CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Laurie Mylroie in a 2001 book described a “Waly Samar” who was a microbiologist connected to the WTC 1993 participants based on phone records. Was he the subtilis expert allegedly connected to Al Qaeda’s anthrax program that the FBI reports it was able to confidently exclude (in adjudging Dr. Ivins the sole culprit)? Did “Waly Samar” live in Trenton in 2001? Who does “Waly Samar” think is responsible for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings?

Posted by DXer on April 30, 2011





32 Responses to “* Laurie Mylroie in a 2001 book described a “Waly Samar” who was a microbiologist connected to the WTC 1993 participants based on phone records. Was he the subtilis expert allegedly connected to Al Qaeda’s anthrax program that the FBI reports it was able to confidently exclude (in adjudging Dr. Ivins the sole culprit)? Did “Waly Samar” live in Trenton in 2001? Who does “Waly Samar” think is responsible for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings?”

  1. DXer said

    The FBI reports that it was able to exclude WS.

    But we have no reason to think it was based on swabbing for the genetically distinctive subtilis.

    So much for pursuing every microscopic lead.

  2. DXer said

    So after Abdul Yasin helped with the bomb the WTC 1993, he repeatedly calls Walied Samarrai, the subtilis expert. And makes calls from Walied’s dorm room. Is that right?

    I would think that Abdul had other things on his mind.

    Or am I misunderstanding. If someone (Abdul Yasin) helped Ramzi Yousef in an attempt to kill 250,000 people (topping one tower into the other) — and then for the next week is calling Walied Samarrai, a subtilis expire… and then years later anthrax is used against US targets…

    and it had been announced by the blind sheik’s lawyer that anthrax was going to be used to retaliate for the imprisonment of the blind sheik…

    who is said to be associated with the WTC 1993 bombing…

    why isn’t pursuing the genetically distinctive subtilis in the mailed anthrax a prime scientific concern?

    It has always been known that the blind sheikh has been central to the motivation of Dr. Ayman and all those involved in Al Qaeda’s anthrax planning.

    • DXer said

      Amid the rubble was a vehicle identification number for a Ryder truck. On March 4, 1993, when Mohammad Salameh tried to get the $400 truck deposit back after claiming it had been stolen, the FBI arrested him. More arrests followed, but the mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, wasn’t arrested until 1995. According to the FBI, “We later learned from Yousef that his Trade Center plot was far more sinister. He wanted the bomb to topple one tower, with the collapsing debris knocking down the second. The attack turned out to be something of a deadly dress rehearsal for 9/11; with the help of Yousef’s uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda would later return to realize Yousef’s nightmarish vision.”

      Today Is The 20th Anniversary Of 1993 World Trade Center Bombing

      Comment: If we don’t learn from history, we are bound to repeat it. Kudos to the FBI for finding the truck axle and so quickly catching a number of the bombers.

    • DXer said

      AHMED HIKMAT SHAKIR provided logistical assistance to Khalid al-Mihdhar (and Nawaf ) on Jan. 5, 2000. See The 9-11 Commission Final Report, July 22, 2004, Footnotes. They were attending the terror summit at anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat’s KL condo — the two hijackers that Yazid sometimes falsely denied knowing. (In fact, Yazid had suggested flight school in Malaysia they might attend).

      Guess what? Telephone records reportedly also connect him to the Kensington Ave apartment in Jersey City. KSM was also attending that summit. Did KSM use Shakir’s telephone?

      Shakir’s telephone reportedly had received a phone call from the Jersey City, New Jersey, safehouse of the plotters who would soon, in February 1993, park a truck bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center. That safehouse was the Yasin apartment was where Abdul, Musab and their mother lived. When Shakir was arrested shortly after the 9/11 attacks, his “pocket litter” reportedly included contact information for Musab Yasin and a 1993 plotter.

      So not only is the subtilis expert connected to the WTC 1993 safehouse but the 1993 safehouse is connected to a player providing the key hijackers logistical support in connection with the meeting at the anthrax lab director’s Kuala Lumpur condo.

      But just because some folks are from Iraq does not make it Saddam’s operation. Al Qaeda and the salafist-jihadis had supporters across the range of countries, including Iraq.

      I’ll have to get back to you on sourcing on some of the points above.

  3. Been on this case with Dr. Laurie Mylroie since soon after the Anthrax attacks. FBI sought me out because they wanted to know how I knew what I knew. I informed then and nothing followed….except at one point my apt had the door kicked in and ransacked within 12 hours after I posted the following article online:

  4. DXer said

    Did Walied and Musab know Nosair? Are there pictures of Nosair with Walied, the subtilis expert who lived 20 miles from the mailbox in 2001?

    B. Admission of Evidence Regarding Nosair
    1. Photographs of Salameh and Nosair

    Salameh insists that the trial judge violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) by admitting photographs of Salameh with El-Sayyid Nosair, a reputed political terrorist convicted of murdering an Israeli rabbi.

    On March 4, 1993, FBI agents recovered Salameh’s briefcase from Yasin’s Jersey City apartment. The briefcase contained a number of photographs, including: (1) a photograph of Salameh, Nosair and Mohammed Abdul Hamed, the resident of the apartment where Abouhalima’s refrigerator (which was used to store bomb making materials) was later discovered; (2) a photograph of Salameh, Nosair and Ayyad; and (3) several photographs of Salameh and Nosair.

    The photograph of Salameh, Nosair and Ayyad demonstrated the relationship between Salameh and Ayyad. As proof of the association between two conspirators, this photograph was probative of the existence of the conspiracy.

    The photograph of Salameh, Nosair and Hamed established a connection between Abouhalima’s refrigerator and the conspiracy. The government argued that the conspirators used Abouhalima’s refrigerator to store bomb making ingredients, and then moved the refrigerator to Hamed’s apartment to cover their trail. The defendants disputed any connection to the refrigerator found in Hamed’s apartment. The photo of Salameh and Hamed linked the two men, and circumstantially connected Salameh and the conspiracy to the refrigerator found in Hamed’s apartment.

    Salameh’s argument also fails because the photographs were not evidence of Salameh’s character. Salameh proposes that the jury was asked to infer from the photographs that he was a terrorist because he associated with Nosair. However, no evidence was presented at trial regarding Nosair’s terrorist activities. Salameh posits that the jury would have recognized Nosair’s name, recalled that he was accused of terrorist acts, and imputed his terrorist activities to Salameh. This is sheer fantasy.

    2. Admission of Abouhalima’s Contacts with Nosair

    Abouhalima contends that Judge Duffy erroneously admitted a visitor’s log indicating that Abouhalima visited Nosair in prison. Abouhalima appears to claim that the visitor’s log was unfairly prejudicial and possessed no probative value. Abouhalima’s argument is contradicted by the record.

