CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Al Hawsawi, who had the anthrax processing documents scanned on his laptop, was closely affiliated with Adnan El-Shukrijumah

Posted by DXer on September 22, 2014

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13 Responses to “* Al Hawsawi, who had the anthrax processing documents scanned on his laptop, was closely affiliated with Adnan El-Shukrijumah”

  1. DXer said

    Trial of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed set to resume at Guantanamo Bay
    Reporters were given a tour of the facilities ahead of the proceedings.
    ByJohn Parkinson andShannon K. Crawford
    September 7, 2021, 5:00 AM

    In addition to Mohammed, four other defendants charged in the 9/11 terrorist attacks will be in the courtroom: Walid bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ammar al-Baluchi (also known as Abd al Aziz Ali) and Mustafa al Hawsawi.

  2. DXer said

    Medical testimony is ordered relating to Hawsawi’s condition after rectal reconstruction.

    Guantánamo judges order secret prison’s medical officer to testify

  3. DXer said

    9/11 defense lawyers: Judge let U.S. secretly des

    “We’re not going to let an individual criminal defendant … mortgage the whole future of the country in one case, because they’ve got something that could force government officials to try to figure out how to accommodate it,” the general said. “We’re not allowed to compromise national security just to get to a result in a case. That’s what Congress is trying to prevent.” …

    The one team that does not seek Pohl’s recusal has proposed a different remedy. The lead lawyer for Mustafa al Hawsawi, a Saudi, said Sunday he wants Pohl to eliminate the possibility of the death penalty for his client.

    Hawsawi’s attorney, Walter Ruiz, said Sunday his 47-year-old client “continues to bleed daily” from rectal abuse inflicted during CIA custody. Defense medical experts say Hawsawi’s injuries require surgery but are treated with ointment at Guantánamo’s Camp 7.


    Readers may recall that KSM actually asked for and welcomed the death penalty. It seems that the justice system would not continue to be bent into unrecognizable shape if the death penalty were simply removed from the table and then matters moved forward.

    Related to an earlier point I made about avoiding a bio attack, the US government has failed to bring defendants to trial in proceedings that have stretched well over a decade. The suggestion the US government can effectively mount a biodefense seems wrongheaded given that they cannot effectively mount a criminal prosecution.

    Ineffective bureaucracy risks the death of us all — at least innocents and loved ones in DC and New York City.

  4. DXer said

    Corroborating that Shukrijumah was with Al-Hawsawi from February 2002- April 2002 is Padilla’s report, according to the Senate Torture Report, that he saw Shukrijumah in Karaachi in March 2002.

  5. DXer said

    Terrorist leader killed in Pakistan had Broward background

    By Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver

    12/08/2014 3:40 PM


    Asked in July 2011 at her Miramar home whether she had heard from him, she told the Miami Herald: “I don’t know if he is alive.” Family members could not be reached on Monday. No one responded to a visit to to the home Monday by a Herald reporter….

    U.S. officials warned that Shukrijumah was especially dangerous to the nation because of the time he spent in America. The mystery surrounding his whereabouts — and whether he played a direct role in 9/11 — remained among the key unanswered questions.

    “They are us. They know us intimately,” said Michael Scheuer, a former top analyst in the CIA unit created after 9/11 to track down al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden, whom U.S. forces killed May 2, 2011, in a raid on his Pakistan hideout.


    Shukrijumah spoke better English than Arabic, apparently because of time he spent in Trinidad, said Sofian Abdelaziz Zakkout, a Miami social worker who met him briefly in 2000 as the head of the American Muslim Association of North America.

    “He didn’t have enough knowledge,” she said. “He would study for one semester and start and stop.”

    In between, she added, he traveled to buy flea market items, worked odd jobs in grocery stores and shops, sold used cars and phone cards, and assembled cell phones.


    Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed first identified Shukrijumah as an al-Qaida operative while under U.S. interrogation after Mohammed’s capture in Pakistan in 2003, according to widely published reports.

    Many contradictory reports have emerged about Shukrijumah.


    One U.S. military intelligence analyst assigned to a unit in Afghanistan that tracked “high value” al-Qaida targets in 2006-07 said that while Shukrijumah’s name came up in some reports, he “was not on our top 10 list.”

