CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* NSA ORCON: CIA and FBI Dropping the Ball In Anthrax Mailings and 9/11 Involved Same Failure To Track And Intercept Al-Midhar And Nawaf After Meeting At Kuala Lumpur Condo Of Anthrax Lab Tech Sufaat and Anthrax Planner Hambali

Posted by DXer on January 27, 2012



100 Responses to “* NSA ORCON: CIA and FBI Dropping the Ball In Anthrax Mailings and 9/11 Involved Same Failure To Track And Intercept Al-Midhar And Nawaf After Meeting At Kuala Lumpur Condo Of Anthrax Lab Tech Sufaat and Anthrax Planner Hambali”

  1. DXer said

    That 2016 report also cites an intriguing but briefly described report from a source that Thumairy received a telephone call from an unidentified person in Malaysia shortly before Hazmi and Mihdhar flew into Los Angeles International Airport on Jan. 15, 2000.

    It has long been known that the CIA had the hijackers under surveillance in Malaysia as they met there with other Qaida operatives early that January, days before leaving for the United States. The CIA then lost the hijackers’ trail and neglected for more than 16 months to alert the FBI, even after learning that at least one of them had entered the United States.

  2. DXer said

    Operation Encore: I believe some documents relating to Al-Midhar And Nawaf will be disclosed this week.

    • DXer said

      Fun fact: The FBI’S Operation ENCORE, phonetically, is a rearrangement of the letters of NSA’s ORCON.

      Once the documents are declassified (hopefully this week), perhaps former FBI Agent Danny Gonzalez could walk us through them. He says that the hijackers had US-based support.

    • DXer said

      Author: ERIC TUCKER Associated Press
      Published: 7:35 PM PDT September 11, 2021
      Updated: 7:35 PM PDT September 11, 2021

      WASHINGTON — The FBI late Saturday released a newly declassified 16-page document related to logistical support provided to two of the Saudi hijackers in the run-up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The document describes contacts the hijackers had with Saudi associates in the U.S. but offers no evidence the Saudi government was complicit in the plot.


      Regarding Sept. 11, there has been speculation of official involvement since shortly after the attacks, when it was revealed that 15 of the 19 attackers were Saudis. Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaida at the time, was from a prominent family in the kingdom.

      The U.S. investigated some Saudi diplomats and others with Saudi government ties who knew hijackers after they arrived in the U.S., according to documents that have already been declassified.

      Still, the 9/11 Commission report found “no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded” the attacks that al-Qaida masterminded. But the commission also noted “the likelihood” that Saudi government-sponsored charities did.

      Particular scrutiny has centered on the first two hijackers to arrive in the U.S., Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In February 2000, shortly after their arrival in southern California, they encountered at a halal restaurant a Saudi national named Omar al-Bayoumi who helped them find and lease an apartment in San Diego, had ties to the Saudi government and had earlier attracted FBI scrutiny.

      • DXer said

        Some background from an earlier 2005 DOJ report:

        Discussion between CIA and FBI employees about Malaysia meetings
        As noted above, computer records show that James, the CTC employee detailed to the FBI’s SIOC, read the cables and the draft CIR indicating that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa. Contemporaneous e-mails show that James discussed the Malaysia meetings with two FBI Headquarters employees in the SIOC in the early morning hours of January 6. Below we detail the cables and the evidence about the discussions that took place between the CIA and FBI personnel in the SIOC about the Malaysia meetings.

        Contemporaneous e-mail messages among CIA employees show that during the night of January 5 James briefed the FBI SSA who we call Bob about Mihdhar’s travel. At the time, Bob was an SSA in the UBL Unit in FBI Headquarters, which was operating out of the SIOC during this period.

        James wrote an e-mail to several CIA employees in which he stated that he was detailing “exactly what [he] briefed [the FBI] on” in the event the FBI later complained that they were not provided with all of the information about Mihdhar.112 This e-mail did not discuss Mihdhar’s passport or U.S. visa.

        As previously mentioned, James told the CIA OIG that he had no recollection of these events. He declined to be interviewed by us.

        Bob told the OIG that he had no independent recollection of any briefing from a CIA employee regarding the Malaysia meetings. However, he was able to locate a scant contemporaneous note that confirmed he had been briefed regarding Mihdhar and his trip to Malaysia. This note contained no details as to the content of the briefing and no reference to Mihdhar’s U.S. visa.

        Bob told the OIG that he does not believe that he had been told in this conversation about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa. Bob stated to us that the presence of a U.S. visa in Mihdhar’s passport would have been extremely important and would have triggered a more significant response than his minimal notes.

        Bob also told the OIG that he did not know why James chose to brief him about Mihdhar. Bob said that he was not a designated point of contact for the CIA while the SIOC was activated, although he also said that he did not know whether there was a designated point of contact in the SIOC. Bob said that he knew James because James had previously been detailed from the CTC to FBI Headquarters and had worked in ITOS with Bob.

      • DXer said

        From the detailed 2005 DOJ OIG report:

        V. OIG’s analysis of the FBI’s handling of the intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar

        We found systemic and individual failings in the FBI’s handling of the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. As a result of these failings, there were at least five opportunities for the FBI to connect information that could have led to an earlier investigation of Hazmi and Mihdhar and their activities in the United States.

        In this analysis section, we first discuss the systemic problems involving the breakdowns in the gathering or passing of information about Hazmi and Mihdhar between the FBI and CIA. We then turn to the problems in handling intelligence information within the FBI. Finally, we discuss the actions of individual FBI employees in handling information about Hazmi and Mihdhar information.

        In this section, we do not make recommendations regarding the actions of the CIA and its employees. We believe the CIA shares a significant responsibility for the breakdowns in the Hazmi and Mihdhar case, and that several of its employees did not provide the intelligence information to the FBI as they should have. We leave it to the CIA OIG, the entity with oversight jurisdiction over the CIA and its employees, to reach conclusions and make recommendations on the actions of the CIA and its employees.

      • DXer said

        An addition excerpt from the 2005 DOJ OIG report:

        In addition, as noted above, the FBI agents did not have access to computer systems that could store much of the information received from the CIA. The computers at each agent’s desk in the New York and San Diego Field Offices only provided access to ACS. This system does not permit storage or access to any information classified above the Secret level or any information deemed sensitive compartmented information. Therefore, even if the FBI recipients of the CIA information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar had wanted to document and store such information in a retrievable fashion, they could not have stored it on the system that FBI agents use. The FBI had no internal system in New York and San Diego that allowed them to use the type of information involved in the Hazmi and Mihdhar case.

        In addition, most FBI agents in the field did not have direct access to CTLink, the shared Intelligence Community database that did contain some of the information on Hazmi and Mihdhar, such as the NSA information. Field agents could not access, let alone conduct research, on this system. As a result, even if the New York and San Diego agents wanted to search for relevant information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, any sensitive or highly classified information obtained from the NSA and CIA could not be stored in the one system that they used.

        In contrast, we observed that the CIA’s workspaces permitted their employees to access highly classified information on computers in their personal workstations. Each CIA employee had their own secure computer on which they could receive and research highly classified material. They had several secure telephones that could be used to discuss Top Secret information with others. The difference in CIA and FBI workspaces was particularly stark in the FBI’s San Diego Field Office where, due to the lack of access to an appropriate SCIF, the CIA employee co-located with the FBI’s San Diego Field Office could not access CIA systems. To access CIA systems, he had to travel to a domestic CIA station.

        OIG conclusion on impediments to information sharing
        In sum, significant and systemic problems that were evident in the FBI’s handling of the Hazmi and Mihdhar case inhibited information sharing between the FBI and CIA. The FBI failed to define the roles and responsibilities of the FBI detailees to the CTC’s Bin Laden Unit. The FBI failed to ensure effective oversight of the detailees at the CTC. The FBI and the CIA failed to develop a clear understanding of the function of detailees from each other’s agencies. The FBI failed to understand the CIA’s reporting process. The FBI lacked an adequate computer system and appropriate infrastructure for handling intelligence information not directly related to a specific investigation.

        Although these systemic problems affected the flow of information between the FBI and CIA, we do not believe they fully explain the FBI’s failure to obtain the critical information on Hazmi and Mihdhar. Employees at both the CIA and the FBI failed to provide or seek important information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, despite numerous interactions between them on issues related to Hazmi and Mihdhar from January 2000 through August 2001. We found these interactions were substantive and that much of the information about Mihdhar and Hazmi was exchanged through these ongoing efforts. Unfortunately, the critical pieces of information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar did not become known to the FBI until shortly prior to September 11. As a former CTC Bin Laden Unit Deputy Chief aptly summarized it to us, “information that should have been shared was not, repeatedly.”

  3. DXer said

    First Guantanamo Court Date Set for Terror Suspect Hambali, 2 Malaysians
    John Bechtel

    A U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) profile of Hambali described him as an operational mastermind for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asian militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda – the group that carried out the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

    Indonesian authorities blamed JI for carrying out bombings that killed 202 people in Bali in October 2002.


    Flesvig said reporters would be able to attend the proceedings.


    I spent 3 or 4 weeks in Bali in 1998. I especially loved Ubud. And I remember the dolphins in Lovina in northern Bali very vividly. Then I moved over to the muslim island of Lombok which was less developed. Have vivid memories .of the Nyale worm festival.

    Although I appreciate that tourists had changed the character of Kuta in the south of Bali, “terrorists” are foolish if they think that violence leads to any worthy end.

  4. DXer said

    Bali bombings: US to move ahead with trial of suspects held in Guantánamo, Guardian, Jan 22, 2021
    Three men charged include Hambali, alleged leader of extremist group that carried out 2002 terror attacks

    Hambali is alleged to have been the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, a south-east Asian affiliate of al-Qaida. The Pentagon said in a brief statement on the case that he is accused with Mohammed Nazir bin Lep and Mohammed Farik bin Amin, who are from Malaysia, of planning and aiding the attacks.

    All three were captured in Thailand in 2003 and held in CIA custody before they were taken to Guantánamo three years later.

    The timing of the charges, which had been submitted under Donald Trump but not finalised, caught lawyers for the men by surprise and would seem to be in conflict with president Joe Biden’s intention to close the detention centre.

    Gen Lloyd Austin, Biden’s nominee to be secretary of defence, this week reaffirmed the intention to close Guantánamo to the Senate committee considering his nomination.

    A spokesman for the military commissions, which have been bogged down for years over legal challenges largely centred around the brutal treatment of men during their previous confinement in CIA detention facilities, had no immediate comment.

    After military prosecutors filed charges in mid-2017, the case was rejected by the Pentagon legal official known as a convening authority for reasons that aren’t publicly known.

    “The case fell apart on them. I cannot tell you why because that’s classified,” said Valentine, part of the legal team for Hambali.

  5. DXer said

    2020-02-05 48 ORDER directing Defendant to produce redacted version of Interim Major Case Summary excerpts. See document for details. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on February 5, 2020. (lcrc3) (Entered: 02/05/2020)

  6. DXer said

    Operation Encore and the Saudi Connection: A Secret History of the 9/11 Investigation
    Behind the scenes, a small team of FBI agents spent years trying to solve a stubborn mystery — whether officials from Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s closest allies, were involved in the worst terror attack in U.S. history. This is their story.

    by Tim Golden and Sebastian Rotella Jan. 23, 5 a.m. EST

    Plaintiff Ken Dillon is seeking some selected portions of Richard Lambert’s memorandum regarding Amerithrax to Robert Mueller. Attorney Lambert is quoted in this article about Operation Encore. He is now consulting with the 911 Plaintiffs.

  7. DXer said

    Jacuzzis, golf and terrorism

    Mike Kelly , Record Columnist, @MikeKellyColumn 1:05 a.m. ET June 6, 2017
    — KAJANG, Malaysia

    THE EIGHT-STORY apartment building just off a highway and up a gentle hill from a Shell Station seems straight out of Southern California. So how did it become a launching pad for the attack on the World Trade Center?

    One of the most mysterious subplots to the Sept. 11 suicide-hijackings revolves around a well-to-do condominium development in this middle-class enclave on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s largest city. Here, say U.S. and Malaysian authorities, a cadre of Muslim extremists, inspired by visions of world-wide Jihad, met in a first-floor apartment in early January 2000 to discuss future mayhem. One of their plans: Blow up the World Trade Center.

    As a place to plot mass-murder, the condo seems a far cry from the group’s austere hideouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    There is a pool with a Jacuzzi, a Jack Nicklaus-signature golf course, potted plants lining the balconies, and satellite TV dishes dotting the roof. A nearby strip mall features a 7-Eleven and a “Maxiwealth” financial planning office. A sign advertises ballet and jazz dance classes for children, whose parents include many well- educated workers at high-tech firms in Malaysia’s version of Silicon Valley.

    The terrorists, however, did not come to relax when they gathered on Jan. 5, 2000. They were reportedly miffed that none of them — or others affiliated with the al-Qaeda network – -had been able to disrupt recent millennium celebrations around the world. Now only a few days into the new year — and a new millennium – a group of nine men gathered in the condo, all intent on murder in the name of Allah and their desire to cleanse the world of non-Muslim infidels.

    They included a short, bearded Islamic cleric from Indonesia who was so poor when he arrived in Malaysia a few years earlier that he carried his belongings in a plastic grocery bag. Another participant had just one leg. Yet another, thin-faced, with a wisp of a mustache, seemed more like a computer geek than the architect of mass-murderer.

    And then, there were two Saudi men, both in their mid-twenties. The CIA had been tracking them, after wire-tapping an al-Qaeda telephone line and hearing their names . But in one of many examples of how the CIA did not pass on news of international terrorists to the FBI, both men would later slip undetected into the United States and end up in the cockpit of the hijacked jetliner that crashed into the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001. Before that, both would pass through northern New Jersey, even taking rooms at separate motels on Route 46 in South Hackensack. One would reportedly obtain a false ID from a Paterson man now being held in the Passaic County Jail.

    The apartment was owned by Yazid Sufaat, a former captain in the Malaysian army. The 37-year-old Sufaat had actually lived in the United States and earned a graduate degree in microbiology from the California State University at Sacramento. He now worked in a drug testing lab. His wife, also a Cal State-Sacramento graduate, was the principal shareholder in a successful computer services firm, Infocus Tech.

    With their young children, the couple lived in a small, middle-class townhouse near Kuala Lumpur. They bought the condo, about 22 miles from the city, for weekend getaways. “City-living, country-style,” proclaimed one ad for the condos, which cost the equivalent of about $40,000. Besides the pool and golf course, the condo development offered classes in foot reflexology and post- partum slimming.

    But Sufaat and his wife apparently had other interests here, too. In the late 1990s, they started loaning their apartment to Afghan war veterans who traveled to Malaysia to obtain artificial limbs. From there, say authorities, the Sufaats became a link to al-Qaeda.

    Sufaat is now in a Malaysian jail cell, suspected of being a conduit for several post-Sept. 11 terrorist plots. He was picked up by Malaysian police after returning from Afghanistan last December, where he reportedly volunteered as a Taliban army medic, When arrested, Sufaat is thought to have been assembling more than four tons of highly explosive ammonium nitrate fertilizer – the same kind of material used by Timothy McVeigh to destroy the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and blow a hole in the foundation of the World Trade Center in 1993.

    Just what did Sufaat plan to do with all that ammonium nitrate? This is an intriguing question – one of many in this mystery.

    Malaysian authorities believe he is linked to the Asian version of al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, whose goal is to create a pan-Islamic superpower by uniting Muslims in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. One of Jemaah Islamiyah’s key players organized the January 2000 meeting at the Sufaat condo. His name: Riduan Isamuddin. But he is better known to authorities by his nickname of “Hambali.” Earlier this year, Time magazine’s Asian edition featured him in a cover story with the headline, “Asia’s Own Osama.”

    When Hambali came to Malaysia a few years earlier, he and his wife carried their clothes in plastic grocery bags. By January 2000, the couple was still living in a run-down bungalow in nearby Banting and did not seem to have regular jobs. Nonetheless, they had a brand new Proton hatchback to drive.

    U.S. investigators, meanwhile, want[ed] to talk to Sufaat about why he and his wife thought so highly of a French citizen of Moroccan descent, Zacarias Moussaoui, that they helped him obtain a U.S. visa in October 2000, claiming he was a salesman for Mrs. Sufaat’s computer firm. In the fall of 2000, three months before other terrorists gathered, Moussaoui visited the Sufaats’ condo before setting off for the United States. He was arrested in August 2001 on immigration charges. But after the attacks on the Trade Center and Pentagon, the FBI was calling Moussaoui the 20th member of the Sept. 11 hijacking plot. He is now facing trial in federal court in Virginia.

    During his short stay in America, Moussaoui never sold a single computer. But the Sufaats paid him $2,500 a month anyway. Where did the money come from? But the most troublesome mystery lurking beneath all these questions is this: Why did all these men meet in Malaysia at this condo, and what did they actually discuss?

    “We’re not certain what transpired at the meeting,” said a U.S. official in Malaysia familiar with the meeting who requested anonymity.

    By January 2000, the CIA already had its eye on the man with one leg. His name: Tawfiq bin Atash. Atash, a Yemenite, was a senior al-Qaeda member. Ten months after the condo meeting, Atash would be named a prime suspect in the al-Qaeda bombing of the USS Cole.

    In January 2000, the CIA tipped off Malaysian intelligence that Atash was in the country. Malaysian agents then put the Sufaat condo under surveillance – but only with video cameras. The Malaysians never set up listening devices.

    In retrospect, this appears to be a major mistake.

    “We know they had a meeting,” said the U.S. official. “We just don’t know what was said.”

    But U.S. and Malaysia officials now say they are confident the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackings were discussed. They reached this conclusion after identifying three other men on the video — Khalid Almihdhar, 26, Nawaf Alhazmi, 25, and Ramzi Binalshibh, 30.

    [Binalshibh was among five al-Qaeda operatives arrested last Wednesday in Karachi, Pakistan, following a four-hour gun battle with police at an apartment building.


    Almihdhar and Alhazmi, both from Saudia Arabia, left the condo in mid-January 2000. They flew to Bangkok, Thailand, then to Los Angeles, finally settling in San Diego where they took flying lessons.

    Almihdhar left the United States for the Middle East a few months later and became a suspect in the USS Cole attack. But by the summer of 2001, he slipped into the United States again, this time to New Jersey. How did he get in if the CIA considered him a suspect in the Cole attack? By then Alhazmi had driven across America and had set up mailbox drops in Wayne and Fort Lee. What sort of mail did he get? These questions remain unanswered.

    During the same week in July 2001, the two were staying in separate motels on Route 46 in South Hackensack. On Sept. 11, they were in the cockpit of the jetliner that crashed into the Pentagon.

    Binalshibh had come to Malaysia from Hamburg, Germany, where he shared an apartment with Mohamed Atta, who later emerged as the Sept. 11 ringleader. Binalshibh never made it to the United States. But last week, on the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, he appeared in an interview broadcast on Islamic television in which he claimed to have helped organize the plot.

    These days, the condo bears no sign of what transpired there. Even residents seem blissfully unaware of the mystery. “You came all the way from New Jersey?” asks Tze Yi Foong, a wedding photographer.

    Told about the meeting, Foong shakes his head. “I’m entirely surprised. I never knew this happened,” he said.

    “This is a Muslim country,” says Foong, 39, sitting now at a picnic table near the empty pool as a breeze rustles the banana trees. He gazes toward the condo where the terrorists met.

    “The authorities,” he adds, “don’t really want to say that they are harboring people like this.”


  8. DXer said

    Bali bombing mastermind Hambali seeks freedom in first appearance for 13 years

    Lindsay Murdoch

    e has never been charged with any offence since he was arrested in Thailand in 2003 and held in a CIA “black site” for three years in a secret location, possibly Jordan or the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, before being transferred to Cuba in 2006.

    In 2008 Indonesia formally requested access to Hambali so that he could face trial in Indonesia over the Bali attack that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians. But the US refused to hand him over.

  9. DXer said

    Richard Clarke, Behind the 28 Pages: Questions About an Alleged Saudi Spy and the CIA, July 19, 2016

    Among those dangling strands of the investigation, two stand out. The first, the subject of these 28 pages, is what role Saudi government officials played in supporting al-Qaeda and the 9/11 plot.

    The second question, with which the 9/11 Commission struggled but was unable to answer, is why the CIA failed to tell the FBI and the White House when the agency knew about al-Qaeda terrorists in the United States.

    I believe that the two questions may be linked and that a major element of the 9/11 tragedy may remain unrevealed: a possible failed CIA-Saudi spy mission on U.S. soil that went bad and eventually allowed 9/11 to proceed unimpeded.

    My perspective on these issues is shaped by my job in the Clinton and Bush administrations, the national coordinator for counterterrorism, based in the White House’s National Security Council. In that role, I was constantly reading detailed intelligence reports and being briefed by the CIA, the FBI and other agencies concerning possible terrorist plots.

    The interagency team I chaired prevented numerous attacks, but not 9/11. Despite the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that information sharing among the agencies was inadequate, we did actually share reports and analysis on a daily basis. In addition to the formal interagency groups that reviewed reports, the CIA director would frequently call me whenever he saw an important report about al-Qaeda plans.

    He never called about the presence of the 9/11 hijackers — even when the CIA knew two of them were in the country and had been tracking them around the world for months.

    According to an investigation by the CIA Inspector General, no one in the agency alerted the FBI or White House with that information for over a year, even though 50 to 60 CIA personnel knew it. Quite the opposite: CIA managers issued instructions that the information was not to be shared. Why?

    The CIA declined to comment for this report, but the answer may be found in what a small group of Saudi nationals were doing in Southern California in 2000 and 2001.

    The Arrival

    Two Saudi would-be hijackers, named Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hamzi, showed up in Los Angeles in 2000. Shortly after they arrived, another Saudi citizen, Omar al-Bayoumi, introduced himself to them, found them housing, provided them with money and took them to Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam who would become a senior al-Qaeda figure, in San Diego.


    But there is another theory that the 28 pages and the 9/11 Commission report do not explore: What if al-Bayoumi was a Saudi spy who was investigating al-Qaeda at the request of the CIA?

    I believe that could be the answer and, if he was, could explain why the CIA took measures to prevent the FBI and the White House from knowing that al-Qaeda terrorists had shown up in California.

    Before they made their way to the U.S., at the CIA’s request, al-Mihdhar’s hotel room in Dubai was searched by the United Arab Emirates’ intelligence service. At CIA’s request, al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi were videotaped by the Malaysian intelligence service while attending an al-Qaeda terrorist planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur. At the CIA’s request, the Thai intelligence service was asked to track them when they flew to Bangkok after that meeting. The Thais later reported back to the CIA, somewhat slowly, that the two men left on a flight for Los Angeles.

    About the time that CIA learned the two men were in Los Angeles, the possible Saudi intelligence officer, al-Bayoumi, found them and befriended them.

    The CIA is not authorized to run intelligence operations in the U.S. Even if it were, most CIA employees would have had a hard time making friends with al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi.

    A fellow Saudi like al-Bayoumi, however, would stand a much better chance, especially if he pretended to be an al-Qaeda sympathizer acquainted with people like the radical imam al-Alwaki. In the parlance of the intelligence world, such approaches to potential sources of information, using false pretenses, are known as false flag operations.

    t would have been entirely logical for the CTC to try to learn things about al-Qaeda by having someone from a friendly intelligence service run a false flag operation on two known al-Qaeda operatives. Because those two men were in the U.S., however, the CIA would have needed to coordinate the approach with the FBI.

    Had FBI been informed, however, it very likely would have vetoed the idea and moved quickly to arrest the two men. I knew very well the FBI personnel in charge of counterterrorism at the time, and they would not have hesitated to make such an arrest. That is also what I would have requested the FBI to do if the CIA had told me, which it should have and did not.

    If the CIA broke the rules about getting FBI approval and, in cooperation with the Saudi intelligence service, ran a false flag operation in the U.S. against al-Qaeda terrorists, that would explain why CIA managers repeatedly made decisions and issued clear instructions not to tell anyone outside the CIA the rather startling and unprecedented news that al-Qaeda operatives were in our country.

