CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* The FBI finally has produced 30 pages of the 88 pages from Lab Notebook 4010 relating to Dr. Ivins’ Flask 1029

Posted by DXer on March 3, 2011

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  • The FBI finally has produced 30 pages from Lab Notebook 4010
  • but has not produced the lab notebook pages detailing his observations of the animals on the nights he allegedly was making a dried powder.
  • They similarly have not produced a key September 17, 2001 email he wrote to Dr. Mara Linscott — on the day the DOJ and FBI suggest, without evidence, that he travelled to Princeton to mail the letters.

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CASE CLOSED

is a novel about the FBI’s “botched” investigation

of the 2001 anthrax attacks

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read the opening scene of CASE CLOSED …

* buy CASE CLOSED at amazon *

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26 Responses to “* The FBI finally has produced 30 pages of the 88 pages from Lab Notebook 4010 relating to Dr. Ivins’ Flask 1029”

  1. DXer said

    The FBI has produced only 30 pages of the 88 pages of Notebook 4010 the notebook associated with the so-called (and inaptly named) “murder weapon” Flask 1029.

    USAMRMC should return Notebook 4010 to USAMRMC and then USAMRIID /USAMRMC should upload the 30 pages produced by the FBI — and process the remaining 58 pages (and upload it to the USAMRMC Electronic Reading Room).

  2. DXer said

    Both the Army and the FBI have failed to upload Lab Notebook 4010 pertaining to Flask 1029 — which the US Attorney insisting on describing as the “murder weapon.” Dr. Dillon should bring suit against the FBI for the FBI’s failure to produce it.

  3. DXer said

    From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
    To:
    Subject: RE: Yet Another Delta Sterne ?
    Date: Thursday, February 13, 2003 9:33:33 AM
    transformed pPA101 and pPA102 into B. subtilis WB600 (a protease-deficient
    strain).
    > —–Original Message—–
    >From:
    >Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2003 9:07 AM
    >To: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
    >Subject: FW: Yet Another Delta Sterne ?
    >
    >Bruce,
    >
    >Do you have time today to look at the paper and see what it actually says (pPA101 vs. pPA102,
    subtilis vs. anthracis; see my notes in black below). I have to meet with my little three letter friends
    this morning and is in a hurry.
    >
    >Thanks
    >
    >

  4. DXer said

    Note that in addition to pages from Lab Notebook 4010, Lab Notebook 3655 is of special interest.

    In describing his lab’s work with subtilis, Dr. Ivins wrote:

    From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
    To:
    Subject: Requested Information
    Date: Friday, March 19, 2004 2:43:07 PM

    I am sending you information requested over the telephone this morning.
    Additional information:

    USAMRIID Notebooks 3655 and 4010 contain information pertaining to Ames spore preparations RMR
    (Reference Material Receipt) 1030 and RMR 1029.

    Our laboratory’s procedure for producing, harvesting and purifying anthrax spores was published:

    Ivins, B. E., . Immunization against anthrax with aromatic compound-dependent (Aro-) Mutants of Bacillus anthracis and with recombinant strains of
    Bacillus subtilis that produce anthrax protective antigen. Infection and Immunity. 58:303-308.

    • DXer said

      Most science goes over my head and I don’t grasp the research involving subtilis and this work with mutants. Patricia Worsham did a good job of explaining it before the NAS in her briefing on the Amerithrax investigation.

      The research at Hunter College, to take an example, deals with

      the heterogeneity in organization of the conserved and redundant rRNA (rrn) operons and tRNA (trn) genes, their expression and the molecular mechanism involved in the regulation of ribosome synthesis in Bacillus subtilis; and

      also how bacterial populations specifically various Bacilli can behave in an organized manner to generate highly geometrically morphologies or morphotypes on solid and semi-solid surfaces. Five morphotypes have been generated for B. subtilis under
      nutrient scarcity and hardness of the agar surface: 1) the common compact round colonial growth with rough edges, (B); 2) tree branches with tip splitting growth, (T); 3) curled or chiral growth with the same handedness branches, (C); 4) vortex branched growth led by bacteria droplets that spin around a common center, (V); that 5) at times become spiral vortex (SV). These forms are stably inherited exhibiting many physiological and genetic properties distinct from B. subtilis. Sequencing of the 16S rDNA gene and Southern hybridization suggests that the colonial patterns may be the result of another Bacilli coexisting with B. subtilis which is activated during certain hostile conditions. Work is on going to understand the genetic basis of morphotypes and the role played by chemotaxis in generating and maintaining these striking differentiated structures.

      All the more reason that the FBI disclose all of Dr. Ivins’ lab notebook pages relating to subtilis, especially Lab Notebook 3655 and 4010.

      • Kearns, D.B., Chu, F., Rudner, R., and Losick R. Genes governing swarming in Bacillus subtili and evidence for a new phase variation mechanism controlling surface motility. Molecular Microbiology 52:357-369 (2004).

      • Shaver, Y. J., Nagpal, M.L., Fox, K. F., Rudner, R., and Fox, A. Variation in the 16S- 23S rRNA intergenic spacer regions among Bacillus subtilis 168 isolates. Molecular Microbiology 42:101-110 (2001).

      • Feinberg L., Jogensen, J., Haselton, A., Pitt, A., Rudner, R, and Margulis, L. Arthromitus (Bacillus cereus symbionts) in cockroach Blaberus giganteus: Dietary influences on bacterial develop and population density. Symbiosis 27: 109- 123 (1999)

      • Rudner, R. Murray, A., and Huda, N. Is there a link between mutation rates and the stringent response in Bacillus subtilis. In Molecular Strategies in Biological Evolution. L.H. Caporale (ed) Ann. of the New York Academy of Sciences, pp 418-422 (1999)

      • Rudner, R., Martsinkevich, O., Leung, W., and Jarvis E. D. Classification and genetic characterization of pattern-forming Bacilli. Molecular Microbiology 27: 687-703 (1998).

      • Rudner, R. , Martsinkevich, O., Leung, W., and Jarvis, E.D. 1998. Classification and genetic characterization of pattern-forming Bacilli. Submitted to Mol. Microbiol. 27:687-703.

      • Rudner , R. , Studamire, B., and Jarvis,E. D. Determination of restriction fragment length polymorphism in bacteria with ribosomal RNA genes. In Methods of Enzymology: Bacterial Pathogenesis vol.235 Part A Identification and regulation of virulence factors. Clark V. L. and Bavoil P.M. (eds.) pp184. Academic Press, In .San Diego,California (1994) 2nd Ed (1997)

      • Gropp, M., Eizenman, E., Glaser, G., Rudner, R. 1994 A relA(s) suppressor mutant allele of Bacillus subtilis which maps to relA and responds only to carbon limitation. Gene, 140: 91-96.