    At trial, the government introduced phone records which showed that Abouhalima and his co-conspirators used Abouhalima’s calling card to contact each other and to order various chemicals and explosives. Abouhalima maintained that his calling card had been stolen and that an unauthorized user made the calls. In support of this claim, Abouhalima pointed out that he twice notified the phone company that his card was being fraudulently used, first on February 8, 1993, and again on the day of the bombing, February 26, 1993.

    To rebut Abouhalima’s claim that he lost the calling card, the government introduced evidence that a call was made with Abouhalima’s calling card on February 7, 1993, from the Attica Correctional Facility’s Visitor’s Center. The government also introduced the visitor’s log from the Attica Visitor’s Center, which showed that Abouhalima visited Nosair on February 7, 1993. Abouhalima was Nosair’s sole visitor that day.

    The visitor’s log was properly admitted. It tended to disprove Abouhalima’s claim that his calling card was stolen. See Fed.R.Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it makes any fact of consequence less probable). The probative value of this evidence easily outweighed any possible unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. This is especially true when it is recalled that Nosair was never identified as a terrorist.

  5. DXer said

    Note the pattern of calls made from the subtilis expert’s phone in February 1993. So did Mr. Yasin go to Hunter College in Manhattan to make the calls? Isn’t it more likely that they were all made by the registrant of the phone number? How is it known or why is it thought that Abdul Yasin that he was the one who made the call, for example, to the Saudi Red Crescent in Islamabad? While Laurie in September 2001 had understood the calls to be from a dorm room, the new poster had an extremely responsible position closely connected to events. I think we can credit that it was not a “dorm room” but the phone of a masters student, the subtilis expert, who had an office phone there. (It is a simple matter to confirm that WS was a masters student in 1993).

    What was the call to Islamabad about? It was to the Saudi Red Crescent (late at night in Pakistan). (That was Dr. Ayman’s cover in initially going to the area.) Was someone making a reporting call to KSM or Dr. Ayman or both from the subtilis expert’s telephone? I’ve emailed Professor Samarrai but not heard back. The calls from the subtilis expert to the Kensington Apartment stopped immediately upon the blind sheik Abdel-Rahman’s arrest.

    Regarding access to Ames, the 16 pages were not faxed from Art Friedlander’s phone until 4 years after the anthrax mailings. Was the subtilis expert whose phone shows this pattern excluded before or after the 16 pages were faxed? Prior to that, the name of the former Zawahiri had been misspelled on the B3 log — and the electronic records did not extend back before Summer 1998.

    Amerithrax was necessarily going to be screwed if more than one was involved given that the new team started with the assumption that the same person who acquired the Ames as processed and mailed it. Dr. Ayman was known to use a cell security structure and yet the investigators formally assumed that the same person would have all roles. The person responsible for any mistaken conclusions in Amerithrax is the person who directed subordinates to only pursue theories in which a lone person had all the roles.

    Amerithrax represents the greatest intelligence failure in the history of the United States.

    Suspect in 1993 Bombing Says Trade Center Wasn’t First Target
    Published: June 01, 2002

    Abdul Rahman Yasin, the sole suspect in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 who got away, said the twin towers were not the original target for that attack, because the mastermind of the plot had originally wanted to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn. Mr. Yasin spoke with Lesley Stahl of CBS News in an interview on May 23 in Iraq, where he fled after the bombing.

    Mr. Yasin, born in Bloomington, Ind., is on Washington’s list of most wanted terrorists. The State Department posted a reward of up to $25 million for information leading directly to catching or convicting him.

    In 1994, four followers of an Egyptian cleric, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, were convicted of roles in the bombing, whose reported mastermind, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was captured in 1995 and convicted in 1997.

    In an interview to be broadcast tomorrow on ”60 Minutes,” Mr. Yasin, 42, said that Mr. Yousef had told him, ”I want to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn,” but that after scouting Crown Heights and Williamsburg, Mr. Yousef had a new idea.

    ”Ramzi Yousef told us to go to the World Trade Center,” Mr. Yasin said in the interview, recalling that Mr. Yousef had said: ”I have an idea we should do one big explosion rather than do small ones in Jewish neighborhoods.”

    ”The majority of the people who work in the World Trade Center are Jews,” Mr. Yasin told Ms. Stahl.

    A federal indictment released in August 1993 accused Mr. Yasin of teaching another conspirator, Mohammed A. Salameh, how to drive the rented van that carried the bomb to the underground garage at the trade center, where the blast killed 6 people and injured more than 1,000.

    The attack was ”revenge for my Palestinian brothers and my brothers in Saudi Arabia,” Mr. Yasin said.

    Mr. Yasin maintained the Jersey City apartment where the terrorists received mail, made telephone contacts in Iran and Pakistan and bought and helped mix the bomb chemicals. Less than a week after the bombing, federal agents questioned him and released him.

  6. DXer said

    “Yousef is believed to have slept on the floor of Abouhalima’s apartment for his first in New York, but within two days he was introduced to a friend of Abouhalima’s called Mohammad Salameh, a slight young Jordanian with a bushy black beard. Born in Biddya in the district of Nablus on 1 September 1967, Salameh had left Jordan for the US in 1987 with a five-year entry visa. Like the majority of his countrymen, he was of Palestinia origin — on his father’s side — and like Yousef he felt a strong affinity for the Palestinian cause. Salameh was a simple, impressionable young man; El Sayyid Nosair had been something of a mentor to him before his arrest. Yousef immediately filled those shoes and began preparting to move in with Salameh at Apartment 4, 34 Kensington Avenue, Jersey City, in an area known locally as “Little Cairo” because of the large number of Arab immigrants.”

    The new jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the future of terrorism, at p. 143, by Simon Reeve.

  7. DXer said

    Prosecuting the New York Sheikh
    by Andrew C. McCarthy
    Middle East Quarterly
    March 1997, pp. 9-18

  8. DXer said

    FBI Discounted Contaminant Clue in Anthrax Case

    Thursday, April 21, 2011

    As the FBI built its case for U.S. Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins being the sole culprit behind the 2001 anthrax mailings, investigators did not pursue a potentially key piece of bacterial evidence that might have pointed them in another direction, McClatchy Newspapers reported on Wednesday (see GSN, March 25).

    A close examination by scientists of the anthrax letters that killed five people in 2001 turned up a trace amount of an innocuous bacterial contaminant called bacillus subtilis, whose uniqueness was hoped to serve as a tool in identifying the perpetrator of the biological attacks.

    In March 2007, a high-ranking FBI official said the contaminant “may be the most resolving signature found in the evidence to date,” according to a now-public memo from the investigation.

