CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Did the Pentagon allow its DARPA-funded Ames research to be infiltrated by a committed Salafist and convicted seditionist Ali Al-Timimi?

Posted by Lew Weinstein on November 14, 2015

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7 Responses to “* Did the Pentagon allow its DARPA-funded Ames research to be infiltrated by a committed Salafist and convicted seditionist Ali Al-Timimi?”

  1. DXer said

    DARPA Wants To Create A ‘Soldier Cell’ To Fight Biological Weapon Attacks

    Terrell Jermaine Starr

    http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/darpa-wants-to-create-a-soldier-cell-to-fight-biologica-1793127965

  2. DXer said

    “August 21, 2003 FBI 302 interview of Ali Al-Timimi –filed in federal district court yesterday — states:

    “Timimi is currently pursuing his PHD at George Mason University (GMU). … The building at which Timimi works houses a number of administrative offices related his and other research projects. Housed within the same building, are the offices of the head of a Bio-Defense project. Timimi frequently talks to this individual about questions related to scientific research. The actual research for the Bio-Defense project is conducted at a separate building….”(p. 9)

    Ha! I have located the directory showing who was in which room. The hallway was loaded room-by-room by the scientists working for Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey. Dr. Alibek told me he did not know Ali. One time he just told me that he would sometimes see him in the hall. Another time he told me that he knew he was hardliner.

    I’ve never spoken to Dr. Bailey. He referred me to legal counsel. Who was it with whom Ali Al-TImimi would speak?

  3. DXer said

    In an FBI 302 dated August 21,2003 (filed in federal district court yesterday), Ali Timimi explained his relationship with Andy Card [the White House Chief of Staff to which FBI Director Mueller reported on the Amerithrax investigation].

    “Timimi advised that in the past he has been placed in positions of trust with the United States government. In 1992, while Timimi was employed by Unisys, he worked on a project with the Department of Transportation (DOT) in which he created a contact database for the Director of the DOT, ANDY CARD. In conjunction with this project, Timimi entered personal information for about 500 or 600 individuals into a database to be used by Card while conducting DOT business. Timimi feels that he was trusted enough that he had access to personal information of a great number of important people, to include cabinet leaders and their children. At the end of the project, Card wrote TImimi a letter of commendation for his work at DOT. Timimi also worked for the U.S.Navy.”

    Note: I have previously explained that his work for the US Navy was classified.

  4. DXer said

    Numerous FBI 302s were filed yesterday in the US v. Ali Al-Timimi case.

  5. DXer said

    When AUSA Lieber, proponent of the Ivins Theory, went to visit Ali Al-Timimi in jail, she was reprimanded for her trouble. Things were in tremendous turmoil in the office for unrelated reasons. But don’t blame her for not considering and adequately vetting alternative alterantive theories. Don’t shoot the messenger. Blame her superiors.

  6. DXer said

    If CDC does not reach the EA-101s relating to Ames anthrax during the 1997-2001 period, then they simply are not doing their job. Transparency has got to mean something more than seeing Dr. Bannan in his swim trunks down in Florida. Maybe if JB was made to run around the block in his underwear…

    • DXer said

      Dr. Franz has written and forwarded to me a recent OpEd on this topic of regulation– or at least the bureaucratization of regulation.

      It is titled “Implementing the Select Agent Legislation: Perfect Record or Wrong Metric? Volume 4, 2015, by David R. Franz.

      “The article ‘‘Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins: 2003-2013’’ by Shelby et al that appears in this issue describes in great detail the type and exact number of transfers of select agents, the day of the week packages were shipped, and the calendar days in transit. It also charac- terizes the ‘‘entities’’ involved in the transfers. The activities described are in response to the select agent regulations (SAR) promulgated in 19971 and 2003.2 The Centers for Disease Control’s Division of Select Agents and Toxins3 (DSAT) and the US Department of Agriculture Select Agent Services4 make up the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP), which approves and oversees transfer of agents that ‘‘pose a severe threat to public health and safety,’’ thereby ‘‘protecting public health and safety.’’* Let’s assume for the sake of this argument that the select agent regulations were brilliantly drafted, necessary, and sufficient. Shelby et al’s article and the resources current and proposed to operate the select agent program, viewed in the shadows of an ap- parently increasing number of shipment errors in select agent labs, suggest that it might be time to revisit the im- plementation of the program”.

      ***

      “What was implemented 15 to 20 years ago as a result of perceived security risks has become an extremely bureaucratic approach to oversight of laboratory safety by government. Assuring safety and security remotely from ‘‘inside the belt- way’’ is impossible.** Perhaps it is time that we revisit the implementation of the select agent regulations and carefully consider their measureable and nonmeasureable impacts on our infectious diseases research programs, our public and agricultural health and safety, and our national security.

      One very specific place to begin might be to carefully examine the real costs and benefits of attempting to account for individual vials of select agents. We might also consider establishing an appeal process and appointing a balanced, expert national advisory board to oversee the implementa- tion of these important regulations. Finally, we must ad- dress the very fundamental problem of micromanaging laboratory directors remotely from inside the beltway. We must once again balance responsibility with appropriate authority and reward enlightened leadership and healthy professional cultures in our research labs.”

      I don’t have any horse in the race on the policy issues — being narrowly focused on the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings whodunnit. But I would ask the CDC to do a close analysis of the EA 101s relating to the transfers of the Ames strain of anthrax. Then, and only then, can we learn from history and learn from our mistakes.

      I’m reminded of the time in October 2001 that NAU sent Los Alamos “live” Ames when it had only asked for DNA.

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