      • Rudner, R., Studamire, B., Jarvis, E.D. 1994 Determination of restriction fragment length polymorphism in bacteria with ribosomal RNA genes. Bacterial Pathogenesis, Vol 235. Methods in Enzymology: p.184. Clark, V.L., Pavoli, P.M.(ed) Academic Press Inc., San Diego, CA.

      • Rudner, R., Chevrestt, A., Buchholz, S.R., Studamire, B., White, A.-M, Jarvis, E.D. 1993 Two tRNA gene associated with rRNA operons rrnD and rrnE in Bacillus subtilis. J. Bacteriol. 175: 503-509.

      • Rudner, R., Martsinkevich, O., Leung, W., and Jarvis E. D. Classification and genetic characterization of pattern-forming Bacilli. Molecular Microbiology 27: 687-703 (1998).

      • DXer said

        “We never found the equivalent B. subtilis at USAMRIID in any of the evidence that we had.” — Jason D. Bannan before the NAS

        • DXer said

          Dr. Bannan, the former collection scientist at American Type Culture Collection (located at GMU) who came to lead the Amerithrax investigation, found that phylogenetic analyses revealed the existence of a previously unknown group of strains closely related to, but distinct from, Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii. He and his co-authors proposed that a new group should be recognized as representing a novel taxon, Bacillus subtilis subsp. inaquosorum subsp. nov.

          Work continues on Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii. It reminds me of genealogical researchers sharing the fruits of their research on ancestry.com. For example, a researcher at Ohio State University has determined that Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii W23 is a direct descendent of B. subtilis ATCC 6633.

          1/
          Int J Syst Evol Microbiol. 2009 Oct;59(Pt 10):2429-36. Epub 2009 Jul 21.
          Phylogeny and molecular taxonomy of the Bacillus subtilis species complex and description of Bacillus subtilis subsp. inaquosorum subsp. nov.

          Rooney AP, Price NP, Ehrhardt C, Swezey JL, Bannan JD.
          Source

          Microbial Genomics and Bioprocessing Research Unit, National Center for Agricultural Utilization Research, Agricultural Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Peoria, IL 61604, USA. alejandro.rooney@ars.usda.gov

          Abstract

          The Bacillus subtilis species complex is a tight assemblage of closely related species. For many years, it has been recognized that these species cannot be differentiated on the basis of phenotypic characteristics. Recently, it has been shown that phylogenetic analysis of the 16S rRNA gene also fails to differentiate species within the complex due to the highly conserved nature of the gene, yet DNA-DNA hybridization values fall well below 70 % for the same species comparisons. As a complementary approach, we propose that phylogenetic analysis of multiple protein-coding loci can be used as a means to detect and differentiate novel Bacillus taxa. Indeed, our phylogenetic analyses revealed the existence of a previously unknown group of strains closely related to, but distinct from, Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii. Results of matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry analyses revealed that the group produces a novel surfactin-like lipopeptide with mass m/z 1120.8 that is not produced by the other currently recognized subspecies. In addition, the group displayed differences in the total cellular content of the fatty acids C(16 : 0) and iso-C(17 : 1)omega10c that distinguish it from the closely related B. subtilis subsp. spizizenii. Consequently, the correlation of these novel phenotypic traits with the phylogenetic distinctiveness of this previously unknown subspecies group showed that phylogenetic analysis of multiple protein-coding loci can be used as a means to detect and differentiate novel Bacillus taxa. Therefore, we propose that this new group should be recognized as representing a novel taxon, Bacillus subtilis subsp. inaquosorum subsp. nov., with the type strain NRRL B-23052(T) (=KCTC 13429(T)=BGSC 3A28(T)).

          2/ The genome sequence of Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii W23: insights into speciation within the B. subtilis complex and into the history of B. subtilis genetics

          Daniel R Zeigler1
          Ohio State University

          The genome sequence of Bacillus subtilis subsp. spizizenii W23 has been determined. The sequence strongly suggests that W23 is a direct descendent of B. subtilis ATCC 6633. W23 shares a 3.6 Mb core genome with the intensively studied model organism B. subtilis subsp. subtilis 168, and gene order within this core has been strongly conserved. Additionally, the W23 genome has 157 accessory (that is, non-core) genome segments that are not found in 168, while the 168 genome has 141 segments not found in W23. The distribution of sequences similar to these accessory segments among other genomes of the B. subtilis species complex shows that those sequences having entered into the phylogeny of the complex more recently tend to be larger and more AT-rich than those having entered more anciently. A simple model can account for these observations, in which parasitic or symbiotic DNAs are transferred into the genome and then are reduced in size and modified in base composition during speciation.

        • DXer said

          Anwar Awlaki, proposed as a possible candidate to succeed Bin Laden, was actively coordinating with fellow Falls Church imam Ali Al-Timimi, who had unfettered access* to the largest microbiological repository inventory at the world.

          *Source: A JD/PhD with BL-3/BL-4 experience, a whistleblower, who was fired immediately upon complaining of the lax security at ATCC (within two weeks of starting). ATCC made her sign a confidentiality . nondisclosure agreement.

      • DXer said

        The head of the Hunter College lab was the mentor of the subtilis expert who was calling the apartment that Ramzi Yousef listed upon the late January 1993 accident (the one associated with the Yasin brothers).

        Did the subtilis expert connected to KSM’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, know Ali Al-Timimi? Ali Al-Timimi was interviewed in connection with WTC 1993 according to his defense committee.

  5. DXer said

    Transfers of material from Flask 1029 are substantiated in the following Lab Notebooks: 3745, 3945, 4000, 4010, 4237, and 4251 — not merely Lab Notebook 4010.

  6. DXer said

    Dr. Tarek Hamouda and lab tech Michael Hayes had worked with virulent Ames with Bruce Ivins in May 1998 — a week or two after the notes made by Dr. Ivins posted above.

    In October 2001, LSU and University of Michigan were subpoenaed. A DARPA Program Manager at the time privately told a friend of mine that they knew where the attack Ames came from and even the machine used to make it. What was the machine? The corona plasma discharge used in the DARPA research? A sonicator used in the DARPA research? A lyophilizer?

    According to Richard Hidalgo, assistant to the dean of the school of veterinary medicine at LSU, the DOJ asked the school to provide by Oct. 23 a log of all visitors and employees at the Hugh-Jones Special Pathogens Lab since Jan. 1, 2000, including their Social Security numbers and dates of birth. The subpoena also asked for information on shipments of pathogens to and from the lab. “Besides Dr. Hugh-Jones and his lab director, only three others have been in the lab” during the time in question, Hidalgo said. “I’ve never been there myself.” Why did the FBI limit the October 2001 subpoena of LSU Special Pathogens Lab to visitors after January 1, 2000. The DARPA research involving virulent Ames supplied by Bruce Ivins prior to that.
    “A subpoena also was delivered to the University of Michigan, according to a source who asked not to be identified. ” …”LSU’s Hidalgo said the FBI appears to be looking for any breach in the strict handling procedures for anthrax and other select agents. It could not be determined yesterday how many institutions have received subpoenas. In some cases, the FBI has made investigative inquiries without court orders.”

