CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Dr. Ayman Zawahiri (Vanguards of Conquest) planned to use universities and charities as cover to develop anthrax for use against the U.S.

Posted by DXer on February 13, 2011



71 Responses to “* Dr. Ayman Zawahiri (Vanguards of Conquest) planned to use universities and charities as cover to develop anthrax for use against the U.S.”

  1. DXer said

    I hope everyone had a safe Thanksgiving. My own take on the Covid19 strain Omicron is that it is already here and in Europe. The surveillance is just very good in South Africa. But I think that in the coming days it will be detected in other countries and be found being spread through community transmission.

    So as we await the likelihood of further red ink in the markets, count your blessings and take comfort in small things.

    Maybe the Amerithrax whodunnit will advance in the forthcoming trials of Hambali and KSM at Guantanamo. It may have taken Zawahiri 20 years to admit 9/11. But once it no longer serves his purpose, if he is alive he may address his secret operation ZABADI, meaning “curdled milk.”

    The 7th floor of Langley has its compartments, but Dr. Ayman literally wrote the book on spying.

    The young FBI agents out of Quantico who dogged Ivins like they did Hatfill simply were not read into Zawahir’s Zabadi operation. Then the agents and actors are motivated to promote their careers rather than truth.

  2. DXer said

    Basnan, al-Bayoumi, Saleh al Hussayen is one thread to pull from the lengthy Complaint.

    Jack Quinn:

    Ask yourself: Who did Saleh al Hussayen visit shortly before he came to the hotel where the hijackers stayed? Where had he been just before Virginia?

    Click to access Ashton-v-KSA-2017.pdf

    Anthrax, Al Qaeda and Ayman Zawahiri: The Infiltration of US Biodefense

    • DXer said

      Excerpt from news article above:

      “US prosecutors say Mr Hussayen was a financial backer of a Michigan-based group, the Islamic Assembly of North America, which is accused of disseminating the teachings of two Saudi clerics who advocate violence against the United States.

      His nephew, Sami Omar Hussayen, a computer student, is in federal detention in Idaho on charges of visa fraud, accused of failing to disclose his role as an internet webmaster for IANA.

      US court filings say the younger Hussayen administered an internet site for IANA that expressly advocated suicide attacks and using airliners as weapons. IANA received about £2 million from abroad since 1995, court papers allege, including £60,000 from Saleh al-Hussayen.

      Saudi envoys confirmed Mr Hussayen’s high rank to reporters this week and told The Wall Street Journal that they were willing to make him available to the Justice Department. That offer was welcomed yesterday by Kim Lindquist, a US assistant attorney working on the federal prosecution of the younger Hussayen in Boise, Idaho.

      Mr Lindquist said: “We’re investigating the IANA. We have the money flowing to the IANA through the nephew from the uncle. We have the uncle visiting the United States just prior to September 11, and upon his return to the East Coast he’s in the same hotel as the hijackers. According to FBI agents he feigns a seizure. It is something that we cannot ignore.”

      Mr Lindquist said he was unwilling to “take the extra step” of linking Saudi officials to the September 11 hijackings. “But it raises the eyebrows,” he said.”

    • DXer said

      But let’s back up to Kabul and work our way forward:

      Page 43, Saudi Arabia’s logistical support of al Qaeda

      “in or around October 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia’s Embassy/Ambassador’s residence in Kabul was used as a “guesthouse”, i.e., safe house, by al Qaeda; and, Osama Bin Laden and numerous other al Qaeda operatives, likely including several of the 19 hijackers, stayed at that safe house.”

      Click to access Ashton-v-KSA-2017.pdf

      some background –,_Kabul

      “During a November 15, 2001 press briefing by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, and Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security Ridge confirmed a report published by The Times that the U.S. had captured nuclear blueprints in an al Qaeda guest house in Kabul.[1][2][3] Ridge stated that the capture of the nuclear blueprints in this al-Qaeda guesthouse was consistent with Osama bin Laden’s plans to become a nuclear threat.

      David Rohde, writing for the New York Times News Service, reported on November 17, 2001, that in addition to nuclear plans, safe houses contained flight simulator programs, documents about the handling of biological and chemical weapons, and information about flight training schools in Florida.[3]

      CNN claimed to have found and gone through the Kabul safe house used by Abu Khabbab, who they described as “Osama bin Laden’s top chemical and biological weapons commander.”[4][5] CNN hired the Institute for Science and International Security to examine the documents they found, and its President, David Albright, confirmed the abandoned documents included plans for a nuclear bomb, and extensive training notes on the handling of radiological material.

      The Combatting Terrorism Center reported that Abu Hafs al Masri (aka Mohammed Atef), al Qaida’s military chief, was killed in an air strike on an “al Qa’ida safehouse” in Kabul, in November 2001.[6]”

  3. DXer said

    Here is the lawsuit filed March 20, 2017 against Saudi Arabia for its alleged responsibility in 9/11 attacks. It is extremely long but you can search for key words and I’ll excerpt and post some relevant passages.