    It is possible that the false flag operation produced no information of value and the CIA lost interest in it.

    We Deserve to Know

    Finally, 18 months after the two al-Qaeda men arrived in the U.S., the CIA, in a very low key way, passed a report to the FBI about al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi. It was too late. Their trail had gone cold. They had entered the final phase of preparations for 9/11.

    Nothing in the joint congressional investigation, the 9/11 Commission’s work or the CIA Inspector General’s investigation explains why the CIA hid its knowledge about these two al-Qaeda operatives.

    Also, nothing in those reports provides any reason to disbelieve the possibility that the CIA, the CTC and the agency’s top management hid a false flag operation that went wrong. Anyone involved in such a false flag operation would have good reason to hide it. Had the presence of the two terrorists in the U.S. led to their arrest and interrogation by the FBI, other 9/11 hijackers might also have been caught.

    It was 15 years ago that the 9/11 tragedy occurred, but it is not too late to finish the investigation, to answer the questions that were left open over a decade ago.

    Was the reason that a Saudi helped the hijackers in California the same reason that the CIA blocked dissemination of information that those hijackers were in the U.S.? Was that reason that the CIA was trying to use those two terrorists as a potential source of insider information about al-Qaeda?

    We all deserve to know.

  10. DXer said

    In written correspondence with the Case Closed blog, the Sacramento State graduate and former Malaysian Army Captain Yazid Sufaat has invoked the “Fifth Amendment” and declined to disclose the b. anthracis strain he was using.
    Posted on April 28, 2015

    DXer says: Adnan El-Shukrijumah is the anthrax mailer … on or about 9/13/2001, he phoned from KSM’s house to tell his mom he was coming to the US
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on June 6, 2014

    Atta Was Coordinating With Jdey’s Associate Al-Hazmi, First In Fort Lee, NJ In Late August 2001 And Then In Laurel, MD in September 2001 ; Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi Had Been At The Planning Meeting At Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur Condo With Anthrax Planner Hambali And Anthrax Lab Director Yazid Sufaat And Yet The FBI Never Told The Public That Jdey Had Been Detained Along With Moussaoui In August 2001 (With Biology Textbooks) And Then Released
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 25, 2012

    DXer says … Adnan El-Shukrijumah, son of Saudi missionary, was the Fall 2001 anthrax mailer and FBI is withholding relevant documents
    Posted on May 12, 2016

  11. DXer said

    Atta Made the 911 Reservation With Nawaf Al-Hazmi At Yuricom; If No Cars Were Passing And He Had Been There A Month Or Two Earlier, He Could Have Seen The Particulate Mixer Being Delivered By The Delivery Truck
    Posted on January 27, 2012

    Atta’s Wire Transfer Of Funds On 9/8/2001 — A Time The FBI Reports He Was Filmed Copying At A Laurel, MD KINKOS — Was To KSMs Assistant Mustafa Ahmad (Hawsawi) Whose Laptop, When Seized, Contained Scanned Notes Detailing Drying Liquid Slurry Of Anthrax To Create Dried Powder Suitable For Dispersal
    Posted on January 25, 2012

    The FBI Should Disclose The Video Surveillance Of Atta Xeroxing, Cutting and Pasting At KINKOS in Laurel, MD on September 7, 2001
    Posted on January 24, 2012

    GAO: Doesn’t the FBI’s photocopy toner report EXCLUDE the make and model of photocopier used at USAMRIID but INCLUDE the make and model used in the Maryland KINKOS so often used by the hijackers in August and September 2001?
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 24, 2012

  12. DXer said

    Some background to the 28 pages:

    September 2000: Basnan and Bin Al-Shibh Are Somehow Linked

    Osama Basnan and Ramzi bin al-Shibh are somehow linked this month, possibly through a female relative or friend of Basnan’s. Basnan is a suspected Saudi spy who helped future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in San Diego, and bin al-Shibh is a hijacker associate in Hamburg, Germany, linked to Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers there. In November 2003, an unnamed FBI agent who focuses on investigating Basnan after 9/11 will be interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. This agent will be paraphrased saying that “one interesting fact is that Osama Basnan’s”—then there is a redacted gap of two or more words—“was in phone and e-mail contact with Ramzi bin al-Shibh in September 2000.” This agent states that “they apparently met over the Internet, as bin al-Shibh was looking for an American wife.” The agent also notes that “bin al-Shibh has confirmed this fact in interrogations.” [9/11 Commission, 11/17/2003 ]

    Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Osama Basnan

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    June 23-July 2001: Alleged Hijacker Associate Basnan Appears to Take over for Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi in San Diego

    Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan are friends with each other and suspected associates of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. On June 23, 2001, al-Bayoumi moves out of the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego where Almihdhar and Alhazmi had lived the year before, and possibly live in again just before 9/11 (see Early September 2001). Basnan had been living in an apartment complex nearby, but he moves into the Parkwood Apartments in July. On the rental application, Basnan lists al-Bayoumi as a personal reference and a friend. A classified FBI report shortly after 9/11 suggests that the fact that Basnan moved in shortly after al-Bayoumi left “could indicate he succeeded Omar al-Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.” Both Basnan and al-Bayoumi have been suspected to be Saudi government agents. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/3/2001 ] Al-Bayoumi moves to Britain (see September 21-28, 2001). Basnan remains in San Diego through 9/11. According to one US official, Basnan later “celebrate[s] the heroes of September 11” and talks about “what a wonderful, glorious day it had been” at a party shortly after the attacks. [Newsweek, 11/24/2002; San Diego Magazine, 9/2003]

    Entity Tags: Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    The next day, Osama Basnan, an alleged associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, reports his passport stolen to Houston police. [Newsweek, 11/24/2002] This confirms that Basnan is in Houston on the same day that Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Saud al-Faisal, and Saudi US Ambassador Prince Bandar meet with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, and National Security Adviser Rice at Bush’s Crawford ranch. [US-Saudi Arabian Business Council, 4/25/2002] While in Texas, it is believed that Basnan “met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States.” [Newsweek, 11/24/2002; Guardian, 11/25/2002] The still-classified section of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry is said to discuss the possibility of Basnan meeting this figure at this time. [Associated Press, 8/2/2003] It is unknown if Basnan and/or the Saudi prince he allegedly meets have any connection to the three figures wanted by the FBI, or even if one or both of them could have been among the wanted figures. Basnan will be arrested in the US for visa fraud in August 2002, and then deported two months later (see August 22-November 2002).

    August 22-November 2002: Possible Hijacker Associate Is Arrested, Then Deported

    Osama Basnan, an alleged associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, and his wife are arrested for visa fraud. [Newsweek, 11/22/2002; Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002] One report says he is arrested for allegedly having links to Omar al-Bayoumi. [Arab News, 11/26/2002] On October 22, Basnan and his wife, Majeda Dweikat, admit they used false immigration documents to stay in the US. [KGTV 10 (San Diego), 10/22/2002] Possible financial connections between Basnan and al-Bayoumi, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, and the Saudi royal family are known to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (as well as the FBI and CIA) at this time. Remarkably, Basnan is deported to Saudi Arabia on November 17, 2002. His wife is deported to Jordan the same day. [Washington Post, 11/24/2002] Less than a week after the deportations, new media reports make Basnan a widely known suspect. [Newsweek, 11/22/2002]

    Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Osama Basnan, Central Intelligence Agency, Omar al-Bayoumi, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Majeda Dweikat

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    November 22, 2002: Newsweek Reports Saudi Royals Sent Money to Hijackers’ Associates

    Newsweek reports that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar may have received money from Saudi Arabia’s royal family through two Saudis, Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan. Newsweek bases its report on information leaked from the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry in October. [Newsweek, 11/22/2002; Newsweek, 11/22/2002; New York Times, 11/23/2002; Washington Post, 11/23/2003] Al-Bayoumi is in Saudi Arabia by this time. Basnan was deported to Saudi Arabia just five days earlier. Saudi officials and Princess Haifa immediately deny any connections to Islamic militants. [Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002] Newsweek reports that while the money trail “could be perfectly innocent… it is nonetheless intriguing—and could ultimately expose the Saudi government to some of the blame for 9/11…” [Newsweek, 11/22/2002] Some Saudi newspapers, which usually reflect government thinking, claim the leak is blackmail to pressure Saudi Arabia into supporting war with Iraq. [MSNBC, 11/27/2002] Senior US government officials claim the FBI and CIA failed to aggressively pursue leads that might have linked the two hijackers to Saudi Arabia. This causes a bitter dispute between FBI and CIA officials and the intelligence panel investigating the 9/11 attacks. [New York Times, 11/23/2002] A number of senators, including Richard Shelby (R-AL), John McCain (R-AZ), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Bob Graham (D-FL), Joseph Biden (D-DE), and Charles Schumer (D-NY), express concern about the Bush administration’s action (or non-action) regarding the Saudi royal family and its possible role in funding Islamic militants. [Reuters, 11/24/2002; New York Times, 11/25/2002] Lieberman says, “I think it’s time for the president to blow the whistle and remember what he said after September 11—you’re either with us or you’re with the al-Qaeda.” [ABC News, 11/25/2002] FBI officials strongly deny any deliberate connection between these two men and the Saudi government or the hijackers [Time, 11/24/2002] , but later even more connections between them and both entities are revealed. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ]

    Entity Tags: Joseph Biden, Joseph Lieberman, Omar al-Bayoumi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Mitch McConnell, John McCain, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bush administration (43), Charles Schumer, Saudi Arabia, Daniel Robert (“Bob”) Graham, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama Basnan, Richard Shelby

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    August 1-3, 2003: Leaks Hint at Saudi Involvement in 9/11

    In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report, anonymous officials leak some details from a controversial, completely censored 28-page section that focuses on possible Saudi support for 9/11. According to leaks given to the New York Times, the section says that Omar al-Bayoumi and/or Osama Basnan “had at least indirect links with two hijackers [who] were probably Saudi intelligence agents and may have reported to Saudi government officials.” It also says that Anwar al-Awlaki “was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers.” Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence, and 9/11 is said to be circumstantial. [New York Times, 8/2/2003] One key section is said to read, “On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists… On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.’”(see August 2, 2002) Some of the most sensitive information involves what US agencies are doing currently to investigate Saudi business figures and organizations. [Associated Press, 8/2/2003] According to the New Republic, the section outlines “connections between the hijacking plot and the very top levels of the Saudi royal family.” An anonymous official is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot more in the 28 pages than money. Everyone’s chasing the charities. They should be chasing direct links to high levels of the Saudi government. We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government.… If the people in the administration trying to link Iraq to al-Qaeda had one-one-thousandth of the stuff that the 28 pages has linking a foreign government to al-Qaeda, they would have been in good shape.… If the 28 pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.” [New Republic, 8/1/2003] The section also is critical that the issue of foreign government support remains unresolved. One section reads, “In their testimony, neither CIA or FBI officials were able to address definitely the extent of such support for the hijackers, globally or within the United States, or the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. This gap in intelligence community coverage is unacceptable.” [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003]

    Entity Tags: Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi, Anwar al-Awlaki, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    March 24, 2004-May 2004: FBI Says Saudi Associates of Hijackers Not Involved in Plot; This Conclusion Is Disputed

    It is reported that the FBI has closed down their investigation into Saudis Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan. The Associated Press reports, “The FBI concluded at most the two Saudi men occasionally provided information to their kingdom or helped Saudi visitors settle into the United States, but did so in compliance with Muslim custom of being kind to strangers rather than out of some relationship with Saudi intelligence.” [Associated Press, 3/24/2004] Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) had cochaired the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that found considerable evidence tying these two men to two 9/11 hijackers and also to the Saudi government. When he sees this news report, he contacts the FBI and is told the report is not correct and that the investigation into the two men is still ongoing. A month later, FBI Director Robert Mueller tells Graham that the report was correct, and the case has been closed. Graham asks Mueller to speak to the two FBI agents who reached this conclusion and find out why they reached it. He asks that he should be allowed the same access to them that the Associated Press had been given. Both Mueller and Attorney General John Ashcroft refuse to give clearance for the agents to speak to Graham. Graham then writes a letter with Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), again asking for clarification and the right to meet with the agents. Their request is denied. Graham concludes that this is something it “seems that neither the FBI nor the Bush administration wants the American people to find out about.” [Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 224-227]

    Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    September 7, 2004: Senator Bob Graham Claims Cover up of Saudi Connection to Two 9/11 Hijackers

    Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) alleges that the White House has covered up possible Saudi Arabian government connections to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. In an interview to promote his new book entitled Intelligence Matters, he contends that evidence relating to these two hijackers, who lived in San Diego, “present[s] a compelling case that there was Saudi assistance” to the 9/11 plot. [Graham and Nussbaum, 2004; Copley News, 9/7/2004] In the words of author Philip Shenon, Graham is “convinced that a number of sympathetic Saudi officials, possibly within the sprawling Islamic Affairs Ministry, had known that al-Qaeda terrorists were entering the United States beginning in 2000 in preparation for some sort of attack,” and that “Saudi officials had directed spies operating in the United States to assist them.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 51] Graham also concludes that President Bush directed the FBI “to restrain and obfuscate” investigations into these ties, possibly to protect US-Saudi relations. The San Diego Union-Tribune notes, “Graham co-chaired the exhaustive Congressional inquiry into the Sept. 11 attacks and is privy to still-classified information about the probe.” Graham claims that Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan are Saudi intelligence agents. He also claims that the FBI deliberately blocked his inquiry’s attempts to interview Abdussattar Shaikh, the FBI informant who was a landlord to the above-mentioned hijackers (see November 18, 2002). The questions the inquiry wanted to ask Shaikh went unanswered because of FBI maneuvering. [Graham and Nussbaum, 2004; Copley News, 9/7/2004]

    Entity Tags: Saudi Arabia, Osama Basnan, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Abdussattar Shaikh, Bush administration (43), Federal Bureau of Investigation, Omar al-Bayoumi, Daniel Robert (“Bob”) Graham

    Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

    • DXer said

      This blogger discusses Attash. Did Attash, at the key summit in Kuala Lumpur at my friend Yazid Sufaat’s condo, come to Los Angeles at some point? (I don’t know). But it seems that now documents answering the questions raised should undergo declassification review.

      THE BLOG
      REDACTED: All The Kingdom’s Men

      06/20/2016 02:47 pm 14:47:46 | Updated Jun 21, 2016

      It was via their monitoring of the Yemen Switchboard that U.S. intelligence learned about the now infamous meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also known as the “terrorist summit,” held in January 2000. U.S. authorities tracked Mihdhar and Hazmi to this meeting when they traveled there with al Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash. U.S. intelligence agencies monitored this meeting with help from certain foreign friends, Malaysian intelligence, among them. Whether our good friends and allies over at Saudi intelligence were also involved in the surveillance of this meeting remains unknown.

      Also attending the Malaysia meeting were al Qaeda operatives: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. At the meeting in Malaysia, the 9/11 attacks and the bombing of the USS Cole were discussed and planned in great detail. After the meeting wrapped up, Mihdhar and Hazmi flew to LAX on January 15, 2000 — and quite possibly, according to one FBI report, so did Attash.


      Evidence now points to Bayoumi being tasked as the advance man for Mihdhar and Hazmi. His job was to provide financial and logistical support for the two terrorists since neither of them spoke English, nor had they ever lived in the United States. As such, immediately after his meeting with Thumairy at the Saudi Consulate on January 15, 2000, Bayoumi picked up Mihdhar and Hazmi and drove them back to his home in San Diego where they lived with him for two weeks.

      Mihdhar and Hazmi stayed as guests in Bayoumi’s home until Bayoumi found them an apartment next door to his own. On February 5, 2000, Bayoumi appears as co-signor and guarantor for Hazmi and Mihdhar on their rental application. They listed Bayoumi’s home as their prior address. Bayoumi recommended Hazmi and Mihdhar to the property manager and was the co-signor and guarantor for Hazmi and Mihdhar because they did not have established credit. Upon entering the lease agreement, Bayoumi paid the 9/11 terrorists’ first two months’ rent and security deposit. In addition, according to the apartment manager, Bayoumi occasionally paidother monthly rents for Hazmi and Mihdhar.

      After securing them a place to live, Bayoumi then helped the two 9/11 terrorists open a bank account at Bank of America with a $9900 cash deposit (conveniently just slightly below the $10,000 threshold for suspicious activity). In addition, Bayoumi gave a welcoming party for the two 9/11 terrorists to introduce them to the San Diego Muslim Community. Members of that community included radical Imam Anwar Awlaki who was killed by a drone strike in 2011 and was connected to nearly 25 terrorist attacks. According to intelligence reports, al Qaeda operative Anwar Awlaki met on many occasions with the two 9/11 hijackers and Omar Bayoumi.

      During the month of February, Bayoumi apparently shared his phone with the two 9/11 terrorists. According to FBI reports, phone calls from both the hijackers’ and Bayoumi’s phones included operational calls to Anwar Awlaki, the “Yemen Switchboard,” the Saudi Embassy, Fahad al Thumairy, and the Saudi Cultural Mission in Washington D.C.

      For example, between January 2000 and May 2000, someone using Omar Bayoumi’s phone made 32 calls to the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C., 37 calls to the Saudi Cultural Mission in Washington D.C., and 24 calls to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles.


      Another key piece of information is the “mini- terrorist summit” held on June 9, 2000 in Los Angeles. The mini-terrorist summit took place at a hotel near the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and was held on Mihdhar’s last night in the United States. The meeting was attended by Mihdhar, Hazmi, and Khallad bin Attash. According to CIA and FBI reports, this mini-terrorist summit might have been facilitated by Saudi Consulate official, Fahad Thumairy.

      This information is particularly damning since Attash was, at the time, a very well known, very well identified lethal al Qaeda operative. In addition, Attash, Mihdhar, and Hazmi had just traveled together (and been monitored by several intelligence agencies) five months earlier, in January 2000, when they attended the larger terrorist summit in Malaysia. Recall that the 9/11 attacks and the bombing of the USS Cole were planned at this larger terrorist summit in Malaysia — and, that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the mastermind behind 9/11, and Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the bagman behind 9/11, were also at this meeting.

      So, the arrival of Attash into the United States should have set off HUGE alarm bells. It did not.

    • DXer said

      We look at why Al-Hazmi was not arrested before 9/11 given what was known — but should we expect the government to have intercepted him when the FBI and Army cannot even produce the notebook containing contemporaneous entries on the date of mailing and weeks prior?

      Background on Nawaf Al-Hazmi from Wikipedia

      Nawaf Al-Hazmi

      In late 1999 the NSA informed the CIA of an upcoming meeting in Malaysia, which Hada mentioned would involve “Khalid”, “Nawaf”, and “Salem”.[11] On January 5, Hazmi arrived in Kuala Lumpur, where he met up with Mihdhar, Attash, and Abu Bara. The group was in Malaysia to meet with Hambali for the 2000 Al Qaeda Summit, during which key details of the attacks may have been arranged. At this time, there was an East Asia component to the September 11 attacks plot, but Bin Laden later canceled it for being too difficult to coordinate with operations in the United States.[4] Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also at the summit, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed possibly attended the summit.[12][13] In Malaysia, the group stayed with Yazid Sufaat, a local member of Jemaah Islamiyah, who provided accommodations at request of Hambali.[4] Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were secretly photographed at the meeting by Malaysian authorities, who provided surveillance at the request of the CIA. Malaysian authorities reported that Mihdhar spoke at length with Tawfiq bin Attash, one of the Yemenis, and others who were later involved in the USS Cole bombing.[11] Hazmi and Mihdhar also met with Fahd al-Quso, who was later involved in the USS Cole bombing.[13] After the meeting, Mihdhar and Hazmi traveled to Bangkok in Thailand on January 8, and left a week later on January 15 to travel to the United States.[14]

      In the United States

      Enters the United States with Mihdhar

      Between February and May 2000, Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi lived at the Parkwood Apartments complex in Clairemont Mesa, San Diego.
      On January 15, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived together at Los Angeles International Airport from Bangkok, and were admitted for a six-month period.[6] Immediately after entering the country, Nawaf and Mihdhar met Omar al-Bayoumi in an airport restaurant. Bayoumi claims he was merely being charitable in helping the two seemingly out-of-place Muslims to move to San Diego where he helped them find an apartment near his own, co-signed their lease, and gave them $1500 to help pay their rent.[15]

      While in San Diego, witnesses told the FBI he and Mindhar had a close relationship with Anwar Al Awlaki.[16] Authorities say the two regularly attended the Masjid Ar-Ribat al-Islami mosque Awlaki led in San Diego, and Awlaki had many closed-door meetings with them.[16]

      In March [2001] al-Hazmi received a shipment of VHS videos including videos about Boeing 747 and 777 flight decks and “how an airline captain should look and act” and later a road atlas, map of NYC and a World aeronautical chart.

      On March 30, Al-Hazmi notified his utility company that he might be moving to another state or Saudi Arabia. He and Hanjour moved out before the apartment rental expired at the end of the month on their way to Virginia. 2 days later on April 1, 2001, Oklahoma police officer C. L. Parkins pulled Hazmi over for speeding in their Corolla along with an additional citation for failing to use a seatbelt together totaling $138. A routine inspection of his California drivers license turned up no warrants or alerts, although his name was known to both the NSA and the CIA as a suspected terrorist.[24]


      On May 21, Al-Hazmi moved in with Hanjour into an apartment in Paterson New Jersey. Mohamed Atta was living in the same city at another location.[34]

      On June 30, Al-Hazmi’s car was involved in a minor traffic accident on the east-bound George Washington Bridge.[24] On June 25, 2001, Hazmi obtained a drivers’ license in Florida, providing an address in Delray Beach, Florida,[35] and


      On August 23, Israeli Mossad reportedly gave his name to the CIA as part of a list of 19 names they said were planning an attack in the near future. Only four of the names are known for certain – Narwaf, Atta, al-Shehhi and al-Mihdhar, but again the connection was not made with previous contacts by local law enforcement.[37] On the same day, he was added to an INS watch list, together with Mihdhar to prevent entry into the US.


      An internal review after 9/11 found that “everything was done [to find them] that could have been done.” But the search does not appear to have been particularly aggressive. A national motor vehicle index was reportedly checked, but Hazmi’s speeding ticket was not detected for some reason. The FBI did not search credit card databases, bank account databases, or car registration, all of which would have produced positive results. Hazmi was even listed in the 2000–2001 San Diego phone book, but this too was not searched until after the attacks.[38] He had not been placed on terrorist watch lists, nor did the CIA or NSA alert the FBI, Customs and Immigration, or local police and enforcement agencies.[24]

      On August 27, brothers Nawaf and Salem purchased flight tickets through using Nawaf’s Visa card.[39]

      On September 1, Nawaf registered Room #7 at the Pin-Del Motel in Laurel, Maryland.[citation needed] On the registration, he listed his driver’s license number as 3402142-D, and gave a New York hotel as his permanent residence. Ziad Jarrah had checked into the hotel on August 27.[40][41]

      Nawaf and Mihdhar purchased their 9/11 plane tickets online using a credit card with their real names. This raised no red flags, since the FAA had not been informed that the two were on a terrorist watchlist.[42]



      Main article: American Airlines Flight 77
      On September 10, 2001, Hanjour, Mihdhar, and Nawaf checked into the Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia where Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a prominent Saudi government official, was staying – although no evidence was ever uncovered that they had met, or knew of each other’s presence.[43]

  13. DXer said

    Atta Was Coordinating With Jdey’s Associate Al-Hazmi, First In Fort Lee, NJ In Late August 2001 And Then In Laurel, MD in September 2001 ; Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi Had Been At The Planning Meeting At Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur Condo With Anthrax Planner Hambali And Anthrax Lab Director Yazid Sufaat And Yet The FBI Never Told The Public That Jdey Had Been Detained Along With Moussaoui In August 2001 (With Biology Textbooks) And Then Released
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 25, 2012

    In Late August 2001, Atta Went With Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi From The Fort Lee, NJ Main Street Location That The Particulate Mixer Had Been Delivered To Laurel, MD Where The FBI Later Has Atta On Film At KINKOS Copying; Jdey’s Associate Nawaf Al-Hazmi Had Been At The Planning Meeting At Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur Condo With Anthrax Planner Hambali And Anthrax Lab Director Yazid Sufaat
    Posted on January 25, 2012

    When The 9/11 Commission Reported That Jdey Had Been Part Of The “Planes Operation” Planning And Was Connected To Atef, Special Operations Planner Saif Adil, KSM, Lead Hijacker Atta, 9/11 Planner Binalshibh, And Key Hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi, Had The 9/11 Commission Been Told By The FBI That Jdey (With Biology Textbooks) Had Been Detained At Same Time As Moussaoui (With Cropdusting Material Scanned) And That Then Jdey Had Been Released? GAO: Has Amerithrax Been One Big “CYA” Operation From The Very Beginning? Was Jdey The Anthrax Mailer?
    Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 25, 2012

    In written correspondence with the Case Closed blog, the Sacramento State graduate and former Malaysian Army Captain Yazid Sufaat has invoked the “Fifth Amendment” and declined to disclose the b. anthracis strain he was using.
    Posted on April 28, 2015

  14. DXer said

    The mystery surrounding 28 pages said to show links between 9/11 plotters and Saudi Arabia
    By Adam Taylor July 15

    Of particular notoriety are the alleged links between two of the hijackers and a Saudi network that helped them when they arrived in California. These hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, could not speak English and may have been expected to struggle with adapting to American life. However, they arrived in California more than a year and a half before the attacks took place.