    The FBI, however, settled on Ivins as its main suspect and only checked for the contaminant in a handful of the work areas used by the many scientists who also worked with the variety of anthrax employed in the attacks. No hint of the contaminant was ever found in any of the hundreds of biological samples taken from Ivins’ residence, vehicle, office and laboratory at the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md.

    Ivins committed suicide in July 2008 before facing any charges. The FBI announced in early 2010 that it had wrapped up the anthrax investigation and named the deceased scientist as the sole actor in the attacks. Some lawmakers and former scientific colleagues of Ivins, however, have criticized the investigation and pointed out that no direct evidence was ever found to connect the researcher to the crime (see GSN, April 23, 2010).

    “This was not an incidental finding,” leading anthrax expert Martin Hugh-Jones said. “The FBI had what I would call an institutional fingerprint. Whoever had that strain of (bacteria) has to answer to the investigators.”

    In the 12,000 pages of declassified FBI documents on the case, there is little indication of testing conducted on other anthrax scientists’ laboratory areas or their caches of the bacillus subtilis material. The federal investigator would not answer how many researchers’ work spaces were analyzed.

    “They’ve got thousands of samples, but were they thousands of the right samples?” Hugh-Jones said.

    Comment: How many searches were conducted that involved swabbing for subtilis?

  9. DXer said

    Lest you think that the threat of attack motivated by the detention of the blind sheik involve arcane historical issues dating to 1993, here is Abbud al-Zomor (2L), a member of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad who was jailed over the 1981 assassination of president Anwar Sadat, attending a demonstration to call for the release of Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman in front of the U.S. embassy in Cairo on April 21, 2011. He was the fellow quoted a day or two ago saying how good-hearted Dr. Ayman is. Abdel-Rahman, was jailed for life in January 1996 for his role in terrorist attacks, including blowing up the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993.

  10. DXer said

    Chasing Islambouli’s Ghost: A Tree Grows In Brooklyn

    When dealing with Ayman Zawahiri, it never pays to underestimate the importance to him in the 1990s of the terrorist infrastructure in Brooklyn. In the late 1990s, Steve Emerson traced the development of the “Mekhtab Al-Khidemat Al-Mujahideen,” or the “Office of Services of the Mujahideen,” from its formation in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the early 1980’s to the Al Kifah Refugee Centers which spread throughout the United States and internationally. Zawahiri visited Brooklyn’s al Farouk mosque, which was part of Khidmat Services in Peshawar and was used to funnel jihadists and funds to Afghanistan. The blind sheik’s lawyer, Montasser al-Zayat, visited in 1990. Islambouli was head of the office in Peshawar. In a 1990 documentary by SBS-TV “Cutting Edge” series entry called “Sword of Islam,” Islambouli said: “Islam grows on the severed limbs and blood of martyrs. Islam will be back, and take over the world.”

    The CIA’s December 4, 1998 PDB to President Clinton explained that Mohammed Islambouli, the brother of Sadat’s assassin, was planning an attack using aircraft and other means on the United States. After Bojinka, which can be thought of as the origin for the 911 planning, Islambouli had been in a cell with KSM in planning the attacks. KSM came to be head of the cell planning to use weaponized anthrax on the United States. Therefore, it is important to understand who Islambouli knew and consider his historical connection to the al-Farook mosque in Brooklyn, New York.

    Now the surest way to know who Islambouli knew would be to go back to the late 1970s leading up to Sadat’s assassination and study membership in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad cells at the universities. But the story also can fruitfully be picked up a decade later in the context of Islambouli’s ongoing connection to al-Farook. The Al-Kifah Refugee Center had found its home in the early 1990s at the Al-Farooq mosque on Atlantic Avenue. Some of the men convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing worshipped at the mosque, as did the blind sheik’s bodyguard El-Sayyed Nosair, who killed the radical Israeli Rabbi Meir Kahane.

    The Brooklyn office of Makhtab Khidmat al-Mujahiden was staffed by Egyptian Islamic Jihad operative Khaled Dahab, a used car salesman from Santa Clara. Dahab handled the logistics for terrorists out of his home. He patched through calls for Egyptian Islamic Jihad members and transferred money. Ayman called Dahab periodically — once to price telephone surveillance equipment. Dahab at last report was in jail in Egypt. Dahab had been recruited by Ali Mohammed, the former US Army sergeant who was Bin Laden’s chief of security during the move from Afghanistan to Sudan. Ali Mohammed helped conduct the surveillance leading much later to the embassy bombings. He trained Dahab on how to make letter bombs.

    When Ali Mohammed would visit Brooklyn, he would stay with a fellow Egyptian Nosair, who assassinated Meir Kahane. Nosair had been one of the men practicing with the men at the Calverton shooting range in Long Island under Mohammed’s instruction (along with some of the WTC 1993 bombers).

    In 1992, Mohammed Islambouli, was in regular fax contact from his Peshawar Mujahedeen Office in Peshawar, Pakistan and the Brooklyn Al-Kifah office. One 1992 memo from Islambouli’s Peshawar office read: “The military wing of the Jihad seals its news with success everywhere. However, the matter is the hands of the leadership to form the Islamic government to manage the country.”

    Sheik Abdel-Rahman would lecture regularly at al-Farook. He would visit Islambouli in Pakistan from Brooklyn in 1989 and during the early 1990s. It was not until April 1993, upon a crackdown on the foreign fighters, that Islambouli and Zawahiri had to move their operations into Afghanistan. Islambouli moved a scant 100 miles. Before disappearing into Afghanistan, Islambouli told the press the group would continue its holy war against the Egyptian government. In 1993, after he had to leave Peshawar, Islambouli lived at the Samarkhiel Guest House in Jalabad, a town in eastern Afghanistan three hours by road from the Pakistan border. In April 1993, a fax to Western news media threatened American interests if anything happened to Abdel-Rahman. At the time, Egyptian Islamic Group had about 200 members in Jalabad.

    Even back then, moreover, there was a connection between Brooklyn and the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. For example, a 1992 memo read:

    “We urge you to support them and to support them and to contribute to their developments, programs and projects in order that they may do their part in accomplishing our jihad and mission of raising the World of Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala and the Message of our Prophet Muhammad (saw) to the Highest.” Another memo from the Moro National Liberation Front read: “THIS IS TO CERTIFY that according to the records of this office, that Mr. Abdul Zindani had shown his sincerity, loyalty, and devotion to his work and noble project as Chairman of:


    P.O. Box – 294, Brooklyn NY -11217

    Telephone No. 718-797-9207

    We urge you to help all kinds of support needed to all concern Islamic movements, specially our Muslim Mujahidin around the Globe including those in Bosnia Herzegovinia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kurdisn, Burma, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Lebanon, India, Trinidad, Somalia and Bangsamoro in Southern Philippines.”