    If you don’t understand the role that the Saudi charities played, then you don’t understand 9/11.

    Click to access Ashton-v-KSA-2017.pdf

  4. DXer said

    The suit names several Saudi Arabian charities that were “alter egos of the government” that were staffed by the government, that ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and “the whole world knows they were dirty,” Kreindler said. The charities worked with late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to open offices in Pakistan and Afghanistan and establish the terrorist organization, the suit alleges.

    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia directly funded al-Qaeda, the lawyer said. Saudi Arabia supported the terrorists by supplying assistance such as passports and worldwide transportation, he said.

    And finally, the suit identifies Saudi officials who worked with the hijackers in Los Angeles, San Diego, Sarasota, Fla., Washington, D.C., and Virginia in the 18 months leading up to the attacks, Kreindler said.

  5. DXer said

    The background and history of the Egyptian Salafist-Jihadis is not merely a matter of historical background. Egyptian Islamic Jihad London cell member, attorney Adel Abdel Bary, faces trial in Manhattan in connection with a claim of responsibility made for the 1998 embassy bombings.

    Al-Fawwaz, a dissident from Saudi Arabia, faces trial also. Al-Fawaz is closely associated with the satellite phone that Dr. Ayman Zawahiri was using — both in terms of the calls placed and procurement of the phone through a charity worker in St. Louis.

    Compartmentalization arising from cell security protects an operation from penetration or betrayal.

    I once thought that fingerprints on the claim of responsibility for the 1998 embassy bombings and his statements to British authorities likely made his prosecution pretty straightforward.

    But I am sensing from his wife’s book that he has a theme for his defense on the merits in mind. Perhaps the key evidence will relate to whether he and his fellow EIJ members in London received the fax before the bombing and then forwarded the fax after the bombing.

    Life as the spouse of a suspected al-Qaida terrorist

    “The one concrete thing her husband was on trial for was his possession of a fax sent to him – found in his office weeks after the events – about the bombings of the US’s East African embassies. (These faxes were everywhere in the Arab areas of London at the time, handed out in places such as outside the Regents Park and other mosques and sent to news organisations across the world.) This fax – along with the al-Qaida defector Jamal Al Fadl’s testimony on Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s supposed al-Qaida links – was apparently enough for the Americans to jump to the conclusion that Abdul Bary (never named by Al Fadl) had prior knowledge and responsibility in the bombings.”

    Human rights lawyer Adel Abdel Bary already has been in prison so many years. These books make for a fascinating sociological study of the effects of political violence on the families of the alleged supporters of the violence. It is not well-known that Adeb Abdel Bary came to the US before he then settled in the UK. Given his widespread connections to the Egyptian jihadists who had spread to numerous countries after Sadat’s assassination, he might be a fount of information and insights, much like Montasser Al-Zayat.

    Who does Adel Abdel Bary think is responsible for the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings?

    Judge tosses ‘terror’ lawyer’s claim in embassy bombing case
    By Associated Press
    October 23, 2013

    see also

    Former bin Laden associate facing U.S. charges seeks UK spy evidence
    WASHINGTON/NEW YORK Fri Sep 27, 2013

  6. DXer said

    Although Yazid Sufaat was staying with KSM, it is not clear how much he was “in the loop.” Malaysian officials were of the impression that he was tantamount to the guy at the airport holding up the sign and that Hambali was calling the shots.

  7. DXer said

    The FBI years ago created a restricted FBI website to update victims and their families on the status of the investigation.

    On that website, in a letter dated January 30, 2004, the FBI referred to its “omnibus approach” to the Amerithrax investigation. “The FBI has neither foreclosed nor dismissed the possibility of foreign government or international terrorist involvement in the anthrax attacks . . . . Please know that the FBI is committed to this comprehensive investigative strategy . . . .”

    A letter dated October 25, 2004, explicitly identified the Ames strain of anthrax as the strain used in the attacks and stated that the omnibus approach focused on U.S. laboratories, foreign laboratories and Islamic extremist groups as potential immediate sources of the Ames strain of anthrax used in the attacks.

    This apparently was just BS PR because they did not even search the key card access records for the former Zawahiri associate who was supplied by Bruce Ivins until FEBRUARY 2005, even though Dr. Ivins was the custodian of the largest supply of virulent Ames around.

    As screw-ups go, they don’t look to be any bigger.

    Now if defenders of the Amerithrax investigation were to raise an issue about compartmentalization — and urge that investigators investigating Hatfill and Ivins just were not privy to Zawahiri associations — then maybe that points to the correctness of Agent Lambert’s point in 2005 that he made in a formal memo to FBI Director Mueller. He argued that compartmentalization would prevent investigators from connecting the dots.