    Alibek says Russia had Ames. Porton Down reportedly provided it to four unnamed researchers. American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”) has written me to say that as a matter of policy, they will not address whether their patent repository (as distinguished from their online catalog) had virulent Ames prior to 9/11. Although ATCC did not take the opportunity to deny it, one can infer from the FBI’s affidavit in connection the search of Ivins’ residence that no lab in Virginia is known by the FBI to have had virulent Ames.

    Thus, FBI, in its “Ivins Theory,” was working on the understanding that ATCC did not have Ames in its patent repository. Work with virulent Ames was done by the Southern Research Institute in Frederick, which in 2000 was announced as the subcontractor under DARPA grant to Advanced Biosystems. Bruce Ivins’ former colleague, Patricia Fellows, who worked with Ames from Flask 1029, left USAMRIID to head the BL-3 lab at SRI.

    • DXer said

      University of Michigan researchers worked alongside Bruce Ivins and Pat Fellows the week or two after the notations above.

      James Baker wrote a December 5, 1997 letter from a University of Michigan Medical Center scientist to Bruce Ivins in advance of the visit by Tarek Hamouda and Michael Hayes. The FBI produced the letter as part of its FOIA production. It states

      “Dear Dr. Ivins:

      It was a pleasure speaking with you the other day. I much appreciate your willingness to work with us concerning our new anti-sporicidal material. We are looking forward to doing it in vitro evaluating or not whether this material against anthrax spores given its efficacy against other species of bacillus spores. These studies would involve mixing the material with the spores for varying lengths of time and then either separating the spores or culturing them directly to determine the viability. We might also do fixation of the spore preparations to determine if there are any ultrastructural changes in the spores that can be oberved with electron microscopy.”

      “My technicians are fully trained in the contagious pathogen handling and have experience with level 3 biosafety requirements. They, as I, are willing to undergo the anthrax and plague immunizations, although I was hoping that they might be able to administer the vaccines at the University of Michigan. This might allow us to only make one trip to USAMRID before we begin the studies. If we could either purchase the vaccine from you or from a commercial distributor, we would be happy to administer it and document titers in any way you feel appropriate.

      I look forward to the initiation of this work. I believe it could be a very interesting collaboration that could eventually lead to animal studies. On December 19, commensurate with the filing of patents on this material, I will send you additional data on the formulations and our studies concerning the ability of these materials to inactivate spores both in vitro and in vivo.

      Sincerely,

      ____________
      _____ Division of Allergy”

      The FBI apparently did not obtain the documents from Bruce Ivins relating to the correspondence with the University of Michigan researchers until 2005 — four years after the mailings. At that time, someone using Arthur Friedlander’s telephone number forwarded evidence that Dr. Hamouda and lab tech Michael Hayes had received anthrax and plague vaccinations in advance of coming to work alongside Dr. Ivins in the BL-3 laboratory using virulent Ames. The sender noted that the 20 pages being forwarded had been provided the sender by Bruce Ivins.

      The University of Michigan Medical Center letter dated May 10 [1998] to Bruce Ivins

      “My colleagues and I would like to extend our thanks and appreciation to both you and Dr. Ivins for the opportunity to work at USAMRIID. Dr. Ivins _______________________ were very helpful and cooperative in facilitating our studies as well as providing excellent technical assistance. Their efforts made our stay at USAMRIID both pleasant and highly productive. In particular, our discussions with Dr. Ivins provided valuable insights which will enable to better define and develop our technology.”

      “The data generated in these studies serves to clarify and validate the results which we have seen in our model systems (see attachments). We were able to block growth of both strains of B. anthracis with emulsion incorporated media (Table 1). We also were successful in reducing both Vollum and Ames spore counts by 95% (as assessed by CFU of viable organisms). These reductions were observed at spore concentrations of up to 1 X 10 6/ ml (Figure 1) and were seen even in conditions which limited germination (room temperature incubation). Decreased numbers of spores also were identified microscopically in the media after treatment. In contrast, no reduction in counts was noted with an initial spore innoculation of 1 X 10 8 / ml (Figure 2). …”

      “We were pleased with this outcome and the personal interaction that produced them. Given the non-toxic nature of these emulsions, we feel that they may have a role in the decontamination and treatment of agents such as anthrax and alphavirus. We look forward to future collaborative efforts with Dr. Ivins and his laboratory staff. With the diverse nature of our respective programs, we believe that a cooperative approach will serve to accelerate the development of these compounds.”

      In a number of patents by University of Michigan researchers in Ann Arbor, Tarek Hamouda and James R. Baker, Jr., including some filed before 9/11, the inventors thanked Bruce Ivins of Ft. Detrick for supplying them with virulent Ames. The University of Michigan patents stated: “B. anthracis spores, Ames and Vollum 1 B strains, were kindly supplied by Dr. Bruce Ivins (USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md.), and prepared as previously described (Ivins et al., 1995). Dr. Hamouda served as group leader on the DARPA Anti-infective project.

      A patent application filed April 2000 by the University of Michigan inventors explained:

      “The release of such agents as biological weapons could be catastrophic in light of the fact that such diseases will readily spread the air.

      In light of the foregoing discussion, it becomes increasingly clear that cheap, fast and effective methods of killing bacterial spores are needed for decontaminating purposes. The inventive compounds have great potential as environmental decontamination agents and for treatments of casualties in both military and terrorist attacks. The inactivation of a broad range of pathogens … and bacterial spores (Hamouda et al., 1999), combined with low toxicity in experimental animals, make them (i.e., the inventive compounds) particularly well suited for use as general decontamination agents before a specific pathogen is identified.”

      In late August 2001, NanoBio relocated from a small office with 12 year-old furniture to an expanded office on Green Road located at Plymouth Park. After the mailings, DARPA reportedly asked for some of their product them to decontaminate some of the Senate offices. The company reportedly had pitched hand cream to postal workers. The inventors company, NanoBio, was initially funded by DARPA.

      Dr. Hamouda graduated Cairo Medical in December 1982. He married in 1986. His wife was on the Cairo University dental faculty for 10 years. Upon coming to the United States in 1994 after finishing his microbiology PhD at Cairo Medical, Dr. Hamouda was a post-doctoral fellow at the Wayne State University School of Medicine in downtown Detroit. His immunology department biography at Wayne indicates that he then came to the University of Michigan and began work on the DARPA-funded work with anthrax bio-defense applications with James R. Baker at their company NanoBio.

