese Malaysian who converted to Islam, was also detained. Given that Hambali reportedly set up a meeting with two of the 9/11 hijackers and was the one who recruited Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian lab technician reportedly engaged in anthrax R&D, the arrest bodes well for the prospect of a successful resolution of the Amerithrax matter. He eventually began providing information about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program.

    Other good news came when it was announced — or at least reported — that the second in command of Egyptian Islamist Jihad after Zawahiri, Shehata, is one of the detainees in Iran. Given the important role he allegedly played in supporting operations, his arrest may be very significant to resolution of the Amerithrax matter (along with Hambali’s). He reportedly was in charge of the Jihad’s security committee, which provides logistics to the military wing, special operations and individuals involved in attacks. Al Qaeda’s military operations chief, an Egyptian named Adel, recently advised sympathizers not to believe reports of the arrest of other cell members. He may very well be right –and indeed some reports had Adel arrested.

    In any event, Shehata, whether detained in Iran or not, was born in the Egyptian city of Zagazig in 1960 and became involved in Islamic movements when he joined law school in Zagazig University. In 1984, he shared an office with Attorney Zayat, who has represented both the blind sheik and Zawahiri. Al Zayat was the attorney in 1999 who had said that Zawahiri could be expected to use biological weapons in light of the extradition pressure its leaders faced.

    The sheer variety of arrests — with the resulting ability to corroborate (or not) the information given — may in the end be enough to crack the Amerithrax mystery.”

    • DXer said

      Here is the 2008 press release upon Jabarah’s sentencing to life in prison.

      http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January08/jabarahsentencingpr.pdf

      “BIN LADEN assigned JABARAH to participate in a terrorist operation in Southeast Asia and, to that end, dispatched JABARAH to meet with senior al Qaeda operative KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (“KSM”) in Karachi, Pakistan. JABARAH stayed with KSM in Karachi for three weeks beginning in mid-August 2001.”

      “During that time, JABARAH received advanced terrorist training in stealth travel and surveillance techniques. JABARAH was also introduced to, and later extensively met with and took direction from, RIDUAN ISOMUDDIN, known as “Hambali” (“HAMBALI”), a leading figure in the Southeast Asia terrorist group known as Jemaah Islamiyah (“JI”).”

    • DXer said

      The bigger picture within which Yazid Sufaat fits is set forth here.

      http://www.amerithrax.wordpress.com

  29. DXer said

    Canadian journalist Stewart Bell, expert on terrorism, addressed this issue of Jdey and Flight 587 in his book “Marty’s Oath” about jihadist Jabarah:

    “Mohammed … told Pavlovic how he had met bin Laden, how KSM had given him an assignment in Southeast Asia, how he had gone there, who he had met, what they looked. He told him he though KSM was “one of the masterminds” behind hte 9/11 attacks. He provided email addresses and passwords. He said he had been in “casual contact” with four of the 9/11 hijackers in Kandahar. CSIS agents showed him photos and he identified the hijackers: Ahmed Al Haznawi, who was aboard 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania; Abudlaziz Alomari, who crashed Flight 11 into the North Tower; and Khalid Al Mihdhar and Salem Alhazmi, who crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon. He said they exchanged “pleasantries” and there was no mention of the upcoming attacks when they met. “According to Jabarah he has never met any of the other hijackers including suspected hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui,” CSIS noted in a report. Jabarah added that he was “impressed” by Al Haznawi because he was so devout and could recite the Koran from memory. [Note: Al-Haznawi is the fellow who came with a blacked eschar on his leg from Kandahar, where Sufaat had his anthrax lab; Dr. Tsonas later opined it was from exposure from anthrax, as did the present Homeland Security top biosecurity official Tara O’Toole. Yazid does not deny to me that the strain he was using virulent Ames.]