    The GAO should obtain a copy of the 2005 memo by lead investigator Richard Lambert and understand its implications.

  8. DXer said

    Is DIA on the job or not?

    • DXer said

      The issue should not be monitoring foreign nationals in foreign labs — the issue should be the failure to monitor foreign nationals in US labs with access to virulent Ames anthrax from RMR 1029. The IG and Sandia report makes clear that the DIA totally dropped the ball at USAMRIID and did not vet foreign nationals working in USAMRIID B3 labs at all (except for fellows).

      Amerithrax represents the greatest failure in the history of US intelligence analysis — and it is ongoing.

      The Frederick News-Post (Maryland)

      Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune Business News

      September 21, 2010 Tuesday

      EDITORIAL: Holt’s tenacity

      BYLINE: The Frederick News-Post, Md.


      LENGTH: 511 words

      Sept. 21–U.S. Rep. Rush Holt, Enhanced Coverage LinkingRush Holt, -Search using:Biographies Plus NewsNews, Most Recent 60 DaysD-N.J., has finally interested someone in further investigating the FBI’s handling of the Amerithrax case and its verdict on Bruce Ivins.

      Holt has been pushing for many months for some action on the case, either through a House committee or the establishment of an official commission similar to the one that examined the U.S. response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, he has been unable to generate enough support among his fellow members of Congress to make either of those options happen.

      Finally, however, Holt and a handful of supporters have interested the Government Accountability Office, the premier independent government watchdog agency, in the Ivins/Amerithrax case. This is potentially very good news, considering the nature and mission of the GAO.

      Readers will recall that the FBI itself called on the National Academy of Science to review the science the bureau used in making its case against Ivins. That review is underway and due to conclude later this year. However, that review specifically excludes any commentary or opinions on whether the FBI’s assertions about Ivins’ guilt are correct or have been reasonably established.

      The FBI’s evidence against Ivins was almost wholly circumstantial, and many of his friends and associates, as well as lawmakers such as Holt, aren’t convinced that Ivins was the perpetrator or that the bureau forged a solid case against him.

      The GAO has agreed to seek answers to three specific questions — questions that the NAS study is not designed to look into. These include the reliability of the forensic methods the FBI used to conclude that Ivins was the lone culprit; the lingering scientific concerns and uncertainties surrounding the FBI’s conclusions; and what agencies monitor foreign containment labs and how they do so.

      The GAO is going to use the findings of the NAS report as a jumping off point in its own investigation. That’s OK, but it will, as we said, delve into critical areas that are beyond the scope of the FBI-initiated NAS report.

      When all is said and done, the Amerithrax case may never be solved. The FBI closed its investigation of these crimes months ago and proclaimed Ivins the man responsible for them. Perhaps the GAO study will conclude that the perpetrator remains undiscovered and recommend that the case remain open.

      If the GAO report does in fact cast doubt on the FBI’s investigative methods and/or its conclusion about Ivins — which we believe it well could — that would be a sea change from where the case now stands.

      And a far more just place for it to remain, if that be its fate.

  9. DXer said

    Dr. Ayman’s sister, a Cairo Medical School professor, may be correct that Dr. Ayman is not afraid of anything but I tire at Dr. Ayman’s lies in the form of false denials — it is not at all the way of the lion.

    (Pstt… ask Tarek Hamouda, supplied virulent Ames by Bruce Ivins, whether he took coursework from microbiology professor Heba Zawahiri and if so, what grade he got. If the President of the Harvard Law Review, magna cum laude, is going to be asked by Donald Trump to show his grades while at Columbia, then I think we should at least know whether the fellow supplied virulent Ames got an A from Dr. Ayman’s sister.)

    At what point does deception — false denials — evidence cowardice?

    Dr. Ayman denied the 1998 embassy bombings, for example. Then he and OBL denied responsibility for both 9/11 and the anthrax.

    Dr. Ayman reasons that deception is part of the conduct of warfare and notes that is why he lied about 1998 embassy bombings, 911 etc. For example, he explains one does not want to put operatives at risk. Or be prevented from doing the same thing again.

    But do lions act with deception? Lions are truth-tellers above else. You hear it in their roar.

    Al-Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri’s Sister: U.S. Encouraging Murder Of Muslims

    Dr. Omnaya Hiba Al-Zawahiri, the sister of Al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, says that the assassination of Osama bin Laden revealed the villainy of the Americans and their encouragement of the murder of Muslims.

    She added that it was decided to assassinate Bin Laden instead of bringing him to trial because the U.S. could not prove that he was responsible for 9/11.

    Further Comment: Dr. Ayman’s sister quoted (he has two sisters who were long-time members of the Cairo Medical faculty) may not have seen the video of OBL boasting of the plot (after initially denying it).