    Some suspect that Hazmi and Mihdhar would have needed help in California. Authorities have investigated whether Fahad al-Thumairy, an official at the Saudi consular office in Los Angeles, could have been someone who provided help.

    • DXer said

      Here are the 28 pages. Now was that really so hard? Geez.

      • DXer said

        At page 22 of 34, the “28 pages” discuss the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”). Ali Al-Timimi was the lead speaker for IANA.

        It likely was a happy coincidence for Ayman Zawahiri, that an active supporter of the Taliban — and associate of Bin Laden’s spiritual advisor, dissident Saudi Sheik al-Hawali — was a graduate student in the same building where famed Russian bioweapon Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey worked at George Mason University’s Discovery Hall in a biodefense program funded by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”). In 2000 and 2001, Timimi was a graduate student in computational sciences. His field was bioinformatics. Al-Timimi tended to travel to give speeches on interpretation of the koran only during semester breaks. He spoke in very moderate, measured tones in the UK, Canada, and Australia — once even in China — against feminism, about the unfavorable treatment of islam in the secular media, about judgment day and the correct interpretation of the koran and hadiths, and the destruction of the Buddha statutes by the Taliban. Locally, he spoke regularly at the Falls Church center that also housed offices of the charity, the Muslim World League. Timimi was associated with the charity Islamic Assembly of North America based in Ann Arbor, Michigan. His speeches are widely distributed on the internet and focus on religious rather than political issues.

        After a bombing raid at a Qaeda camp in Darunta, Afghanistan US forces found 100+ pages of typed and handwritten pages of documents that shed light on Al Qaeda’s early anthrax planning. It was not clear whether or not they had yet acquired virulent anthrax or weaponized it, but it was clear that the planning was well along. When Cheney was briefed on the documents in late 2001, he immediately called a meeting of FBI and CIA. “I’ll be very blunt,” the Vice President started. “There is no priority of this government more important than finding out if there is a link between what’s happened here and what we’ve found over there with Qaeda.” A June 1999 memo from Ayman to military commander Atef said that “said the program should seek cover and talent in educational institutions, which it said were ‘more beneficial to us and allow easy access to specialists, which will greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing.’ ” Thus, in determining whether Al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax mailings in the Fall of 2001, the FBI and CIA knew based on the growing documentary evidence available by December, that Al Qaeda operatives were likely associated with non-governmental organizations and working under the cover of universities. From early on, the CIA and FBI knew that charity is as charity does.

        Among the supporters of these militant islamists were people who blended into society and were available to act when another part of the network requested it. Two letters — one typed and an earlier handwritten one — written by a microbiologist named Rauf detail his efforts to obtain a pathogenic strain of anthrax. He attended conferences on anthrax and dangerous pathogens such as one in September 2000 at the University of Plymouth cosponsored by DERA, the UK Defense Evaluation and Research Agency. A handwritten letter from 1999 is written on the letterhead of the oldest microbiology society in Great Britain. The 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces by Rauf describe the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; a conference on dangerous pathogens cosponsored by UK’s Porton Down and Society for Applied Microbiology he attended, and the need for vaccination and containment. Rauf had arranged to take a lengthy post-doc leave from his employer and was grousing that what the employer would be paying during that 12-month period was inadequate. Malaysian Yazid Sufaat, who told his wife he was working for a Taliban medical brigade, got the job instead of Rauf.

        I have uploaded a scanned copy of a typed memo reporting on a lab visit, which included tour of a BioLevel 3 facility, where there were 1000s of pathogenic samples. The memo mentioned the pending paperwork relating to export of the pathogens. The documents were provided to me by the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”) under the Freedom of Information Act. I also have uploaded a copy of earlier correspondence between Dr. Rauf and Dr. Zawahiri from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The handwritten letter was reporting on a different, earlier visit, where the anthrax had been nonpathogenic. Finally, on the same linked page, there are handwritten notes about the plan to use non-governmental-organizations (NGOs), technical institutes and medical labs as cover for aspects of the work, and training requirements for the various personnel at the lab in Afghanistan.

        US-trained Malaysian biochemist Yazid Sufaat met with 9/11 plotters and two hijackers in January 2000. The two hijackers are the subject of much of the 28 pages released today. Sufaat was a member of Al Qaeda and a member of Jemaah Islamiah (“JI”). JI has ties with the Moro Front. Sufaat used his company called Green Laboratory Medicine to buy items useful to Al Qaeda. Zacarias Moussaoui, who had a crop dusting manual when he was arrested, stayed at Sufaat’s condominium in 2000 when he was trying to arrange for flight lessons in Malaysia. Yazid Sufaat provided Moussaoui with a letter indicating that he was a marketing representative for Infocus Technologies signed “Yazid Sufaat, Managing Director.” Sufaat had given Moussaoui an e-mail that was accessed by authorities shortly after 9/11. The crop dusters were to be part of a “second wave.” Al Qaeda’s regional operative, Hambali, was at the key January 2000 meeting and supervised Sufaat. Khalid Mohammed’s involvement dates back to Bojinka, as did Hambali’s. The money for Bojinka, a plot to simultaneously bomb airliners and to assassinate the Pope, went from Bin Laden’s brother-in-law Khalifa to the Abu Sayyaf Group, Al Qaeda’s primary Philippine affiliate, and then on to the cell that included KSM.

        When 9/11 hijacker Saeed Al-Ghamdi videotaped his will in 2000, he praised Saudi Sheik Al-Hawali. Telephone records for Mounir el-Mottasedeq, a Moroccan convicted in Germany of helping Mohammed Atta and other members of the “Hamburg cell” that planned 9/11 show that, in the months prior to the attacks, he made repeated calls to Al-Hawali’s Riyadh offices.

        In late January 2001, the Immigration Minister in Canada and Justice minister received an anthrax threat in the form of anthrax hoax letters. The letters were sent upon the announcement of bail hearing for a detained Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader who had managed Bin Laden’s farm in Sudan. Canada announced on January 18, 2001 that an Egyptian Islamic Jihad Shura member, Mahmoud Mahjoub, would have a January 30 bail hearing. The court dismissed a motion directed to the constitutionality of his detention on January 23. Soon after, someone sent an anthrax threat letter to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Minister Caplan had signed the security certificate authorizing Mahjoub’s detention. After arriving in Canada in 1996, Mahjoub continued to be in contact with high level militants, including his former supervisor, al-Duri, an Iraqi reputed to be Bin Laden’s chief procurer or weapons of mass destruction. In the early 1990s, al-Duri lived in Phoenix and then in the late 1990s lived in British Columbia. In the intervening years, he had worked for Bin Laden’s businesses in Sudan and had been involved in an attempt to buy uranium for Bin Laden.

        In February 2001, the CIA briefed the President in a “Presidential Daily Bulletin “(“PDB”) on “Bin Laden’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons” in a still-classified briefing memorandum. Like the PDB on Bin Laden’s threat to use planes to free the blind sheik, the February 2001 would illustrate the wisdom that most intelligence is open source. There was little about Ayman’ s plan to use anthrax against US targets in retaliation for rendering of EIJ leaders that was not available to anyone paying attention.

        On March 14, 2001, former USAMRIID head and Ames researcher Charles L. Bailey and famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek filed a patent application for a process to treat cell culture with hydrophobic silicon dioxide so as to permit greater concentration upon drying. Dr. Bailey was in Room 156B of GMU’s Discovery Hall. at the Center for Biodefense. Ali Al-Timimi, an associate of radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali, considered to be Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, was a graduate student who worked in the same building.

        The website of the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”) contained “Provision of Suicide Operations,” dated June 19, 2001, that stated: “The mujahid [or warrior] must kill himself if he knows this will lead to killing a great number of the enemies … or demolishing a center vital to the enemy or its military forces. … In this new era, this can be accomplished with the modern means of bombing or bringing down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses.” On August 26, 2001, IANA’s website published a propaganda statement that encouraged individuals to join arms against the West titled “An Invitation to Jihad,” stating that “t]he mujahid brothers will accept you with open arms and within a period of two weeks you will be given commando training and will be sent to the frontline.” Whatever the debate on whether nonconventional weapons were forbidden (haram), some of the sheiks whose fatwas were appearing on the IANA website were likely to take a more permissive view.

        A week after 9/11, someone mailed some newspapers letters containing anthrax and a message urging the destruction of the US and Israel. Then, on or about October 6, 2001, someone sent very fine powderized anthrax to US Senators Leahy and Daschle with a similar message. An infant visiting ABC was one of the first affected, which should have been haram in anyone’s book. Five people died.

        One of the first things FBI Special Agent Jack Cloonan from the FBI’s New York Office did after the anthrax mailings was to fly down to Sudan with CIA agents and meet with al-Duri, Mahjoub’s former supervisor at Bin Laden’s farm in Sudan. After 9/11, FBI agents questioned Ali Al-Timimi, a microbiology graduate student in a program jointly run by George Mason University and the American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”). An undercover operation was run at the Falls Church islamic center.

        By spring of 2002, Ali Al-Timimi was on GMU staff and paid $70,000 a year. At sometime in 2002, officials learned of communications between Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s spiritual adviser, radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali.

        In March 2002, a crude biological weapons site was found. U.S. forces discovered a site near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that appeared to be an Al Qaeda biological weapons lab under construction. Zawahiri’s plan, evidenced in the documents found previous in the Fall, was to move the location of the lab every 3 months.

        It was later in 2002 that the United States government chose to keep this discussion of the help that the two hijackers received in the United States — and the discussion of the Islamic Assembly of North America — from the American public.

        But if it all seems too complicated on a Friday night — with the GOP convention looming and a coup in Turkey being reported — just orient yourself with a picture of a relaxed and smiling Prince Bandar on the back porch of the White House.

        • DXer said

          Declassified 9/11 pages show ties to former Saudi ambassador [Bandar]

          Erin Kelly and Ray Locker, USA TODAY

        • DXer said

          Man tied to 9/11 hijackers received money directly from Prince Bandar, Saudi Amb. to US

        • DXer said

          Malaysia’s forgotten, forgiven 9/11 history
          By Derek Henry Flood

          On January 4 and 5, 2000, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi arrived at Kuala Lumpur International Airport and headed directly to Cheras, a suburb of the capital city in neighboring Selangor state.

          Terror summit
          Intelligence records show that they were hosted by Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian microbiologist and former army captain educated at California State University-Sacramento in the 1980s, in a gated community of clustered red brick condominium towers. There they were joined by at least nine other terrorists for what was later to be dubbed the “Kuala Lumpur Summit”.

          The meeting was a planning operation for the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole warship in Aden, Yemen, headed by an operative known as Khallad, as well as the 9/11 attacks before al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi traveled to Los Angeles en route to San Diego via Bangkok. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, both Saudi nationals and then future hijackers of the American Airlines Flight 77 that smashed into the Pentagon, were able to enter Malaysia visa-free as citizens of signatory states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

          Their meeting was secretly monitored by Malaysia’s Special Branch intelligence unit, which had closely tracked the movements of Al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, Khallad and other participants as they shuttled back and forth from Sufaat’s condo. Malaysian agents were acting on a tip from the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) dedicated Osama bin Laden tracking unit, known as Alec Station.

          The CIA had been alerted to al-Mindhar’s travels by United Arab Emirates (UAE) authorities after he passed through Dubai’s international airport en route to Malaysia. In the UAE, US agents were able to covertly photograph his passport whereupon they discovered his US visa issued by the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and anticipated that some type of plan was afoot, though precisely what they apparently did not know at the time.

          Malaysian Special Branch agents videotaped and photographed the future hijackers and logisticians around Chera’s Bandar Sungai Long golf-centered development as they popped in and out of Internet cafes and eateries. They also documented them making phone calls to a safe house in Aden from a grubby pay phone across the road from the condominium complex.

          One of the meeting’s key participants, the man known simply as Khallad, is believed to be a Saudi national of Yemeni origin named Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as Walid bin Attash). He arrived in Malaysia allegedly to receive a prosthetic leg from an English manufacturer called Endolite with a rehabilitation clinic in a campus on a quiet middle class cul-de-sac in another Selangor State suburb, Petaling Jaya.

          According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al-Qaeda leader bin Laden specifically recommended the tranquil rehab campus in Petaling Jaya to wounded Arab fighters in Afghanistan, including Khallad, as a place they could safely travel and receive treatment without questioning about the origin of their amputation injuries. Kuala Lumpur’s suburbs functioned as both rehab and rest and recreation locales, as well as places to plan future terror operations.

          When the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) later announced that Malaysia was “a primary operational launch pad for the September 11 attacks”, the statement offended then serving prime minister Mahathir. FBI director Robert Mueller, apparently looking to salvage cooperation with Malaysian law enforcement agents in the nascent “war on terror”, attempted to diffuse tensions by saying in March 2002, “There are a number of countries where the terrorists have met and planned, and to use the word ‘launch pad’ is certainly inaccurate” in Malaysia’s case.

          Modern outlook, ancient appeal
          As another 9/11 anniversary approaches, the fundamentals of al-Qaeda’s flawed, idiosyncratic and hypocritical ideology remain greatly misunderstood by much of the American public, which has been asked for the last nine years to part with blood and treasure in the name of fighting the shadowy radical movement. In the immediate aftermath of the most devastating terrorist attacks in US history, many grappled with the media explanations that bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri were anti-modernists who sought to strike a blow against rampant globalization and return the world to a seventh century era of the Prophet Mohammed and his sahaba (companions).


          Meanwhile, Yazid Sufaat is a free man in Malaysia, leading a supposedly closely monitored quiet domestic existence. He was imprisoned for seven years after returning to Malaysia from the Afghanistan-Pakistan war theater in December 2001. He was released in December 2008 after he was deemed a non-threat to Malaysian society, regardless of his alleged knowledge of germ warfare.

          Across the Indian Ocean, USS Cole bomb plotter Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, another critical attendee of the long meetings at Sufaat’s condominium, was inexplicably released from a Yemen prison in 2007 and now continues to threaten US interests as a vocal member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Like 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Khallad was captured in Pakistan in 2003. Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, JI’s military leader and another 9/11 operative, was nabbed in Ayutthaya, Thailand, that same year with his Malaysian wife, whom he met while living in Malaysia’s Johor state.

          Khallad, Khalid, Hambali and another supposed “Kuala Lumpur Summit” attendee, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, remain in US detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, out of reach of journalists and other non-government inquisitors. The operational terrorists of the 9/11 attacks were turned to dust of their own accord. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are perpetually out of reach, apparently still hiding in caves along the rugged and remote Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

          But the majority of the men in attendance at the “Kuala Lumpur summit”, with their intricate knowledge of both the USS Cole bombing and 9/11 attacks, as well as a host of other aborted or unsuccessful terrorist plots, are all alive and well, living in obscurity and hidden behind walls of still opaque circumstances.

          Derek Henry Flood is a freelance journalist specializing in the Middle East and South and Central Asia and is the editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor. He blogs at

      • DXer said

        Long-classified ’28 pages’ show 9/11 hijackers were aided by men with ‘extensive links’ to Saudi government,
        • David Lawler
        • Nick Allen, Washington
        15 July 2016

  15. DXer said

    By Reena Flores CBS News July 14, 2016, 5:32 PM
    28 pages of Congressional report on Saudi ties to 9/11 to be released soon

  16. DXer said

    Note the 2 hijackers involved in the “28 pages”.

    A Saudi Imam, 2 Hijackers and Lingering 9/11 Mystery


    It’s one of those cases where there are an awful lot of very troubling coincidences,” said Richard L. Lambert, who oversaw the investigation into the hijackers’ contacts as the assistant agent in charge of the F.B.I.’s San Diego office in the year after the attacks.


    Whether out of charitable instincts or at someone’s direction, Mr. Bayoumi, then 42, helped the two future hijackers settle in San Diego, in the apartment building where he himself lived. He co-signed the lease and paid the security deposit and first month’s rent, though they reimbursed him

    Mr. Lambert, the former F.B.I. official in San Diego, said he was skeptical that the assistance was given by chance. With the 9/11 plot riding on the hijackers’ ability to manage daily life, he said, Qaeda leaders would most likely have made arrangements to get them help.

    “I have to believe something was planned for the care and nurturing of these guys after they arrived,” he said. “They weren’t too sophisticated, and they didn’t speak English. They needed help getting settled and making preparations.”

  17. DXer said

    New CIA Documentary Puts Spymasters Under the Klieg Lights
    BY JEFF STEIN 11/27/15 AT 12:37 PM

    So naturally, when he sat down for his first on-the-record interview in more than eight years, Tenet tore into the failure of others to act on his warnings, from 1999 through the late summer of 2001, that Al-Qaeda was determined to strike targets in the United States. He could “barely contain himself when talking about the unheeded warnings he says he gave the White House,” says Chris Whipple, executive producer and writer of The Spymasters: CIA in the Crosshairs, a surprisingly riveting documentary premiering November 28 on Showtime.

    Likewise, Tenet’s former deputy Cofer Black is still livid about those White House meetings more than 14 years ago. “You know what pisses me off? When people call this an intelligence failure,” he says on the show, nearly jumping out of his seat. “I mean, how is it that you could warn senior people so many times and nothing actually happened?” It was like “The Twilight Zone,” he says.

    Tenet and company are full of excuses, however, when it comes to the CIA’s own failures to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Years after the debacle, two FBI agents who had been stationed in the CIA’s Osama bin Laden tracking unit came forward to say that the CIA knew two of the future hijackers were in the United States but—for reasons that remain unclear—forbade them from alerting their headquarters, which is responsible for preventing domestic attacks. Under questioning by Whipple, Tenet blames “policies” that “were out of date.” Former Bush White House counterterrorism adviser Richard A. Clarke has suggested that the CIA didn’t want the FBI barging into an operation to try to recruit one or both of the Al-Qaeda operatives as double agents.

  18. DXer said

    Former FBI Agent Blasts Newly Declassified CIA Reports on 9/11
    BY JEFF STEIN 6/19/15 AT 6:07 AM

    James Bernazzani, who took charge of the FBI contingent at the CTC in Langley, Virginia, soon after 9/11 attacks, recalled an encounter with Rossini. “Mark walks into my office one day at Langley and says, ‘Something’s been really bothering me.’ He tells me the whole story” about how he and Miller had been prohibited from telling anyone about the likely presence of at least one Al-Qaeda terrorist, al-Mihdhar, in the U.S. the previous July, Bernazzani says.

    “I said, Mark, if it ain’t on paper, it never happened. He said, ‘I got it.’ After a few minutes he came back and showed it to me.” Miller, as it turned out, had made a copy of the warning cable he had prepared for FBI headquarters.

    “I looked at it and I said, ‘Holy friggin’ shit,’” Bernazzani recalls. “I said, ‘This would’ve stopped this thing.’ I called up Assistant Director Pat D’Amuro,” who was in charge of the FBI’s investigation into the 9/11 attacks. “I said I needed to see him right away. He said, ‘This better be worth it.’ I assured him it was. I drove straight to FBI headquarters. It took me only about 15 minutes to get there. I probably set some speed records.”

    Bernazzani, who retired in 2008 with a Presidential Award for Meritorious Service, says D’Amuro “looks at it, he looks at me, and he says, ‘I’ll take care of it.’”

    Bernazzani returned to CIA headquarters. “I told Mark it was done, it was in the right hands,” Bernazzani says. Later, when congressional investigators came looking for documents related to the 9/11 attacks, “the FBI couldn’t find it in their computers,” he says. “If they did, they didn’t tell me.”

    D’Amuro, now managing director of 930 Capital Management in New York, did not immediately respond to request for comment.

    All these years later, “What Mark said is true,” Bernazzani says. “It did happen” as Rossini told it.

    As for why CIA analysts at the CTC ordered Rossini and Miller not to tell the FBI about Al-Qaeda terrorists at large in the U.S., Bernazzani can only theorize. “It was a classic example of analysts owning information,” he says. “Operators share information. Some analysts tended to think of information as none of your business.”

    Rossini is more blunt. “They ran a clandestine op in the U.S., and they didn’t want the bureau involved in it.”

    • DXer said

      WikiLeaks Says It’s Leaking Over 500,000 Saudi Documents
      ISTANBUL — Jun 19, 2015, 1:25 PM ET

      WikiLeaks is in the process of publishing more than 500,000 Saudi diplomatic documents to the Internet, the transparency website said Friday, a move that echoes its famous release of U.S. State Department cables in 2010.

      WikiLeaks says in a statement that it has already posted roughly 60,000 documents. Most of them appeared to be in Arabic.

      There was no immediate way to verify the authenticity of the documents, although WikiLeaks has a long track record of hosting large-scale leaks of government material. Many of the documents carried green letterhead marked “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” or “Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

      The Associated Press was not immediately able to reach anyone whose phone numbers or email addresses were published in the various documents, but WikiLeaks spokesman Kristinn Hrafnsson told AP he was confident that they were genuine. He declined to comment on the documents’ source.

      The Saudi Embassy in Washington did not immediately return messages seeking comment.

      • DXer said

        WikiLeaks Begins Releasing Leaked Saudi Arabia Cables
        Julia Zorthian @jzorth
        2:11 PM ET

        The transparency advocate site WikiLeaks began publishing leaked documents from the Saudi Arabia Foreign Ministry on Friday afternoon, dumping over 60,000 classified documents into the public domain.


        WikiLeaks announced that internal reports from Saudi government organizations and communications between Saudi embassies across the globe will be included in the documents. The press release states the Saudi Cables “provide key insights into the Kingdom’s operations and how it has managed its alliances and consolidated its position as a regional Middle East superpower, including through bribing and co-opting key individuals and institutions.”


        Some major US companies may want to have a look to see if maybe call that FCPA counsel they have on retainer.

        Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

  19. DXer said

    9/11 investigation still open; disagreement persists

    WASHINGTON — Fourteen years after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a disagreement persists within the FBI over whether others inside the U.S. had advance knowledge of the operation and supported the suicide hijackers, a special review commission found.

    The commission, mandated by Congress to assess the FBI’s continuing anti-terror capabilities, said the FBI’s 9/11 investigation into a potential broader conspiracy remains open and “active.’’

    “We have no credible evidence that there were additional assisters or funders,” the director said.

    Commissioners, including former attorney general Edwin Meese, former congressman Tim Roemer and Georgetown University professor Bruce Hoffman, focused new scrutiny on the pre-attack activities of San Diego-based hijackers Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Midhar and whether they were provided operational assistance previously unknown to authorities.

    Despite differing accounts from one associate of the hijackers, Mohdar Abdullah, who once allegedly bragged that he knew in advance of the hijackers’ plans, the commission “did not discover anything new” that would alter previous conclusions that there was no broader conspiracy in the U.S. before the 2001 attacks.