    Yet he was connected to so many alleged plots, and reportedly spotted in so many countries — Panama, Honduras, Mexico, Trinidad, Canada, Britain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen — that he was called the Elvis Presley of al-Qaida.

    While much was known about Shukrijumah, gaps remained. The most crucial: whether he was in contact with the 9/11 hijackers and pilots. Sixteen of the 19 hijackers lived in or visited South Florida before the attacks.

    One U.S. immigration inspector told investigators she was “75 percent sure” she saw Shukrijumah with Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 pilots, and another man at the former Immigration and Naturalization Service building on 79th Street in Miami on May 2, 2001.


    The 9/11 Commission report noted that “to date” no information had surfaced associating Shukrijumah with the plot, but it didn’t rule it out, given that he “is considered a well connected al-Qaida operative.”

    One of those connections, according to the report, was his father, an imam who testified on behalf of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the Egyptian who is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for a plot to bomb the United Nations headquarters in New York, along with the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and the George Washington Bridge.

    Shukrijumah’s father, Gulshair, served as an imam, or prayer leader, at al Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, where Rahman once preached. He moved the family to Miramar in 1995, when he became imam of al Hijra Mosque, which then was around the corner from the family home.

    In March 2001, FBI agents deployed an informant to infiltrate the mosque run by Shukrijumah’s father because they were targeting another Broward Community College student who attended, Imran Mandhai.

    The informant recorded Mandhai vowing to establish a jihad cell that would target electrical substations, Jewish institutions and a National Guard armory. Mandhai tried to recruit Shukrijumah, but he resisted and declined to join, according to the recordings.


    Former U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Sloman, who prosecuted the Mandhai case along with current Miami-Dade Circuit Judge John Schlesinger, said it was the country’s first successful terrorism-related prosecution after 9/11.

    Sloman said he thought it was more than sheer coincidence that Shukrijumah was in Broward at the time Mohamed Atta and other terrorists were in South Florida.

    “It’s pretty scary,” he said. “Not even Carl Hiaasen could make this stuff up.”

    Miami Herald staff writer Amy Sherman contributed to this story from Broward County and McClatchy correspondent Tom Hussain contributed from Pakistan. The story was supplemented with information from the Associated Press.

  6. DXer said

    Al-Qaeda chief Adnan Shukrijumah killed in raid in Pakistan

    After the September 11 terror attacks, Shukrijumah was seen as one of al-Qaeda’s best chances to attack inside the US or Europe, captured terrorist Abu Zubaydah told US authorities. Shukrijumah studied computer science and chemistry at a community college in Florida and is thought to be the only al-Qaeda leader to have once held a US green card. He lived in Miramar, Florida, with his mother and five siblings.

    He had come to South Florida in 1995 when his father, a Muslim cleric and missionary trained in Saudi Arabia, decided to take a post at a Florida mosque after several years at a mosque in Brooklyn.

    But at some point in the late 1990s, the FBI says Shukrijumah became convinced that he must participate in “jihad,” or holy war, to fight perceived persecution against Muslims in places like Chechnya and Bosnia. He eventually went to a training camp in Afghanistan where he studied the use of weapons, explosives and battle tactics.

    When the FBI showed up to arrest him as a material witness to a terrorism case in 2003, he had already left the country.

    In 2004, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft called Shukrijumah a “clear and present danger” to the United States. Experts said what made him so dangerous was his firsthand knowledge of the United States. There was no immediate comment from the US to the news of Shukrijumah’s death.

    The Pakistani military said that Shukrijumah had recently moved from the North Waziristan tribal area to South Waziristan to avoid a military operation the Pakistanis launched in June in North Waziristan. The military said he was hiding in a compound when he was killed but gave few other details about the raid. One Pakistani soldier was killed and another seriously wounded during the assault, the military said.

    Pakistan’s army spokesman, Major Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa, said on Twitter that five “terrorists” also were detained in the raid.