    His Own Chilling Words / In video, bin Laden boasts of his 9/11 plot [ALL EDITIONS] Newsday – Long Island, N.Y. Author: Mohamad Bazzi. STAFF WRITER Date: Dec 14, 2001 Start Page: A.03 Section: NEWS Text Word Count: 1318 Abstract (Document Summary)
    The videotape, which the [George W. Bush] administration said was found in a private house in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, is the most direct evidence yet that bin Laden and his al-Qaida network were behind the Sept. 11 attacks. After several days of internal debate, the Bush administration decided to release the tape in an effort to ease doubts in the Arab world about bin Laden’s responsibility for the attacks.

    On the tape, bin Laden was also surrounded by several top al- Qaida leaders. They included Ayman al-Zawahri, an Egyptian surgeon who is bin Laden’s deputy, and Sulaiman Abu Gaith, a Kuwaiti cleric and al-Qaida’s official spokesman. Abu Gaith was unknown until he surfaced at bin Laden’s side in a tape aired on the Al-Jazeera network hours after the U.S. launched air strikes on Afghanistan on Oct. 7.

    AP Cover Photo – bin Laden.; The bin Laden Video. ‘We calculated in advance the number of casualties…I was the most optimistic of them all.’ AP Photo – bin Laden.

    Expressing hope that Allah would guard her brother from the Americans, she said that he did not fear dying for the sake of Allah.

    Source: Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, May 4, 2011

    • DXer said

      “[Cairo] Medical School” (1979-1982): Recruitment By Ayman Zawahiri

      The following is a lengthy excerpt from Inside Jihad: Understanding and Confronting Radical Islam (2007) by Dr. Tawfik Hamid.

      “[Born in 1961], I entered the medical school at Cairo University when I was 17 (Egypt didn’t have the same concept of ‘undergraduate’ typical of the West). Naturally I continued to pursue my recently acquired fervor for Islam. At the time, an Islamic organization called Jamaa Islamiya had been gaining a foothold at the school. Although it was later classified as a terrorist group, Jamaa’s activities were perfectly legal then. They began by receiving permission to build a small prayer room inside the medical school, which quickly developed into a small mosque. Shortly thereafter, a library was added to the “mosque” where Jamaa members promoted Salafist books.

      Clearly, Egypt’s “Revival of Islam” had made its way to the medical school. Jamaa members would not only preach in their ‘mosque’. As its influence spread, the group started a tradition of meeting in the morning lecture hall 45 minutes before the teacher arrived, where they would lecture on Islamic topics from the podium. Most muslim students thought it a good thing, but more secular ones found it annoying, and Christian students were wholly intimidated into silence. ***

      As its influence grew, Jamaa Islamiya began to intervene with the secular traditions of the medical school. They insisted on separate seating in the lecture halls for men and women, and sometimes forcibly separate students who did not comply. Occasionally, they would use violence to stop students from playing music or singing, activities the members considered “un-Islamic.”

      One naturally asks, “Why medical students?” Westerns are often astonished to observe highly accomplished Muslim doctors in the terrorist ranks. These include Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri (surgeon) second in command of Al-Qaeda *** Doctors almost universally agree to the Hippocratic Oath and swear by another of Hippocrates’ maxims: “First, do no harm.” How then could a group like Jamaaa Islamiya gain traction in a medical school?

      It is actually not a surprise to me that I became radicalized there. Our medical schools at that time were a vanguard of fundamentalism in most Egyptian universities.


      Eventually in my first year I was approached by a promising member of Jamaa named Muchtar. He was in his fourth year and known in the group as amir, or “prince.” The title was short for “Prince of the Believers,” a term taken from early writings about the Islamic caliphate. Determination to serve Allah overcame my hesitancy that remained from witnessing the incident with Dr. Edward, and I agreed to join in what I thought would be a commonplace gathering for prayer. En route to the mosque, Muchtar impressed upon me a concept that he called al-fikr kufr — that one becomes an infidel (kufr) by thinking critically (fikr). One’s brain is similar to a donkey, he elaborated — you can ride it to the palace of Allah, but you must leave it outside when you enter.


      Doctor “Ayman”

      It happened one afternoon that a guest Imam came to deliver a sermon. His topic didn’t concern itself with dry details of prayer and fasting. He was fiery and charismatic; his passion was holy war. His topic didn’t concern itself with dry details of prayer and fasting. He was fiery and charismatic; his passion was holy war. It was to be fought on all fronts, against all non-believers, without compromise, until all people either converted, submitted to Sharia, or were slain. He made us feel that we could make the glorious days of the Islamic conquest return. After the sermon, a fellow member, Tariq Abdul-Muhsin, asked me if I knew the Imam. When I answered I didn’t, he told me that the speaker was Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Because I was a new member, Tariq offered to introduce me to him.