    Mohammed told Mike that Al Qaeda had been responsible for the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the charismatic and politically moderate commander of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Abdelrahman had told him so in Oman. He added that Al Qaeda was also responsible for the November 12, 2001 crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in Queens, New York. The crash had been reported in the press as an accident, but Abdelrahman told Mohammed the plane had been brought down with a shoe bomb similar to the type used by Richard Reid.” Abdelrahman told Jabarah the bomber was the Canadian Abderraouf Jdey. (Although Jdey is alleged to have trained with the 9/11 hijackers, and he recorded a martyrdom pledge on video that was found in Afghanistan.” The National Transportation Safety Board has found no evidence indicating the crash was the result of an act of terrorism.)”

    • DXer said

      A Wikipedia provides handy background on Jabarah and describes his relationship with Zawahiri, KSM and Hambali.

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Jabarah

      In July 2000, Abdul Rahman left for an Afghan training camp, and the following month Mohammed flew to Kuwait where he met with Ghaith who paid his fare to Karachi, from whence he traveled to Peshawar and hiked on foot into Torkham where the two brothers met up, waiting for their promised camp to finish construction and hanging around the Sheik Shaheed Abu Yahya Training Camp near Kabul instead.[5]

      In early 2001, he was diagnosed by doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri with hepatitis, and given a month’s bedrest.[5] While his brother went home to Canada, Mohammed attended a 10-week program at Al Farouq training camp, where he declined an offer to become a trainer, before moving into a guesthouse in Kandahar where his brother later visited him.[5]

      He vowed allegiance to bin Laden in May[9] or July 2001 in Kandahar.[6] Bin Laden sent him to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who paired Jabarah with Ahmed Sahagi as a partner in Karachi.

      After meeting with Hambali, Jabarah was given three eMail addresses; only Mohammed would send mail to “silver_crack2002@yahoo.com”,[5] while only Hambali would send eMails to Honda_civic12@yahoo.com – and Jabarah was to use the address bob_marley123@yahoo.com to respond to them.[5][6] On September 10, 2001 – at the urging of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Jabarah left Pakistan and flew to Hong Kong where he stayed in a hotel.[3] Two days later, he flew to Kuala Lumpur, where he stayed in a hotel in the Indian district, while meeting with militant contacts at a McDonald’s in the food court of a local shopping mall.[3] In late September, he took a bus to Singapore, where he met members of Jemaah Islamiyah anxious for him to give them al-Qaeda funds for their intended bombings. However the group was under surveillance, and arrested members confessed to meeting “Sammy”, although Jabarah had fled the country. Authorities tracked down his identity through the landing card he had filled out upon arriving in Singapore, where he gave his true name and Canadian address.[3]

  30. DXer said

    Mr. Dillon suits the phrase “a gentleman and a scholar” more than anyone I know.

    I hope the Malaysian officials ask Yazid Sufaat about Jdey. I wrote the Malaysian prosecutor yesterday asking whether the Affidavits provided defense counsel are publicly filed somewhere but haven’t heard back. Sufaat’s has a hearing scheduled for on May 6, 2013.

    The FBI in the denial of Mr. DIllon’s appeal, I understand, denied on the grounds of FOIA Exemption 6.

    The DOJ FOIA manual explains Exemption 6:

    “In order to determine whether Exemption 6 protects against disclosure, an agency should engage in the following two lines of inquiry: first, determine whether the information at issue is contained in a personnel, medical, or “similar” file covered by Exemption 6; and, if so, determine whether disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” by balancing the privacy interest that would be compromised by disclosure against any public interest in the requested information.5 When engaging in this analysis, it is important to remember that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has declared that “‘under Exemption 6, the presumption in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found anywhere in the Act.'”6

    To warrant protection under Exemption 6, information must first meet its threshold requirement; in other words, it must fall within the category of “personnel and medical files and similar files.”8 Once it has been established that information meets the threshold requirement of Exemption 6, the focus of the inquiry turns to whether disclosure of the records at issue “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”9 This requires a balancing of the public’s right to disclosure against the individual’s right to privacy.10 First, it must be ascertained whether a protectible privacy interest exists that would be threatened by disclosure.11 If no privacy interest is found, further analysis is unnecessary and the information at issue must be disclosed.12