    The United States has been pushing Pakistan for years to launch an operation in North Waziristan, the last area of the tribal region bordering Afghanistan where the Pakistani military had not forcefully moved to root out militants. The military says they have killed 1,200 militants in the North Waziristan operation and cleared 90 percent of the territory.

    Shukrijumah’s death is a significant success for Pakistan’s military, Pakistani security analyst Zahid Hussain said.

    “They seem to have developed a strong intelligence networks in the tribal areas,” he said.

  7. DXer said

  8. DXer said

    Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. After being shipped to Jordan, where he was harshly interrogated, Hambali eventually began providing information about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. He told interrogators that the terror network had what author Ron Suskind describes as an “extremely virulent” strain of anthrax before the September 11 attacks. In the autumn of 2003, Suskind reports, U.S. forces in Afghanistan found a sample of the virulent anthrax at a house in Kandahar. Pulitzer Prize winning author Ron Suskind writes: “One disclosure was particularly alarming: al Qaeda had, in fact produced high-grade anthrax. Hambali, during interrogation, revealed its whereabouts in Afghanistan. The CIA soon descended on a house in Kandahar and discovered a small, extremely potent sample of the biological agent.” He continued: “The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What’s more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized.”

    Suskind writes:

    “Ever since the tense anthrax meeting with Cheney and Rice in December 2001, CIA and FBI had been focused on determining whether al Qaeda was involved in the anthrax letter attacks in 2001 and whether they could produce a lethal version that could be weaponized. The answer to the first was no; to the second, ‘probably not.’ Though the CIA had found remnants of a biological weapons facility — and blueprints for attempted production of anthrax — isolating a strain of virulent anthrax and reproducing it was viewed as beyond al Qaeda’s capabilities.

    Suskind continued:

    “No more. The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What’s more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized.”

    “Alarm bells rang in Washington. Al Qaeda, indeed, had the capabilities to produce a weapon of massive destructiveness, a weapon that would create widespread fear.

    The next puzzle piece was tucked, inconspicuously, inside a computer. The computer was picked up in late August in Pakistan in a sweep by ISI of apartments that were once safe houses for al Qaeda operatives. On the hard drive were pictures of a very precise, very professional casing effort in New York City. Grand Central Terminal, and its cavernous vaults, from many angles. Banks. Hotel lobbies.

    The headquarters of famous Manhattan-based companies, with pictures that included everything from heating, ventilation, and air-condition systems to locks on security doors.

    Many of the sites photographed represented closed spaces, each ideal, in different ways, for mubtakkar attacks or, now, an anthrax attack.”

    This apparently was the report from the trip to New York City by Dhiren Bhart and El-Shukrijumah (and perhaps they were joined in 2000 by Al-Marri).

    Based on the additional information being provided in 2003, authorities also captured two mid to low level technicians. President Bush has explained that these mid-to low level technicians were part of a cell that was developing an anthrax attack on the United States. In Fall of 2006, President Bush explained:

    “KSM also provided vital information on al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain biological weapons. During questioning, KSM admitted that he had met three individuals involved in al Qaeda’s efforts to produce anthrax, a deadly biological agent — and he identified one of the individuals as Yazid. KSM apparently believed we already had this information, because Yazid had been captured and taken into foreign custody before KSM’s arrest. In fact we did not know about Yazid’s role in al Qaeda’s anthrax program. Information from Yazid then helped lead to the capture of his two principal assistants in the anthrax program. Without the information provided by KSM and Yazid, we might not have uncovered this al Qaeda biological weapons program, or stopped this al Qaeda cell from developing anthrax for attacks against the United States.”

    Sufaat wrapped things up in the Summer of 2001, according to Tenet, and briefed Hambali and Zawahiri over the course of a week.

    University of Maryland “peace studies” researcher Milton Leitenberg views Al Qaeda’s efforts in Afghanistan as incompetent. To the contrary, I view Yazid Sufaat as skilled and discern Milton’s undergrad degree to have been in organizational behavior rather than microbiology. He asserts: “The 2005 Silberman-Robb Commission report claims that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan did obtain ‘‘Agent X,’’ which is understood to have meant a B. anthracis pathogenic strain, and not a vaccine strain. The claim appears to be incorrect.” (Though what was harvested at the vaccine lab, which was entirely separate from Sufaat’s lab, may very well have been the Sterne strain; Yazid wouldn’t tell me).