      In person, Al-Zawahiri was very polite and decent with the members of Jamaa. It was hard to reconcile his fiery sermons with the quiet man before me.***


      I remember feeling very proud when Zawahiri told me: “Young Muslims like you are the hope for the future return of Khalifa [Caliphate or Islamic global dominance].” He made me want to fight for him, to show him my courage and loyalty. Zawahiri himself came from a wealthy, well-known and well-educated family and was a top post-graduate student at the medical school. He was active in a number of Islamist groups so he did not devote all of his time to Jamaa. We used to call him “Dr. Ayman.”


      He was a master of at attracting new recruits and inciting them to jihad. It is worthwhile studying his use of Islamic texts in terms of the phrases and tactics we have mentioned, particularly hatred, superiority and war.


      Islamic Jihad … was extremely violent. They would concentrate on the assassination of important political leaders. Their violence was not diffuse, but highly targeted.


      There remains, at last, Jamaa Islamiya (literally, “Islamic Group”). It concentrated on recruiting from society’s “best and brightest” by entrenching itself in universities and medical schools. Having done so, Jamaa prepare the theoretical foundation for jihad and propagated them to promising students who could best absorb them. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaa didn’t participate directly in terror — it would have been counterproductive to provoke a crackdown from school administrations. Jamaa was more of a ‘gateway’ groups, which, having indoctrinated recruits and equipped them with jihadist knowledge, encouraged them to assume leadership positions in Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, or to practice jihad in other countries.

      Intellectually, Al-Zawahiri was much affected by the teaching of a Muslim Brotherhood leader named Sayyid Qutb. He used to praise Sayyid by saying ‘Rahimahu Allah’ whenever he mentioned his name. The expression means, ‘May Allah show him mercy and kindness’. ***


      Second Thoughts

      My entire relationship with Jamaa Islamiya lasted for approximate two to three years (from 1979-1982). It took about six months to become sufficiently indoctrinated Over the next year, I became increasingly active in the movement. Eventually, my involvement reached the point where I thought myself prepared to train with jihadi groups in Afghanistan, to fight and kill in the name of Allah. It was at this time that my conscience began to awaken. ***

      One episode in particular gave me second thoughts. It transpired that I overheard a conversation between Ahmed Omar and other members of the group. A fourth-year medical student, Ahmed was an “amir” of Jamaa. He was planning to to kidnap a police officer and bury him alive”. His exact word was netaweeh, which meant in Egyptian slang, ‘to dig a grave for someone and bury him alive”. The issue concerned a party that was planned that day at the medical school. Music and women singers were to be featured, and the view of Jamaa was, of course, that such an event was unIslamic. Members of the Jamaa gathered that day in thousands to protest the party and disrupt it by force. The police intervened and the medical school came under martial law.


      By the late 1970s, Islamists had penetrated into every aspect of Egyptian life. *** In 1981, not long before I graduated, President Sadat was assassinated by a military lieutenant named Khaled Islambouli — a member of the Islamic Jihad. The Iranians were delighted at the assassination and named a street after him. Zawahiri was also a member of Islamic Jihad, and was indicted for the assassination, but his connection to it was never proven. He was released from prison in 1984. Today, “Dr. Ayman” is the second-in-command of Al Qaeda, and possibly its foremost leader.


      The “Blind Sheikh”, Omar Abdel-Rahman was a spiritual leader ***. Americans will recognize his name — he resides now in the US, in solitary confinement, for conspiring to blow up the United Nations building, New York City FBI branch, and for attempting to destroy the World Trade Centers in 1993 — a job finished by al-Qaeda in 2001. Though estimates vary, it is thought that 75% of Al-Qaeda’s top leadership is Egyptian.”

      • DXer said

        The Cairo Medical School Dropout Trained To Recruit US Operatives And Make Booby-Trapped Letters (1989-1998)

        Lance Williams of the San Francisco Chronicle wrote an eye-opening profile of Khalid Dahab, a Cairo Medical School drop-out who recruited US operatives for Al Qaeda. He was trained by Bin Laden’s head of intelligence, former US Army Sergeant Ali Mohammed. Ali Mohammed had recruited him while he was student at Cairo Medical in the early 1980s. The article was based on statements made in a Cairo court proceeding.

        Williams reports that Bin Laden personally congratulated Dahab, an Egyptian- born US Citizen, a Silicon Valley car salesman and member of Zawahri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad/Vanguards of Conquest, for recruiting Islamist Americans into al Qaeda. The account of Dahab’s confession was first published in the October 10, 2001 edition of the London-based Arabic language newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat. Dahab said he and Bin Laden’s head of intelligence, former U.S. Army Sgt. Ali Mohamed. Ali Mohamed was also a Silicon Valley resident. Ali Mohamed had traveled to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s to report to bin Laden on the success the two were having in recruiting Americans. Bin Laden told them that recruiting terrorists with American citizenship was a top priority.

        Ali Mohamed has admitted role in planning the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, killing more than 200 people.