    The commission also re-examined the pre-9/11 activities of American-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who before being killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen helped inspire a string of strikes and attempted assaults on the U.S, including the failed Christmas 2009 suicide bombing aboard a commercial airliner approaching Detroit and the attempted 2010 truck bombing in New York City’s Times Square.

    In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks, Al-Awlaki had been questioned about al-Midhar and al-Hamzi and their visits to a San Diego mosque where the cleric once preached. He was not detained at the time and left the country shortly after where he eventually rose to prominence in al-Qaeda’s franchise in the Arabian Peninsula, where he became the organization’s chief spokesman and recruiter.


    “We have no credible evidence that there were additional assisters or funders,” the director said.

    Director Comey: You mean in addition Atta’s pre-911 associate Adnan El-Shukrijumah, who was taking his orders from KSM?

    Scott Shane in his forthcoming book will reason that Awlaki was not looped in to Bin Laden’s plans prior to 911. My point to Scott has been that under principles of operational security, Awlaki would have no “need to know.” Scott’s book will be like a Thanksgiving dinner that you’ve anticipated all afternoon and then gets served late in the day.

    As for Awlaki’s views, however, I’ve always pointed to his roommate at Hajj in Spring 2001, a lawyer in California, Hal, who told me years ago that privately (behind closed doors) Awlaki was always hardcore.

    On the issue of whether fellow Falls Church imam Awlaki knew fellow Falls Church imam Al-TImimi well, the defense always omits mentioning that they had spoken together abroad, in Canada and the UK, in July and August 2001.

  20. DXer said

    The “28 pages” in part relates to this timeline.

    Amerithrax: Hazmi and Mihdhar Timeline

    Posted by Lew Weinstein on January 30, 2012

    I think the subject of the “28 pages” it is going to bring out some heavy-hitters. For example, today there is an article “9/11: the Saudi Connection.” I’ve always been a fan of James Ridgeway since reading his “Blood In the Face” years ago.

    And the Nader/ General Motors anecdote is one of my favorite bits of history in investigative journalism.

    From Wikipedia:

    Ridgeway became nationally known when he revealed in The New Republic that General Motors had hired private detectives to tail consumer advocate Ralph Nader in an attempt to dig up information that might discredit him (Nader was behind litigation which challenged the safety of the Chevrolet Corvair). Ridgeway’s revelations of the company’s snooping and dirty tricks prompted a Senate subcommittee led by Senator Abraham Ribicoff to summon James Roche, president of GM, to explain his company’s harassment — and apologize. The incident catapulted auto safety into the public spotlight and helped send Nader’s book, Unsafe at Any Speed (1965), to the top of the bestseller1 lists.[1]

    He served as Washington correspondent for The Village Voice where he worked from the mid-1970s until April 2006.
    He has written: “The 5 Unanswered Questions About 9/11: What the 9/11 Commission Report Failed to Tell Us,”

    I’ve been meaning to study INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, the FBI, CIA and Saudi Arabia (2004) as background. But I think I’ll start with Ridgeway’s “The 5 Unanswered Questions About 9/11: What the 9/11 Commission Report Failed to Tell Us.”

    SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

    The Bush Cover-Up Begins to Unravel
    9/11: the Saudi Connection

    In his New Yorker article, posted on the magazine’s web site last week, Lawrence Wright tells how the Bush administration deleted 28 pages in the 2002 report of the Joint Congressional Inquiry on 911 probably because they describe in detail the Saudi connection to the Al Qaeda attack and Saudi financing of its operatives in the United States—people who knew two of the hijackers, and may well have been used as conduits for Saudi cash. Some of the money may have come from the royal family through a charity.

    In removing the 28 pages Bush said the publication of the information would damage American intelligence operations. The Saudis deny all of this.

    In fact no one would be talking about it now were it not for families of victims of the attack and insurers, who are suing the Saudis.

    Wright goes on to report:

    “There’s nothing in it about national security,” Walter Jones, a Republican congressman from North Carolina who has read the missing pages, contends. “It’s about the Bush Administration and its relationship with the Saudis.” Stephen Lynch, a Massachusetts Democrat, told me that the document is “stunning in its clarity,” and that it offers direct evidence of complicity on the part of certain Saudi individuals and entities in Al Qaeda’s attack on America. “Those twenty-eight pages tell a story that has been completely removed from the 9/11 Report,” Lynch maintains. Another congressman who has read the document said that the evidence of Saudi government support for the 9/11 hijacking is “very disturbing,” and that “the real question is whether it was sanctioned at the royal-family level or beneath that, and whether these leads were followed through.” Now, in a rare example of bipartisanship, Jones and Lynch have co-sponsored a resolution requesting that the Obama Administration declassify the pages.

    But there are other questions here, and they involve the story of how the Bush administration sought to suppress evidence that would reveal how much it knew of the attack plot —and didn’t do anything to stop it.

    To resume the story briefly:

    Two of the flight 77 hijackers—Khalid al-Mihdhar, a Saudi who fought for al-Qaeda in Bosnia and Chechyna, and Nawaf al Hazmi, another Saudi with battle experience in Bosnia, Chechyna and Afghanistan, met at an al-Qaeda strategy meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January, 2000. The CIA had asked the Malaysian intelligence service to conduct surveillance, but it proved not to be very effective. The two left that meeting, went to the airport and boarded a commercial flight to Bankok on January 8, and subsequently took a United Airlines flight from Bangkok to Los Angeles, landing without incident and passing through US immigration.

    By that time, according to the Joint Inquiry Report, “the CIA and NSA had sufficient information available concerning future hijackers al-Midhar and al-Hamzi to connect them to Usama Bin Laden, the East Africa embassy bombing and the USS Cole attack…and they should have been placed on the State Department TIPOFF watch-list and the INS and Customs watch-list.’’

    By July 2001, analysts operating on their own confirmed the two had landed in the US and notified the FBI. The Bureau alerted its offices in New York, but not in Los Angeles or San Diego. And no one thought to tell the FAA, INS or Customs Service not to let these men fly on planes.

    Once in the US, the two hijackers passed unnoticed beneath noses of the CIA and FBI. They went from Los Angeles to San Diego, where they rented an apartment, got Social Security cards, drivers licenses, credit cards and a car. They soon began flight training.

    The two had contact with a radical iman, who the FBI was watching and with a leader in the local Saudi community who was believed to be a Saudi financial conduit to the hijackers.

    Perhaps most significant they had contact with a local FBI informant, in fact, living in his house. This man was charged by the FBI with keeping tabs on the local Saudi community. “He stayed at the home of a source of ours,’’ an FBI counterterrorism official later told James Bamford, author of the book A Pretext for War. “Had we known about them we would have followed them and said, ‘Hey,these guys are going to aviation school.’’’

    The Joint Inquiry concluded that the informants contacts with the hijackers, had they been followed up, would have given the FBI’s San Diego office the best chance to unravel the plot. Later efforts by the Joint Inquiry to interview the informant were thwarted by the FBI and Justice Department.

    According to former Florida Senator Bob Graham, in his bookIntelligence Matters, when the Joint Inquiry asked the FBI for all its files on the informer, the members were denied access to him and when the Joint Inquiry subpoened him, the FBI stalled. Graham called a meeting with CIA director George Tenet, FBI director Robert Mueller and Attorney General John Ashcroft. They suggested Graham question the informant in writing. But by the time the FBI sent out their questions, the informant had retained a top lawyer, a former employee of the Justice Department. The lawyer demanded immunity for the informant before testifying. Graham writes in his book, “It seemed strange that an individual who claimed to have done nothing wrong and who the FBI argued continued to be a valuable source of information would request immunity.’’

    The committee turned down the request.

    Graham wrote, the FBI ”insisted that we could not even in the most sanitized manner, tell the American people that an FBI informant had a relationship with two of the hijackers.” The Bureau opposed public hearings, deleted any reference to the situation from the Joint Inquiry’s unclassified report. Only a year later did the FBI allow a heavily-redacted version of the story in the public report.

    Finally in his book Graham describes a letter from a member of the FBI’s congressional staff explaining the Bureau had been uncooperative on orders of the administration. “We were seeing in writing what we had suspected for some time. The White House was directing the coverup.

    “Later, when the 911 Commission conducted its own investigation, both Bush and Cheney met with them in a private, off-the-record conversation.”

    This story and the new piece by Wright strongly suggest the President, Vice President and head of the FBI were engaged in obstruction of justice. If so, that would call for the convening of a federal grand jury. Would the Justice Department, which runs the FBI, do that? Probably not.

    So it is left to the families suing the Saudis to find and publish the truth.

    James Ridgeway is an investigative reporter in Washington, DC.

  21. DXer said

    Senator Bob Graham says the 28 pages also include references to various federal agencies and federal officials.

    Bill Maher interviews Bob Graham – 9/11 Saudi Connection

    Uploaded on Jun 23, 2011
    November 2008 – Sen. Bob Graham talks about government coverup involving the joint inquiry into the intelligence failure of September 11, 2001 which he was involved with. Important findings of the inquiry, including 28 pages dealing with Saudi financing to the terrorists were censored by the Bush administration before it’s public release

    • DXer said

      In the Maher interview, the “Joint Inquiry” Chairman Graham discusses the summit at the condo of Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat attended by the two hijackers who then proceeded to the United States.

      Senator Graham voted AGAINST the invasion of Iraq. He voted in FAVOR of going after Al Qaeda.

      He still seems so well-spoken that perhaps he could run for President again.

      In terms of (Presidential) demeanor, I’m also a big fan of 911 Commission Co-Chair Lee Hamilton. I hope to hear from Lee Hamilton on this issue.

      Anthrax, Al Qaeda and Ayman Zawahiri: The Infiltration of US Biodefense

  22. DXer said

    The 2001 Anthrax Deception: The Case for a Domestic Conspiracy
    by Dr. Graeme Macqueen, PH.D.

    About this title: The anthrax letter attacks occurred from September through November of 2001, killing five and wounding many. The attacks were widely held to be the work of Muslims and were used to support the invasion of Afghanistan and, later, the invasion of Iraq. They were used explicitly and repeatedly to justify the passing of the Patriot Act. They were also meant to support withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, a withdrawal eagerly sought by the neoconservatives associated with the Project for a New American Century who wished to pursue their global agenda without obstruction from small states with WMD. In the early days of the attacks there were several perpetrator hypotheses in play. One that gained prominence was the Double Perpetrator hypothesis according to which Iraq had supplied the sophisticated anthrax spores while al-Qaeda had supplied the foot soldiers responsible for preparing and sending the letters. This hypothesis was eagerly reported by the mainstream media. It came to grief quickly when scientists discovered that the anthrax spores had a domestic source and appeared to come from the heart of the US military and intelligence communities. The FBI rapidly began a search for “the anthrax killer,” promoting the idea that there was a lone wolf perpetrator within the military community–a renegade, an unbalanced person whose behavior revealed nothing of significance about structures and institutions of the deep state. In 2008 the Bureau named Dr. Bruce Ivins of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases as the “anthrax killer.” Ivins had conveniently died a week before being named and could not fight back in court. Ivins remains the FBI’s choice to this day: the case was closed in 2010. This book support with a great deal of evidence the following four assertions: (a) the anthrax letter attacks were carried out by a group of perpetrators, not by a lone wolf; (b) the group that perpetrated this crime was composed, in whole or in part, of deep insiders within the U.S. state apparatus; (c) these insiders were connected to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks; (d) the anthrax attacks were meant to play an important role in the strategy of redefinition through which the Cold War was replaced by a new global conflict framework, the Global War on Terror.”


    “(c) these insiders were connected to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks;”

    Yes, but Bin Laden was behind the 9/11 attacks.

  23. DXer said

    As to who the US wants to kill with a drone, I don’t know which is favored by the report today that the “really bad guy” knew Awlaki.

    If it was Adnan El-Shukrijumah, then it is especially important to note the argument that the dropped ball relating to Amerithrax relates to the dropped ball relating to the two hijackers who then were guided by Anwar Awlaki.

    Now based on the description of the American citizen abroad ” they want to kill with a drone as a “really bad guy” — let’s consider who has been described by the phrase.

    In a boolean search of “really bad guy” Shukrijumah we get 153 results. Hammami, the Shabbaab former flea market worker, barely gets 3 and without clicking through I’m not sure any of them fit. Heck, if he is giving interviews on twitter to in 2013 and writing his autobiography, could he be such a really bad guy? It seems that really bad guys should be more secretive and mysterious. Besides, I thought Hammami retired a few months ago and was shopping his autobiography for a movie deal.

    Without clicking through, it seems that some reports are referring to El-Shukrijumah as a “really, really, bad guy.” I don’t know if a former yard saler is scarier than a former flea market worker but yard sales are a little more bold and individualistic. And for wet work, Adnan’s car washes couldn’t be beat.

    So with the Guyana airline threat report, Shukrijumah’s connection to AQ WMD aspirations, and his boolean association with “really bad guy” and “really, really bad guy,” I would like to move the odds I’m giving to 70% Adnan El-Shukrijumah, 10% Hammami, 10% Gadahn, and 10% someone I’ve never heard about. And I’m giving the mouthpiece Gadahn odds even with Hammami because I don’t like the heavy metal that Gadahn liked so much.

    Adnan, although a momma’s boy, at least knows his way around an IED. Certainly both El-Shukrijumah and Gadahn would live in their mom’s basement given the chance — if that kill-the-infidel thing hadn’t appealed to their manhood.

  24. DXer said

    “We see the threats that come into this nation,” Alexander said in opening remarks. Before the Sept. 11 attacks, he said “we had no way to connect those dots.”

    Comment: Is that entirely accurate? Wasn’t it a failure of analysis of the intecerpted intel — didn’t the FBI fail to look in the phone book to locate the hijackers who had come from Yazid Sufaat’s condo?

  25. DXer said

    • September 11th Warning Signs Fast Facts

    CNN-Jul 27, 2013

    The meeting takes place at a condo owned by Yazid Sufaat. January 15, 2000 – The CIA tracks Nawaf Alhazmi from the Malaysian summit to …

    September 10, 2001 – The National Security Agency intercepts two communications from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia. One says, “Tomorrow is zero hour,” and the other says “The match begins tomorrow.” The messages are not translated until September 12.


    What is Yazid saying about Nawaf Alhazmi?

    Like the FBI, the NSA is damned if they do and damned if they don’t.

  26. DXer said

    NSA chief testifies that ‘dozens’ of terror attacks have been stopped using phone-data surveillance
    • By S.A. MILLER in Laurel, Md., and ANDY SOLTIS in NY

    • Posted: 1:51 AM, June 13, 2013

    Secret US surveillance prevented “dozens” of terror attacks in recent years — and might have foiled the 9/11 hijackers if sophisticated phone tracking had been in place in 2001, the head of the National Security Agency testified yesterday.

    Gen. Keith Alexander said US intelligence knew of phone calls Khalid al-Mihdhar made allegedly to an al Qaeda safe house before he hijacked the plane that crashed into the Pentagon.

    “We had intercepts on Mihdhar,” Alexander told the Senate Appropriations Committee. “But we didn’t know where he was.”

    Mihdhar and another hijacker, Nawaf al-Hazmi, had traveled to San Diego for pilot training.


    General Alexander,

    Greetings from the Valley.

    Why do you say NSA didn’t you know where Mihdhar was? He was in the telephone book right? Isn’t the problem that the NSA did not tell the FBI? It is important to connect the dots. Hardware and technology is great but connecting the dots and recognizing the dangers of stovepiping will always be key.

  27. DXer said

    Why would a man “living in Hawaii in paradise and making a ton of money” decide to leave everything behind, he asked. Because he realized that his computer savvy was helping erect an ever-expanding “architecture of oppression” and he believed the people must be told.

    Matt Damon would be great for the part. Here he explains why he shouldn’t work for the NSA.

  28. DXer said

    Yazid Sufaat’s hardworking and loving daughter reports that her dad’s hearing scheduled for tomorrow will be postponed until Monday.

    Soraya Yazid ‏@sorayaanur 6h
    Apparently Bapak’s court trial tomorrow to strike off the charges will be postpone [until] monday

    Defense counsel tend not to be much for milk and cookies. But if they have Yazid’s interests truly at heart, they’ll rethink things and get behind his cooperation and resulting freedom. A lot can be done in a weekend.

  29. DXer said

    Classified documents show that the FBI suppressed information relating to El-Shukrijumah and it is only now coming to light. (Note: El-Shukrijumah’s father was employed by the Saudi government as a missionary).

    Classified documents contradict FBI on post-9/11 probe of Saudis, ex-senator says, March 13, 2013

    By Anthony Summers and Dan ChristensenSpecial to

    Former Florida Sen. Bob Graham, who co-chaired Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has seen two classified FBI documents that he says are at odds with the bureau’s public statements that there was no connection between the hijackers and Saudis then living in Sarasota, Fla.
    “There are significant inconsistencies between the public statements of the FBI in September and what I read in the classified documents,” Graham said.

    “One document adds to the evidence that the investigation was not the robust inquiry claimed by the FBI,” Graham said. “An important investigative lead was not pursued and unsubstantiated statements were accepted as truth.”

    Whether the 9/11 hijackers acted alone, or whether they had support within the U.S., remains an unanswered question — one that began to be asked as soon as it became known that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens. It was underlined when Congress’s bipartisan inquiry released its public report in July 2003. The final 28 pages, regarding possible foreign support for the terrorists, were censored in their entirety — on President George W. Bush’s instructions.

    The newly-released FDLE documents, meanwhile, contain a description of Mr al-Hijji by Wissam Hammoud, a Lebanese-born US citizen who is serving a 21-year prison sentence for attempting to murder a federal agent. In an interview in 2004, Hammoud claimed he was introduced to the al-Hijjis in 1996. He said Mr al-Hijji was once accompanied in Sarasota by a man Hammoud identified as Shukrijumah. He claimed that Mr al-Hijji had also spoken about taking flight training at Venice Airport.

    President Bush was at a reading class for six year-olds when news of the World Trade Centre attacks was whispered into his ear. The school was Emma E Booker Elementary in Sarasota. Just 10 miles away, a family home lay abandoned. A decade on from September 11, the mystery of what happened at 4224 Escondito Circle remains.

    FBI: ‘No credible evidence’

    The FBI-led investigation a decade ago focused on Abdulaziz al-Hijji and his wife, Anoud, who moved out of their home in the upscale, gated community of Prestancia, near Sarasota, and left the country in the weeks before 9/11. The couple left behind three cars and numerous personal belongings, such as furnishings, clothes, medicine and food, according to law enforcement records. After the 9/11 attacks, a concerned neighbor contacted the FBI.

    Analysis of Prestancia gatehouse visitor logs and photographs of license tags showed that vehicles driven by several of the future hijackers had visited the al-Hijji home at 4224 Escondito Circle, according to a counterterrorism officer and former Prestancia administrator Larry Berberich. If that did occur, it will feed into suspicions that the hijackers had Saudi support — a suspicion held by some official investigators but played down by the 9/11 Commission.

    Al-Hijji, who now lives and works in London, recently called 9/11 “a crime against the USA and all humankind” and said he was “saddened and oppressed by these false allegations.” He also said it was “not true” that Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers visited him at his Sarasota home.
    The FBI has backed up al-Hijji. After initially declining to comment, the bureau confirmed that it did investigate but said it found nothing sinister. Agents, however, have refused to answer reporters’ specific questions about its investigation or its findings about the Prestancia gate records.
    The FBI reiterated its position in a Feb. 7 letter that denied a Freedom of Information Act request seeking records from its Sarasota probe. The denial said their release “could constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

    “At no time during the course of its investigation of the attacks, known as the PENTTBOM investigation, did the FBI develop credible evidence that connected the address at 4224 Escondito Circle, Sarasota, Florida, to any of the 9/11 hijackers,” wrote records section chief David M. Hardy.

    Newly released Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents, however, state that an informant told the FBI in 2004 that al-Hijji had considered Osama bin Laden a “hero” and may have known some of the hijackers. The informant, Wissam Hammoud, also said al-Hijji once introduced him to Adnan El Shukrijumah, an ex-Broward County resident and suspected al-Qaida operative on the FBI’s Most Wanted list.

    Last September, FBI spokesmen also disputed Graham’s assertion that Congress was never told about the Sarasota investigation.

    That prompted Graham to ask the FBI for assistance in locating in the National Archives the Sarasota-related files that were allegedly turned over to Congress. Instead, after what Graham said were two months in which the FBI was “either unwilling or unable” to help find the records, the bureau suddenly turned over two documents to the Senate Intelligence Committee, which Graham once headed and where he still has access. It is those documents that Graham has said are inconsistent with the FBI denials. ***

    Kean did not return several phone messages seeking comment. But Hamilton, a former Indiana congressman, confirmed this month that he learned nothing about the Sarasota matter while serving as vice-chair of the 9/11 commission.
    Graham sees the information now emerging about Sarasota as ominously similar to discoveries his inquiry made in California. Leads there indicated that the first two hijackers to reach the U.S., Saudis Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, received help first from a diplomat at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles and then from two other Saudis, one of whom helped al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi find a place to live.

    The newly surfaced FDLE documents containing informant Hammoud’s troubling 2004 information about al-Hijji have reinforced Graham’s concerns because they conflict with the FBI’s public statements.

    Hammoud’s statement that al-Hijji introduced him to Saudi terror suspect Shukrijumah is consistent with the report that Prestancia gate logs showed Shukrijumah had visited the al-Hijji house – and buttresses longstanding official suspicion that he was linked to the hijackers. When Mohamed Atta visited a federal immigration office in Miami to discuss a visa problem in May 2001, a 9/11 Commission footnote reports, a man who closely resembled Shukrijumah accompanied him.

    Graham sees what he believes to be the suppression of evidence pointing to Saudi support for the 9/11 hijackers as arising from the perceived advantages to the West, at the time and now, of keeping Saudi Arabia happy.

  30. DXer said

    The 911 Commission says Jdey may have trained in Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received instruction from KSM with Atta and Binalshibh. The dropping of the ball as to Nawaf and Khalid led not only to 911, it led to the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings. Jobs were on the line after 911. Inside the Beltway — as most places — everyone is motivated to save their job and further their career prospects.

    Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi. A Canadian passport holder, he may have trained in
    Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received instruction from KSM with Atta
    and Binalshibh.A letter recovered from a safehouse in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also suggests
    that Jdey was initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group.A videotape
    of Jdey’s martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef ’s house near Kabul following a
    November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and
    Khallad confirm Jdey’s status as an al Qaeda recruit,KSM says Jdey was slated for a “second wave”of attacks
    but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004); Intelligence
    report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,May 21,
    2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003.

  31. DXer said

    CBS News Transcripts

    October 9, 2003 Thursday

    SHOW: CBS Evening News (6:30 PM ET) – CBS

    Al-Qaida may be trying to produce biological weapons



    DAN RATHER, anchor:
    Al-Qaida may be hard at work trying to produce weaponized anthrax and other biological weapons. There’s evidence to that extent. In this exclusive report, CBS’ Mark Phillips has the details US interrogators have extracted from a top al-Qaida operative.

    MARK PHILLIPS reporting:
    The new worry comes from the man accused of masterminding last year’s terror bombings in Bali that killed more than 200 people and last summer’s Jakarta hotel blast that left another 12 people dead. Riduan Isamuddin, better known simply as Hambali, has been in the hands of US intelligence agents since his arrest in Thailand last August, and he’s been singing.

    According to interrogation reports seen by CBS News, Hambali was implementing a plan to cause far more deaths using biological weapons, using anthrax. Hambali, as al-Qaida’s main connection in the Far East, was apparently trying to establish an al-Qaida bioweapons branch plant.

    According to the documents, Hambali told his US interrogators he had been, quote, “working on an al-Qaida anthrax program in Kandahar,” Afghanistan. There, he worked with this man, Yazid Sufaat, a fellow member of the al-Qaida-affiliated terror group Jemaah Islamiah. Sufaat had received a degree in chemistry and laboratory science from California State University in Sacramento. But in October 2001, when things became too hot during the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Hambali and Sufaat fled to safety in neighboring Pakistan. There again, according to the interrogation reports, the two men discussed, quote, “continuing the anthrax program in Indonesia.” In fact, the men did return to the Far East, and Yazid Sufaat was arrested as he tried to enter his native Malaysia.