    Milton argues Al Qaeda’s “effort failed, as the organization was unable to obtain a pathogenic strain of B. anthracis. Al Qaeda’s work was incompetent in the extreme and had barely advanced beyond early speculation by the time a joint allied military team raided and occupied its facilities in December 2001. To the contrary, the lab had been up and running since May 2001 — for at least four months. I have previously discussed Milton’s treatment of the typed letters from Rauf Ahmad to Ayman Zawahiri in 1999 where Milton neglected to quote the first sentence announcing that the targets had been achieved. Milton simply has no basis whatsoever for his assertions and conclusions and has spun the documentary evidence. The process outlined on Hawsawi’s laptop only would take a month.

    Indeed, the Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat, who Milton never bothered to interview, doesn’t deny the anthrax mailings in written correspondence. He pleads the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Leitenberg concludes: “In terms of bioterrorism perpetrated by a terrorist organization, the Amerithrax events are an outlier, as they almost certainly were carried out by a U.S. scientist, fully trained, with access to pathogenic strains and optimum working conditions. ” Milton points to no equipment that was needed but was not present at the Kandahar lab.

    Instead of surmise, let’s hear from GAO about the DNA findings for Ames strain found at the Kandahar lab. See Professor Relman’s piece in SCIENCE. He was Vice-Chair of the NAS review panel.

    Dr. Ayman contemplated decontaminating the labs — that is why they were to be painted. The plan was to wipe the walls with insecticide. Moreover, some equipment was removed and other equipment was attempted to be destroyed.

    But Al Qaeda had all the equipment they needed at the Kandahar lab. The FBI has never said anything different.

  9. DXer said

    In the indictment announced today of KSM, Al-Hawsawi and the others, the indictment mentions experiments in the use of biological weapons. What experiments in the use of bioweapons were conducted?

    Posted by Lew Weinstein on April 4, 2011

    2014 Straits Times report : Into what weapons did Yazid Sufaat attempt to load anthrax?
    Posted on February 23, 2014

    • DXer said

      In anticipation of Hawsawi’s trial, note that his laptop contained documentary evidence relating to both the logistical assistance he provided Atta leading up to 9/11 and his expenses during the Feb-April 2002 time he spent with Adnan El-Shukrijumah in Karachi.

      The millions spent on the legal defense of these mass murderers could be spent feeding hungry people in the world. Is justice being served?

      UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
      08 February 2007, Subject: Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Al Hawsawi, Mustafa Ahmed.

  10. DXer said

    The relative ease Shurkrijumah may have had because of his “U.S. Status,” his looks, and his fluency in English, was increased due to his skill at creating fake travel documents. Jaffar al-Tayyar taught others “to falsify documents by substituting photographs, erasing entry/exit stamps, and removing visas.”

    Adnan worked out of the media center in Kandahar.

    Click to access 03053_060901display.pdf

    “Analyst Note: Padilla and al-Tayyar were known to work out of the media center in Kandahar. … Al-Tayyar is Adnan al-Shukrijummah who is currently at

    I first ventured the connection between the media center and the anthrax mailings well over a decade ago.

    In 2001, before departing for the UAE, Al-Hawsawi had worked in the Al Qaeda media center Al Sahab (Clouds) in Kandahar. The letter containing the first anthrax went to the American Media in Florida had blue and pink clouds on it.

    On March 23, 2003, the Washington Post reported on documents allegedly discovered at the Abdul Qadoos Khan residence — on a seized laptop — relating to biochemical weapons. The documents indicated that Al Qaeda leaders may already have manufactured some of them. The documents at the Qadoos home reveal that Al Qaeda had a feasible production plan for anthrax. Confronted with scanned handwritten notes on the computer, Mohammed reportedly began to talk about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. KSM, however, denies that it was his computer. He says it was the computer of Mustafa Hawsawi, who was captured at the home the same day.