      The University of Michigan researchers presented in part at various listed meetings and conferences in 1998 and 1999. The Department of Justice provided a copy of December 1999 article titled “A Novel Surfactant Nanoemulsion with Broad-Spectrum Sporicidal Activity of against Bacillus Species” in its disclosure under FOIA. The article in the Journal for Infectious Diseases states: “B. anthracis spores, Ames and Vollum 1B strains, were supplied by Bruce Ivins (US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID], Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD) and were prepared as described elsewhere. Four other strains of B. anthracis were provided by Martin Hugh-Jones (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge).” Dr. Baker advises me by email that NanoBio’s research with virulent Ames was “done at USAMRIID by a microbiologist under Dr. Ivins’ direct supervision and at LSU under the direction of Dr. Hugh Jones.”

      In the acknowledgements section, the University of Michigan authors thanked:

      (1) Shaun B. Jones, Jane Alexander, and Lawrence DuBois (Defense Science Office, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) for their support;

      (2) Bruce Ivins for supplying virulent Ames;

      (3) Patricia Fellows (who is identified as Ivins’ Former Colleague #2 in the Amerithrax Investigative Summary);

      (4) Mara Linscott (who is identifed as Ivins’ “Former Colleague #1); and

      (5) Arthur Friedlander, the Army’s top anthrax expert.

      He thanked Drs. Fellows, Linscott and Friedlander for their technical support and helpful suggestions in the performance of the initial anthrax studies.

      (7) Martin-Hugh-Jones at LSU,

      (8) Kimothy Smith, who moved from LSU to Northern Arizona University, where he was a key genetics expert for the FBI typing submitted samples in 2002; and
      (9) Pamela Coker, Kimothy’s close associate who served as the LSU biolevel 3 lab head.

      Dr. Hamouda thanked Hugh-Jones, Smith and Coker for supplying the characterized B. anthracis strains and the space at Louisiana State University (Baton Rouge).

      The University of Michigan researchers found that their nanoemulsion incorporated into the growth medium completely inhibited the growth of the spores. Transmission electron microscope was used to examine the spores.

      The patent explained that “The nanoemulsions can be rapidly produced in large quantities and are stable for many months *** Undiluted, they have the texture of a semisolid cream and can be applied topically by hand or mixed with water. Diluted, they have a consistency and appearance similar to skim milk and can be sprayed to decontaminate surfaces or potentially interact with aerosolized spores before inhalation.”

      A March 18, 1998 press release had provided some background to the novel DARPA-funded work. It was titled “Novavax Microbicides Undergoing Testing at University of Michigan Against Biological Warfare Agents; Novavax Technology Being Supplied to U.S. Military Program At University of Michigan as Possible Defense Against Germ Warfare.” The release stated that “The Novavax Biologics Division has designed several potent microbicides and is supplying these materials to the University of Michigan for testing under a subcontract. Various formulations are being tested as topical creams or sprays for nasal and environmental usage. The biocidal agent’s detergent degrades and then explodes the interior of the spore. Funding, the press release explains, was provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.

      In a presentation at the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (ICAAC) on September 26, 1998, Michael Hayes, a research associate in the U-Michigan Medical School, presented experimental evidence of BCTP’s ability to destroy anthrax spores both in a culture dish and in mice exposed to anthrax through a skin incision. “In his conference presentation, Hayes described how even low concentrations of BCTP killed more than 90 percent of virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis spores in a culture dish.” Its website explains that the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy is the “[p]remier meeting on infectious diseases and antimicrobial agents, organized by the American Society for Microbiology.”

      In 1999, LSU researcher Dr.Kimothy Smith, who was thanked for providing BL-3 space for the research by the University of Michigan researchers, moved to the Arizona lab, bringing with him the lab’s first samples of anthrax.”

      A University of Michigan Medical school publication, Medicine at Michigan, (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1999) explained: “In studies with rats and mice in the U-M Medical School under the direction of James R. Baker, Jr., M.D., professor of internal medicine and director of the Center for Biologic Nanotechnology, the mixture, known as BCTP, attacked anthrax spores and healed wounds caused by a closely related species of bacteria, Bacillus cereus. (The letters BCTP stand for Bi-Component, Triton X-100 n-tributyl Phosphate.)

      Baker describes the process as follows: “The tiny lipid droplets in BCTP fuse with anthrax spores, causing the spores to revert to their active bacterial state. During this process, which takes 4-5 hours, the spore’s tough outer membrane changes, allowing BCTP’s solvent to strip away the exterior membrane. The detergent then degrades the spores’ interior contents. In scanning electron microscope images, the spores appear to explode.” The rapid inactivation of anthrax bacteria and spores combined with BCTP’s low toxicity thus make the emulsion a promising candidate for use as a broad-spectrum, post-exposure decontamination agent.
      ***
      The research is sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the central research and development organization for the U.S. Department of Defense.”

      Dr. Baker, by email, advises me that Ivins did the studies involving Ames for them at USAMRIID. He reports: “We never had Ames and could not have it at our UM facilities.” Before September 2001, it’s office was described as in the basement of a downtown bank which seems to describe 912 N. Main St., Ann Arbor, just west of the University of Michigan campus.

      An article in the Summer of 2000 in Medicine at Michigan explains:

      “Victory Site: Last December [December 1999] Tarek Hamouda, Amy Shih and Jim Baker traveled to a remote military station in the Utah desert. There they demonstrated for the U.S. Army Research and Development Command the amazing ability of non-toxic nanoemulsions (petite droplets of fat mixed with water and detergent) developed at Michigan to wipe out deadly anthrax-like bacterial spores. The square vertical surfaces shown here were covered with bacterial spores; Michigan’s innocuous nanoemulsion was most effective in killing the spores even when compared to highly toxic chemicals.”

      An EPA report explains: “In December 1999, the U.S. Army tested a broad spectrum nanoemulsion and nine other decontamination technologies in Dugway, Utah, against an anthrax surrogate, Bacillus globigii. Nanoemulsion was one of four technologies that proved effective and was the only nontoxic formulation available. Other tests against the vaccine strain of B. anthracis (Sterne strain) were conducted by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and by the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research.”

      As Fortune magazine explained in November 2001 about NanoBio: “Then bioterror struck…. It moved to a bland corporate park where its office has no name on the door. It yanked its street address off its Website, whose hit rate jumped from 350 a month to 1,000 a day.” NanoBio was part of the solution: “in the back of NanoBio’s office sit two dozen empty white 55-gallon barrels. A few days before, DARPA had asked Annis and Baker if they could make enough decontaminant to clean several anthrax-tainted offices in the Senate. NanoBio’s small lab mixers will have to run day and night to fill the barrels. ‘This is not the way we want to do this,’ sighs [its key investor], shaking his head. ‘This is all a duct-tape solution.’ ” James Baker, founder of Ann Arbor’s NanoBio’s likes to quote a Chinese proverb: “When there are no lions and tigers in the jungle, the monkeys rule.”