    Comment: The US should have succeeded in arranging the extradition of Yazid Sufaat to the US in 2002 or 2003.

  32. DXer said

    Yazid may deny it now to the press, but he reportedly told Malaysian questioners that he had met the hijackers who went to the terror summit held at his KL condo.

    Intelligence Online

    March 14, 2002

    Al Qaeda’s Malaysian Links

    An investigation into Yazid Sufaat, arrested in Malaysia, has shed light on ties between the terrorists involved in the Sept. 11 attacks.

    According to a source close to American intelligence, the alleged terrorist Yazid Sufaat, arrested in Malaysia in late December, admitted meeting with at least three of the Sept. 11 hijackers, as well as with the French national Zacarias Moussaoui who is being held in Virginia in connection with the attacks.

    A former Malaysian army officer, Sufaat is thought to be one of the organizers, if not the leader, of an Islamist group known under the name of Jeema Islamiah that had connections with Ossama Bin Laden’s group, and which allegedly provided logistic support for the Sept. 11 assailants. Suffat reportedly also gave Moussaoui a sum of $ 40,000 when the two met in Kuala Lumpur between September and October, 2000. A few months later Moussaoui deposited almost all of the money in a bank at Norman, Oklahoma, where he began his pilot training. Sufaat’s organization is also thought to belong to a ring operating in various South Est Asian countries and specializing in setting up and maintaining sleeper units that can be activated on command. During his clandestine operations Sufaat is said to have met several times with Fathuir Rahman Ghozi, an extremist Indonesian militant living in the Philippines and suspected of having organized an attack last December against the U.S. embassy in Singapore. The assault was headed off by Singapore security, which arrested 13 terrorist suspects.

    • DXer said

      Yazid Sufaat, not Steve Hatfill, should have remained FBI Director Mueller’s priority throughout the summer of 2002 in connection with Amerithrax. A federal district court judge found that there was not a scintilla of evidence implicating Dr. Hatfill. The head of the Amerithrax criminal prosecution, Daniel Seikaly, had come over from the CIA in September 2001. The CIA had monitored the terror summit held at Yazid’s KL condo but then dropped the ball in allowing Nawaf and his colleague enter the country.

      The daughter of the lead prosecutor then came to represent Ali Al-Timimi, who shared a suite with the leading DARPA Ames researchers, pro bono. It was the lead prosecutor who pled the Fifth Amendment concerning his hyped leaks about anthrax smelling bloodhounds in derailing the investigation over a Hatfill Theory. Amerithrax represents the greatest counterintelligence analysis failure in the history of the United States. The invasion of Iraq has caused thousands of lives. A fallure to correctly analyze the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings threatens the destruction of Washington DC or New York City.

      Channel NewsAsia

      September 3, 2002 Tuesday

      M’sia not aware of US request to question terror suspect: Mahathir


      LENGTH: 157 words

      Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has said he knows nothing about a US request to interrogate a Malaysian suspect over alleged links to the September 11 attacks.
      He was responding to a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal.

      In March, Malaysian police had said that visiting FBI chief Robert S Mueller had indicated interest in questioning the suspect.
      Yazid Sufaat is one of 62 suspected Muslim militants being held under the Internal Securities Act on allegations of plotting to overthrow the government.

      According to the daily, the US Justice Department is seeking permission for the FBI to interview Mr Yazid to strengthen its case against French terror suspect Zacarias Moussaoui.

      Mr Moussaoui, allegedly part of the September 11 hijack gang, is on trial in the US.

      Mr Yazid is said to have hosted Mr Moussaoui in Kuala Lumpur, and his residence was also allegedly used by two visiting September 11 hijackers.

  33. DXer said

    Time : Eye of the Storm

    From Time Magazine
    4 February 2002
    Eye of the Storm


    If Abubakar was the founding father and spiritual leader [of JI], Hambali was
    his chief executive officer. A 36-year-old veteran of the Afghan
    struggle against the Soviet Union, Hambali was the practical man who
    made the plans and gave the orders. Officials say he was responsible
    for organizing paramilitary training stints for Jemaah Islamiah
    members in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    These sources also say he was the mastermind behind a series of
    bombing missions around the region. In one example, Hambali sent a
    known associate, Malaysian Taufik Abdul Halim to Jakarta, where he was
    arrested on Aug. 1, 2001, after a bomb he was carrying exploded and
    blew off one of his legs. Last fall in Malaysia itself, Hambali
    instructed Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain now under
    detention in Kuala Lumpur, to place an order for four tons of ammonium
    nitrate, a fertilizer that can be used as a bombmaking ingredient. The
    current whereabouts of the chemical remains a mystery.

    The role of bombmaker was a surprising one for Yazid, who officials
    say was a minor figure in the Selangor branch of the KMM, a “runner”
    as one puts it. But Yazid flourished in the Jemaah Islamiah, rising to
    become Hambali’s most trusted lieutenant. Hambali ordered Yazid to
    host the two hijackers who died in the Pentagon attack at his condo in
    Kuala Lumpur. Yazid has told his interrogators that he had no
    knowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks but, one official says, he suspected
    the men who stayed at his apartment had some role in the attacks
    because “they had asked if there were flying schools in Malaysia.
    Yazid recommended one in [BRACKET {Melaka}] but they said it would not
    be suitable for them.”

  34. DXer said

    What does Hambali say about this January 2000 meeting?

  35. DXer said

    Yazid was 1 of Malaysia’s most prominent security detainees in the past decade.

    He allegedly let several senior al-Qaida operatives, including two eventual hijackers in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, use an apartment he owned for meetings in Malaysia in January 2000. …

    Yazid, a U.S.-trained biochemist, was previously arrested in late 2001 when he returned home from Afghanistan, where he was suspected of working on a biological and chemical weapons program for al-Qaida.

    Yazid has not spoken publicly about many of the specific accusations against him, but in an interview with news website Malaysiakini last year he said he had met Osama bin Laden before his detention and underwent combat training in Afghanistan.

  36. DXer said

    Al Qaeda anthrax lab tech Yazid has far too personable demeanor not to at least ask him about how he knew Attash (but not, he at one point claimed) the hijacker Nawaf. Tabouli, grapes. He likes a good meal.

    It does not compromise the security of an operation for past Al Qaeda operatives now to set the history straight from over a decade ago. For example, he can be asked how well he knows Al-Balucchi.

    Certainly, advocacy on behalf of Aafia and others might have been more successful if they had not lied. For example, on the shooting incident involving Aafia — absent forensic evidence — credibility of witnesses was the paramount determinant of the outcome at trial. The last thing Aafia wanted to do was lie about knowing Al-Balucchi (to whom she was provably married.) In a video in 2010 after her conviction, Fowzia and Ismaat warned of the destruction of the United States. The video is uploaded to YouTube (it is in Urdu). Now, after the Algeria hostage taking and murder of innocents, they reiterate a denunciation of violence. That letter is in English.

    Truth is the most powerful weapon of all. In advocacy, telling the truth and providing corroboration then allows your argument to be accepted on issues for which there is not corroboration. Sara Flounders and Cynthia McKinney should have delved more deeply into the facts on this question of the marriage to Al-Balucchi and Aafia’s claim that she researched biological weapons for 6 months at the Karachi technical institute.

    Aafia’s lies to the visiting Pakistani delegation in 2008 not long after her capture are understandable. But she should provide a full, corroborated narrative as background for any request for repatriation. I’ve always been fond of Aafia — for her doe eyes, articulateness , intelligence and passion. But no one likes a liar who knowingly marries a 911 plotter responsible for killing 3,000 innocents — who at least does not have the courage of her convictions to tell the truth about it.

    • DXer said

      The “Man Behind The Curtain” is not going to allow anything be said about anthrax that is classified. So Yaziid is going to have to fill in the blanks — given that his former colleagues are being prevented from being heard.

      The Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Hearings Resume: But Who Is The Man Behind The Curtain? And “Who is Controlling These Proceedings?”
      By Adam Kirchner
      The Public Record
      Jan 28th, 2013

      “The Prosecution alleges that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the “architect of the 9/11 concept” in its motion designed to exclude from the trial information that it asserts could compromise the United States’ national security. See Government Motion to Protect Against Disclosure of National Security Information, AE013, page 3. Elaborating on the claim that Mohammed was the “architect of the 9/11 concept,” the Prosecution charges that he conceived of and oversaw the preparation for the 9/11 attacks. Co-defendant Walid bin Attash’s alleged role in the 9/11 attacks was developing the method by which the hijackers smuggled weapons aboard the airplanes, in addition to training the hijackers in hand-to-hand combat. Following co-defendant Ramzi Binalshibh’s denied entry into the United States, his alleged role in the 9/11 attacks was to be the liaison between the chief hijackers and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Co-defendant Ammar al-Baluchi’s alleged role in the 9/11 attacks included financial coordination of the hijackers, in addition to procuring a cockpit operations video and flight simulator for the hijackers’ training. Co-defendant Mustafa al-Hawsawi’s alleged role in the 9/11 attacks was financial coordination of the hijackers. Al-Hawsawi’s actions allegedly included draining the hijackers’ bank accounts on the day of the attacks.


      Who is the Man Behind the Curtain?

      Static filled the gallery’s speakers, and the large video screens which displayed the 40-second-delayed proceedings went blank— to prevent lip-reading— while a red light flashed at the right-hand side of Judge Pohl’s desk. Observation of the hearing was shut down.
      As soon as the audio and visual feeds resumed and the flashing light shut off, Judge Pohl expressed two immediate question/concerns: Who ordered the audio/visual feeds to be censored, because it was not on his authority and why were the feeds censored when Learned Counsel for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, David Nevin, had been discussing theunclassified portion of the Joint Defense Motion to Preserve Evidence of Any Existing Detention Facility? After resuming control of what information would appear on the record, Judge Pohl emphasized his concern that an “external body” is superseding his authority, remarking that it was if “if some external body is turning the commission off.”

      Nevin, on behalf of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, echoed Judge Pohl’s concerns and asked: “Who is controlling these proceedings?”

      Learned Counsel for Walid bin Attash, Cheryl Bormann, emphasized that the mere mention of a motion that contained some classified information seemed to trigger the censorship..

      Defense Counsel for Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Navy Commander Walter Ruiz, raised an even more worrisome implication: If an external body above Judge Pohl’s authority is censoring the audio/visual feeds, that same external body might also be eavesdropping on the defense teams’ communication during the proceedings even when they are not addressing the court. After all, the courtroom is filled with microphones.

      Only the Prosecution did not look surprised when the curtain of silence fell upon the courtroom, and they would not discuss what they knew in public.”

  37. DXer said

    Op-Ed Contributor

    The Deafness Before the Storm


    Published: September 10, 2012


    That is, unless it was read in conjunction with the daily briefs preceding Aug. 6, the ones the Bush administration would not release. While those documents are still not public, I have read excerpts from many of them, along with other recently declassified records, and come to an inescapable conclusion: the administration’s reaction to what Mr. Bush was told in the weeks before that infamous briefing reflected significantly more negligence than has been disclosed. In other words, the Aug. 6 document, for all of the controversy it provoked, is not nearly as shocking as the briefs that came before it.

    The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a terrorist operation.


  38. DXer said

    In an email from August 2001 about Khalid Almidhar one CIA analyst says that perhaps the FBI could fly by Almidhar’s name past Ressam.

    It had long been known Osama Bin Laden was interested in using cropdusters to disperse biological agents (since the testimony of millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam).

  39. DXer said

    U.S. Spy Chief: 9/11 ‘Could Have Been Prevented’

    Sept. 18, 2007

    Six years after the deadliest attack on U.S. soil, the head of U.S. spy operations admitted to lawmakers that “9/11 should have and could have been prevented.”

    Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, told members of the House Judiciary Committee Tuesday that “it was an issue of connecting information that was available.”

    “Yeah, that translates to negligence,” charged committee chairman John Conyers, D-Mich.

    “Or interpretation of the law — of how the culture had evolved,” McConnell countered.

    Given the vast resources of the intelligence community, along with the FBI’s and CIA’s knowledge that al Qaeda had an interest in flight training, and had sent 9/11 hijackers Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and terrorism suspect Zacarias Moussaoui to undertake such training in the United States, McConnell said, “For whatever reason, we didn’t connect the dots.”

    A federal judge in Virginia sentenced Moussaoui, the only person indicted in connection with the 9/11 attacks, to life in prison without the possibility of parole, in May 2006. He is serving his time at a super-maximum security federal facility in Florence, Colo.

    “We could have done a better job as a community,” McConnell told the House panel.

    McConnell’s admissions before the panel took a statement he made on June 29 a few steps further.

    In his earlier remarks, McConnell said, “The rules that were established during the Cold War and post-70s served us well, but it created seams. In my view, the 9/11 tragedy should have been prevented. It was preventable. But, I think the terrorists took advantage of the seams that had been created in the process for how we conduct our affairs, both intelligence and law enforcement.”

    The 9/11 Commission criticized the National Security Agency and its ability to analyze intercepted communications, noting in its final report, “While the NSA had the technical capability to report on communications with suspected terrorist facilities in the Middle East, the NSA did not seek FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) court warrants to collect communications between individuals in the United States and foreign countries, because it believed that this was an FBI role.

    “It also did not want to be viewed as targeting persons in the United States and possibly violating laws that governed NSA’s collection of foreign intelligence,” the report continued.

    Intelligence officials had previously stated that the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program was established after analyzing the pre-9/11 movements and communications of the hijackers after the attacks.

    After poring over the hijackers’ phone calls and e-mails, investigators noticed missed opportunities — communications that could have been intercepted, and possibly would have tipped investigators to the coming attacks.

    After a review by lawyers from the White House, NSA and Justice Department, the program operated at the NSA, and allowed the agency to perform warrantless electronic surveillance of suspected al Qaeda members in the United States.

    Much of Tuesday’s hearing focused on changes in the FISA law, and technical aspects of the government’s data collection programs.

    Shortly after the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program was transferred to the FISA court’s jurisdiction in January 2007, a secret order from the court required intelligence agencies to obtain a warrant to intercept foreign-to-foreign communications that were routed on U.S. communication networks.

    Given the NSA’s ability to collect communications and data from around the world and the Internet, the nation’s security officials faced a daunting task. McConnell told the House Judiciary Committee that, in some cases, this meant that the U.S. was required to get a warrant to intercept Iraqi insurgent communications.

    He added that the changes made to FISA under the Protect America Act, signed into law in August, provided wider surveillance coverage of terrorism targets by freeing up resources.

    Civil liberties groups have long voiced concerns about the changes in the law, and over the NSA program. The Terrorist Surveillance Program had operated covertly until it was revealed in a December 2005 story by the New York Times. A pending leak investigation is underway by the Justice Department over the disclosure.

    Congress is currently holding hearings on making changes in the FISA law permanent. At the Tuesday hearing, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D-N.Y., said, “The power to invade people’s privacy cannot be exercised unchecked.”

  40. DXer said

    And of course, the same failure in intelligence analysis led to the 3000 deaths on 9/11.

    Amerithrax will be the legacy of Attorney General Eric Holder and FBI Director Mueller due to their failure to take proactive steps to correct the missteps in intelligence analysis.

  41. DXer said


    Dr. Zawahiri accomplished the attack on the US “structure” he intended. With the planes, Al Qaeda struck the US trade dominance (World Trade Center) and its military might (Pentagon). With the anthrax, some US-based supporter(s) of the goals of Zawahiri rounded out the field that they imagine provides support to Israel — the legislative branch and media. Analogous letter bombs were sent in connection with the earlier attack on the World Trade Center and the imprisonment of the Blind Sheikh and militant islamists responsible for that attack and a related plot. Thus, relying on the postal service to send its deadly missives in connection with an earlier attack of the World Trade Center is not only Al Qaeda’s modus operandi, it is its signature.

    The two FBI investigative squads were compartmentalized and not even aware what the other investigative squad was doing, how was there seamless cooperation between the CIA and FBI? How can the investigators on the one squad judge the quality of their analysis? How can the scientists on the third forensics squad know how they are being used in putting out the spin? In light of politicization of the US DOJ, how can one say that the compartmentalization has not been used to serve political or personal or financial interests — rather than a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

    Ayman’s plan established by the documentary evidence seized in Afghanistan was to use the cover of charities and universities. That’s exactly what he did.

    In the Washington, D.C. area, Taliban supporter Ali Al-Timimi worked in the same building as famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID Deputy Commander and Acting Commander Charles Bailey, who had co-invented a process using silanized hydrophobic silica to lead to greater concentration of a biological agent. Dr. Bailey has been a prolific Ames anthrax strain researcher. Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey had multimillion dollar grants from DARPA funding a contract with USAMRIID with Delta Ames supplied by NIH. NSA intercepts showed that Ali Al-Timimi was working with Bin Laden’s sheik al-Hawali, who had been the subject of Bin Laden’s 1996 Declaration of War and his 1998 claim of responsibility for the embassy bombings. Timimi has been sentenced to life plus 70 years before his conviction was reversed and remanded. Bilal Philips had been Ali’s mentor and the father of Jafar the Pilot had been Bilal Philips’ mentor. Ali Al-Timimi shared a fax machine with famed Russian anthrax bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID deputy commander Charles Bailey, who is listed as an author on various articles reporting biodefense research using virulent Ames strain of anthrax. Dr. Bailey had worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency (”DIA”) for years on threat assessment of biological weapons. Both he and Dr. Alibek had consulted for Battelle, world renown for its expertise on anthrax aerosols. They had co-authored the patent filed in mid-March 2001 on concentrating biological agents using silica in the growth medium that was still confidential as of Fall 2001. Both Dr. Bailey and Ali Al-Timimi had a high security clearance while working at SRA in 1999. Al-Timimi was doing work on a Navy contract.

    CIA Director Tenet, in a May 2007 book, notes that the CIA was startled to learn that the anthrax planning had been done in parallel with the 9/11 planning. Indeed, it was the laptop of Hawsawi, who was KSM’s assistant who sent and received money from the hijackers, that had the anthrax spraydrying documents on it. In June 2003, a UN report explained that Al-Qaeda “WMD Committee” — Mohammed Abdel-Rahman was one of its three members — “is known to have approached a number of Muslim scientists to assist the terrorist network with the creation and procurement of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.” Al-Timimi was one such scientist but there were others.

    The anthrax operation was likely led by Mohammed Islambouli, who had been in a cell with KSM in connection with the planned attacks on the US using aircraft and other means. Islambouli’s role and his planned visit to the US in preparation for the attacks was the subject of the December 4, 1998 Presidential Daily Brief by the CIA to President Clinton. If we don’t learn from history, we are doomed to repeat it. The job of journalists, however, is news, not analysis. So journalists understandably needed to wait until they are told these things by the government. Unfortunately, they never were. Sometimes the government’s interest in the fruits of intelligence activity causes them to forego explaining what is really going on or in seeking a criminal prosecution. Sometimes it is a bureaucrat’s attempt to cover his ass or a politician’s effort to stay in office. Sometimes it is is just a failure to connect the dots. The solution to Amerithrax, however, has been there for all to see — most intelligence is open source.

    In the Summer 2006, the “911 Imam” Awlaki (Aulaqi) from Falls Church, Virginia was arrested in Yemen and held for 18 months. Awlaki met both in San Diego and in Falls Church with hijacker Nawaf who had been at the planning meeting in January 2000 at the condo of anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat. 911 planner Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh had the telephone number of Awlaki’s mosque. CIA Director Tenet in his 2007 book says authorities were startled to find that the anthrax planning had been done in parallel with the 9/11 planning and that Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh had a CBRN role. The Falls Church “911 Iman” Awlaki would speak alongside fellow Falls Church imam Ali Al-Timimi and Bilal Philips about the signs of the coming day of judgment. In August 2001, he spoke with Ali Al-Timimi in London along with unindicted WTC 1993 conspirator and recruiter Bilal Philips.

    As the FBI’s Ivins Theory stands based on evidence disclosed to date, Amerithrax looks to be a total mess. There needs to be a full-blown review of the Amerithrax Investigation by either Congress, a Committee or Inspector General. For starters, the FBI and various agencies need to comply with the Freedom of Information Act. For example, in two years since Dr. Ivins suicide, USAMRIID has produced only a few of the 10 years of emails. The entire stack should have been redacted as appropriate and put on a table in a room back in September 2008. People more efficient than the FOIA office personnel could have uploaded them overnight. If the United States government is so inefficient in producing documents under FOIA, it does not bode well for its efficiency in sharing information internally. Efficiency in sharing of information is critical to “connecting the dots.”

    Perhaps the withholding of information in Amerithrax may be due in part to a profound embarrassment and fear of legal liability, rather than due merely to the confidentiality required in a criminal and national security investigation. History in time will permit us to judge who was part of the problem and who in the end proved part of the solution. It is never too late to do the right thing — even if that is to say: “We don’t know who is responsible.”

  42. DXer said

    “The Straight Path”: Connecting the Dots

    Ali Al-Timimi, who was coordinating with Anwar Awlaki, shared a suite with the two leading virulent Ames researchers who in Spring 2001 co-invented a process by which silica was used in the growth medium to concentrate anthrax.

    Al-Timimi’s attorney explained in a court filing that unsealed in April 2008 that Ali “was a participant in dozens of international overseas calls to individuals known to have been under suspicion of Al-Qaeda ties like Al-Hawali” and “was described during his trial by FBI agent John Wyman as having ‘extensive ties’ with the ‘broader al-Qaeda network.” Al-Timimi was on an advisory board member of Assirat al-Mustaqueem (”The Straight Path”), an international Arabic language magazine. Assirat, produced in Pittsburgh beginning in 1991, was the creation of a group of North American muslims, many of whom were senior members of IANA. Its Advisory Committee included Bassem Khafagi and Ali Al-Timimi. As Al-Timimi’s counsel explained in a court filing unsealed in April 2008:

    “[IANA head] Bassem Khafagi was questioned about Dr. Al-Timimi before 9-11 in Jordan, purportedly at the behest of American intelligence. [redacted passage ] He was specifically asked about Dr. Al-Timimi’s connection to Bin Laden prior to Dr. Al-Timimi’s arrest. He was later interviewed by the FBI about Dr. Al-Timimi. Clearly, such early investigations go directly to the allegations of Dr. Al-Timimi’s connections to terrorists and Bin Laden.”

    Two staff members who wrote for Assirat then joined IANA’s staff when it folded in 2000. They had been members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and were activists in the movement. One of the former EIJ members, Gamal Sultan, was the editor of the quarterly IANA magazine in 2002. Mr. Sultan’s brother Mahmoud wrote for Assirat also. The most prominent writer was the founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Kamal Habib. He led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad at the time of Anwar Sadat’s assassination when young doctor Zawahiri’s cell merged with a few other cells to form the EIJ. Two writers for Assirat in Pittsburgh had once shared a Portland, Oregon address with Al Qaeda member Wadih El-Hage. Wadih al Hage was Ali Mohammed’s friend and served as Bin Laden’s “personal secretary.”

    Kamal Habib had been a founding member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and had spent 10 years in jail for the assassination of Anwar Sadat. In the late 1970s, the cell run by the young doctor Zawahiri joined with three other groups to become Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) under Habib’s leadership. After a visit in 2000, Gamal Sultan said Pittsburgh was known as the “American Kandahar,” given its rolling hills. In Egypt he formed the Islah (“Reform”) party with Gamal Sultan. While contributing to Al Manar al Jadeed, the Ann Arbor-based IANA’s quarterly journal, the pair sought the blind sheik’s endorsement of their political party venture in March 1999. They were not seeking the official participation of organizations like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or the Egyptian Islamic Group. They were just hoping the groups would not oppose it. The pair wanted members of the movement to be free to join in peaceful partisan activity. They were not deterred when the blind sheik responded that the project was pointless, at the same he withdrew his support for the cease-fire initiative that had been backed by the imprisoned leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group.