    Hawsawi worked under KSM who in turn worked for Zawahiri. Al-Hawsawi was a facilitator for the 9/11 attacks and its paymaster, working from the United Arab Emirates. He sent thousands to Bin Al-Shibh in the summer of 2001. After 9/11, he returned to Afghanistan where he met separately with Bin Laden, Zawahiri and spokesman Abu Ghaith. KSM worked closely with al-Hawsawi. It would make perfect sense that the computer is actually al-Hawsawi’s. The fact that the anthrax spray drying documents were on that computer, however, and that Al-Hawsawi had worked for Al Sahab in Kandahar in 2000, serves to suggest that the undated documents predated 9/11, particularly given that extremely virulent anthrax was later found in Kandahar. At the same time, it suggests that Al-Hawsawi has personal knowledge relevant to anthrax. Al-Hawawi in turn worked with Aafia Siddiqui’s husband-to-be, KSM’s nephew Al-Baluchi, in the UAE in the summer of 2001. The two provided logistical support for the hijackers.

    Hawsawi worked as a financial manager for Bin Laden when he was in Sudan. He was associated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad shura leader Mahjoub, who was Bin Laden’s farm manager in Sudan. Mahjoub was the subject of the anthrax threat in January 2001 in Canada, upon announcement of his bail hearing. The day after Mahjoub’s bail was denied on October 5, 2001, the potent stuff was sent to US Senators Daschle and Leahy. The FBI needed to prioritize any lead involving individuals who knew Mahjoub; but in accusing Ivins, it appears that they failed to do so.

    The Washington Post explained that “What the documents and debriefings show, the first official said, is that “KSM was involved in anthrax production, and [knew] quite a bit about it.” Barton Gellman in the Post explained that Al Qaeda had recruited competent scientists, including a Pakistani microbiologist who the officials declined to name. “The documents describe specific timelines for producing biochemical weapons and include a bar graph depicting the parallel processes that must take place between Days 1 and 31 of manufacture. Included are inventories of equipment and indications of readiness to grow seed stocks of pathogen in nutrient baths and then dry the resulting liquid slurry into a form suitable for aerosol dispersal.” The Washington Post story notes that U.S. officials said the evidence does not indicate whether al Qaeda completed manufacture. The documents are undated and unsigned and cryptic about essential details.

    In addition to establishing him as paymaster for the hijackers, Al-Hawsawi’s computer disks reportedly also included lists of contributors worldwide, to include bank account numbers and names of organizations that have helped finance terror attacks. In press accounts, one unnamed government official confirmed that the information has yielded the identities of about a dozen suspected terrorists in the US. In his substituted testimony in the Moussaoui case, Al-Hawsawi says he became part of Al Qaeda’s media committee in Afghanistan in about July 2000. Hawsawi lived at the media office. For about 4-5 months in 2000, Hawsawi worked as a secretary on al Qaeda’s media committee. Hawsawi’s role “was to copy compact discs and reprint articles for the brothers at the guesthouse in Qandahar. After 2000, Hawsawi worked at the direction of Sheikh Mohammed, transferring funds, and procuring goods.” KSM joined the committee in February 2001.

    The first time that Hawsawi was asked to be come involved in operational activities was about March 2001, when he took his second trip to the UAE. Although Sheikh Mohammed did not use the word “operation,” Sheikh Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be purchasing items, receiving and possibly sending money, and possibly meeting individuals whom Hawsawi would contact or who would contact him. Sheikh Mohammed also told Hawsawi that his stay would be lengthy, so he should rent an apartment. Sheikh Mohammed said Hawsawi did not need cover because he was carrying a Saudi passport, and it was a common practice for a Saudi to rent an apartment in the UAE. In approximately August 2001, Hawsawi, with Sheikh Mohammed’s blessing, decided to take an English course.

    Sheik Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be in contact with individuals called ‘Abd Al-Rahman (Muhammad Atta) and the “Doctor” (Nawaf al-Hazmi). Atta called Hawsawi four times while in the US. Hawsawi says he was never in contact with Hani or Nawaf while in the US. On September 9, Ramzi bin Shibh told him the date of the planned operation and urged that he return to Pakistan. He flew out on 9/11 and after a night in Karachi, flew on to Quetta. Hawsawi stated repeatedly that he never conducted any activity of any type with or on behalf of Moussaoui and had no knowledge of who made Moussaoui’s travel arrangements. Documents, however, reportedly show that al-Hawsawi worked with the Dublin cell to finance Moussaoui’s international travel. The indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui named al-Hawsawi as an unindicted co-conspirator. Moussaoui unsuccessfully tried to call KSM and Hawsawi as witnessses.