        Williams wrote: “Dahab’s confession supports the view of many terrorism experts that al Qaeda has “sleeper” operatives on station in the United States for future terrorist attacks.” Khaled Duran, an author and terrorism expert who has written about the Silicon Valley cell, said the recruits would be expected to “fade into the woodwork” until the organization needed them, he said. Williams continues: “His story, obtained from accounts of Egyptian court proceedings and interviews with people who knew him, is entwined with that of Mohamed, a former Egyptian military officer and aide to bin Laden who recruited Dahab into al Qaeda, brought him to America and became his handler.”

        Handsome and outgoing, Dahab spoke excellent English. He said he was from a wealthy Alexandria family. His mother was a physician and he was planning a career in medicine.

        “But Dahab told acquaintances he had been radicalized by a tragedy that happened when he was a schoolboy: his father, he claimed, had been among 108 people killed in the 1973 crash of a Cairo-bound Libyan Arab Airlines plane that was shot down by Israeli fighter jets when it strayed over the Sinai Peninsula, which at the time was occupied by Israel. He claimed that his father’s death — and Egypt’s failure to avenge it — had turned him against the Egyptian government and against Israel and the United States, as well. He said he was drawn toward Islamic Jihad, a radical movement that had assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 in an effort to remake Egypt into a fundamentalist Muslim state.”

        Williams reports that it was while a medical student i in about 1984, according to his confession, that Dahab met Mohamed, who then was an officer in the Egyptian commando forces and a Jihad operative planning to emigrate to the United States. Dahab came to the United States in 1986, obtaining a student visa by saying he wanted to study medicine. He rented an apartment in Santa Clara, where Ali Mohamed now lived with his American wife. He dropped the name Dahab, calling himself Khaled Mohamed or Ali Mohamed, the same name used by the man who had recruited him. “He sometimes claimed, falsely,” Williams explains, “that he had been a physician in Egypt, said people who met him.”

        “In 1992, Dahab married a junior college student from a tiny town in South Dakota whom he met while lawn-bowling in Santa Clara. His third wife converted to Islam. They had four children, and the marriage helped him win citizenship, acquaintances said. The family settled in a duplex near Santa Clara High School. Dahab struggled to support his family, court records show. He worked as a maintenance man at Kaiser Hospital in Santa Clara, then at National Semiconductor, then as a $30,000-per-year car salesman in San Jose.” In the mid-1990s, despite financial problems, “[h]e was often abroad, traveling extensively in the Middle East, vacationing in Pakistan, telling associates he was starting a chemical business in Egypt.”

        “In 1995, using a fake passport and identity documents, Dahab and Ali Mohammed smuggled Zawahiri into the US from Afghanistan for a covert fund-raising tour. Dahab reports that part of the money financed the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. Dahab also said that at Mohamed’s direction he had gone to terrorist camps in Afghanistan in 1990 and trained guerrilla fighters to fly hang gliders. He said Islamic Jihad was planning a hand-glider assault to liberate imprisoned Jihad leaders, some of whom had been locked up since the assassination of Sadat.”

        A former friend remembers that Dahab turned up in the parking lot at the Al- Noor Mosque in Santa Clara, driving a station wagon with a hang glider in the back and saying he was bound for Afghanistan. “He said, ‘I am going to take (the aircraft) to Afghanistan and help the mujahedeen — I am going to take it over there and train people to fly it,’ ” the friend said. “People said, ‘Oh, you crazy guy — they thought he was joking.’ ” Jihad later canceled the attack, Dahab said in his confession.”

        Williams continues: “Meanwhile, Dahab said Mohamed gave him military training and taught him how to make letter bombs. Dahab said he had also worked as an al Qaeda communications specialist, aiding terrorists inside Egypt by patching through their calls to other operatives in Afghanistan and the Sudan. This helped the terrorists plan operations while avoiding electronic surveillance by Egyptian security forces who routinely wiretapped calls between Egypt and countries that harbored jihad terrorists.

        Also in the 1990s, Dahab said, he and Mohamed were told to begin recruiting U.S. citizens of Middle Eastern heritage. Dahab said the recruitment project had first been outlined to him by an al Qaeda fighter named Abdel Aziz Moussa al Jamal, who, according to Arabic press accounts, recently surfaced in Islamabad, Pakistan, serving as translator for Taliban envoy Abdul Salam Zaeef. On another visit to Afghanistan, Dahab said, he and Mohamed discussed the project with Zawahiri and bin Laden.” “Dahab told Egyptian authorities he and Mohamed had found 10 recruits, all of them naturalized U.S. citizens who had been born in the Middle East. The account of the confession did not name the recruits or provide other details about them.”

        Williams explains that Dahab was arrested and sent to an Egyptian prison. “By 1998, Dahab was spending more and more time abroad, and he told a family law judge in San Jose that he intended to move his family back to Egypt. In August 1998, while Dahab was in Egypt, al Qaeda mounted suicide attacks on the embassies in East Africa. Within weeks Ali Mohamed was arrested for complicity in the attack. He pled guilty. .

