CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* DXer: A motherlode of documents attached to Dr. Reynolds Salerno’s deposition!

Posted by DXer on March 8, 2014


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8 Responses to “* DXer: A motherlode of documents attached to Dr. Reynolds Salerno’s deposition!”

  1. DXer said

    Final Report
    Sandia National Laboratories
    Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185
    September 26, 2002
    Case 9:03-cv-81110-DTKH
    Security Review of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Fort Detrick, Maryland

    “Perhaps the most important observation in this report is that the culture at USAMRIID does not reflect the same indisputable commitment to security as it does to research. The effectiveness of any security system depends on the wilingness of the individuals who work at the site to support the mission of the security system. The unique nature of microbiological research, particularly the facts that diversion of small quantities of material can be significant and that organisms cannot be reliably detected, makes the effectiveness of a biosecurity system dependent on the development and sustainability of a research culture that is clearly supportive of a balanced, well conceived security program. …

    Individuals are often given access to the facility and the network, which may include access to HCPTs and/or sensitive HCPT information, prior to the completion of a National Agency Check background investigation. Personnel screening does not recur. A clear set of
    personnel in-processing and out-processing policies and procedures to manage facility and network access does not exist. Communication among the various USAMRIID and Garrison offices that handle personnel information has not been consistent or clear.


    the amounts of an HCPT in use or storage within a research setting are typically small, involving microgram- to gram-sized quantities of materiaL. The active and diverse nature ofresearch, however, dictates that various quantities and types of HCPTs can be in use at any given time, spread across several laboratory suites. The self-replicating nature of HCPTs, the diverse places within a legitimate laboratory where HCPTs are located, and the various quantities of HCPTs required 10 do legitimate research indicate that the absolute amount of any given organism at USAMRIID (or other active biological research facilities) cannot be reliably quantified from day to day.”


    “Threat of Diversion

    The development of systems designed to protect HCPTs against diversion should be based on not only an understanding of the unique characteristics of HCPTs, but also a comprehensive assessment of the threat of HCPT diversion. Certain intrinsic characteristics involving HCPTs make them vulnerable to ilicit diversion. Because of the nature of HCPTs and the manner in which they are used in a laboratory setting, inventory controls will not necessarily deter or detect diversion of materiaL. Additionally, current federal regulations21 regarding the official transfer of HCPTs between registered facilities are inadequate to prevent diversion of material by a knowledgeable insider. Diversion of even small amounts can be significant, as HCPTs can be released in small amounts or amplified with common, commercially available equipment for bioterrorism purposes. HCPTs do not emit adequate amounts of energy or other signatures to be detected with available standoff properly contained, removal of most HCPT’s would pose little health risk to the perpetrator(s).

    Therefore, HCPTs could be diverted or released from their controlled environments in research facilities for terrorism or proliferation purposes.”

  2. DXer said

    The United States Department of Justice confirms these facts:

    –It would be simple for perpetrators to remove a pathogen from a lab because of the very small amount required to grow much larger amounts and the ability to conceal small amounts in clothing or an orifice, which cannot be detected. Ex. 8: Eitzen Dep. at 69-71, 178-81; see Ex. 14: Jahrling Dep. at 96-98.)

    –Even with a two-person rule, it would be fairly easy for one scientist to divert a small amount of agent with the other scientist distracted. Ex. 8: Eitzen Dep. at 185. For that and other reasons, the Defense Science Board recommended against DoD imposing a two-person rule for security as counter-productive. Ex. 5: Lynn Dep. at 99-100 (quoting Franz Ex. B: DSB report at 42, DOD-000122).

    –After 2001, the short-lived attempt to employ a two-person rule detrimentally affected USAMRIID’s operations, mission fulfillment, and staff morale. Ex. 3: Worsham Dep. at 55. For example, a two-person rule requires simultaneous scheduling for lab time on evenings or weekends when cultures have to be checked. Before October 2001, USAMRIID did not have the professional staff or budgetary resources needed to apply a two-person rule. Ex. 8: Eitzen Dep. at 184-86.

    Click to access stevens-155-1.pdf

    The DOJ knew that the USAMRIID did not have a two person rule at the time of the mailings and that a short-lived 2-person rule was implemented in January 2002 — thus resulting in the end to Dr. Ivins’ late hours in November and December 2001. (His late hours coincideded with the installation of a laptop with internet connections in the summer 2001.) That laptop and its archive of images and pages accessed went missing.

  3. DXer said

    What is expert Reynolds M. Salerno’s expert opinion on the wisdom of allowing Ali Al-Timimi to share a suite with the leading DARPA-funded Ames anthrax researchers?

    A 2009 Powerpoint by Salerno and a colleague titled “Evolution of Biosecurity”:

    Biosecurity Leveraging the Foundations of Biosafety

    Click to access Evolution_of_Biosecurity_May_2009.pdf

    • DXer said

      Salerno and his colleagues prepared the following report on laboratory biosecurity for the United States government in 2006.

      Laboratory Biosecurity: A Survey of the U.S. Bioscience Community
      Jennifer Gaudioso, Susan B. Rivera, Susan Caskey, and Reynolds M. Salerno
      Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

      Click to access 061103gaudioso.pdf

    • DXer said

      What is the expert opinion of Reynolds Salerno on Rauf Ahmad’s infiltration of the 1999 and 2000 anthrax conferences sponsored by Porton Down and attended by Bruce Ivins and his USAMRIID colleagues?