      It’s naive to think that Al Qaeda could not have obtained Ames just because it tended to be in labs associated with or funded by the US military. US Army Al Qaeda operative Sgt. Ali Mohammed accompanied Zawahiri in his travels in the US. (Ali Mohamed had been a major in the same unit of the Egyptian Army that produced Sadat’s assassin, Khaled Islambouli). Ali Al-Timimi was working in the building housing the Center for Biodefense funded by the DARPA and had access to the facilities at both the Center for Biodefense and the adjacent American Type Culture Collection. For example, Michael Ray Stubbs was an HVAC system technician at Lawrence Livermore Lab with a high-level security clearance permitting access; that was where the effort to combat the perceived Bin Laden anthrax threat was launched in 1998. Aafia Siddiqui, who attended classes at a building with the virulent Vollum strain. She later married a 9/11 plotter al-Balucchi, who was in UAE with al-Hawsawi, whose laptop, when seized at the home of a bacteriologist, had anthrax spraydrying documents on it. The reality is that a lab technician, researcher, or other person similarly situated might simply have walked out of some lab that had it.

      In June 2001, in addition to the conference at Annapolis organized by Bruce Ivins, a conference was held at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Edgewood) for small businesses that might contribute to the biodefense effort. It showcased APG’s world class facillities that had the full range of relevant equipment, as well as the range of activities and research featured by presenters at such conferences. It was called “Team APG Showcase 2001.″ Edgewood maintains a database of simulant properties. The information and equipment, including spraydrying equipment, is available to participants in the SBIR — promoting small business innovation. Might the anthrax attack have required the learning of a state? Well, to get that, all you needed to do was go to the program that shares such research for the purpose of innovation in the area of biodefense. APG built a Biolevel-3 facility and, according to a Baltimore Sun report, by October 2002 had 19 virulent strains of anthrax, including Ames. A 1996 report on a study done at Edgewood involving irradiated virulent Ames provided by John Ezzell that was used in a soil suspension. Another article discusses Delta Ames supplied to Edgewood by the Battelle-managed Dugway, subtilis, and use of sheep blood agar. Edgewood tested nanoemulsion biocidal agents during this time period, according to a national nanobiotechnology initiative report issued June 2002.

      Alternatively, did Battelle have virulent Ames across I-95?

  7. Old Atlantic said

    Then the DOJ/FBI would want the notebook pages disclosed. If it showed him in his own lab not working on checking animals during the hours they claim he prepared the anthrax they would want to document that.

    • DXer said

      The FBI has said that Dr. Ivins made notebook entries recording his observations on the health of the animals on each of five days –Friday, September 28 through Tuesday, October 2. It is those pages the FBI should now produce.

      September 28
      September 29
      September 30
      October 1
      October 2

      It should not be necessary to debate that the FBI should produce the contemporaneous notes he made on those dates. The notes relate to observation on the health of animals and there is no justification for their withholding. It may have been an oversight that they were not produced and they can now be produced or given to the Frederick News Post for uploading — no fuss no muss. Same with all September 17, 2001 emails.

    • DXer said

      Who were the colleagues that left with him for Covance, PA on September 18, 2001 at 7 a.m. or so? What do they say?

    • DXer said

      According to a Washington Field Memo dated May 15, 2004, under “transfers and use of RMR 1029 inside USAMRIID,” 10 ml was used for a “Bioport rabbit challenge” on 10/4/2001.

      https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2010/03/04/use-of-anthrax-from-rmr-1029-for-bioport-rabbit-challenge-at-usamriid/

    • DXer said

      Compare the characterizations by AUSAs Kohl and Lieber in the Amerithrax Summary with the documentary evidence produced to date. Given the dramatic discrepancy, they should be sure to produce the documents bearing on the question not yet produced — to include all the emails and contemporaneous notes.

      The DOJ of course have actual notes and emails from the colleagues who participated in the same experiments.

      Rachel and Ken mention only mice when actually there were dozens of rabbits involved in an October 2 challenge.

    • Old Atlantic said

      Ed wrote

      Anonymous wrote:

      “I don’t have the mind reading capabilities you seem to claim you have,”

      ===

      Name reading, the first step to mind reading.

    • BugMaster said

      The spore purification procedures have been published repeatedly in scientific journals, Ed!

  8. DXer said

    A former Zawahiri associate worked alongside Pat and Bruce in the BL-3 the week after the notations above about the plasmid screen. Which of the people below did he know?

    Know Not Just Your Enemy, But Who He Knew

    Given that the documentary evidence establishes Ayman Zawahiri’s central and key role in anthrax planning, the individuals with the closest connection to him are the strongest candidates for co-conspirators in the anthrax mailing. Analysis of who Ayman Zawahiri might have recruited can start with these known associates that Zawahiri had known for a quarter century. Through the 1990s, there was an ongoing debate among these associates over tactics.

    As a general matter, Ayman commanded the loyalty of members of the Vanguards of Conquest, which was an offshoot of Egyptian Islamic Jihad once led by Agiza. Agiza, one of the main EIJ intellectuals, was extradited from Sweden after 9/11. He broke away from Zawahiri due to disagreements in 1993 but Bin Laden helped the Egyptian islamists reconcile their differences in the mid-1990s. Al Zayat argued in his book that the Vanguards of Conquest was not a separate group, and that Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest were “two names for the same group led by Zawahiri.” Attorney Al Zayat says in his book that Ayman Zawahiri, not Saif Adel, was in charge of the Vanguards of Conquest: “This was clear from the fact that the four accused in the Vanguards of Conquest cases that were tried by a military court were shouting their allegiance to Zawahiri from behind bars.”

    The August 6, 2001 PDB to President Bush explained: “Al-Qaida members — including some who are US citizens — have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the plot to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.” (The reference was to Ali Mohamed with no mention that he trained US Special Forces on matters relating to jihad at Ft. Bragg and had been Ayman Zawahiri’s head of intelligence).

    In a study of 400 terrorists, University of Pennsylvania professor Marc Sageman concluded that 70 percent of terrorists were recruited outside their native country, having traveled abroad in the hope of improving their livelihood through jobs or education. Separation from their families and a feeling of alienation from their host countries prompted many to seek companionship at mosques. Friendship constituted 70 percent of recruitment, kinship 20 percent and discipleship only 10 percent. Social networking continues to be relied upon by the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of recruitment. Who did Ali Mohammed and Ayman Zawahiri meet in their travels? Just as interesting as the question who Ayman Zawahiri knew is who Ali Mohammed, Ayman’s head of intelligence and cell recruitment, knew. He recruited Dahab from Cairo Medical in the early 1980s.

