CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Homeland Security September 2012 Guidance for Protecting Responders’ Health During The First Week Following A Wide-Area Aerosol Anthrax Attack (excerpt)

Posted by DXer on October 22, 2012



6 Responses to “* Homeland Security September 2012 Guidance for Protecting Responders’ Health During The First Week Following A Wide-Area Aerosol Anthrax Attack (excerpt)”

  1. DXer said

    I think there will be mass flight out of a city targeted with aerial spraying of anthrax. What about car washes set up 10-20 miles outside the city at rest-stops with easy on/offs. So flashing screens can direct cars to pull off for a drive-through that sprays their car down.

    Instead of the usual “Welcome to Pennsylvania” or “Welcome to West Virginia” sign, the residents of the adjacent states likely would appreciate the spores were not carried by the evacuating cars. Those evacuating might appreciate that it would be in their own interest to not carry spores with them. Indeed, it could be offered by a private entrepreneurial type company. People routinely pay $500 for repairs they may not even need — what would they pay to decontaminate their car so that they aren’t inclined to abandon it?

    • DXer said

      Could a neighboring state, consistent with the constitution, prevent vehicles from entering from an area affected by an aerial release?

      Could Canada shutt its borders?

      Note that anthrax is not an infectious disease and the particulates spread the disease.

      Questions such as this are addressed in the note, “The Statue of Security: Human Rights and Post 9/11 Epidemics in the American Health Association journal, Spring 2005.

      The author writes:

      In the midst of the SARS epidemic, New York City, however, changed its health code to permit the city’s health commissioner to order the quarantine of individuals who “may” endanger the public health because of smallpox, pneumonic plague, or other severe communicable disease. n67 In addition, a contact may also be quarantined: someone who “[has] been or may have been” in “close, prolonged, or repeated association with a case or carrier.” n68 This change in the code from permitting the quarantine of people who actually pose a danger to the public health and who have actually been in close contact with infected individuals, to those who “may” pose a danger and those who “may” have been in close contact with them is breathtaking in its invitation to arbitrariness. Given this, it is disturbing that not one person showed up to testify at the April 28, 2003, public hearing on this change. n69 In the case of SARS, for example, which the revised rules specifically reference in a section on “post publication changes,” n70 the new regulation would have permitted the department to quarantine New York’s entire Chinatown area since all residents there “may” have been in contact with someone who “may” have SARS. No one seems to have even suggested such a rerun of the totally arbitrary San Francisco Chinatown quarantine, which was allegedly for plague. n71 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even nineteenth-century U.S. courts, while granting extremely broad powers to public health agencies, condemned the arbitrary use of quarantine, even for smallpox, and required public health officials to have reasonable cause for any isolation. n72

      • DXer said

        Would anthrax powder settling on cars be killed by sunlight?

        Does silica absorbed into the spore coat — such as was observed in the Fall 2001 anthrax — serve to make it resistant to sunlight?

        Biosecur Bioterror. 2012 Mar;10(1):108-22. Epub 2012 Feb 21.
        Decontamination after a release of B. anthracis spores.

        Campbell CG, Kirvel RD, Love AH, Bailey CG, Miles R, Schweickert J, Sutton M, Raber E.

        Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551, USA.


        Decontaminating civilian facilities or large urban areas following an attack with Bacillus anthracis poses daunting challenges because of the lack of resources and proven technologies. Nevertheless, lessons learned from the 2001 cleanups together with advances derived from recent research have improved our understanding of what is required for effective decontamination. This article reviews current decontamination technologies appropriate for use in outdoor environments, on material surfaces, within large enclosed spaces, in water, and on waste contaminated with aerosolized B. anthracis spores.

        • DXer said

          From the same publisher, related articles include

          Total Decontamination Cost of the Anthrax Letter Attacks
          Ketra Schmitt, Nicholas A. Zacchia
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. March 2012: 98-107.

          A Decade of Countering Bioterrorism: Incremental Progress, Fundamental Failings
          Richard Danzig
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. March 2012: 49-54.

          U.S. Medical Countermeasure Development Since 2001: A Long Way Yet to Go
          Philip K. Russell, Gigi Kwik Gronvall
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. March 2012: 66-76.

          Reaerosolization of Bacillus spp. in Outdoor Environments: A Review of the Experimental Literature
          Julie A. Layshock, Brooke Pearson, Kathryn Crockett, Michael J. Brown, Sheila Van Cuyk, W. Brent Daniel, Kristin M. Omberg
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. September 2012: 299-303.

          Transport of Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki from an Outdoor Release into Buildings: Pathways of Infiltration and a Rapid Method to Identify Contaminated Buildings
          Sheila Van Cuyk, Alina Deshpande, Attelia Hollander, David O. Franco, Nerayo P. Teclemariam, Julie A. Layshock, Lawrence O. Ticknor, Michael J. Brown, Kristin M. Omberg
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. June 2012: 215-227.

          Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Response Strategies to a Large-Scale Anthrax Attack on the Chicago Metropolitan Area: Impact of Timing and Surge Capacity
          Demetrios N. Kyriacou, Debra Dobrez, Jorge P. Parada, Justin M. Steinberg, Adam Kahn, Charles L. Bennett, Brian P. Schmitt
          Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. September 2012: 264-279.

        • DXer said

          With the money that the DOJ saved in not copying and providing key relevant forensic studies and contemporaneous pages, maybe they could study spikes in shorting real estate investment trusts. It seems that the value of the targeted real estate would be devastated. Battelle is busesting rabbit models that would be effective in measuring prolonged low level exposures after an attack. But you heard it from me first: upon an attack, many people will move.

          Front Cell Infect Microbiol. 2012;2:71. Epub 2012 Jun 13.

          Achieving Consistent Multiple Daily Low-Dose Bacillus anthracis Spore Inhalation Exposures in the Rabbit Model.

          Barnewall RE, Comer JE, Miller BD, Gutting BW, Wolfe DN, Director-Myska AE, Nichols TL, Taft SC.


          Battelle Biomedical Research Center, Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus, OH, USA.


          Repeated low-level exposures to biological agents could occur before or after the remediation of an environmental release. This is especially true for persistent agents such as B. anthracis spores, the causative agent of anthrax. Studies were conducted to examine aerosol methods needed for consistent daily low aerosol concentrations to deliver a low-dose (less than 10(6) colony forming units (CFU) of B. anthracis spores) and included a pilot feasibility characterization study, acute exposure study, and a multiple 15 day exposure study. This manuscript focuses on the state-of-the-science aerosol methodologies used to generate and aerosolize consistent daily low aerosol concentrations and resultant low inhalation doses to rabbits. The pilot feasibility characterization study determined that the aerosol system was consistent and capable of producing very low aerosol concentrations. In the acute, single day exposure experiment, targeted inhaled doses of 1 × 10(2), 1 × 10(3), 1 × 10(4), and 1 × 10(5) CFU were used. In the multiple daily exposure experiment, rabbits were exposed multiple days to targeted inhaled doses of 1 × 10(2), 1 × 10(3), and 1 × 10(4) CFU. In all studies, targeted inhaled doses remained consistent from rabbit-to-rabbit and day-to-day. The aerosol system produced aerosolized spores within the optimal mass median aerodynamic diameter particle size range to reach deep lung alveoli. Consistency of the inhaled dose was aided by monitoring and recording respiratory parameters during the exposure with real-time plethysmography. Overall, the presented results show that the animal aerosol system was stable and highly reproducible between different studies and over multiple exposure days.

  2. DXer said

    DHS releases guidance on protecting first responder health during anthrax attack

    October 21, 2012 | By David Perera


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