      Rauf Ahmad was a scientist working with Dr. Ayman Zawahiri to infiltrate western biodefense. The DIA provided me his correspondence showing his visit to a second lab with thousands of pathogens in the B3. He announced to Dr. Zawahiri that had his targets had been achieved.

      What is Dr. Salerno’s expert opinion on Rauf Ahmad’s ability to sneak a microscopic sample of virulent Ames out of the lab he visited?

    • DXer said

      DOJ confirms this fact:

      “Pathogens at USAMRIID are found in multiple media, including Petri dishes, cell cultures, laboratory incubator environmental samples, clinical specimens, infected animal models, animal carcasses, animal excrement, refrigerator storage, or freeze-dried forms. The self-replicating nature of pathogens, the diverse places where located within a legitimate laboratory, the quantities required to do legitimate research, and their unquantifiable growth and decay rates (varying depending on genetic makeup, reagents or other materials used to supplement growth, and the environment where grown), indicate that the absolute amount of any given organism cannot be reliably quantified from day to day. Ex. 6: Salerno Dep. at 46, 49-50, 246, 250-51 (quoting Ex. 7: Sandia report at 46, ARMY02-009988). Even when the amount starting in a culture is known, it is very difficult to properly document amounts put onto plates, remaining amounts going into tubes, and amounts going into autoclave. Ex. 3: Worsham Dep. at 79-80.

      Click to access stevens-155-1.pdf

  4. DXer said

    Reynolds Salerno is senior manager of the International Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs in the Global Security Center at Sandia National Laboratories.

    Click to access 130503_Kuntz_BioThreatPrevention_Web.pdf

    Reynolds Salerno is senior manager of the international Cooperative threat reduction (Ctr) programs in the global Security Center at Sandia National laboratories. Dr. Saler- no’s programs enhance U.S. and international security by reducing biological, chemical, and nuclear threats worldwide. Many different U.S. government agencies, as well as for- eign governments and international agencies, sponsor the work of Sandia’s Ctr programs. His international Biological threat reduction team has done extensive international work on laboratory biosafety, biosecurity, biocontainment, and infectious-disease diagnostics and control. Dr. Salerno and his team have worked with the World Health organization since 2004 to develop international laboratory biosecurity guidelines. Dr. Salerno has also served as a member of numerous working groups, including the U.S. delegation to the Bio- logical Weapons Convention, the Dual-Use Biological research guidelines working group of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, the international Criminal and police organization′s Counter-Bioterrorism Board of experts, and the international Feder- ation of Biosafety Associations. Dr. Salerno received his ph.D. from yale University and his B.A. from Middlebury College.

    Here is a copy of a recent e-book online:

    A Biological Threat Prevention Strategy: Complicating Adversary Acquisition and Misuse of Biological Agents (CSIS Reports) by Carol Kuntz, Reynolds Salerno, Eli Jacobs

    Book Description
    Publication Date: October 17, 2013 | ISBN-10: 1442224738 | ISBN-13: 978-1442224735
    A contradiction sits at the core of U.S. biological threat prevention policy. Despite the U.S. government accepting the scientific and industrial costs of a domestic biosecurity system, it has not committed the diplomatic and financial resources needed to successfully promote the global adoption of similar systems. While the safety and security of biological pathogens within the United States are important national goals, their pursuit has the potential to impede another crucial goal: a robust research and commercial enterprise. To make matters worse, domestic policies are insufficient to fully protect U.S. citizens, since they provide limited protection from attacks launched with pathogens brought into the United States from abroad. Biosecurity has become a global problem. With the rapid spread of technology and know-how, attacks that originate from less-regulated locales outside the United States are becoming increasingly serious risks to U.S. national security. This means that the United States is bearing the full costs of domestic bio threat prevention without attaining the benefits of a thorough global prevention system.

  5. DXer said

    The United States Department of Justice summarized Dr. Salerno’s testimony in a court filing:

    “If Plaintiffs reject the notion that Dr. Ivins perpetrated the attacks and attempt to proceed under an “unknown assailant” theory, the government is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether government negligence caused Mr. Stevens’ murder. ***”

    “Dr. Reynolds Salerno, author of the first and only book in the emerging field of biosecurity (published 2007) and head of a team from Sandia National Laboratories that conducted a security review of USAMRIID in 2002, testified that once a bad actor is hired and allowed inside a facility, if he or she wants to take pathogens for illicit or aggressive purposes, the amount of physical security at the facility or the detail in tracking the amounts of biological material will not make a difference. According to Dr. Salerno, “Biological scientists know the material they are working with, and how to remove the material from the facility, if they want . . . even a strip search would not prevent a determined insider from removing biological agent from [the] laboratory.” Similarly, “a determined insider could divert material, even if there were cameras in the room . . . .” “[E]ven if the number of vials in an inventory” of pathogens “were correct, an insider could remove a sample, amplify it, divert the amplified portion, and return the original amount to the freezer.” Security and accountability can only be achieved by controlling who is granted authorized access to biological materials.”

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