    Zawahiri traveled to Malaysia, Singapore, Yemen, Iraq, Russia, Great Britain and United States. In March 1995, Zawahiri reportedly met with Taha (who at the time was based in Peshawar, Pakistan), Egyptian Islamic Group leader Mustafa Hamza (who at the time was based in Sudan), and Sudanese leader Turabi. Zawahiri traveled to Sudan and Ethiopia in mid-June. According to his former friend and EIJ’s spiritual advisor, Al-Sharif, Zawahiri was paid $100,000 by Sudanese intelligence to attempt to kill the Egyptian prime minister on a visit he made to Ethiopia. Al-Sharif writes that Zawahiri promised Sudanese intelligence to carry out 10 operations against Egypt.

    Zawahiri went to Russia in 1996 where he was imprisoned for 6 months. (Zawahiri was arrested in Dagestan after he tried to enter Chechnya; the Russians apparently never learned his real identity.) Two men joined the local islamists in urging the release of the three. One was Shehata, who would later serve briefly as head of al Jihad. Shehata was in charge of “special operations” and was in regular contact with Jaballah in Canada.

    As in life, who you know is important. What mosques did Zawahiri visit when he came to the United States in 1995? Who did he know from his days recruiting students to jihad at Cairo Medical in the early 1980s?

    In an article that reconstructed his travels of his travels between April 1995 until December 1996, Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison of the Wall Street Journal described some of the contents of his computer: “visa application for Taiwan; details of a bank account in Guangdong, China; a receipt for a computer modem bought in Dubai; a copy of a Malaysian company’s registration that listed Dr. Zawahiri, under an alias, as a director; and details of an account in a bank in St. Louis, Mo.” The St. Louis bank account related to reimbursement of expenses of the satellite phone used in planning the 1998 embassy attacks. Purchase was made by a charity worker in Columbia, Missouri. (The Saudi dissident in London who was a friend of Bin Laden and the Egyptian London cell members were complicitous in the purchase). The father of Al-Timimi’s friend Royer rented a room to Khalil Ziyad in his St. Louis-area home in 2000.

    In 1997, back in Afghanistan, after his imprisonment in Russia, al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden plotted their strategy as to the United States. Bin Laden was able to convince Al-Zawahiri to discontinue the military operations inside Egypt and, instead, focus on the common enemies America and Israel. They had concluded that it was United States’ appropriations that propped up the regimes of Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt that had prevented the islamists from toppling those regimes. In 1996, Bin Laden announced war against America to the extent of its presence in the Middle East region. By the end of 1997, Bin Laden had determined to openly declare war against America and urge that Americans be killed everywhere.

    Bin Laden issued a fatwa on February 23, 1998 announcing the creation of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and the Crusaders [Christians].” Along with Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, it was signed by Taha, the man in charge of the Advisory Council of the Islamic Movement in Egypt. Taha was the blind sheik’s successor in the Egyptian Islamic Group. At the end of July 1998, Taha signed a statement saying he had never signed the fatwa. Al-Zayat, who had remained in touch with Taha until he was detained while transiting Syria, reports that Taha said that he was asked on the phone whether he would sign a statement to support the Iraqi people who were under American air strikes and he agreed. Taha explained that he had agreed to join in the 1998 “Crusaders” statement because he was told it was in opposition to the bombing strikes in Iraq. “He was surprised to discover later that the statement referred to the establishment of a new front, and that it included a very serious fatwa that all Muslims would be required to follow.” Taha emphasized that this all happened without “any clear approval” from the Egyptian Islamic Group “regarding participation in the Front. [The group] found itself a member of a front that they knew nothing about.”

    Attorney al-Zayat notes that when Mabruk, a long-time confidante of Zawahiri and the head of military operations, was captured in Albania in 1998, “[i]n his possession, the authorities found a laptop that had many names of the members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This led to the arrest of more than a hundred members, who were tried in one case.” As a general rule, however, organizational security was very strict. “Any arrest of members is an opportunity for information to be extracted through torture. This is why each member knows only his role. When the members pledge their obedience and loyalty to the leader of the group, they are aware that they are not supposed to ask any questions about things that are not directly related to their role.” For example, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zubaydah knew only the limited operation they were engaged in. Such adherence to cell security makes piercing a conspiracy and proving it beyond a reasonable doubt very difficult.

    Islamic Group military commander Mustafa Hamza, who reportedly supported a cease-fire, and Islamic Group leader Taha, who supported a return to violence, apparently had a falling out after the Luxor debacle. In 1998, following Taha’s resignation as Islamic Group’s head, Hamza took over as its head. But after Taha was rendered to Egypt while in transit through Syria in 2001, Islamic Group leader Taha’s wife and children lived with Hamza’s family in Mashhad, Iran. Thus, the alleged falling out perhaps had not caused too great a rift. They both remained in contact with the blind sheik and his paralegal Sattar in 1999 at a time there was talk of a need for a second Luxor.

    Zawahiri kept in touch with Mahmoud Jaballah, who had emigrated to Canada in 1996, by satellite phone. EIJ shura member Mahmoud Mahjoub was also in Canada. Mahmoud Mahjoub was second in command of the Vanguards of Conquest, after Agiza (who later was succeeded by Zawahiri) In seeking refugee status in Canada, Mahjoub claimed that the persecution in Egypt was the result of a brief association with a suspected member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mahjoub said that he was arrested several times while in Egypt and claimed to have experienced torture at the hands of the civilian authorities.

    In June 2000, Zawahiri visited Hambali in Indonesia with al-Qaeda military chief Mohammed Atef. Hambali the next year would attempt to reestablish Sufaat’s anthrax lab in Southeast Asia.

    Another friend and colleague of Ayman, Kamal Habib, was playing a prominent role in Egyptian politics. Kamal Habib had graduated from Cairo University in 1979 in political science. Twenty years later, he wrote for the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”) quarterly magazine. The Cairo-based publication Al-Manar Al-Jadeed was sponsored by the Ann Arbor-based charity, Islamic Assembly of North America. The 1999 website announced:

    “IANA has signed a cooperative agreement with the Cairo based publisher and distributor Dar Al-Manar Al-Jadeed. Jointly they will publish in Cairo and distribute around the world the quarterly Al-Manar Al-Jadeed magazine. The magazine is devoted to addressing the religious, social, and civil matters. Six issues of the magazine have already been published. The editor in chief is the well-known writer, Jamal Sultan. We wish the magazine a very prosperous future.”