    In early April 2001, Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rented an apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, for about a month, with the assistance of a man they met at the mosque. Nawaf Al-Hazmi had been at the January 2000 meeting at Yazid Sufaat’s Malaysian condominium in January 2000. Hijackers Nawaf and Hani Hanjour, a fellow pilot who was his friend from Saudi Arabia, attended sermons at the Dar al Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, where Al-Timimi was located until he established the nearby center. The FBI reports that at an imam named Awlawki who had recently also moved from San Diego had closed door meetings with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 2000 while all three of them were living in San Diego. Police later found the phone number of the Falls Church mosque when they searched the apartment of 9/11 planner Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Germany. In his 2007 book, Center of the Storm, George Tenet noted that Ramzi bin al-Shibh had a CBRN role.

    Yusuf Wells, who was a fundraiser for the Benevolence International Foundation, visited Northern Virginia over the April 14-15, 2001 weekend. The previous month he had been at Iowa State University on a similar visit. On April 15, 2001, he was brought to a paintball game. In the second season, they had become more secretive after an inquiry by an FBI Special Agent was made in 2000 of one of the members about the games. Part of BIF fundraiser Wells’ job involved writing reports about his fund raising trips. In his April 15, 2001 report he writes:

    “I was taken on a trip to the woods where a group of twenty brothers get together to play Paintball. It is a very secret and elite group and as I understand it, it is an honor to be invited to come. The brothers are fully geared up in camouflage fatigues, facemasks, and state of the art paintball weaponry. They call it ‘training’ and are very serious about it. I knew at least 4 or 5 of them were ex US military, the rest varied.

    Most all of them young men between the ages of 17-35. I was asked by the amir of the group to give a talk after Thuhr prayer. I spoke about seeing the conditions of Muslims overseas while with BIF, and how the fire of Islam is still very much alive in the hearts of the people even in the midst of extreme oppression. I also stressed the idea of being balanced. That we should not just be jihadis and perfect our fighting skills, but we should also work to perfect our character and strengthen our knowledge of Islam. I also said that Muslims are not just book reading cowards either, and that they should be commended for forming such a group.
    Many were confused as to why I had been ‘trusted’ to join the group so quickly, but were comforted after my brief talk. Some offered to help me get presentations on their respective localities.”

    A man named Kwon recalled driving Al-Timimi home from the mosque September 11, 2001 after the terrorist attacks. He said Al-Timimi and another scholar argued, with Al-Timimi characterizing the attacks as a punishment of America from God. “He told me to gather some brothers, to have a contingency plan in case there were mass hostilities toward Muslims in America.” Kwon said Al-Timimi told the group that the effort to spread Islam in the United States was over and that the only other options open to them were to repent, leave the U.S. and join the mujahadeen —preparing to defend Afghanistan against the coming U.S. invasion.

    After 9/11, although a dinner that night was cancelled in light of the events of the day, Al-Timimi sought “to organize a plan in case of anti-Muslim backlash and to get the brothers together.” The group got together on September 16. Al-Timimi when he came in told the group to turn of their phones, unplug the answering machine, and pull down the curtains. Al-Timimi told the group that Mullah Omar had called upon Muslims to defend Afghanistan. Al-Timimi read parts of the al-Uqla fatwa to the group and gave the fatwa to Khan with the instructions to burn it after he read it. Al Timimi said the duty to engage in jihad is “fard ayn” — an individual duty of all Muslims. Over a lunch with two of the group on September 19, Al-Timimi told them not to carry anything suspicious and if they were stopped on the way to Pakistan to ask for their mother and cry like a baby. He told them to carry a magazine. The next day the pair left for Pakistan. The group from the September 16 meeting met again in early October, and a number left for Pakistan immediately after that meeting.

    Al-Timimi’s lawyer explains that Al-Timimi was in telephone contact with Al-Hawali on September 16, 2001 and September 19, 2001

    “The conversation with Al-Hawali on September 19, 2001 was central to the indictment and raised at trial. Al-Timimi called Dr. Hawali after the dinner with Kwon on September 16, 2001 and just two hours before he met with Kwon and Hassan for the last time on September 19, 2001.”

    Al-Timimi was urging the young men go defend the Taliban against the imminent US invasion. A recent open letter to Ayman Zawahiri from a senior Libyan jihadist, Bin-Uthman, now living in London, confirms that Ayman Zawahiri and Atef, at a several day meeting in Kandahar in the Summer of 2000, viewed WMD as a deterrent to the invasion of Afghanistan.

    Kwon, who had just become a U.S. citizen in August 2001, went to the mountain training camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba. The U.S. placed on its terrorist list in December 2001. Kwon practiced with a semi-automatic weapons and learned to
    fire a grenade launcher, but he was not able to join the Taliban. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan closed as U.S. forces took control of Afghanistan shortly before Kwon completed his training. His trainers suggested that he instead go back to the United States and gather information for the holy warriors. Kwon told jurors at al-Timimi’s trial how he first heard Al-Timimi speak in 1997 at an Islamic Assembly of North America conference in Chicago and then found that Al-Timimi lectured locally near his home in Northern Virginia. “Russian Hell” — a jihad video that featured bloody clips of a Chechen Muslim rebel leader executing a Russian prisoner of war —
    was a favorite among the videos that the group exchanged and discussed. “They (the videos) motivated us. It was like they gave us inspiration,” Kwon told the jurors.

    In 2001, Al-Timimi kept the personal papers of IANA President Khafagi at his home for safekeeping. His taped audio lecturers were among the most popular at the charity Islamic Assembly of North America in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He knew its President, Khafagi, both through work with CAIR and IANA. The same nondescript office building at 360 S. Washington St. in Falls Church where Timimi used to lecture at Dar al Arqam housed the Muslim World League.

    Al Timimi was close to his former teacher Safar al Hawali, the dissident Saudi sheik whose writings hail what he calls the inevitable downfall of the West. (Under pressure from authorities after 9/11, Al Hawali has played a public role in mediating between Saudi militants and the government.) Al-Timimi sought to represent and explain the views of radical sheik Al-Hawali in a letter he sent to members of Congress on the first anniversary of the mailing to the US Senators Daschle and Leahy. The Hawali October 6, 2002 letter drafted by Al-Timimi was hand delivered to every member of the US Congress just before their vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq, warning of the disastrous consequences that would follow an invasion of Iraq. Dr. Timimi’s defense committee explained on their website:

    “Because Dr. Al-Timimi felt that he did not have enough stature to send a letter in his name on behalf of Muslims, he contacted Dr. Al-Hawali
    among others to send the letter. Dr. Al-Hawali agreed and sent a revised version which Dr. Al-Timimi then edited and had hand delivered to every member of Congress.”

    In addition to the October 6, 2002 letter, drafted by Al-Timimi, Hawali had sent a lengthy October 15, 2001 “Open Letter” to President Bush in which he had rejoiced in the 9/11 attacks. One Al-Hawali lecture, sought to be introduced in the prosecution of the IANA webmaster, applauded the killing of Jews and called for more killing, praised suicide bombings, and said of Israel that it’s time to “fight and expel this hated country that consists of those unclean, defiled, the cursed.”

    Bin Laden referred to Sheik al-Hawali in his 1996 Declaration of War on America. Prior to the 1998 embassy bombings, Ayman’s London cell sent letters to three different media outlets in Europe claiming responsibility for the bombings and referring to Hawali’s imprisonment. In two of the letters, the conditions laid out as to how the violence would stop were (1) release of Sheik al-Hawali (who along with another had been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia in 1994) and (2) the release of blind sheik Abdel Rahman (who had been imprisoned in connection with WTC 1993). Hawali was released in 1999 after he agreed to stop advocating against the Saudi regime.

    Al-Timimi sent out a February 1, 2003 email in Arabic containing an article that said:

    “There is no doubt Muslims were overjoyed because of the adversity that befell their greatest enemy. The Columbia crash made me feel, and God is the only One to know, that this is a strong signal that Western Supremacy (especially that of America) that began 500 years ago is coming to a quick end, God willing, as occurred to the shuttle.”

    As Ali later explained to NBC, “To have a space shuttle crash in Palestine, Texas, with a Texas president and an Israeli astronaut, somebody might say there’s a divine hand behind it.”

    • DXer said

      GMU Center for Biodefense: Discovery Hall

      Ali Al-Timimi worked at George Mason University’s Discovery Hall throughout 2000 and 2002 period. The Mason Gazette in “Mason to Pursue Advanced Biodefense Research” on November 17, 2000 had announced: “The School of Computational Sciences (SCS) and Advanced Biosystems, Inc., a subsidiary of Hadron, Inc., of Alexandria, are pursuing a collaborative program at the Prince William Campus to enhance research and educational objectives in biodefense research. The article noted that the program was funded primarily by a grant awarded to Advanced Biosystems from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). A 2007 GMU PhD thesis explains that the “An Assessment of Exploitable Weaknesses in Universities” by Corinne M. Verzoni offices and research located in Discovery Hall, making this an attractive building on the Prince William Campus to target for information and technology.” The 2007 PhD student biodefense student explained: “Discovery Hall currently has BSL 1, 2 and 2+ labs in which students work with attenuated and vaccine strains of Fracella tularemia, anthrax and HIV. GMU will eventually have new biological labs featuring a BSL-3 lab which will have anthrax and tularemia.”

      Instead of starting a center from scratch, GMU chose to join forces with Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey’s existing research firm, Hadron Advanced Biosystems Inc. Hadron was already working under contract for the federal government, having received funding from DARPA. Dr. Alibek told the Washington Post that he and Bailey had spent their careers studying an issue that only recently grabbed the country’s attention, after the anthrax mailings the previous fall. Dr. Bailey and Alibek met in 1991, when a delegation of Soviet scientists visited USAMRIID at Ft. Detrick. Dr. Bailey explained that the purpose of the tour was to show the Soviets that the US was not developing offensive biological weapons. Bailey said he tried to engage Alibek in conversation but Alibek remained aloof. Alibek, for his part, explains that he was suspicious of this American smiling so broadly at him. A year later, Alibek would defect to the US and reveal an illegal biological program in the Soviet Union of a staggering scope. Alibek says that one reason he defected was that he realized that the Soviet intelligence was wrong — that the US research was in fact only defensive.

      Former USAMRIID Deputy Commander and Acting Commander Ames researcher Bailey coinvented, with Ken Alibek, the process to treat cell culture with hydrophobic silicon dioxide so as to permit greater concentration upon drying. He was in Room 156B of GMU’s Discovery Hall at the Center for Biodefense. The patent application was filed March 14, 2001. Rm 154A was Victor Morozov’s room number when he first
      assumed Timimi’s phone number in 2004 (and before he moved to the newly constructed Bull Run Hall). Morozov was the co-inventor with Dr. Bailey of the related cell culture process under which the silica was removed from the spore surface.

      One ATCC former employee felt so strongly about lax security there the scientist called me out of the blue and said that the public was overlooking the patent repository as a possible source of the Ames strain. ATCC would not deny they had virulent Ames in their patent repository pre 9/11 (as distinguished from their online catalog). The spokesperson emailed me: “As a matter of policy, ATCC does not disclose information on the contents of its patent depository.” Previously, though, the ATCC head publicly explained that it did not have virulent Ames.

      George Mason University, Department Listings, accessed August 17, 2003, shows that the National Center For Biodefense and Center for Biomedical Genomics had the same mail stop (MS 4ES). The most famed bioweaponeer in the world was not far from this sheik urging violent jihad in an apocalyptic struggle between religions. Dr. Alibek’s office was Rm. 156D in Prince William 2. The groups both shared the same department fax of 993-4288. Dr. Alibek advises me he had seen him several times in the corridors of GMU and was told that he was a religious muslim hard-liner but knew nothing of his activities. At one point, Timimi’s mail drop was MSN 4D7.

      Charles Bailey at 3-4271 was the former head of USAMRIID and joined the Center in April 2001. He continued to do research with Ames after 9/11. Dr. Alibek reports that shortly after the mailings, he wrote FBI Director Mueller and offered his services but was advised that they already had assembled a large group. A 2004 report describes research done by Dr. Alibek and his colleagues using Delta Ames obtained from NIH for a research project done for USAMRIID. There were two grants from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency from 2001. One $3.6 million grant dated to July 2001 and the other was previous to that.

      Ali Al-Timimi had the same telephone number that Dr. Victor Morozov of the Center for Biodefense would later have when he joined the faculty and occupied the newly constructed Bull Run Building, which opened in late 2004 (Rm. #362). Dr. Morozov focuses on the development of new bioassay methods for express analysis, high-throughput screening and proteomics. He has recently developed a new electrospray-based technology for mass fabrication of protein microarrays. Dr. Morozov is currently supervising a DOE -funded research project directed at the development of ultra-sensitive express methods for detection of pathogens in which slow diffusion of analytes is replaced by their active transport controlled and powered by external forces (electric, magnetic, gravitational or hydrodynamic). His homepage explains that: “A variety of projects are available for students to participate in “*** 7. Develop software to analyze motion of beads. 8. Develop software to analyze patterns in drying droplets. 9. Develop an electrostatic collector for airborne particles.”

      Al-Timimi obtained a doctorate from George Mason University in 2004 in the field of computational biology — a field related to cancer research involving genome sequencing. He successfully defended his thesis 5 weeks after his indictment. Curt Jamison, Timimi’s thesis advisor, coauthor and loyal friend, was in Prince William II (Discovery Hall) Rm. 181A. The staff of Advanced Biosystems was in Rm. 160, 162, 177, 254E and several others. Computational sciences offices were intermixed among the Hadron personnel on the first floor of Prince William II to include 159, 161, 166A, 167, 181 B and 181C. Rm. 156B was Charles Bailey, former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, who was head of the Center for Biodefense. Defense contractor Hadron had announced the appointment of Dr. Bailey as Vice-President of Advanced Biosystems in early April 2001.

      “Over 13 years, Dr. Bailey had served as a Research Scientist, Deputy Commander for Research, Deputy Commander and Commander at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute. As a USAMRIID scientist, he designed and supervised the construction of BL-3 containment facilities. His hands-on experience with a wide variety of pathogens is chronicled in 70 published articles. During his 4 years with the Defense Intelligence Agency, he published numerous articles assessing foreign capabilities regarding biological weapons.” When I asked Dr. Bailey to confirm Al-Timimi’s room number relative to his own, his only response was to refer me to University counsel. Counsel then never substantively responded to my inquiry regarding their respective room numbers citing student privacy. Ali’s friend and thesis advisor, Dr. Jamison never responded to an emailed query either. GMU perhaps understandably was very nervous about losing the $25 million grant for a new BL-3 regional facility to be located very near our country’s capitol.

      The reports on the study on the effectiveness of the mailed anthrax in the Canadian experiment was reported in private briefings in Spring and Summer of 2001. An insider thus was not dependent on the published report later that Fall. (The date on the formal report is September 10, 2001).

      Dr. Charles Bailey for DIA wrote extensively on the the biothreat posed by other countries (and presumably terrorists). He shared a fax number with Al-Timimi. What came over that fax line in Spring and Summer of 2001? At some point, Dr. Al-Timimi, Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey also shared the same maildrop. It certainly would not be surprising that the two directors who headed the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense — and had received the biggest defense award in history for work with Delta Ames under a contract with USAMRIID — would have been briefed on the threat of mailed anthrax. The 1999 short report by William Patrick to Hatfill at SAIC on the general subject was far less important given that it did not relate to actual experimental findings.

      Plus, it is common sense that while someone might use as a model something they had surreptitiously learned of — they would not use as a model something in a memo that they had commissioned. Thus, it was rather misdirected to focus on the 1999 SAIC report commissioned by Dr. Hatfill rather than the 2001 Canadian report. The Canadian report related to the anthrax threat sent regarding the detention of Vanguards of Conquest #2 Mahjoub in Canada. Mahjoub had worked with al-Hawsawi in Sudan (the fellow with anthrax spraydrying documents on his laptop). The anthrax threat in late January prompted the still-classified Presidential Daily Brief (“PDB”) in early February 2001 by the CIA to President Bush on the subject.

      In Fall 2001, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (”AFIP”) had detected silicon dioxide (silica) in the attack anthrax — with a characteristic big spike for the silicon. No silica was observable on the SEMs images that Dr. Alibek and Dr. Matthew Meselson saw. The Daschle product was “pure spores.” Was silicon dioxide used as part of a microdroplet cell culture process used prior to drying to permit greater concentration? As explained in a later related patent, the silica could be removed from the surface of the spore through repeated centrifugaton or an air chamber.

      Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey had filed a patent application in mid-March 2001 involving a microdroplet cell culture technique that used silicon dioxide in a method for concentrating growth of cells. The patent was granted and the application first publicly disclosed in the Spring of 2002. Weren’t the SEMS images and AFIP EDX finding both consistent with use of this process in growing the culture? It’s been suggested informally to me that perhaps the silicon analytical peak was due to silanol from hydrolysis of a silane, used in siliconizing glassware. But didn’t the AFIP in fact also detect oxygen in ratios characteristic of silicon dioxide? Wasn’t the scientist, now deceased, who performed the EDX highly experienced and expert in detecting silica? Hasn’t the AFIP always stood by its report. In its report, AFIP explained: “AFIP experts utilized an energy dispersive X-ray spectrometer (an instrument used to detect the presence of otherwise-unseen chemicals through characteristic wavelengths of X-ray light) to confirm the previously unidentifiable substance as silica.” Perhaps the nuance that was lost — or just never publicly explained for very sound reasons — was that silica was used in the cell culture process and then removed from the spores through a process such as centrifugation. The applicants in March 2001 for an international patent relating to vaccines were a leading aerosol expert, Herman R. Shepherd, and a lonstanding anthrax biodefense expert, Philip Russell.

      Dr. Morozov is co-inventor along with Dr. Bailey for a patent “Cell Culture” that explains how the silicon dioxide can be removed from the surface. Perhaps it is precisely this AFIP finding of silicon dioxide (without silica on the SEMs) that is why the FBI came to suspect Al-Timimi in 2003 (rightly or wrongly, we don’t know). The FBI would have kept these scientific findings secret to protect the integrity of the confidential criminal/national security investigation. There was still a processor and mailer to catch — still a case to prove. After 9/11, intelligence collection takes precedence over arrests. As Ron Kessler explains in the new book, Terrorist Watch, many FBI officials feel that they are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t. Outside observers are oxygen in ratios characteristic of silicon dioxide? Wasn’t the scientist, now deceased, who performed the EDX highly experienced and expert in detecting silica? Hasn’t the AFIP always stood by its report. In its report, AFIP explained: “AFIP experts utilized an energy dispersive X-ray spectrometer (an instrument used to detect the presence of otherwise-unseen chemicals through characteristic wavelengths of X-ray light) to confirm the previously unidentifiable substance as silica.” Perhaps the nuance that was lost — or just never publicly explained for very sound reasons — was that silica was used in the cell culture process and then removed from the spores through a process such as centrifugation. The applicants in March 2001 for an international patent relating to vaccines were a leading aerosol expert, Herman R. Shepherd, and a lonstanding anthrax biodefense expert, Philip Russell.

      Dr. Morozov is co-inventor along with Dr. Bailey for a patent “Cell Culture” that explains how the silicon dioxide can be removed from the surface. Perhaps it is precisely this AFIP finding of silicon dioxide (without silica on the SEMs) that is why the FBI came to suspect Al-Timimi in 2003 (rightly or wrongly, we don’t know). The FBI would have kept these scientific findings secret to protect the integrity of the confidential criminal/national security investigation. There was still a processor and mailer to catch — still a case to prove. After 9/11, intelligence collection takes precedence over arrests. As Ron Kessler explains in the new book, Terrorist Watch, many FBI officials feel that they are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t. Outside observers are an enormous amount of water for the four DI taps in the whole building. According to the assistant director for operations, it is difficult to calculate the reason for that much water since no leak was found. A large amount of water used over a short period of time for unknown reasons could indicate that the research is being conducted covertly.”

      “A student with legitimate access to Discovery Hall,” she explained, “has easy accessibility to equipment. A student with access to the loading dock could steal equipment on the weekend when campus security is not present in Discovery Hall. A student could also walk out of the entrance with equipment on the weekend without security present.” She concluded: “The events at GMU demonstrate opportunity to create a clandestine lab, the ability to sell items illegally, or the ability to exploit school equipment.” In a late September 2001 interview on NPR on the anthrax threat, Dr. Alibek said: “When we talk and deal with, for example, nuclear weapons, it’s not really difficult to count how much of one or another substance we’ve got in the hands. When you talk about biological agents, in this case it’s absolutely impossible to say whether or not something has been stolen.”

      Presently, Al-Timimi’s prosecution is on remand while the defense is given an opportunity to discover any documents that existed prior to 9/11 about al-Timimi and to address an issue relating to NSA intercepts after 9/11. Ali’s defense counsel explained to the federal district court, upon a remand by the appeals court, that Mr. Timimi was interviewed by an FBI agent and a Secret Service agent as early as February 1994 in connection with the first World Trade Center attack. The agents left their business cards which the family kept. Defense counsel Johnathan Turley further explained that “We have people that were contacted by the FBI and told soon after 9/11 that they believed that Dr. Al-Timimi was either connected to 9/11 or certainly had information about Al Qaeda.”

      Al-Timimi worked for SRA in 1999 where he had a high security clearance for work for the Navy. At a conference on countering biological terrorism in 1999 sponsored by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Dr. Alibek was introduced by a former colleague of Dr. Bailey:

      “Dr. Llewellyn: This is rather strange because I just met Dr. Alibek today. He was introduced to me by Dr. Charlie Bailey, who now works for SRA. But Charlie and I were associated with the Army Medical Research and Development Command Defense Program for over 20 years.”

      When I emailed Dr. Bailey in December 2007 to confirm Ali had the room right near his at Discovery Hall and whether he had worked with Al-Timimi at SRA he politely referred me to counsel and took no questions. Dr. Alibek and Dr. Popov have told me that Ali is not known to have worked on any biodefense project. Dr. Popova told me I should direct any such questions to Dr. Bailey. Dr. Bailey told me I should direct any questions to University counsel. University counsel declined to answer any questions.

      • DXer said

        The 2006 Arrest Of Falls Church “911 Imam” And Fellow Salafist Lecturer Awlaqi

        In March 2002, fellow Falls Church iman Anwar Aulaqi — known as the “911 imam” — suddenly left the US and went to Yemen, thus avoiding the inquiry the 9/11 Commission thought so important. (Eventually Aulaqi would be banned from entering both the UK and US because of his speeches on jihad, martyrdom and the like). Upon a return visit in Fall 2002, “Aulaqi attempted to get al Timimi to discuss issues related to the recruitment of young Muslims,” according to a court filing by Al-Timimi’s attorney at the time, Edward MacMahon. McMahon reports that those “entreaties were rejected.” After 18 months in prison in Yemen in 2006 and 2007, he was released over US objections, where he says he was subject to interrogation by the FBI. By 2010, when the United States announced that there was authorization to attempt to kill Anwar Aulaqi, he had long since gone into hiding after acknowledging his role in the Ft. Hood shooting and attempt to bring down an airliner flying into Detroit.

        Al-Timimi’s counsel explained in a court filing unsealed in April 2008: “]911 imam] Anwar Al-Aulaqi goes directly to Dr. Al-Timimi’s state of mind and his role in the alleged conspiracy. The 9-11 Report indicates that Special Agent Ammerman interviewed Al-Aulaqi just before or shortly after his October 2002 visit to Dr. Al-Timimi’s home to discuss the attacks and his efforts to reach out to the U.S. government.”

        Falls Church imam Awlaqi (Aulaqi), who met with hijacker Nawaf, reportedly was picked up in Yemen by Yemen security forces at the request of the CIA in the summer of 2006. British and US intelligence had him and others under surveillance. Al-Timimi would speak alongside fellow Falls Church imam Awlaqi (Aulaqi) at conferences such as the August 2001 London JIMAS and the August 2002 London JIMAS conference. They would speak on subjects such as signs before the day of judgment and the like. Dozens of their lectures are available online. Unnamed U.S. officials told the Washington Post in 2008 that “they have come to believe that Aulaqi worked with al-Qaida networks in the Persian Gulf after leaving Northern Virginia.” One official said: “There is good reason to believe Anwar Aulaqi has been involved in very serious terrorist activities since leaving the United States, including plotting attacks against America and our allies.” “Some believe that Aulaqi was the first person since the summit meeting in Malaysia with whom al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi shared their terrorist intentions and plans,” former Senate Intelligence committee chairman Bob Graham wrote in his 2004 book “Intelligence Matters.”