    By 1995, Nosair was in prison and a defendant in a trial for sedition along with the Blind Sheik. The father of Adnan El-Shukrijumah (“Jafar the Pilot”) once translated for the Blind Sheik and was a character witness for Clement Rodney Hampton one of the defendants in the 1995 sedition trial. Jafar’s father was Bilal Philip’s mentor. Bilal Philips in turn was Al-Timimi’s mentor (and he continued to be in contact with him). Hampton-El testified that Philips was the head of “Project Bosnia.” He explained that Philips funneled money from Saudi Arabia to pay for noncombatant support services for the mujahideen in Bosnia. Project Bosnia also recruited combatants and men for paramilitary training. Numerous cities would come to have subsidiary Al Kifah offices. Aafia Siddiqui would be associated with the one in Boston, which after WTC 1993 was renamed Care International. The Care head was MIT MSA Imam Suheil Laher. He worked with Aafia in fundraising.

    In 2003, prosecutors alleged in a complaint unsealed in Brooklyn federal court that a Yemeni cleric raised millions, some of it through Al-Farooq mosque, that was then funneled to al-Qaida terrorists. Prosecutors alleged that Sheik Mohammed Al Hasan Al-Moayad used the mosque to raise money for Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network in 1999. He allegedly told an FBI informant that he supplied al-Qaida with more than $20 million, recruits and weapons in the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The government sought to extradite Al-Moayad and his assistant. The complaint said much of the money came from contributors in the United States, including the Al-Farooq mosque.

    If the federal investigative interest over the years has been any indication, it appears that authorities perceived that a tree grew in Brooklyn.

    • DXer said

      When Insiders Go Postal: US Postal Employee Ahmed Abdel Sattar

      Ahmed Abdel Sattar told Frontline in a 1999 interview: “As a younger man growing up in Egypt in the seventies [and] in the ’80s, looking around me, hav[ing] no hope in a country where I was born and raised, seeing things deteriorating to a level that will not be acceptable by anybody. There was no other way except [turning] to Islam ideology, to believe in it and to try to change things through it.” He told of the hardship: “People graduating college cannot find a job. Hundreds of thousands, even millions. People who reach the age of thirty, thirty-five cannot find an apartment to rent. Poverty was everywhere.”

      Sattar was discharged from the Egyptian army in January 1981. After Sadat’s assassination, his family pressured him to leave Egypt for fear that the government would pursue him for islamist activities. He came to New York in July 1982 on a tourist visa. He did not speak much English when he arrived. Settling in Brooklyn, he worked as a busboy and waiter. He met his wife, a Roman Catholic, in November 1984 and they married on Valentine’s Day 1985. He went to work for the Post Office in 1988. The couple had four children. She was not a practicing Christian when they married and did not adopt islam for nearly a decade.

      Sattar first saw Abdel-Rahman in 1990 when he came to the United States. In the Summer of 1990 when he visited Sattar’s Abu Bakri mosque as a guest speaker. Abdel-Rahman had been famous in Egypt after the Sadat assassination trial in which he was acquitted. Abdel-Rahman’s attorney Al-Zayat also was at the mosque in 1990. Sattar was introduced to him on another occasion when Abdel-Rahman spoke at the mosque in 1991 and then came to know him in 1992. Beginning in October 1992, when Sattar became a member of the Board, he would see Abdel-Rahman regularly, whenever he spoke at the mosque. The blind sheik spoke twice a week. Mr. Sattar describes Abdel-Rahman’s as fiery, anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, and anti-American policy. Sattar explained at trial that “90 percent of his sermons were about Egypt, what’s gone on in Egypt, how the government is treating the citizens of Egypt, what the people should do, how the people should react to the treatment by the government.” In January 1993, about 2,300 people attended a hearing on the attempt by the government to deport Blind Sheikh Abdel-Rahman and he arranged media interviews. During this period, he was questioned three times by the FBI — the first was in August 1992. He was questioned again in September 1992. Then in April or May 1993, two FBI agents came to his workplace with a subpoena seeking a hand swabbing.

      In June 1993, 10-15 were arrested for conspiracy to engage in a war of urban terrorism. Abdel-Rahman was indicted later that summer. The blind sheik was at the mosque and Sattar drove to the mosque to tell him the news. After sending out a “fake Abdel-Rahman” intended to distract media, , he says, he negotiated for a surrender to made at the firehouse across the street. Over the years, Sattar would “sit in the kitchen away from everybody and smoke — and he recognized smoking was sinful — and read relevant newspapers to Abdel-Rahman. He read various Arabic papers including Al Hayat. He read all the major New York newspapers but did not like the New York Post.

      He is pictured alongside Abdel-Rahman in 1993 leaving the courthouse with the blind sheik followers. They lived in Brooklyn until 1995 and then moved to Staten Island. After a few months as a letter carrier, he started his job as a special delivery working messenger. At trial, he explained that he would deliver to the Coast Guard and until 1995, he would deliver to high security Navy installations where nuclear submarines would load and unload. He worked at the Post Office until the day of his arrest on April 9, 2002. In addition to his post office job, he helped a friend in his baby formula business — his friend bought wholesale and sold retail.

      Sattar made hundreds of phone calls from his family’s small apartment to fundamentalist followers of the sheik across the globe — from Britain to Egypt to Afghanistan. Over the years, in the course of the calls he arranged, Mr. Sattar eventually joined their debates about using violence. Senior IG leaders began calling in late 1998. Sattar’s hundreds of telephone calls to Egypt cost him thousands of dollars a year. The government tapped 90,000 calls as part of the major intelligence effort.

      The wiretapped calls show a tense dispute over whether to continue a cease-fire in their long war against the Egyptian government or return to violence. On the subject of the cease-fire, at trial , Sattar explained that Taha was the “bad cop” to the “good cop” played by Hamza, Montasser Al-Zayat and the imprisoned IG leaders. Egyptian Islamic Group founder Salah Hashim was the architect of the peace initiative. Al-Zayat’s codename was Zarzur meaning “little bird” (and he’s not little). In one call, Taha asked that Abdel-Rahman confirm he had “no objection to the formation of a team that calls for cancellation of the initiative or makes threats or escalates things.” Sattar’s comments suggest he came to favor the view of those who wanted to abandon the truce. Mr. Sattar’s phone calls show the debate between Sheik Salah Hashim, the Islamic Group’s group’s leader in Egypt, an outspoken proponent of the cease-fire and Taha, who opposed it. Taha was close to the Taliban and drawing ever closer to Bin Laden and Zawahiri. It was public outrage over those killings that led the Islamic Group to announce the cease-fire later that year and prompted Taha to step down as IG head in favor of Mustafa Hamza. Hamza would call Sattar every three weeks or month. Taha called more often. Sattar used to speak with Rifa’i Taha all the time. In 2002, Taha wrote a book found in the search of Sattar’s apartment and garage. As Sattar explained at trial, in the book “Basically Taha was trying to justify all the violence that took place in Egypt from 1990 until 1997 and to just make a justification for those things.” The book was uploaded to London-based Al-Sirri’s website.