    On the other hand, if a privacy interest is found to exist, the public interest in disclosure, if any, must be weighed against the privacy interest in nondisclosure.13 If no public interest exists, the information should be protected; as the D.C. Circuit has observed, “something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time.”14 If there is a public interest in disclosure that outweighs the privacy interest, the information should be disclosed; if the opposite is found to be the case, the information should be withheld.15

    See DOD v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (“We must weigh the privacy interest . . . in nondisclosure . . . against the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis – the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would ‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens ‘know what their government is up to.'” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773); Multi Ag, 515 F.3d at 1228 (noting that if requested information falls within Exemption 6, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether “disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . [by] balanc[ing] the privacy interest that would be compromised by disclosure against any public interest in the requested information”); News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1205 (“In order to affirm withholding the addresses, we would have to find that the privacy interests against disclosure are greater than the public interest in disclosure.”); see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, …”

    The FBI’s denial on this basis, in my opinion, lacks merit. The FBI may then turning to Exemption 7 relating to “law enforcement exemption.” The DOJ manual states:

    In determining that documents related to national or homeland security satisfy Exemption 7’s law enforcement requirement, courts have looked to the agencies’ mandates to protect society and to prevent violence in determining whether the threshold is satisfied.35

    See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926, 928 (explaining that terrorism investigation is one of DOJ’s chief law enforcement duties); Kidder, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27 (emphasizing that records at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes because FBI’s investigation into violations of criminal laws and “possible terrorist activity against the United States” falls within FBI’s law enforcement duties; further explaining that investigating terrorism is “‘one of DOJ’s chief law enforcement duties at this time'” (quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926)); Owens v. DOJ, No. 04-1701, 2006 WL 3490790, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2006) (noting that “threshold showing has been made” because records were “generated during an investigation into terrorist attacks” and defendant agencies are “statutorily authorized to investigate activities of this type”); L.A. Times, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (explaining that there is “a cognizable law enforcement mandate in Iraq” of improving intelligence information that will enhance security); Gordon,388 F.2d at 1045 (“[T]he information was compiled in connection with maintaining the watch lists to prevent another terrorist attack on civil aviation. … Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 (concluding that “inundation maps” were compiled for law enforcement purposes because they are used for homeland security as part of the Department of the Interior’s “Emergency Action Plans and to protect and alert potentially threatened people”); Coastal Delivery, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 964-65 (reasoning that law enforcement requirement is satisfied by cargo-inspection data at seaports where disclosure could permit terrorists to direct activities to “vulnerable ports”); Ayyad v. DOJ, No. 00-960, 2002 WL 654133, at *8-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2002) (ruling that information satisfies Exemption 7’s threshold because it “is clearly related to law enforcement proceedings and was compiled by the FBI to investigate” 1993 World Trade Center bombing); Judicial Watch v. Reno, No. 00 0723, 2001 WL 1902811, at * 9 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that records concerning investigation of terrorist threats involved legitimate law enforcement duty and satisfied threshold)….

    In the case of criminal law enforcement agencies, the courts have accorded the government varying degrees of deference when considering whether their particular records meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7.63 While the degree of deference varies, it is well established that courts do defer to agencies’ assertions of “law enforcement purposes.”64 In recognizing the propriety of judicial deference, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Center for National Security Studies v. DOJ observed that it was acting “in accord with several federal courts” that defer to the executive on decisions of national security.65

    The District Court for the District of Columbia has opined that the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Center for National Security Studies “[a]t most, . . . stands for the proposition that the Department’s claim that records were compiled for a law enforcement purpose is entitled to some deference, so long as its proffer in that regard meets the standards set forth in the case law.”66

    Along these lines, the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted a per se rule that qualifies all “investigative” records of criminal law …

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