        In October 1998, the Egyptian military moved to crush Islamic Jihad by arresting more than 70 of the organization’s leaders. Dahab decided to flee, and on Oct. 28 booked a flight to the United States. According to Dahab acquaintances, Egyptian security police boarded the plane shortly before takeoff and took him away in handcuffs. Dahab confessed his involvement with al Qaeda and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.”

        Sleepers, the former head of Bin Laden’s intelligence (and a former US Army sergeant) Ali Mohammed testified, “don’t wear the traditional beards and they don’t pray at the mosques.” An Al Qaeda encyclopedia, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, advises sleepers to “have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic orientation,” and for men not to wear a beard. The book also instructs sleepers not to denounce unjustice faced by the ummah, and not to use common Islamic expressions such as “peace be on you,” nor to go to Islamic locations, such as mosques.

        Consider the example of another “sleeper” or operative, Tarik Hamdi of Herndon, Virginia. ABC News employed him to help secure an interview with bin Laden in early 1998. ABC News transported Hamdi to Afghanistan, unaware that his real purpose in going there was to carry a replacement battery to bin Laden for the satellite telephone he would later use to order the embassy bombings in East Africa. ABC was also unaware that the CIA had planted a listening device in the phone. The successful CIA operation, however, did not serve to prevent the planning of the embassy operation. Ironically, it facilitated it. If we don’t learn from history, we are bound to repeat it.

        • DXer said

          The Cairo Medical School Alum Who Was Zawahiri’s Tour Guide On His Last US Tour

          In 1995, Ayman came once again to the United States where he was accompanied by US Army Sergeant Ali Mohammed on his travels to California, then Brooklyn, then the Washington, D.C. area. Who did he visit in Washington, D.C.? Zawahiri traveled to the US in 1991 and 1995 under an alias (though the dates are disputed). Zawahiri sometimes was accompanied by two brothers, a New Jersey pharmacist and a California doctor, Ali Zaki (a fellow Cairo Medical alum who denies knowing who Zawahiri was). They were joined by a former US Army sergeant and key Al Qaeda operative, Ali Mohammed. In Santa Clara, Ayman reportedly stated at the home of Ali Mohammed, even though Mohammed had recently been subpoenaed to testify about what he knew about Bin Laden’s activities. Dr. Zaki says he was a good friend of Ali Mohammed and that it was widely known that Ali Mohammed was a liaison between the islamists in Afghanistan and the CIA. In one of his trips, he also reportedly went to Texas. One of the most important starting points of the FBI’s Amerithrax investigation should have been to trace the contacts that al-Zawahiri made on his last trip to the United States. He met with supporters associated with the Maktab Khidmat al-Mujahidin (the Al-Mujahidin services office) in the US. In that connection, they should have considered whether the subtilis expert regularly calling Abdul Yasin’s apartment in February 1993 had access to virulent Ames. Indeed, KSM’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 WTC mastermind, listed the apartment as his residence in late January 1993 after getting in a fender bender.

          The troubles of Cairo Medical School graduate (’71), San Jose physician Ali Zaki, over taking Ayman Zawahiri and Bin Laden’s head of intelligence around the US in 1995 had just about faded from memory. In January 2000, a new problem then reared its head. In 1999, he had prescribed $164,000 in prescriptions for Viagara, a syringe of a drug for renal insufficiency and a vial for hypogonadism. (Bin Laden suffered from renal insufficiency.) The California Board governing physicians found that Dr. Zaki violated regulations because no patient was named and he had kept no records. The drugs were ordered ostensibly for a fictitious business MedChem. When an investigator went to check out the listing it was the address at 550 Bevans Drive it turned out to have been a recently closed deli called Landmark Gourmet Delicatessen. Owned by Hasan Ibrahim, the business had been evicted. According to the decision, the drugs reportedly were for resale abroad. If they were intended for Afghanistan, someone must have expected a lot of action with some virgins. Perhaps erectile dysfunction was common there because of the cold, harsh conditions and the stress in that line of work. One of the allegations in the January 21, 2000 “Accusation” alleged that “On or about June 15, 1999, respondent ordered 100 bottles of Viagara, 30 tablets per bottle, at 100 milligram strength.” Cost: $164,000. Memories: Priceless. The public reprimand issued in August 2001 and is available online at the State agency’s website.

        • DXer said

          Hallmark Greetings: Egyptian Islamists’ Earlier WTC Letter Bombs To Washington DC And New York City Newspapers And Symbolic Targets

          A memo seized in the 1995 arrest proposed flying an explosive laden plane into CIA headquarters. Anyone reading the Washington Post in the mid-1990s read about the plan to fly a plane into CIA headquarters over their morning coffee. The earlier plot to fly an airliner into the Eiffel tower by some Algerians connected to Bin Laden was also notable. Condi Rice professes not to have imagined the threat even though it was publicly known and even a threat at the G-8 conference. It’s important that as a country we learn from our mistakes and not pay short shrift to the evidence on the issue of modus operandi relating to Zawahiri’s planned use of anthrax.