      In his opening argument, the federal prosecutor explained:

      “Sattar led a double life. By day he was a postal worker. By night he was a terrorist living in a shadowy world, a world where to avoid detection people speak in code and don’t use their real names when they speak on the telephone. A world where Abdel Rahman is revered, a world where violence is solicited and terrorist conspiracies are hatched, a world where Sattar can proudly utter the words that he wants everybody to hear. These are his words: ‘Kill Jews wherever they are and wherever you find them.'”

      In 1999, Sattar emphasized in a Frontline interview that reaction to what he perceived as a war against Islam was inevitable. “You’re going to see the same feeling everywhere in a Muslim country toward Americans right now. In Syria, in Lebanon, in Palestine, in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in Morocco, everywhere you go, you’re going to have the same feeling that there is a war declared by the West on Islam, and in particular, the United States of America on Islam. And something has to be done about it. [The] reaction could be like the bombing in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. It could be some demonstrations in front of American embassies throughout the Islamic world that we saw before. Could be kidnapping of Americans.”

      In 1999, US Postal employee Sattar explained his admiration for Bin Laden. “I have an admiration for anybody who will stand up to a tyrant and tell him, “You are a tyrant” whether this tyrant [is a] man named [Mubarak] or [the] government of the United States of America.” Sattar described the Blind Sheik as “My friend, my mentor, my sheik, my imam, my father.” He recognized that it made him a suspect. He explained that he had been followed days and nights, under surveillance 24 hours a day sometimes. He said he had been visited by FBI agents at his Staten Island Post Office job in an attempt to prejudice my coworkers against me. He said “To me, am I a terrorist? Nope. I am a father. I am a man who believes in his religion.”

      When the Frontline interviewer in 1999 suggested that the NYC joint terrorism task force likely thought he knew a lot of people who know a lot, he said he did. But he explained that an act like the World Trade Center or Oklahoma City bombing or the 1998 embassy bombings does not need many people to do it. As the result of this operational security and compartmentalization, he is not in a position to know. “Could be four or five people like in the World Trade Center.” He continued: “I’ll tell you something. When the World Trade Center occurred here, the American government released a list. 173 names. And they called them coconspirators of people who were living in this country, and people living abroad. 173 names. So, let’s not just jump to conclusions because the American government, you know, released a name that he must be a part of it. 173.”

      Sattar also put another islamist lawyer in touch with Islamic Group leader Taha. Attorney Saad Hasaballah announced a proposed cease-fire by some members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, following the example of Egyptian Islamic Group two years earlier. The attorney, like Montasser Al-Zayat, had represented defendants in the Albanian Returnees trial resulting in the sentences in March 1999. The attorney for imprisoned EIJ leaders made the announcement along with an EIJ leader Osma Ayoub Sidiq, who was living in Germany.

      Before 2000, Mr. Sattar seemed to stay aloof from the group’s internal feuds, simply connecting phone calls among its members after finishing his work at the post office. But he began to change in June of that year after Mr. Abdel Rahman issued a statement, announced by Attorney Stewart in a press release in defiance of formal prison restrictions on communication. The Blind Sheik withdrew his support for the cease-fire. Sattar rushed the news of the cleric’s new view in calls to Islamic Group members overseas. Islamic Group military leader Hamza, who was in Afghanistan at the time as was Taha, protested the sheik’s change and pleaded with Mr. Sattar not to release it to the press.

      The federal prosecutor explained in his opening argument before the jury: “[A]ll the secret messages back and forth between Abdel Rahman and his terrorist network culminate in the spring of 2000, when a public announcement is made by Abdel Rahman, courtesy of these defendants, saying that Abdel Rahman no longer supported a cease fire by this terrorist organization, the cessation of terrorist violence between his organization and the Egyptian government. In essence, these defendants helped Abdel Rahman break out of jail to inspire his terrorist group to return to terrorism. They allowed Abdel Rahman to tell his followers, ‘Fire.'”

      After the press release by Attorney Stewart announcing the blind sheik’s new position, Mr. Sattar set up conference calls and then remained on the line while Mr. Hashim spoke from Egypt and Mr. Taha spoke from Afghanistan argued angrily. Mr. Taha said the Egyptian government of President Hosni Mubarak “must be removed, and will not be removed except by using armed force.” “We are in a difficult stage; we can’t use force at all,” Mr. Hashim insisted. Many hundreds of IG members were still in jail and negotiations were underway with the government for their release.

      At the time of these exchanges, Taha appeared with Bin Laden on a videotape that was broadcast on September 21, 2000, by Al Jazeera. They called for violent worldwide jihad to free Mr. Abdel Rahman from jail. A couple days later Mr. Taha called Mr. Sattar to get his reaction. “The words caused such an impact,” Mr. Sattar exclaimed.

      In late September 2000, during an upsurge of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Sattar came home from the post office each day, immediately going to monitor Arab news Web sites and television. The images all look to him like Israeli attacks on innocent Palestinian civilians, according to the transcripts. “Animals, animals, I swear by God the Almighty,” Mr. Sattar said, referring to the Israelis. When Mr. Taha called, Mr. Sattar urged him to compose a religious decree that they could attribute to the sheik. Later he edited Mr. Taha’s draft. “Kill the Jews wherever they are found,” it says. On the day after the fatwah was published Sattar read a newspaper article to Taha. That article identified a man named Atia as the leader of the Islamic Group military wing in Egypt. Taha commented to Sattar that the writer of the article had really good information. Three days later, Taha called Sattar and told Sattar that he should contact Atia and tell them about the fatwah they had issued, the one demanding the murder of the Jews. Sattar agreed to do so and called Atia in early October 2000.

      In his opening argument, the federal prosecutor explained: “Using the pretext of attorney-client visits and telephone calls, these defendants were able to break Abdel Rahman’s message of terror out of jail and deliver it to the very people who never should have heard it, other terrorists who still walk the streets and were still able to follow his instructions.” Separately, Taha wrote a legal justification for killing innocents and Sattar had a copy of the book.
      Sattar helped Islamic Group leader Taha, who was in Afghanistan with the IG military commander Mustafa Hamza, compose a religious edict and release it under the sheik Abdel-Rahman’s name. He arranged for it to be uploaded to the internet and released to the press. He coordinated with Vanguards of Conquest spokesman Yasir Al-Sirri, based in London. Sattar says he was moved to order the killing of jews after the visit of Ariel Sharon to the site of the Al Aqsa mosque in September 2000. At trial, he lamented Mr. Sharon’s visit as a “violation of that holy place.” His fatwa urged young Muslims to fight Jews “by all possible means of jihad, either by killing them as individuals or by targeting their interests and their advocates, as much as they can.” The blind sheik did not see the fatwa issued in his name until the next week but approved it after the fact. The sheik had signed a power of attorney for Mr. Sattar and trusted his judgment completely.