    Hawsawi has said that it was Qahtani who was to have been “the 20th hijacker” rather than Moussaoui. Qahtani, Hawsawi said, had trained extensively to be one of the “muscle hijackers.” Atta went to pick Qahtani up at the Orlando airport but immigration officials turned Qahtani away. Al-Hawsawi said he had seen Moussaoui at an al-Qaeda guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, sometime in the first half of 2001, but was not introduced to him and had not conducted any operations with him. At Moussaoui’s trial, the government pointed to FAA intelligence reports from the late 1990s and 2000 that noted that a hijacked airliner could be flown into a building or national landmark in the U.S., Such an attack was viewed “as an option of last resort” given the motive of the attack was to free blind sheik Abdel Rahman. Flying a plane into a building would afford little time to negotiate.

    Zacarias Moussaou reportedly was in Karachi with anthrax lab tech Yazid Sufaat on February 3, 2001 when they bought air tickets through a local travel agency for Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They reportedly left on a flight for KL on February 8, 2001. Moussaoui began at the Norman, Oklahoma flight school on February 26, 2001. KSM says that Moussaoui’s inquiries about cropdusters may have related to Hambali and Sufaat’s work with anthrax.

    Another reason not to underestimate Hawsawi’s role in an anthrax operation is his contact with al-Marri. Al-Marri, who entered the country on September 10, 2001, was researching chemicals in connection with a “second wave.” Al-Marri was also drafting emails to KSM. Although al-Marri denies being in contact with Hawsawi, phone records show otherwise. Email evidence also confirms messages drafted by al-Marri to KSM. An article by Susan Schmidt in the Washington Post on al-Marri notes that al-Marri picked up $13,000 in cash from al-Hawsawi. Al-Marri made the mistake of opening the briefcase containing the money in bundles and peeling off a few hundred dollars to pay his bail after being stopped on a traffic charge a couple days after 9/11. References to al-Hawsawi turned up in the Dublin, Ireland, office of a Saudi-backed charity suspected of having links to bin Laden upon a raid after 9/11 by Irish authorities. even though his English was fine. In applying, he would not provide a home address or sign the application. “He was a very pugnacious individual,” the administrator told the Post. He was calling students. A number of people reported him as acting suspicious in the heightened sensibilities after 9/11. One student from whom he sought help was the local mosque imam, graduate student Jaloud. Jaloud curiously reports that he did not remember him as the fellow he had taken to the airport 90 minutes away in the summer of 2000, or the fellow he had argued about shipping the computer, or the fellow who had then put him to the expense of shipping the computer to Washington. (Jaloud reports when questioned in 2005, he told the Saudis that he did not remember the address in Washington where he sent the computer.)

    Al-Marri is due to get out of prison this next January.

    Meanwhile, Hawsawi and KSM face trial still.

    Anthrax, Al Qaeda and Ayman Zawahiri: The Infiltration of US BIodefense

  11. DXer said

    Majid Khan, the plotter who Aafia Siddiqui was helping to get into the country in a plot to blow up gas stations, knew Jaffar al-Tayyar. The detainee assessment for Majid Khan indicates that KSM wanted to use Adnan El-Shukrijumah because of the relative ease in slipping into the country due to his “US status.”

    “Jaffar al-Tayyar is assessed to be Adnan G. al-Shurkrijumah who is sought by the FBI in connection with possible terrorist threats against the US. The term “US status” is assessed to refer to those individuals, US citizens or foreigners, who have a valid and legal purpose for traveling to and within the US, and who could do so with relative ease and without raising the suspicions of US authorities. See TD-314/85346-06.