    Habib was a key founding member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and spent 1981-1991 in jail for the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Like Abdel-Bari, al-Zayat and Taha, he was critical of Ayman’s tactics, though not his goals. In the late 1970s, the cell ran by the young doctor Zawahiri joined with three other groups to become Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) under Habib’s leadership. The blind sheik was their spiritual adviser. In a 2002 New Yorker article, Lawrence Wright wrote in “The Man Behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian doctor became a master of terror,” that “[l]ike Zawahiri, Habib, who had graduated in 1979 from Cairo University’s Faculty for Economics and Political Science, was the kind of driven intellectual who might have been expected to become a leader of the country but turned violently against the status quo.”

    The editor-in-chief of the IANA quarterly journal Al Manar Jadeed was Gamal Sultan, who had also been a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. When Mr. Sultan traveled to Pittsburgh in 2000, Mr. Sultan recalls other islamists remarking it was the Kandahar of the US, given its rolling hills. Kamal Habib and Jamal (Gamal) Sultan also wrote for Assirat Al-Mustaqeem, an Arabic-language magazine embracing radical, anti-U.S. views that was published in Pittsburgh from 1991 to 2000. Mr. Sultan’s brother Mahmoud did also. Unlike Zawahiri, Kamal Habib and Gamal Sultan believe in achieving shariah law through democracy. Computational biologist Al-Timimi was on the Assirat Advisory Board.

    Al-Timimi was sentenced to life plus 70 years for exhorting young men to jihad. A prominent IANA speaker, he shared a fax in the summer of 2001 with former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID head and Ames researcher Charles Bailey. Al Timimi met government agents regularly for more than a year before his indictment. The indictment against the paintball defendants alleged that that at an Alexandria, Virginia residence, in the presence of a representative of BIF, the defendants watched videos depicting Mujahadeen engaged in Jihad and discussed a training camp in Bosnia. Al-Timimi had asked the FBI to hold off on the indictment until he received his degree. His defense lawyer says that the FBI searched Al-Timimi’s townhouse “to connect him to the 9/11 attacks or to schemes to unleash a biological or nuclear attack.” Former Russian bioweaponeering program head Ken Alibek told me that he would occasionally see Al-Timimi in the hallways at George Mason, where they both were in the microbiology department. Dr. Alibek was vaguely aware that he was an islamic hardliner but considered him “a numbers guy.” When what his defense counsel claims was an FBI attempt to link him to a planned biological attack failed, defense counsel says that investigators focused on his connections to the men who attended his lectures at the local Falls Church, Va.

    The IANA webmaster Al-Hussayen from Moscow, Idaho complained in a Sept. 8, 2002, phone conversation that “we have to have control over our projects,” saying operators of the Islamway Web site, the Al-Manar magazine and the Alasr Web site were doing whatever they wanted, then sending IANA the bills. At the IANA publication Alasr, he complained, “Khalid Hassan puts in it what he wants, with some of the articles being sensitive causing us some problems at the present time. .. They don’t think, for example, what you might face being here.” Four fatwas justifying suicide attacks — including flying a plane into a tall building — that were posted on the Alasr’s Web site were central to the allegations against Sami Al-Hussayen.

    Al Qaeda military commander and former Egyptian police sergeant commander Atef, a key anthrax planner, was killed in November 2001. Taha was rendered transiting Syria in 2001. Canadian Khadr was killed. In 2005, Iran reportedly turned Mustafa Hamza over, where he was tried and convicted for assassination and attempted assassination of various high Egyptian government officials. In 2006, Zawahiri’s chief aide al-Hadi was captured. Cairo attorney Mamdouh Ismail, al-Zayat’s co-founder of the Islamic party, was arrested in late March 2007. He allegedly was serving as a conduit with jihadis in Egypt, Yemen and Iraq. In short, it’s not been a good decade for Friends of Ayman. Any compartmentalized cell in which Ayman operated in his anthrax program was tight indeed. The roots of the Amerithrax likely grew in the United States rather than a faraway place like Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia or Malaysia. Although the seeds were planted in Cairo, the tree took root not only in Brooklyn and in many places in the US.

  9. DXer said

    Sailing The Good Ship Anthrax

    In January 2002, FBI Assistant Director Van Harp told the 40,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology that it was “very likely that one or more of you know this individual.” They very likely did — to include the very scientists who were part of the FBI effort to guard against special pathogens against the United States. For example, now one of those scientists, section chief David Smith, is in charge of keeping classified the Battelle document produced to the NAS and listed on the index but never actually disclosed to members on the NAS panel.

    USAMRIID released some emails by Bruce Ivins discussing the difficulties of planning the Fourth International Conference on Anthrax in Annapolis. The first of the emails was from September 1998, upon his return from the conference at Plymouth. In June 2001, the good ship anthrax sailed in Annapolis, Maryland, the “sailing capital of the world.” The 4th International Conference on Anthrax was held at St. John’s College in historic Annapolis, Maryland, June 10 – 13, 2001. The conference was organized by the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and managed by the American Society for Microbiology. The 74-foot classic wooden schooner was named WOODWIND. Martin Hugh-Jones had convened the conference along with Peter Turnbull, the Porton Down scientist who had led the UK conferences attended by Ayman Zawahiri’s scientist, Rauf Ahmad. Reports of livestock and national park outbreaks were followed by a summary by Dr. Turnbull. Other anthrax notables who spoke included senior USAMRIID scientist Dr. Ezzell, who had one of the first looks at the Daschle product, and Dr. Paul Keim, who would play a key role in the genetic investigation.

    Theresa Koehler from the Houston Medica School gave a talk titled “The Expanding B. anthracis Toolbox.” Dr. Koehler that year had a $100,000 grant from the CIA to study the growth of anthrax in soil. Timothy Read from The Institute of Genome Research summarized research on The B. Anthracis Genome. Houston Medical School, the UK’s biodefense facility Porton Down, and Pasteur Institute each fielded three presenters. UK scientists presented on the characteristics of the exosporium of “the highly virulent Ames strain.” Researchers from Columbus, Ohio and Biological Defense Research Directorate (BDRD) of the Navy Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, assisted by Porton Down scientists from the UK, demonstrated that inoculated mice survived a challenge with b.anthracis spores. Researchers used b.anthracis containing a plasmid with a mutated lethal factor.” Dr. Phil Hanna from University of Michigan presented, as he did at the conference attending with Rauf Ahmad.

    A Kazakhstan Ministry of Health scientist presented on the re-emergence of anthrax in Kazakhstan. Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union the first job offer Ken Alibek fielded was the position of Minister of Health in Kazakhstan. He protested when he realized that his new employer just wanted to do what the Soviets had been secretly doing in an illegal and massive bioweapons program he had supervised as its First Deputy. After the KGB asked to meet with him, he asked to schedule the meeting in two weeks, so that he might visit his parents, and then found a secret expedited way of coming to the United States.