      There were about 90,000 intercepted conversations from Sattar’s home phone made between March 1995 and March 2002, as part of a federal foreign intelligence investigation. The Assistant United States Attorney explained at trial that the “criminal investigation and any consideration of charges were put on hold due to a fear that the criminal investigation could possibly blow the intelligence investigation.” The coincidence that anthrax would be delivered by a postal worker, however, likely did not go unnoticed by those pursuing the theory that US-based supporters of Al Qaeda were responsible for the anthrax mailings. Sattar put Taha in direct contact with the head of the Islamic Group in Egypt, Atia, who was hiding in southern Egypt. On October 11, 2000 Sattar told Taha that he had spoken with Atia. He told Taha that he believed that Atia was eager ready and able “to do things,” and that he had to warn Atia repeatedly during their telephone call that his telephone was “not safe.” Atia then was killed in a raid a week later. In early November, Taha gave Sattar the news that Atia had been killed. Taha in the calls set up by Sattar was urging Atia to conduct operations. Then Atia was caught and killed. Sattar said at the time: “I feel guilty, guilty. I am telling you I suspect it is 90 percent my phone.” The expert on functionalized polymers, Magdy al-Nashar, was connected to the people who did Luxor, according to the biochemist’s brother. Al-Nashar arranged for the London flat used by the 7/7 bombers is represented by Mamdouh Ismail (allegedly Zawahiri’s chief conduit to jihadis). Sattar said at the time

      The Washington Post reported in May 2002 that investigators had heard a summer 2001 conversation about a letter of introduction from Al-Sirri relied upon by the two who concealed a bomb in a camera that purportedly was going to film Northern Alliance leader. Massoud was killed two days before 9/11. A draft of the letter was found on Ayman’s computer in Kabul. Perhaps Taha wrote the letter on the computer in Ayman’s office after a conference call with Sattar and Al-Sirri. Britain has a very lengthy and inefficient extradition process — the original request has been withdrawn and the US now has renewed its request Al-Sirri be transferred to the US under a new treaty.

      On October 25, 2000, Taha told Sattar that an Egyptian male was involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and that Sattar should help in delivering a message to the US government suggesting that similar attacks would occur unless Abdel Rahman were freed. Now as Dr. Ayman’s leadership of Al Qaeda upon Bin Laden’s death is discussed, and he is credited with the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, analysts should give hard consideration to whether he isn’t also responsible for the anthrax mailings. His intention to use anthrax against US targets had been expressly announced. Call him “anti-charismatic” if you like. But recognize that he is not known to not carry out his announced plans.

      If we do not learn from history, we are bound to repeat it. If the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency and Postal Inspectors failed to catch the Amerithrax killer(s), as in my opinion was the case, then the Defense Intelligence Agency should succeed where the other agencies failed. Our troops depend on the DIA to keep them safe. If the DIA isn’t up to the challenge of dealing with the conclusion of bureaucrats at a politicized, compartmentalized Department of Justice where the agents regularly rotate to new assignments, then how will they prove themselves a match for Zawahiri?

  11. DXer said

    Did Walied Samarrai live in Piscataway in 2001, home of Rutgers, and 3 miles from the Hamilton mailbox in Princeton? If so, then the grounds for excluding him must be a lack of access to Flask 1029. (I haven’t heard back from Professor Samarrai to confirm the date he lived in Piscataway but that’s what the undated Intellius listing shows for free.) The FBI went to Rutgers and checked the photocopiers as they did, I’m sure, in numerous places.

    Given Professor’s expertise in subtilis, genomics, mutations resulting from nutritional starvation, resistance to sunlight and chemicals etc. and codons etc, what does he think of the FBI’s code theory (based on the codons)? One of the letters the FBI claimed to be underlined in fact appears NOT to be underlined and so their theory seems to be crap.

    • DXer said

      Steve Coll , managing editor of Washington Post wrote in GHOST WARS:

      “In a letter claiming responsibility to New York newspapers (on behalf of the Liberation Army, Fifth Battalion” KSM’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, issued three political demands: an end to all U.S. aid to Israel, an end to diplomatic relations with Israel, and a pledge to end interference “with any of the Middle East countries [sic] interior affairs.” The theme was political, not religious.

      In an earlier discarded draft found on a computer belonging to one of his co-conspirators, there was an added warning:

      “Unfortunately, our calculations were not very accurate this time” read the deleted sentence. “however, we promise you that next time, it will be very precise and WTC will continue to be one of our targets unless our demands have been met.”

      Question: On whose computer was it found? Where was the computer located? What is the date that the letter was written?

      • DXer said

        At page 278, Steve Coll describes a long review of global terrorism circulated by the FBI in the latter half of 1995, classified Secret, which “noted the vulnerability of the American homeland to attacks. It specifically cited Murad’s confessed plot to hijack a plan and fly it into CIA headquarters as an example.” It had the heading “Ramzi Ahmed Yousef: A New Generation of Sunni Islamic Terrorism” and explained:

        “Unlike traditional forms of terrorism, such as state-sponsored or the Iran/Hezbellah model, Sunni extremists are neither surrogates of nor strongly influenced by one nation,” the FBI’s analysts wrote.

        • DXer said

          The report noted that there was now [by 1995] reason to suspect Yousef and his associates receive support from Osamba bin Laden and may be able to tap into bin Laden’s mujahedin support network.” In addition, they may have also been able to draw on Islamic charities for support.

      • DXer said

        Did Professor Samarrai know this fellow who wrote that letter?

  12. DXer said

    That long call to the Pakistani charity from the subtilis expert’s room was to “Saudi Red Crescent” in Pakistan.

    That was who Ayman Zawahiri was working for when he used that as a cover to travel in the United States with Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s intelligence chief Ali Mohammed in the 1990s.

    (Who does Professor Samarrai say the call was to?)

    Ayman Zawahiri travelled with his chief of intelligence Ali Mohammed with Dr. Zaki and his brother, a New York pharmacist (as I recall, it was the People’s Pharmacy in Harlem). (This is different from the Harlem pharmacist said by the detainees to be connected to Al Qaeda’s anthrax program).

    Dahab was a fellow that Ali Mohammed taught to make lethal letters.

    I told all this to the CIA (the Zawahiri Task Force) in December 2001.

    The first thing the FBI should have done is to figure out “who knew who” dating back to Brooklyn in the early 1990s.