        The unclassified portion of a U.S. Department of Justice memorandum dated September 26, 2001 states

        “Aulaqi was familiar enough with Nawaf Alhazmi to describe some of Alhazmi’s personality traits. Aulaqi considered Alhazmi to be a loner who did not have a large circle of friends. Alhazmi was slow to enter into personal relationships and was always very soft spoken, a very calm and extremely nice person. Aulaqi did not see Alhazmi as a very religious person, based on the fact that Alhazmi never wore a beard and neglected to attend all five daily prayer sessions.”

        The Washington Post explains that “After leaving the United States in 2002, Aulaqi spent time in Britain, where he developed a following among young ultra-conservative Muslims through his lectures and audiotapes. His CD “The Hereafter” takes listeners on a tour of Paradise that describes “the mansions of Paradise,” “the women of Paradise,” and “the greatest of the pleasures of Paradise.” In London, after leaving the United States, he spoke at JIMAS and argued that in light of the rewards offered to martyrs in Jennah, or Paradise, Muslims should be eager to give his life in fighting the unbelievers. “Don’t think that the ones that die in the sake of Allah are dead — they are alive, and Allah is providing for them. So the shaheed is alive in the sense that his soul is in Jennah, and his soul is alive in Jennah.” He moved to Yemen, his family’s ancestral home, in 2004.” Before his arrest in Yemen in mid-2006, Aulaqi lectured at an Islamist university in San’a run by Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who fought with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and was designated a terrorist in 2004 by the United States and the United Nations.

        Law enforcement sources told the Post that Aulaqi was visited by Ziyad Khaleel, who the government has previously said purchased a satellite phone and batteries for bin Laden in the 1990s. The Post explains: “Khaleel was the U.S. fundraiser for Islamic American Relief Agency, a charity the U.S. Treasury has designated a financier of bin Laden and which listed Aulaqi’s charity as its Yemeni partner. A Washington Post article explained: “The FBI also learned that Aulaqi was visited in early 2000 by a close associate of Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called Blind Sheik who was convicted of conspiracy in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and that he had ties to people raising money for the radical Palestinian movement Hamas, according to Congress and the 9/11 Commission report.”

        He now has been released and came to be at the center of a controversy concerning what the FBI should have known and shared about Hasan, the Ft. Hood shooter. The next month he was alleged to have been involved with the planned bombing of a airliner flying into Detroit. What did Awlaqi, detained in mid-2006 and held for a year and a half, tell questioners, if anything, about his fellow Falls Church imam and fellow Salafist conference lecturer Ali Al-Timimi?

  43. DXer said

    Hani and Nawaf on the Straight Path: Connecting the Kuala Lumpur, Falls Church and New Jersey Dots

    Nawaf Al-Hazmi was one of the two hijackers who had been at the meeting at anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat’s Malaysian condominium in January 2000. Nawaf Hazmi and a colleague had arrived the previous year in San Diego, where they had been unsuccessful in learning to fly. Upon arriving in San Diego in 2000, he met with Imam Anwar Aulaqi — perhaps even the same day as arriving. The 911 Commission Report said that Nawaf and his fellow hijacker and “developed a close relationship with him.” One pilot at the flight school in Arabic said that Nawaf wanted to learn to jets right away, rather than start with small planes. The pilot man thought Nawaf and his colleague, Khalid al-Mihdar, were either joking or dreaming.They were joined in San Diego by Hani Hanjour, a good friend of Nawaf’s from Saudi Arabia. Hani was the pilot of flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon. He was one of the most conservative and religiously observant of the hijackers.

    Hani had first come to the United States in 1991. After short stay in the US in Tucson where he studied in English, he returned to Saudi Arabia until 1996, when he worked in Afghanistan for a relief agency. He took flight lessons in Phoenix, Arizona where he did poorly. He eventually earned his commercial pilot training in 1998. Hani had been at al-Qaeda’s al-Faruq camp when Bin Laden or Atef told him “to report to KSM, who then trained Hanjour for a few days in the use of code words.” Hani then met with Aafia Siddiqui’s future husband al-Baluchhi in United Arab Emirates. Al-Balucchi opened an account for Hani who then traveled to San Diego.

    Aulaqi in early 2001 moved to Falls Church. Several months later, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who by then had joined them in San Diego in December 2000, also moved to Falls Church, Virginia. On April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi received a ticket for speeding in Oklahoma, apparently while driving cross-country from San Diego to Falls Church, Virginia. Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rented an apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, for about a month, with the assistance of a man they met at Aulaqi’s mosque. They lived at 3355 Row St., Apt. 3 in Falls Church. The hijackers attended sermons at the Dar al Hijrah mosque, where Aulaqi was now located. Ali Al-Timimi attended the mosque until he established the nearby center. Police later found the phone number of the Falls Church mosque when they searched the apartment of 9/11 planner Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Germany. Various instructors have confirmed that Hani continued to have poor english and flying skills. Nawaf’s english and flying skills also remained poor.

    On May 1, 2001, Nawaf reported to police that men tried to take his wallet outside a Fairfax, Virginia residence. Before the county officer left, al-Hazmi signed a “statement of release” indicating he did not want the incident investigated. Hani and Nawaf then moved to Paterson, New Jersey, renting a one-bedroom apartment where they lived with some of the other hijackers. On June 30th, his car was involved in a minor traffic accident on the east-bound George Washington Bridge. Hani was stopped by police on August 1, 2001 for driving 55 mph in a 30 mph zone in Arlington, Virginia. On August 22, 2001, Nawaf al Hazmi purchased a Leatherman Wave Multi-tool from a Target department store in Laurel, Maryland.

    Hani and Nawaf moved out of the New Jersey apartment on September 1. Hani was photographed a few days later using an ATM with a fellow hijacker in Laurel, Maryland, where all five Flight 77 hijackers had purchased a 1-week membership in a local Gold’s Gym. On September 10, 2001, Hanjour, al-Mihdhar, and al-Hazmi checked into the Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia where Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a prominent Saudi government official — who later was appointed to head the mosques at Mecca and Medina — was staying. He was the uncle of Sami al-Hussayen, the webmaster of the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”).

    • DXer said

      Kandahar Souvenir: Hijacker Ahmed’s Blackened Leg Lesion

      One of the hijackers, Ahmed Al-Haznawi, went to the ER on June 25, 2001 with what now appears to have been cutaneous anthrax, according to Dr. Tsonas, the doctor who treated him, and other experts. “No one is dismissing this,” said CIA Director Tenet. Alhaznawi had just arrived in the country on June 8. He had traveled with al Shehri from Dubai, United Arab Emirates via London-Gatwick, England to Miami, Florida. His exposure perhaps related to a camp he had been in Afghanistan. He said he got the blackened gash-like lesion when he bumped his leg on a suitcase two months earlier. Two months earlier he had been in camp near Kandahar (according to a videotape he later made serving as his last Will and Testament). His last will and testament is mixed in with the footage by the al-Qaeda’s Sahab Institute for Media Production that includes Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith. There are some spiders that on rare occasions bite and cause such a blackened eschar (notably the Brown Recluse Spider found in some parts of the United States).

      Dr. Tara O’Toole of the Biodefense Center at John Hopkins, now head of biosecurity at Homeland Security, concluded it was anthrax. The former head of that group, Dr. Henderson, and National Academy of Sciences anthrax science review panel member, explained: “The probability of someone this age having such an ulcer, if he’s not an addict and doesn’t have diabetes or something like that, is very low. It certainly makes one awfully suspicious.” The FBI says no anthrax was found where the hijackers were. (The FBI tested the crash sites where the planes came down and found no traces of anthrax). Although no doubt there are some other diseases that lead to similar sores, it is reasonable to credit that it was cutaneous anthrax considering all the circumstances, to include the finding by the 9/11 Commission that ” in 2001, Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda in a laboratory he set up near the Kandahar airport.” Now that Kandahar reportedly is where the extremely virulent anthrax was located, it makes it more likely that the Johns Hopkins people were correct that the lesion was cautions anthrax.

      At the time, CBS reported that “U.S. troops are said to have found another biological weapons research lab near Kandahar, one that that was eyeing anthrax.” But CBS and FBI spokesman further noted that “Those searches found extensive evidence that al-Qaida wanted to develop biological weapons, but came up with no evidence the terrorist group actually had anthrax or other deadly germs, they said.” Only years later did author Suskind claim that in fact there was extremely virulent anthrax at Kandahar. Thus, a factual predicate important to assessment of the Johns Hopkins report on the leg lesion needed to be reevaluated after Hambali’s interrogation in Jordan.

      Another intriguing potential lead concerned a report about Atta’s red hands. Shortly before 9/11, Atta went to a pharmacy with red hands, as if he had been working with bleach or detergent. Delray Beach, Florida pharmacist Greg Chadderton explained:

      “There are two fellows, well dressed, and I asked if there was anything I could do to help them. And the one fellow turned over to me and he showed me his hands, and he said “They’re itching and they’re burning, do you have a cream for this?” His hands were red from this area down (indicating from wrist down) on both of his hands, they were red. Not the normal colour you and I would have from just being like this, but they were red. They weren’t blistering – they were simply red. They were red as if you had taken your hands and dunked them in a bucket of perhaps bleach or something. But they weren’t red on this side (backs of hands) where you would think. That’s what puzzled me, it was very perplexing that this side (palms?) was all red, it was almost as if he had touched something like this.”

      He was given a cream called acid mantle. The explanation I favor is that it was just a latex allergy from wearing gloves. Maybe his red hands related to use of gloves while making a gas or spray later used to subdue passengers such as the red pepper spray introduced as an exhibit in the Moussaoui trial. But there is another disturbing, less likely possibility. The late Midhat Mursi aka Abu Khabab, the chemist helping Zawahiri with his Zabadi, or Curdled Milk, project, worked with a chemical additive for his pesticide/nerve agent. It increased absorption into the skin. Saponin, a natural detergent, is used for that purpose in a variety of commercial contexts. In late 2002, a plot was foiled when an attempt to purchase 1100 pounds of saponin was noticed by a chemical company and stopped. Authorities are not talking. A final even more remote possibility for Atta’s red hands concerns the use of chlorine bleach to decontaminate anthrax.

      • DXer said

        Was Mahmoud Jaballah The Egyptian Scientist In The Library Researching Anthrax?

        As likely explained in the still-classified February 2001 Presidential Daily Brief (”PDB”), a threat to use anthrax was mailed to the Canadian immigration minister in late January 2001 if bail was denied. The mailed anthrax was sent to the United Senators the day after a judge denied bail to Jaballah’s colleague, Mahmoud Mahjoub, who now is revealed have once been the #2 man in Vanguards of Conquest.

        When Mahmoud Mahjoub’s bail hearing was announced in January 2001, one of Zawahiri’s minions threatened to use anthrax if bail was denied. He was the #2 in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad/ Vanguards of Conquest. Bail was denied on October 5, 2001. The potent anthrax was mailed to the US Senators the next day.

        By way of some background, the Canadian government alleged that on the day of the 1998 bombing of the African embassies, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad military commander Mabruk had called Canadian named Jaballah from Baku, Azerbaijan and told him to call the London cell members. Mabruk asked Jaballah to tell them they could reach him in the home of Shehata, who was in charge of Special Operations for Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Shehata was Jaballah’s brother-in-law and had been Jaballah’s lawyer in the 1980s in connection with problems with the government. (Shehata was Montasser al-Zayat’s law partner). Jaballah allegedly had been in regular contact with Mabruk, Shehata and the London cell members who faxed responsibility for the 1998 embassy bombings in which over 200 people died. Shehata’s former law partner, Montasser al-Zayat, and military commander Mabruk announced in March 1999 that Ayman Zawahiri was going to use anthrax against US targets in retaliation for the rendering of senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad leaders. Jaballah’s colleague Mahjoub was #2 in Zawahiri’s Vanguards of Conquest.

        The government alleges that at one point Jaballah reported to Mabruk that he had recruited individuals who had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood and emphasized that they had been tested and could be trusted.

        The government publicly alleges that Jaballah was regularly in touch with Ayman Zawahiri by telephone. Zawahiri was head of Al Qaeda’s program to weaponize anthrax for use against US targets. The Globe and Mail, quoting allegations made public earlier this week, infers that “The new charges indicate CSIS targeted Mr. Jaballah almost as soon as he arrived in Canada [in 1996]. They make specific references to 1990s-era phone calls, and even include remarks about the suspect’s tone of voice. The documents cite code words Mr. Jaballah is alleged to have used or heard in his phone calls.”

        Was Mahmoud Jaballah the Egyptian scientist in the library in Ohio in June 2001 researching anthrax in water? The mailed anthrax was sent to the United Senators the day after bail was denied by the Canadians of his colleague, Mahmoud Mahjoub, who now is revealed to have been the #2 man in the Vanguards of Conquest under Cairo Medical alum Agiza.

        Stateside, in Ohio, there was the long-forgotten case of a mysterious Egyptian in the Summer of 2001 associated with the members of an alleged terror cell. The young men worked at a local chicken slaughterhouse and are more commonly known as the “Detroit cell.” In June 2001, they had an angry conversation about the detention of the Egyptian blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. Sometime before 9/11, an older Egyptian man with one of these young men made repeated attempts to obtain maps of the water supply system of Canton, Ohio. At the library, he studied books dealing with disease spread to human by animals such as anthrax. The Akron Beacon Journal reported that after 9/11, a librarian in Canton alerted authorities who called in the FBI. The man had visited the library as many as a half dozen times and asked for detailed maps of Canton’s water system and books concerning microbiology and animal borne diseases. Among the things the man sought were maps of waterlines running under Interstate 77 to Canton’s Mercy Medical Center. The librarian described the man as 50ish, with a slight paunch, and balding. Jaballah reports that he graduated from the University of Zagazig’s Faculty of Biology.

        Was the mega wealthy person that Hank Crumpton and his colleagues briefed about the anthrax Frank Perdue? I often corresponded with Mitzi. The entire family would discuss the issue around the dinner table.

        Was the scientist in Ohio in June 2001 ever identified and questioned? According to the Akron Beacon Journal, the man told the librarian that he worked at Case Farms. After 9/11, Case Farms was investigated in connection with allowing illegal immigrants to work without proper identification. The Egyptian reportedly had lived with the young men in Canton for a time in the past year or so, according to the librarian. (Their names were Hanna and Koubriti). The FBI has never confirmed the story. Case Farms doesn’t confirm the story. The librarians won’t confirm the story. A reporter who went to the library in person at my request was shown the door. What news, if any, came out of the trial of members of the Detroit terror cell? Portions of the proceeding were sealed. During the same period, two of the men on trial reportedly had enrolled in a four-week truck-driving course.

        The “Detroit defendants” were arrested when the week after 9/11 authorities kicked down the door of the apartment that had the name Nabil al-Marabh on the mailbox. Knowing of his connection to Al Qaeda, the FBI had gone looking for him after 9/11. His lawyer handling a fender bender involving al-Marabh’s taxicab in Boston had a forwarding address for him. In considering how many Egyptians trained in biology taxi driver Nabil Al-Marabh knew, he knew Mahmoud Jaballah. Mahmoud Jaballah was a biology teacher and co-founder, with al-Marabh’s uncle, of an elementary school on the edge of Little Beirut in Toronto. After coming to Canada in 1996, Jaballah would contact Ayman regularly on Ayman’s Inmarsat satellite phone.

        Jaballah reports that he graduated at the University of Zagazig from what he described as “the Faculty of Biology.” A January 2008 decision addressed the conditions of Jaballah’s detention (such as whether his son could bring a wireless laptop home, why his apartment had DSL service etc.).

        Jaballah was rearrested in August 2001 even though an earlier security certificate was quashed. Why was he rearrested? Were authorities upset had gone off the radar for a matter of weeks? CSIS alleges Jaballah knew Mahmoud Mahjoub who the CSIS now for the first time alleges was #2 in the Vanguards of Conquest. CSIS alleges that Jaballah was in regular contact with both the Vanguards/Egyptian Islamic Jihad head of military operations and the head of special operations — with the latter being both his brother-in-law and lawyer. CSIS alleges that he has had contact for years with Hassan Farhat and Ali Hussein, whom they say were part of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Hassan Farhat was with the Ansar al-Islam. Hassan Farhat was a senior member of Ansar Al Islam, formed in 2001, and was arrested by Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq. Farhat was the Imam of the Salaheddin Mosque in Toronto, which was affiliated with the school founded by Jaballah, from 1997 to 2002. Farhat also lived in Montreal for a time where Jaballah visited him. For an organization that emphasizes cell security, Jaballah was well-connected. Did Hassan Farhat know Montrealer Jdey, who had part of the 911 plot until he pulled back for unknown reasons (that did not include cold feet)?

        After Jaballah’ s second arrest, Nabil al-Marabh’ s uncle, Ahmed Shehab, took over as principal at Jaballah’ s school. Shehab and Jaballah had shared control of the school with Jaballah as its co-founders. Was Jaballah the scientist researching anthrax in Canton, Ohio from May to July 2001? The man told the librarian that he had worked at a laboratory in Egypt where he had learned to detect pathogens otherwise not detectable. He said he wanted to help the United States detect pathogens. (The librarian said that his english was so poor, she would expect him to be asking about a green card; but she finally got the word “pathogens” out of him). Jaballah was 40 rather than 50ish. But he otherwise fit the description and from his picture looks older than his age.

        Aly Hindy, president of the affiliated Salaheddin Islamic Center, imam of its mosque and a civil engineer in Toronto, described the school to the Wall Street Journal in December 2001. “We had to take our children out” of the public-school system, which teaches about “homosexuality” and allows undue “mixing between boys and girls.” The Wall Street Journal article explains: “Mr. Jaballah helped organize the curriculum at Salaheddin during the summer of 2000 and taught Arabic for a few months. “He wanted to be principal. I told him no,” Mr. Hindy says, because his English wasn’t good enough.”

        As likely explained in the still-classified February 2001 Presidential Daily Brief (”PDB”), a threat to use anthrax was mailed to the Canadian immigration minister in late January 2001 if bail was denied. The mailed anthrax was sent to the United Senators the day after a judge denied bail to Jaballah’s colleague, Mahmoud Mahjoub, who now is revealed have once been the #2 man in Vanguards of Conquest.

  44. BugMaster said

    F.B.I. math:

    1,982 plus 25 = 2,008


    • BugMaster said

      But don’t ask me, I am anonymous nobody.

      any further questions?

      Ask David Willman!

      • BugMaster said

        In regards to whom should have been called to testify before the investigative arm of congress in regarding to this issue (In other words, the G.A.O.)


        • BugMaster said

          BTW: In a bit of a snit, I forwarded all 220 emails between myself and David to Lew.

          I was in a really bad mood that night, and I hope, Lew, perhaps you archived them.

          If not, I would understand.

        • DXer said

          The person who you have always thought responsible was not even working in connection on the subject of anthrax until much later. Mr. Tuttle explains to me that this is all provable through the records of the intellectual property lawyers where they document such things. Mr. Willman’s trip to Europe made for a nice vacation but did not relate to a well-conceived lead. Moreover, as the person you suspect explains to me — and the FBI has explained — it would have been a simple matter to establish his alibi. At Battelle, they use company issued phones and the records were available for the asking. The FBI could exclude him based on his January 2002 interview. See 302. The sorts of events from years earlier are reminiscent of the underpinnings of an Ivins Theory — the missteps and imagined prior misconduct involved pranks from a quarter century earlier. Statistically, most males have done worse — you can start by looking at the crime statistics.

        • DXer said

          Bob Tuttle did not even work in the relevant building at Battelle. Moreover, as he noted to me, the fact he was in New Jersey to look at fermenters on a different date is evidence that, well, he was in New Jersey on a different date. It is not travel that is key — it is travel on the relevant dates. He travelled quite a bit — making sure to be home on his birthday in October — and his travel expenses showing the details of his travel are well-documented and were also easily pulled.

        • BugMaster said

          F.B.I. math:

          1,982 plus 25 = 2,008


        • BugMaster said

          “Mr. Willman’s trip to Europe made for a nice vacation but did not relate to a well-conceived lead.”

          It was in no way whatsoever, a vacation.

          BTW; In any of my postings, did I ever name names? No, but you did!

        • BugMaster said

          n regards to whom should have been called to testify before the investigative arm of congress in regarding to this issue (In other words, the G.A.O.)

          DAVID WILLMAN!

        • DXer said

          In the case of an Ivins Theory, Nancy Haigwood said she “knew” it was Dr. Ivins went he sent a bunch of people an email working with a stack of petri dishes (containing what we don’t know). He sent the email to many others. She said that scientists did not send photos by email — they published papers. I don’t know if she is on Facebook but sharing photos is actually quite common — especially when a national story breaks so close to one’s interest. That week her work had been described in the Washington Post as tantamount to “cold fusion” (see google news) — and she would reason to be furious at the person she suspected of causing a paper by others on the subject of her paper not to be published. See book on AIDs research. Dr. Ivins did peer review on the subject of vaccine research. See emails. She may have suspected that his prior bad acts — such as stealing her notebook and then returning it, using shaving cream to write on her car, and writing a letter to the editor using her name to defend hazing by sororities — pointed to him as the person responsible for causing her setbacks. Certainly, there is no doubt that she had ample reason to despise him. But the FBI investigators must always consider — especially faced with allegations not based on anything substantial — what motivation the person has in making such a claim based as “I knew” when I saw the email it was him. Many people have done bad acts. Many people are justifiably intensely disliked by the victims of their bad acts or perceived bad acts. But even the evidence of a scorned woman needs to be weighed against what constitutes actual evidence of (for example) travel to Princeton on the particular dates. And the surest way to vet a theory is to call or email them and ask. Bob Tuttle was not working with anthrax until later in the Spring of 2002. He did not travel on those dates. End of story. If David had called him, he could have discovered that.

        • BugMaster said

          “The FBI was excluded based on his January 2002 interview. See 302.”

          Yeah, right. Except the conversations I had with the FBI agent who interviewed him in January 2002 (Conversations in late 2002, January 2003).

          Out of respect for the (now retired) agent who interviewed him, and may have been speaking “out of school” so to say, I will say no more.

        • DXer said

          And when I say “working with anthrax”, he never worked with it in an a “hands-on” capacity. He was in the other building that handled the administrative side of things.

        • BugMaster said

          Actually, from what I do know, he was working on project “Chickshit”, as in a spore purification project involving a parasite in chickens. Search Google Patents if you don’t believe me.

        • BugMaster said


          Project “chickenshit”

          “How’s like like to work with chickens?”

          I wouldn’t really like to work with chickens.

          Well, chickens are o.k., but their shit would be a bit tiresome.

        • DXer said

          It is a fallacy to mistake emails with a reporter as evidence of a crime. It is a fallacy to mistake a conversation with some FBI agent — who was not even part of the Task Force by the way — as evidence of a crime. The Task Force does not share information outside of the Task Force.

        • BugMaster said

          BWT: The guy is amazing. The smartest son of a bitch I have ever met, a great guy, and believe me, he can do anything he set his mind to!

        • BugMaster said

          Forgive me for being redundant here, but this is getting beyond absurd:

          “In regards to whom should have been called to testify before the investigative arm of congress in regarding to this issue (In other words, the G.A.O.)

          DAVID WILLMAN!”

        • BugMaster said

          “Moreover, as he noted to me, the fact he was in New Jersey to look at fermenters on a different date is evidence that, well, he was in New Jersey on a different date”

          New Jersey?? Well, that’s news to me!

        • BugMaster said

          You have to be kidding me. Seriously, he related to you that he was in NEW JERSEY looking at fermenters???!!

          Please, please, say it is not so!