    “KU-10024 tasked detainee to conduct research to support unspecified poisons attacks against US water reservoirs.35”

    “(S//NF) KU-10024 discussed plans to target the infrastructure of the US. KU- 10024 stated he wanted to target water reservoirs and water treatment plants in the US. KU-10024 had not worked out the details of this plan and admitted determining the appropriate contaminant would require further research. KU-10024 was interested in having detainee work on the water supply project.”

  12. DXer said

    By June 06, 2003, the FBI was explaining that El-Shukrijumah was “believed to have entered the United States illegally after September 1, 2001.”

    Most Wanted: The Next Atta?, Mar 27, 2003

    The FBI Search For El-Shukrijumah

    FBI agents are desperately looking for a man they say could be the next Mohammad Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 hijackers. Like many other al Qaeda members, they say this man was born in Saudi Arabia, attended terrorist camps in Afghanistan and is an expert in explosives.

    But, unlike others, he is believed to have been tutored by some of the best minds in al Qaeda. And what makes him really dangerous, the FBI believes, is that he lived in America for several years, which now makes him one of the bureau’s most wanted men in the world.

    His name is Adnan El-Shukrijumah, a 27-year-old Saudi Muslim who, the FBI fears, has been anointed the head of a new cell with orders to attack targets inside the United States. Pat D’Amuro is the head of counter terrorism for the FBI and the man who decided to ring the alarm bell.

    Of all the suspected al Qaeda operatives out there, where does El-Shukrijumah fit on the FBI’s scale?

    Says D;Amuro, “This individual would rate in the top five with respect to protection of the homeland… I would say, for domestic reasons, within the continental United States, this individual is very important for the FBI to find.”

    In fact, he could be the bureau’s worst nightmare: a bright, budding new cell leader, they believe, who has lived in the U.S. long enough to use his knowledge of the country to blend in and attack, even as America is preoccupied with the war in Iraq.


    Stewart went to Adnan’s home in Florida to meet his family. His father, Gulshair, and his brother, Nabil, say Adnan left home some months before Sept. 11 and that he isn’t guilty of anything.


    The FBI says lately it’s hearing El-Shukrijumah’s name all around the terrorist network it monitors. It prompted them to issue what is called a national BOLO (Be On the LookOut).

    Dale Watson, a former FBI counter terrorism chief, said that shows just how nervous the bureau is about this man.


    But if there’s a mystery about where he is, there’s no question about who he is. Adnan El-Shukrijumah moved to the United States from Saudi Arabia with his family in 1995, eventually settling in Miramar, Fla. He attended a community college and majored in computers, but developed other interests as well, eventually making friends with Imran Mandhai, who was convicted in 2002 of plotting to blow up power plants, among other things.

    In what sorts of incidents was he allegedly involved?

    “Some facilities in south Florida. I think Mount Rushmore – I think, was one of the allegations,” recalls Watson.

    As terrorist plots go, this one’s targets may have been monumental, but the planning was infantile. The FBI quickly busted the small ring and although El-Shukrijumah’s was never caught in the plot, it did gain him a place on the FBI’s terrorist watch list

    Then came 9/11 and the Afghanistan campaign. That’s where El-Shukrijumah surfaced again in so-called “pocket litter,” documents and scraps taken from prisoners and dead al Qaeda.

    Then there were the geographical coincidences. Hani Hanjour, the hijacker who flew the plane into the Pentagon had stayed just three miles down the road from the family. A flight school used by two of the hijackers wasn’t far away. And Jose Padilla, a man suspected of plotting to set off a dirty radiological bomb, had attended a mosque El-Shukrijumah visited.


    But the FBI believes this: that El-Shukrijumah has already trained in the camps in Afghanistan and is known by some of the most notorious members of al Qaeda: men like Ramzi bin-Al Shib, who allegedly helped plan the 9/11 attacks and was captured last year in Pakistan.

    Even more significant, investigators say El-Shukrijumah has now been fingered by captured terrorist Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, said to be the brains behind al Qaeda and the right-hand man of Osama bin Laden.

    Khalid Shaikh Mohammad is the man who would not only carry out the dreams and wishes and plans of Osama bin Laden, but he knew the players. He knew the individual cell leaders. In fact, he often picked them out. Is that why Watson would think that anybody he’d know would ordinarily be a pretty bad character?

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