    Vince Cannistraro, who was advising the Task Force to set up a sting website (anthraxhunt) and post flyers announcing the perp was bi-polar and had a sexual dysfunction, coincidentally would be expert on the Blind Sheik’s operation in Peshawar.

    Who does Vince think is responsible for the anthrax mailings?

    Top bin Laden aide toured state / SPECIAL REPORT: Al-Zawahiri solicited funds under the guise of refugee relief

    October 11, 2001|By Lance Williams, Erin McCormick, Chronicle Staff Writers


    In accounts of the confession, Dahab said that Zaki and his brother, a New York pharmacist, had accompanied al-Zawahiri on his 1995 fund-raising tour. Dahab also said Zaki had paid for shipping the hang-glider to Afghanistan.

    In an interview, Zaki said he knew of only one U.S. visit by al-Zawahiri — in 1989 or 1990, at a time when the Afghan struggle against the Soviets was either still under way or only recently over. The United States had strongly backed the Afghan freedom fighters, he pointed out.

    Zaki said he had been introduced to “Dr. Mu’izz,” al-Zawahiri’s fake name, by Mohamed and Dahab, whom Zaki said he knew because both worshipped at the same mosque. He provided limited help for what he believed was a charitable cause, he said.

    “I have been investigated by the FBI, and I testified before the grand jury for the bin Laden case, and I explained to them, (al-Zawahiri) might have been (here) in the mid-’90s, but the only time I met Mr. Zawahiri was in 1989 or 1990, and he came with a different name as a representative of the Red Crescent, which is equivalent to the Red Cross,” he said.

  13. DXer said

    I’ve emailed Professor “Samar” for as many reasons he can be excluded as apply:

    for example, some that occur to me might include:

    1) no access to virulent Ames,
    2) alibi,
    3) case of mistaken identity regarding phone records, etc.

    • DXer said

      As for Abdul Yasin, the fellow who (now Professor) Samarrai was calling, he was interviewed by CBS in 2001. The FBI should not have let him go — he was obviously a flight risk, having just recently arrived and not having ties (other than to this microbiologist). Is there more up-to-date information?

      The First World Trade Center Attack

      On February 26, 1993, bombs rocked the World Trade Center in New York City for the first time. The FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force reports that over 1,000 people were injured in the explosions, while six were killed.

      Investigators say that Abdul Yasin was one of the men behind the attacks that police report caused more than half a billion dollars in damage. Yasin was born in Bloomington, Ind., but is now believed to be in Iraq.

      One-On-One With A Suspected Terrorist Mastermind

      Abdul Rahman Yasin, the sole remaining fugitive indicted for the February 26, 1993 World Trade Center bombing, has been located and interviewed in Baghdad. In 2001, America’s Most Wanted aired a segment detailing Yasin’s involvement in the 1993 bombing …

      CBS News reported that they found Yasin in Baghdad, and with the approval of the Iraqi government, conducted an interview between he and correspondent Leslie Stahl. Abdul Rahman Yasin fled to Iraq after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He lived as a free man for a year, but authorities in Iraq told CBS News they put him in prison in 1994.

      After September 11th, President Bush put Yasin on a new most wanted list, with a $25 million reward. According to CBS News, Yasin tells Stahl that the twin towers were not the terrorists’ first choice. Yasin tells Stahl “[Ramzi Yousef] told me, ‘I want to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn.'” But after scouting Crown Heights and Williamsburg, Yasin says, Yousef had a better idea. “Ramzi Yousef told us to go to the World Trade Center. ‘I have an idea we should do one big explosion rather than do small ones in Jewish neighborhoods,'” Yasin says.

      The FBI says they never knew that Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn were on the original hit list of Yousef and his co-conspirator, Mohammed Salameh. … During the Stahl interview, Yasin, now 40, says he is sorry for what he did and that the bombers, whom he says he met for the first time while living in a Jersey City apartment building, talked him into it. “[Yousef and Salameh] used to tell me how Arabs suffered a great deal and that we have to send a message that this is not right, to revenge for my Palestinian brothers and my brothers in Saudi Arabia,” Yasin tells Stahl. He adds that they also prodded him about being an Iraqi who should avenge the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War.

      Yasin confirms that Yousef was the maker of the bomb used in the attack and that Yousef learned the process in a terrorist camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, before entering the United States. According to CBS News, 60 Minutes has independently confirmed that the man interviewed is, in fact, Abdul Rahman Yasin, whose picture is on the FBI Web site along with Usama bin Laden. Yasin is indicted in the United States for his participation in the 1993 World Trade Center attack.

      Wanted For:

      Assault Of A Federal Officer In The Line Of Duty , New York , NY ; Feb 26, 1993
      Aiding and Abetting
      Importation,Manufacture,Distribution Storage Of Explosive Materials ; Feb 26, 1993
      (Information valid as of July 16, 2008)

    • DXer said

      I have a very stupid question: If he retraced for the FBI agents where and how the WTC bomb was built in New York and New Jersey. Why was he released?

      (The CBS interview apparently was in May 23, 2002 rather than 2001 as I suggested in another post.)

      Arrival in United States, 1992

      On June 21, 1992 Yasin was able to use his American birth citizenship to obtain a US passport from the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan, and thus enter the United States.

      Recruited by Ramzi Yousef, he had acid burns on his legs and jeans from bomb chemicals.

      Soon following investigation of the attack on February 26, 1993, Yasin was picked up by the FBI on March 4, 1993, the same day as the arrest of Mohammed A. Salameh, in a sweep of sites associated with Salameh. Yasin was found in the apartment in Jersey City, New Jersey, that he was sharing with his mother.[2]

      Yasin was taken to New Jersey FBI headquarters in Newark, where he was reportedly very cool and cooperative. Agents had Yasin retrace where and how the WTC bomb had been built in New York and New Jersey.

      Yasin said he was released after giving agents names and addresses, and went to Iraq.

      Return to Iraq, 1993

      On February 26, 1993, Yasin boarded Royal Jordanian flight 262 to Amman, Jordan. From Amman, Abdul Rahman Yasin went on to Baghdad.[4]

      In Baghdad, Iraq, Yasin lived freely for at least a year. Saddam Hussein regime’s gave money and housing to Yasin. The Iraqi government later claimed he was arrested and put in prison (see CBS Stahl interview, below).

      On October 10, 2001 Yasin appeared on the initial list of the FBI’s top 22 Most Wanted Terrorists, which was released to the public by President Bush.

      On several occasions, Iraq offered to turn Yasin over to the US government in exchange for lifting UN economic sanctions.[citation needed] Tariq Aziz, spokesman of Iraq, claimed that in the 1990s all Iraq wanted in return was a signed statement that Iraq had handed over Yasin. But reportedly the statement presented to the U.S. at the time contained lengthy wording essentially exonerating Iraqi involvement in the 1993 WTC attack. Nevertheless, Kenneth Pollack of the State Department stated that there was no CIA information tying Iraq into the 1993 WTC bombing.