          Check your facts, please check your facts!


          Busted, disgusted and not to be trusted!

        • BugMaster said

          “Moreover, as he noted to me, the fact he was in New Jersey to look at fermenters on a different date is evidence that, well, he was in New Jersey on a different date”

          What @*$#@!! date would have that been, anyway??!!

  45. DXer said

    Revealed: Hundreds of words to avoid using online if you don’t want the government spying on you (and they include ‘pork’, ‘cloud’ and ‘Mexico’)

    • Department of Homeland Security forced to release list following freedom of information request
    • Agency insists it only looks for evidence of genuine threats to the U.S. and not for signs of general dissent

    PUBLISHED: 04:32 EST, 26 May 2012 | UPDATED: 12:46 EST, 26 May 2012

    The Department of Homeland Security has been forced to release a list of keywords and phrases it uses to monitor social networking sites and online media for signs of terrorist or other threats against the U.S.

    The intriguing the list includes obvious choices such as ‘attack’, ‘Al Qaeda’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘dirty bomb’ alongside dozens of seemingly innocent words like ‘pork’, ‘cloud’, ‘team’ and ‘Mexico’.

    Released under a freedom of information request, the information sheds new light on how government analysts are instructed to patrol the internet searching for domestic and external threats.

    The words are included in the department’s 2011 ‘Analyst’s Desktop Binder’ used by workers at their National Operations Center which instructs workers to identify ‘media reports that reflect adversely on DHS and response activities’.

    Department chiefs were forced to release the manual following a House hearing over documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit which revealed how analysts monitor social networks and media organisations for comments that ‘reflect adversely’ on the government.

    However they insisted the practice was aimed not at policing the internet for disparaging remarks about the government and signs of general dissent, but to provide awareness of any potential threats. …

    The list has been posted online by the Electronic Privacy Information Center – a privacy watchdog group who filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act before suing to obtain the release of the documents.

    In a letter to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counter-terrorism and Intelligence, the centre described the choice of words as ‘broad, vague and ambiguous’.


    Homeland Security: In case you missed it, IMO, Amerithrax represents the greatest intelligence failure in the history of the United States. AUSA Kohl and Lieber withheld the documents about the research with rabbits that Dr. Ivins was doing on the nights that they claimed his time was unexplained. To defer to some federal prosecutors in regard to this sort of intelligence analysis was an abdication of your duty.

    That withholding of documents resulted in a botching of the investigation of the Falll 2001 anthrax mailings. Meanwhile, Dr. Ayman Zawahiri likely still is planning on attacking the US in a mass anthrax attack. See article purported to have been written by Anwar Awlaki in this year’s edition of INSPIRE.

    Key words: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman, retaliation for detention of prisoners, mass aerosol anthrax attack on New York City and DIstrict of Columbia.

  46. DXer said

    The opening statement of prosecutor in Moussaoui prosecution emphasizes Sufaat’s connection to these two hijackers.

    The final avenue that Mr. Zebley will describe involves
    17 another item recovered from Moussaoui’s belongings after September
    18 11th, again would have been discovered before September 11th had
    19 he not lied. This is a letter, a false cover letter stating that
    20 Moussaoui is the marketing representative for a Malaysian company
    21 called Infocus Tech, owned by someone named Yazid Sufaat. This
    22 letter is signed by someone named Yazid Sufaat.
    23 Had Moussaoui not lied, FBI agents would have had this
    24 letter and investigated Yazid Sufaat. A rudimentary investigation
    25 of Yazid Sufaat connects him not only to Moussaoui, but also to

    1 another one of the 9/11 hijackers named Khalid al-Midhar. Now,
    2 Midhar was a name that had already been given to the CIA and the
    3 FBI in that summer, and a little bit before, in 2001. The FBI got
    4 the name al-Midhar and another 9/11 hijacker named Nawaf al-Hazmi
    5 in August of 2001.

  47. DXer said

    NSA Analyst: “We Could Have Prevented 9/11”
    Posted: 05/14/2012 4:05 pm


    I’m not interested in looking back — finding fault. Especially with the NSA which basically takes in everything (for example, with ECHELON, they would take in all fax, phone and email communication in Europe. So at one level, of course they will have had information available to it.)

    I can even look past conflict of interest that riddled Amerithrax — usually through no one’s fault, and often with the conflict of interest only becoming clear upon hindsight.

    But my point is that the same failure in intelligence relating to 9/11 — at NSA, CIA and FBI — is STILL involved in the understanding of Amerithrax. The absolute last thing we needed to do was spend a decade scratching our navel about how many microbes we can fit on a pin or collect polygraphs rather than document alibis.

    And it poses an existential threat to the country given the importance to the country of New York City and Washington, D.C. Is the country really going to be able just to “write off” Manhattan or Capitol Hill?

    If the DOJ criminalized obstruction of justice stemming from a CYA-careerist mentality that exists in government circles — as well as they do leaking information — it would lead to sounder analysis.

    CYA, of course, is simply a human response. It is perfectly understandable that was the reaction of individual employees. And I totally understand the need to enforce secrecy laws.

    But as to these events now over a decade ago, isn’t it time to get the history right?

    If the DOJ gave everyone a free pass and urged them to come forward to the GAO with information, the anthrax threat might be better addressed.

    On this question of Congressional oversight, my understanding is that DOJ prosecutors laugh at the idea that there is any meaningful oversight.

    Excerpt from “NSA Analyst: “We Could Have Prevented 9/11”
    Posted: 05/14/2012 4:05 pm

    Barbara Koeppel: What did you tell the Saxby Chambliss Congressional subcommittee and the Congressional Joint Inquiry?

    Thomas Drake: I can’t say fully, because it’s classified. But I showed that NSA knew a great deal about the 9/11 threats and Al Qaeda, electronically tracking various people and organizations for years — since its role is to collect intelligence. The problem is, it wasn’t sharing all of the data. If it had, other parts of government could have acted on it, and more than likely, NSA could have stopped, I say stopped 9/11. Later, it could have located Al Qaeda — at the very time the U.S. was scouring Afghanistan.

    It’s true that there were systemic failures throughout the intelligence system, but NSA was a critical piece of it. I gave both committees prima facie evidence, with documents. One was an early 2001 NSA internal, detailed multi-year study of Al Qaeda and sympathetic groups’ movements that revealed what NSA knew, could have done, and should have done. It was astonishingly well-analyzed current intelligence. Soon after 9/11, some NSA analysts called me about it. Why? Because they were pulling their hair out, knowing they had this information and they couldn’t get NSA leadership to share the report with the rest of the intelligence community — even though it’s mandatory! It was actionable information. Remember the time period–we were in the early part of the war in Afghanistan. People needed to act on it, to unravel Al Qaeda networks.

    But NSA leaders deliberately decided not to disseminate it. So the analysis — about what it knew before and after 9/11 — got buried very deeply, because it would really have made them look bad.

    In fact, after the analysts called me to complain, I told my superior, Maureen Baginski, Director of Signals Intelligence (called SIGINT), who was the number-three person at NSA. But instead of acting on it, she got mad at me. She said, “Tom, I wish you’d never brought this to my attention.”

    BK: Why?

    TD: Because she no longer had plausible deniability.

    BK: And then?

    TD: I said, Mo (that’s what we called her), I’m bringing it to your attention because it’s information we need to share. This is key to Al Qaeda’s position. But she folded. She was going to protect the institution. Screw national security.

    BK: Talk more about the Congressional investigations.

    TD: The Saxby Chambliss subcommittee began its hearings in February and March 2002. It had subpoena power and contacted me off the record, because it was investigating NSA. I gave both the subcommittee and the subsequent, much larger Joint Inquiry voluminous amounts of information.

    BK: What did they do with it?

    TD: I don’t know. There’s a report, but it’s classified. I never saw it. And the public got just a small version of the data I gave them. In fact, there’s very little oversight in Congress anymore. When there is, it’s essentially just talk.

    BK: How did NSA react to the investigations?

    TD: It did everything it could to obstruct them so it could hide what it knew. I remember hearing from Lt. General Michael Hayden, NSA’s director, while the investigations were under way, saying how “convenient” it was for CIA and FBI to be taking the heat, while we remained in the shadows. I’m paraphrasing, but NSA knew a lot.

    BK: How did NSA obstruct them?

    TD: First, it asked the committee investigators to set up their office at NSA, where the agency could put minders, NSA people who would sit and take notes. But the committee refused.

    BK: Other ways?

    TD: NSA set up what we called the “war room,” to figure out how to respond to the Saxby Chambliss investigation. The joke was, ‘Who are we at war with? Congress or terrorists?’

    Then in February, Mo asked me to lead an NSA team, to go around the agency pulling together information about what NSA knew that it could give to the subcommittee as its official classified statement, for the record.

    So I wrote the statement, which went through multiple drafts. Later, I was in England on another assignment, and I got a frantic call from one of my staff, saying, “Tom, they pulled us off the effort and re-assigned it to someone else.” I asked why. “Well, it’s confusing, you’ll have to ask Mo.” When I got back, the first thing I did was ask her why we were taken off. She said, “Data integrity.” This was a euphemism.

    BK: A euphemism for what?

    TD: That there was a problem with the data. But there wasn’t a problem. They just didn’t want it out there. Congress was asking us to take our clothes off, come clean, say we screwed up, and how we would fix it.

    But NSA chose not to do that. Instead, it persisted in the cover-up and didn’t tell about the staggering amounts of information it had in its data banks and didn’t share. When it’s being investigated, it closes ranks. To say they were not cooperating with the 9/11 investigations is an understatement.

    NSA created a secret team that reported to Bill Black, the Agency’s deputy director, whose task was to find the agency’s 9/11 skeletons. Why? In case you’re put on the stand, you want to know where you’re vulnerable so you have an answer, or can create one to serve as a cover. The idea is, NSA only tells Congress what it wants them to hear, and Congress will just have to figure out what it really knows. The problem is, how will Congress find something unless it knows what it’s looking for and where to find it? And if NSA can keep it hidden, Congress’ chances of finding it are slim to none.

    BK: Are there other ways it obstructed?

    TD: A dramatic one. It happened in early 2002, when Mo warned me, “Be careful, they’re looking for leakers.” What she meant was, “Back off! Don’t say anything more to Congress than you need to.” But I wasn’t leaking to the press, or outside of channels. I was a material witness in official investigations of NSA!

    BK: Then why call it “leaking”?

    TD: They were calling it that. For NSA’s purpose, it’s leaking. Me, I’m serving as a material witness to Congress, which called me to do that. I didn’t go to them.

    BK: If it wanted to, could NSA follow your trail?

    TD: Easily. Bread and butter. That’s what they do. In fact, during this whole time, NSA was doing everything it could to figure out and track who was cooperating with the investigators or called as material witnesses.

    BK: Why was it so important for NSA to hide what it knew?

    TD: Because NSA is a closed, secret culture. Its primary focus is collecting data, even within the intelligence community.

    The coin of the realm is what you know. If I share something with you, then I don’t have power any more. So why would I give my power away? Because we collect the data, we own it. If we own it, we control it. If we control it, we can say what it means. We tell you what we want to, or not. I used to hear that in executive sessions, post-9/11. Other agencies were clamoring for the raw or nearly raw data, to do their own analyses. And NSA was balking because “we don’t know what they’re going to do with it.”

    BK: But wouldn’t NSA want to prevent a 9/11 or track Al Qaeda?

    TD: That’s logical thinking. You have to remember, NSA is an institution, and it preserves its integrity before anything else. Rule number one. It’s pathological. It’s what I call the deep, dark side of this culture, one that has rarely been discussed. Everything is secret. Over decades, people work, communicate, and engage in secret. Obviously, certain state secrets are legitimate, but this goes way beyond that. The agency thinks, if it gives away information, it’s fragmenting its identity. In fact, even before 9/11, NSA reprimanded people for cooperating with other parts of the intelligence community.

    BK: Do other intelligence agencies operate the same way?

    TD: Yes. When I was at CIA, I worked in the Science and Technology directorate on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. I was asked by people at its National Photographic Interpretation Center to look at pictures of WMD targets. I agreed, but I couldn’t tell from the photos who was talking to whom without knowing more about the target. So I called my buddies at NSA — because they have electronic and signals intelligence — to find out, and they told me what they knew. But the people I worked with at CIA said, “Why did you call them? You have everything you need right here.” Well, I didn’t. It’s so arrogant, to say you can’t learn from others. But this is the culture. And it’s even worse at NSA.

  48. DXer said

    It seems that it would be more logical to conduct the drill in Las Vegas, DC and NYC.

    Published Thursday, May 03, 2012

    Mail workers hold drill, prep for possible attack
    The Associated Press – MINNEAPOLIS
    Workers with the U.S. Postal Service will deliver empty pill bottles to homes in the metro area Sunday in a drill to test how well they can deliver medicine in the event of a terror attack.

    The Postal Service and the Minnesota Department of Health are announcing details of the drill Thursday.

    It’s the country’s first full-scale test for postal workers to distribute medicine in case of an anthrax outbreak or other medical emergency. Plans for similar practice runs are in the works in Boston, San Diego, Philadelphia and Louisville, Ky.

    The drill will take place Sunday in parts of Minneapolis, St. Paul, Golden Valley, Crystal and Robbinsdale. Volunteers and police officers will handle the delivery. The Health Department says more than 300 volunteers are trained for the task.

  49. DXer said

    “Emptywheel” says he “I’ll come back to the anthrax later” in commenting on Jose Rodriguez’ sound bytes from his book tour. He was in charge of the CIA’s “Hard Measures” at some points against some detainees.

    Commenting on Mr. Rodriguez’ statements is best informed by reading the book.

    You won’t find anything in the book that goes beyond his bare single-sentence statement about anthrax in interviews.

    For that, one needs to delve into the actual documents and understand the intelligence analysis.

    Knee jerk drive-by comments (whether from liberal poster at emptywheel or the conservative posters at Freerepublic) are part of the problem, not the solution to Amerithrax. IMO, Amerithrax constitutes the greatest intelligence analysis failure in United States history — a conclusion totally separate from any political worldview. The analysis is only greatly undermined by confusing the true crime and intelligence analysis with politics.

    As for the Rodriguez (CIA) vs. Soufan (FBI) debate about tactics to use in questioning, reading the respective books side-by-side brings an important underlying factual disagreement into sharp relief.

    Mr. Rodriguez says that the approach by the FBI agents he describes was “ham-fisted” and Zubaydah had stopped answering questions. Mr. Rodriguez gives the example of the FBI agent who said he was going to “go Sipowicz” (an NYPD Blues allusion) and told Zubaydah that he was a “mother f——-” and “son of a b——.” Mr. Rodriguez reasons that given that among many devout jihadists, dogs are extremely unclean, Zubaydah took special offense and shut up.

    Mr. Soufan says the opposite — that Al-Zubaydah had not stopped talking and only stopped talking when the inexperienced CIA contractor got involved.

    One should not gloss over that factual disagreement without noting it — or merely assume one factual premise rather than the other. Of course, that issue does not resolve the important policy and moral issue presented. (I’ll leave the important policy and moral issues to others. )

    On the one hand, I’ve never understood how interrogators with no experience or background in the substantive details of the intelligence analysis would have been let near the detainee. On the other hand, Mr. Rodriguez understandably has the perception that “no good deed goes unpunished.” (The FBI officials similarly have the understandable perception that “we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t”).

    But to question detainees or suspects without being fully up on the substantive details and having mastered the substantive details is ill-advised.

    That requires communication between all the different parts of the different agencies. For example, Mr. Soufan gives the example of the CIA not sharing critical information about who was at the meeting at Yazid Sufaat’s KL condo.

    Now, that question might best be put to Yazid over a game of Words With Friends. I tried to demonstrate common ground and recruit Yazid to a friendly war of words by pointing out how much my wife and I loved the countries in Southeast Asia, describing trips to KL, Bali, Lombok, Thailand, Singapore etc. and telling him how lucky he was to live in that part of the world.

    But would I understand that some might just want to indict and extradite his punk ass and put him on trial for giving Moussaoui that money knowing that he wanted to fly into the buildings like the other young men? (See French interview) For publicly justifying the murder of 3000 innocents? Absolutely.

    Will I understand why AUSA Lieber and Montooth and FBI Director Mueller didn’t do exactly that? Never. With a charge for conspiracy to use anthrax against US targets thrown in for good measure?

    I can’t for the life of me justify the FBI’s failure to even so much as go to Malaysia until November 2002 to speak with him — even though it reasonably was known he was involved in Al Qaeda’s anthrax program since his capture in December 2001.

    How is it that I knew it by February 2002 and was posting on local Sac State bulletin boards about it but the USG (President Bush) claims not to have known it until after KSM’s capture in March 2003… as the result of the hard mesasures?

    Amerithrax represents the greatest failure in intelligence analysis in United States history.

  50. DXer said

    Dark Web
    Integrated Series in Information Systems, 2012, Volume 30, Part 1, 19-30, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-1557-2_2
    Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI): Research Framework

    Hsinchun Chen

    Download PDF (170.0 KB)
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    Search Within This Book
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    Look Inside


    Front matter


    Part 1 / Research Framework: Overview and Introduction


    Front matter


    Dark Web Research Overview


    Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI): Research Framework


    Terrorism Informatics


    Part 2 / Dark Web Research: Computational Approach and Techniques


    Front matter


    Forum Spidering


    Link and Content Analysis


    Dark Network Analysis


    Interactional Coherence Analysis


    Dark Web Attribute System


    Authorship Analysis


    Sentiment Analysis


    Affect Analysis


    CyberGate Visualization


    Dark Web Forum Portal


    Part 3 / Dark Web Research: Case Studies


    Front matter


    Jihadi Video Analysis


    Extremist YouTube Videos


    Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on Dark Web


    Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on Dark Web


    Bioterrorism Knowledge Mapping


    Women’s Forums on the Dark Web


    US Domestic Extremist Groups


    International Falun Gong Movement on the Web


    Botnets and Cyber Criminals


    Back matter

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    References (12)
    Export Citation

    In this chapter, we review the computational research framework that is adopted by the Dark Web research. We first present the security research context, followed by description of a data mining framework for Intelligence and Security Informatics research.
    The tragic events of September 11 and the following anthrax contamination of letters caused drastic effects on many aspects of society. Academics in the fields of natural sciences, computational science, information science, social sciences, engineering, medicine, and many others have been called upon to help enhance the government’s ability to fight terrorism and other crimes. Six critical mission areas have been identified where information technology can contribute, as suggested in the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” report, including: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and responses. Facing the critical missions of national security and various data and technical challenges, we believe there is a pressing need to develop the science of “Intelligence and Security Informatics” (ISI).
    To address the data and technical challenges facing ISI, we present a research framework with a primary focus on KDD (Knowledge Discovery from Databases) technologies. The framework is discussed in the context of crime types and security implications. Selected data mining techniques, including information sharing and collaboration, association mining, classification and clustering, text mining, spatial and temporal mining, and criminal network analysis, are believed to be critical to criminal and intelligence analyses and investigations. In addition to the technical discussions, this chapter also discusses caveats for data mining and important civil liberties considerations.

  51. DXer said

    The White House kept the FBI and DOJ out of a proper and full investigation of Al-Timimi and the communications among members of the network through a program called STELLAR WIND, under which DOJ and FBI investigators — and the federal courts — were left largely out of the loop.

    FBI Director famously threatened to quit over STELLAR WIND and drafted his resignation letter.

  52. DXer said

    The Department of Justice OIG, in its report on the intelligence failings relating to CIA-FBI communication about the Kuala Lumpur, failed to note the anthrax connections.

    For example, there was an additional anthrax connection already known connected to the Cole bombing. Not only would Yazid Sufaat serve as the key lab anthrax tech in Afghanistan, but a microbiology student in Karachi was secretly rendered on October 23, 2001. How is GAO going to get answers about the intelligence failures and resulting risks if the CIA whisked those with personal knowledge of the failings to Jordan? Never to be seen again.

    Alissa Rubin, “Pakistan Hands Over Man in Terror Probe,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2001.


    The man, who authorities confirmed was named Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, was detained and deported to the U.S. in connection with America’s terrorism investigation.

    “This is not unusual. Over the last six months, many people have been deported if they had false documents or suspect links with terrorist organizations in African and Middle Eastern countries,” a military intelligence source said….

    Mohammed was handed over to the United States under cover of night. The transfer took place about 1 a.m. Tuesday and involved masked U.S. officers, according to witnesses at the Karachi airport.

    The plane was parked in a dark and isolated area of the terminal, according to witnesses, and military sources confirmed that special arrangements were made for the man’s deportation.

    The plane arrived from Amman, Jordan, and headed back there after picking up the detainee. A private company was used to service the U.S. aircraft rather than national airport authorities….

    The deported man was a student of Yemeni origin who went to Karachi in 1993 and was a student there, according to local reporters. Karachi is a large city on the Arabian sea in southern Pakistan.

    He stopped showing up for classes in early October. Shortly before he disappeared, the Interior Ministry requested all information about him from the university.

    • DXer said

      Masood Anwar, “Mystery Man Handed Over to US Troops in Karachi,” The News International (Pakistan), October 26, 2001.


      Pakistani authorities handed over a ‘suspected foreigner’ to the US authorities in a mysterious way in the early hours of Tuesday and there are strong suspicions that he was an Arab student of the Karachi University, with connections to some infamous wanted organisation. A Falcon aircraft owned by the US air force landed at Karachi airport at around 1 am and was parked in a remote, dark and isolated area at the old terminal, a source at the Karachi airport disclosed told The News.

      The aircraft having registration numbers N-379 P arrived from Amman and departed at 2.40 am for the same destination, he said. “I cannot tell you about the nationality and identification of the person handed over to the US men. The entire operation was so mysterious that all persons involved in the operation, including US troops, were wearing masks,” he said. A masked US trooper was also making a video film of the entire operation.

      A private service company at the Karachi airport, Chemic Aviation, provided the airport services to the US aircraft. The ‘wanted person’ handed over to the US forces was not a Pakistani national as the man was addressed as a deportee. No one in the Civil Aviation Authority and Airport Security Force knew the details of the operation. Everything was kept in secret and operated by an agency, sources said…

      The most likely possibility is that an Arab student of Microbiology Department of Karachi University, who has been missing since the start of October, could be the man deported. Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammad belonged to Taiz, a city of Yemen. He came to Karachi in 1993 from Sana’a. Just before he went missing, Interior Ministry had asked the University administration to send all the information about him. His connections with any terrorist organisation or if and why he was deported, could not be confirmed from official sources.

      • DXer said

        Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn, “U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects,” Washington Post, March 11, 2002.


        In October, for instance, a Yemeni microbiology student wanted in connection with the bombing of the USS Cole was flown from Pakistan to Jordan on a U.S.-registered Gulfstream jet after Pakistan’s intelligence agency surrendered him to U.S. authorities at the Karachi airport, Pakistani government sources said. The hand-over of the shackled and blindfolded student, Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, who was alleged to be an al Qaeda operative, occurred in the middle of the night at a remote corner of the airport without extradition or deportation procedures, the sources said.

        Comment: If you don’t know the lab that Rauf Ahmad visited by Dr. Ayman to obtain the anthrax, ask yourself: Why don’t you know?

  53. DXer said

    The systemic Intelligence Community deficiences during the Summer of 2001 leading up to the attacks were summed up by the 9/11 Commission: “Information was not shared…. Analysis was not pooled.” The FBI lacked basic computer capabilities and did not share information even within the FBI. The CIA and FBI were unwilling to exchange information quickly and effectively with each other. The IC analysts were ill-equipped to “connect the dots.” There was a lack of coordinated effort. The purpose of this blog is not to find fault with the analysis of particular individuals — with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Everyone seems hard-working and talented and acting in good faith. The purpose instead is to permit the efficient pooling of documents and informaiton. The purpose of the blogging and uploading of documents is to get people on the same page. If you are involved in the selection production of documents to the GAO, history will not be kind — because there are no secrets that will withstand the test of history.

    Fault is only leveled at those responsible for withholding of documents in violation of FOIA, who thus actively thwart that effort and are obstructing justice.

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