    Pakistan Rauf Ahmad had been the predator looking for the Ames strain and consulting on weaponization techniques at the UK conference. Did the Amerithrax perp attend this conference or work on any of the research presented? The WMD section chief David Smith, declassifying the Battelle studies from November 2001 on the silicon, attended with FBI’s anthrax expert at USAMRIID, John Ezzell. Who was in charge of biosecurity at the conference? Dr. Ivins in an email mentioned security people should be involved but was not specific.

    Ali Al-Timimi is a case study. He had a high security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy. Why? When? What did his work involve? It was in the public domain that he spoke alongside, for example, the blind sheik’s son at an IANA annual conference. IANA was the Ann Arbor-based conference that promoted the views of Bin Laden’s two Saudi sheiks. The blind sheik’s son who spoke alongside Al-Timimi would later serve on Al Qaeda’s WMD committee and was charged with recruiting scientists.

    Was Rachel, the Amerithrax AUSA working with AUSA Kenneth Kohl, reprimanded after she went to speak to Ali Al-Timimi in prison? Or was she allowed full and unfettered access. If she was reprimanded on the grounds that a deal had been cut with Al-Timimi — and he was off-limits — who were the superiors who made that call?

    Rachel wrote me, through a spokesman, that I was never going to get the contemporaneous notes from his lab notebook making observations on the health of the animals on the nights she says he was making an anthrax aerosol. Is she right? I assume it was just an oversight not to produce them. And I was not following proper procedure in making a FOIA request or FOIA appeal. But there would be no justification for withholding emails that were sent September 17, 2001. There should be a supplemental production. Those emails would show the time he sent them and corroborate the computer he used. The USAMRIID, too, did not produce them and John Peterson should be asked why they were not produced.

    • DXer said

      WMD And The Hunt For Moles

      Raymond Zilinskas, who was researching a history of the Soviet bioweapons program, told The Baltimore Sun a couple years ago that “his sources now say that Soviet intelligence routinely obtained details of work at USAMRIID that went beyond the descriptions in scientific journals.” The Sun quoted him saying: “It was clear there was somebody at Fort Detrick” who worked for Soviet intelligence. Alexander Kouzminov, a biophysicist who says he once worked for the KGB, had first made the claim in a book, Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence Services in the West. Initially, Dr. Zilinskas had dismissed the memoir because the Russian had made separate fanciful inferences about the US program being offensive and some specific claims unrelated to infiltration of the US program.

      The Sun article explained that then “another former Soviet scientist told the Sun that his lab routinely received dangerous pathogens and other materials from Western labs through a clandestine channel like the one Kouzminov described.” A second unnamed “U.S. arms control specialist” told the Sun he had independent evidence of a Soviet spy at Fort Detrick.”

      The Baltimore Sun, in the 2006 article, also relied on Serguei Popov, who was “a scientist once based in a Soviet bioweapons lab in Obolensk, south of Moscow.” Dr. Popov “said that by the early 1980s his colleagues had obtained at least two strains of anthrax commonly studied in Detrick and affiliated labs. They included the Ames strain, first identified at Detrick in the early 1980s.” Ames was used for testing U.S. military vaccines and was the strain used in the 2001 anthrax letters that killed five people and infected 23 in the U.S. Dr. Popov is now at George Mason University’s National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Disease in Fairfax, Va.

      “If you wanted ’special materials,’ you had to fill out a request,” he said. “And, essentially, those materials were provided. How and by whom, I can’t say.” One colleague, Popov told the Sun, used this “special materials” program to obtain a strain of Yersinia pestis, a plague bacterium being studied in a Western lab. But he didn’t know whether that particular germ came from Ft. Detrick. Former KGB operative and author Kouzminov says the KGB wanted specific items from Western labs — including Detrick — that were closely held and were willing to pay for the privilege. The Soviets also wanted the aerosol powders U.S. scientists developed for testing during vaccine tests.

      Raymond Zilinskas, the bioweapons expert with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and two colleagues had written a scathing review of Biological Espionage in Nature, a British scientific journal, but he later told The Sun “that his sources now say that Soviet intelligence routinely obtained details of work at USAMRIID that went beyond the descriptions in scientific journals.”

      Expert William C. Patrick III, a retired Ft Detrick bioweapons expert, and famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek agree. Patrick’s suspicions arose when he debriefed defector Alibek in the early 1990s. Alibek emigrated to the U.S. upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Patrick and Alibek both recognized that the Soviet and American programs had moved in a curious lock step during the 1950s and ’60s. “Anything we discovered of any import, they would have discovered and would have in their program in six months,” Patrick told the Sun. After his talks with Alibek ended: “For the next two weeks I tried to think, ‘Who the hell are the spies at Detrick?’”

      Both former Russian bioweaponeers Ken Alibek and Serge Popov worked with Ali Al-Timimi at George Mason University. Dr. Al-Timimi has been convicted of sedition and sentenced to life plus 70 years. Popov and Alibek worked at the Center for Biodefense funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (”DARPA”). At one point, Al-Timimi worked not much more than 15 feet (as I look at the floor plans) from both Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey.

  10. Anonymous said

    A first read at this notebook suggests that Dr Ivins kept Notebook 4010 exclusively for notes on the creation and testing of flask RMR-1029. Weeks and/or months seem to pass sometimes between entries.

    He likely had several ongoing notebooks – maybe a specialized notebook for each project.

    Hence details of the animal checking activities he performed on the evenings he is accused by the FBI of growing, drying and mailing dry spores will not likely be in Notebook 4010.

    It would certainly be revealing to see that notebook, whereever is is, to read exactly what lab activites he performed on those evenings, how detailed the notes were, etc,

    • DXer said

      I think you are correct.

      Note separately that only 30 pages out of 88 pages was produced. The GAO should obtain the entire notebook. For example, the former Zawahiri associate visited and worked alongside Pat and Bruce the week after the entry above.

      • Anonymous said

        Another point is that the activities on these evenings demand that detailed notes be taken. He would have been checking on the health of possbily dozens of animals in cages – each animal with a given code number etc. The whole vaccine trial relies on precisely which animals died and when. The notebook does exist somewhere.
        If it didn’t exist the FBI would have been all over it already saying there were no notes for these evenings.

        • richard rowley said

          From above post:
          ————–
          Another point is that the activities on these evenings demand that detailed notes be taken. He would have been checking on the health of possbily dozens of animals in cages – each animal with a given code number etc. The whole vaccine trial relies on precisely which animals died and when. The notebook does exist somewhere.
          If it didn’t exist the FBI would have been all over it already saying there were no notes for these evenings.
          ===============
          Oh, but maybe it’s the privacy of the animals in question that is being protected ????

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