      With Yasin reportedly being held as a prisoner in Hussein’s Iraq, Leslie Stahl of CBS interviewed him there for a segment on 60 Minutes on May 23, 2002 (see below). Yasin appeared in prison pajamas and handcuffs. It was claimed that Iraq had held Yasin prisoner on the outskirts of Baghdad since 1994.[2]

      Yasin is believed to still be in Iraq but he hasn’t been seen or heard from since the 2002 prison interview.

      • DXer said

        So I believe (although I may be mistaken and correct me if I’m wrong) that the Attorney General Eric Holder wanted to indict Khalid Mohammed, using an indictment that referenced anthrax, in the WTC 1993 case that named Abdul Yasin (the telephone buddy with the subtilis expert).
        August Term, 1997
        (Argued: December 18 & 19, 1997 Decided: August 04, 1998 )
        Docket Nos. 94-1312, -1313, -1314, -1315
        MOHAMMED A. SALAMEH, NIDAL AYYAD, MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA, also known as Mahmoud Abu Halima, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ, also known as Khurram Khan, Defendants-Appellants,

        RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF, BILAL ALKAISI, also known as Bilal Elqisi, ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN, also known as Aboud, Defendants.

        • DXer said

          I believe the indictment of KSM and the others would have been in 93 Cr. 180.

        • DXer said

          There is up to a $5 million reward offered for Abdul Yasin.

          If the subtilis expert calling so often knows where he is, he should come forward with the information.

          I haven’t heard back in response to my email to “Waly Samar” (Walied Samarrai) if he lived in Trenton in 2001 as claimed by one skip tracer.

        • DXer said

          Note that the connection is not with Saddam (as Laurie thought) but with the blind sheik’s organization in Peshawar — which was headed by Islambouli.

          Former CIA operations person from years ago, Vince Cannistraro, was called by Blind Sheik’s defense counsel in connection with that trial. Years later, Vince was the one advising the Amerithrax Task Force to set up this anthraxhunt sting operation that posited a bi-polar fellow with a sexual dysfunction. The fellow working on the anthraxhunt website the next year or so was the one who published about how auras reveal one’s personality.

          I think Amerithrax represents the greatest intelligence failure in the history of the United States.

        • DXer said

          Former Fla. student high in al-Qaida
          Published: May 3, 2011 at 11:44 AM

          Adnan El Shukrijumah, courtesy of the FBI.

          MIAMI, May 3 (UPI) — A former Florida community college student has risen to the top ranks of al-Qaida’s global operations, the U.S. Justice Department says.

          Read more:


          Adnan El Shukirjumah’s dad testified as a character witness in the 1993 WTC trial. In the early 1990s, Sheikh Gulshair took a job with the Al Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn where some congregants were linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the subsequent foiled plot to blow up New York City landmarks.

          Read more at:

          Who does Adnan think is behind the mailings? What about Jdey, for whom I think there also is a $5 million reward.

          Upon the dad’s passing, Ali Al-Timimi’s mentor, Bilal Philips, wrote to say on a webpage how close he had felt to the dad.

          Question: How was the subtilis expert in regular contact with Abdul Yasin, the 1993 plotter, ruled out? Did they at least test his work areas for the genetically distinct subtilis? Was he ruled out on the grounds that Ali Al-Timimi never had access to virulent Ames? (even though Ali shared a suite with the DARPA-funded Ames researchers?)

          GAO: Was Rachel Lieber the AUSA who was told she could not interview the jihadist? Wasn’t the jihadist Ali Al-Timimi? (The AUSA’s nickname is The Ice Princess).

        • DXer said

          The death of bin Laden now leaves a vacancy in the role of Emir, and with Mohammed currently in captivity in Guantánamo Bay it would appear that Shukrijumah may be bin Laden’s natural successor.

          It is, in fact, possible that Shukrijumah had already been the de facto leader of al-Qaeda given how bin Laden had apparently become more of an inactive figurehead.

          “He was always a symbol, but as a movement, he was unable to lead and manage as he was being pursued so closely,” Abdel Rahman – the son of an Egyptian sheikh who was jailed over a failed plot to attack New York’s tourist landmarks – tells today’s New York Times.

          Comment: Hey, Adnan. You’ve come a long way from those garage sales you used to hold in 2001 to raise money for jihad.

        • DXer said

          So the FBI are still looking for “Atta-level” Floridian, Adnan El Shukrijumah, who Siddiqui is thought to have known and been assisting.

          His nickname is “Jafar the Pilot.”

          A senior DOJ official reports that Adnan has experience as a commercial pilot.

          He is said by one FBI agent to be “very, very, very” dangerous. He allegedly was at one or more meetings in the Summer of 2001 in Pakistan at which KSM and Sufaat were present.

          He may have been seen in Hamilton, Canada — along with Egyptian al-Maati, who apparently also has received pilot training.

          The United States truly no longer has time for faulty analysis or politically-based preconceptions.

          In early June 2003, a CIA report concluded that the reason for Atta’s and Zacarias Moussaoui’s inquiries into cropdusters was in fact for the contemplated use in dispersing biological agents such as anthrax.

          It has long been known Osama Bin Laden was interested in using cropdusters to disperse biological agents (since the testimony of millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam).

  14. DXer said

    New story –

    Doubt of anthrax suspect’s role resurfaces in lawsuit

  15. Old Atlantic said

    This is important. It is unlikely Ivins would have introduced the foreign subtilis into Ft. Detrick only into the letter anthrax and leaving no other trace.

    For Ivins to have environmentally contaminated the mailed anthrax he would have had to himself personally have picked up the subtilis from the environment outside Ft. Detrick and then personally transmitted it only into the flasks used to prepare the letter anthrax, and not have allowed it to have contaminated Ft. Detrick, his car or home after he prepared it.

    Since he had to change clothes and shoes before entering the BSL3 this is unlikely. He also likely washed his hands between contact with the subtilis outside Ft Detrick and entering the lab.

    If someone else introduced the subtilis they would not have infected only the flasks used to produce the letter anthrax.

    There are two improbable events joined together here. One is that the subtilis came into the flask for preparing the anthrax only in the BSL3. The second is that once the strange subtilis was magnified in amount by growth that it did not spray in the BSL3 and every where the anthrax went as well.

    If the swabbing by Ivins the FBI points to was of anthrax he prepared, then there should have been the strange subtilis around as well and equally easily found by swabbing. Such was never detected.

    Two improbabilities back to back are very unlikely. This is strong evidence against Ivins doing it.

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