          This was not the first time the Egyptian islamists sent letter bombs to newspaper offices in connection with an attack on the World Trade Center. NPR set the scene. It was January 2, 1997, at 9:15 a.m. at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C. The employee of the Saudi-owned newspaper Al Hayat began to open a letter. It was a Christmas card — the kind that plays a musical tune. It was white envelope, five and a half inches by six and a half inches, with a computer-generated address label attached. It had foreign postage and a post mark — a postmark appearing to be from Alexandria, Egypt. It looked suspiciously bulky, so he set it down and called the police. Minutes later they found a similar envelope. These were the first two of four letter bombs that would arrive at Al Hayat during the day. A fifth letter bomb addressed to the paper was intercepted at a nearby post office. They all looked the same. Two similar letter bombs addressed to the “parole officer” (a position that does not exist) arrived at the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth. It seemed evident how some Grinch had spent the holidays in Alexandria, Egypt.

          Egyptian Saif Adel (Makawwi), thought to be in Iran, was involved in military planning. Adel was a colonel in the Egyptian Army’s Special Forces before joining Al Qaeda. He helped plan the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Africa. He was also a planner in the attack on the USS Cole and has served as the liaison officer between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Adel assisted Atef, who had overall responsibility for Al Qaeda’s operations. According to Cairo Attorney Al-Zayyat, Makkawi had many times claimed responsibility for operations that were carried out inside Egypt but when the perpetrators were arrested, it would be al-Zawahiri’s name whose name they shouted loyalty to from the docks. After the letter al-Hayat letter bombs were sent in January 1997, Saif Adel (Makawwi) gave a statement denying responsibility on behalf of the Vanguards of Conquest.

          On January 7, 1997 Saif Adel purporting to be speaking for the Egyptian Vanguards of Islamic Conquest said: “Those are messages of admonishment. There is no flirtation between us and the Americans in order for us to send them such alarming messages in such a manner.” Adel said that “the Vanguards of Conquest “are heavyweight and would not embark on such childish actions.” US press and political commentaries had hinted at the Vanguards of Conquest organization’s involvement in these attempts. In his statement to Al-Hayat, perhaps referring to the Egyptian Islamic Group, Adel added “I am surprised that we in particular, and not other parties, should be accused of such an operation.”

          He got admonished by the unnamed but official spokesman for the Vanguards organization. This other spokesmanchastisied him as not being authorized to speak for the organization (or even being a member). “We welcome any Muslim who wants to join us, and if Makkawi wants to [join us], he will be welcomed to the Vanguards march, but through the organizational channels. But if words are not coupled with actions, we tell him: Fear God, and you can use a different name other than the Vanguards to speak on its behalf.” The spokesman denounced Makkawi’s authority to speak for the group, referring to the January 5th statement it had made denying responsibility. The spokesperson for the Vanguards of Conquest apparently was Post Office employee Sattar’s friend, Al-Sirri, based in London.

          The FBI would not speculate as to who sent the letters or why. But this was your classic “duck that walks like a duck” situation. As NPR reported at the time, “analysts say that letter bombs are rarely sent in batches, and when they are it’s generally prompted by politics, not personal animus.” Al Hayat was a well respected and moderate newspaper. It was friendly to moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. That, without more, was accurately discerned by observers at the time as sufficient to make the newspaper outlet a target of the militant islamists. The newspaper, its editor explained, does not avoid criticizing militant islamists. The Al Hayat Editor-in-Chief explained: “We’ve been opposed to all extremists in the Arab world, especially the fundamentalists.” Mohammed Salameh, a central defendant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was sent to Leavenworth in 1994. The other three Egyptian extremists convicted in the bombing were sent to prisons in California, Indiana and Colorado. Like the blind sheik Abdel-Rahman, Salameh had complained of his conditions and asked to be avenged. The Blind Sheik was particularly irked that the prison officials did not cut his fingernails.

          Abdel-Rahman was convicted in 1995 of seditious conspiracy, bombing conspiracy, soliciting an attack on an U.S. military installation, and soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. His followers were indicted for plotting to bomb bridges, tunnels and landmarks in New York for which Rahman allegedly had given his blessings. The mailing of deadly letters in connection with an earlier attack on the World Trade Center was not merely the modus operandi of militant islamists, it was the group’s signature. It’s their calling card. Khaled Abu el-Dahab, a naturalized American, from Silicon Valley, in a confession detailed Egyptian defense ministry document dated October 28, 1998, explained that he was trained to make booby-trapped letters to send to important people, as well as asked to enroll in American aviation schools to learn how to fly gliders and helicopters. He was a friend of Ali Mohammed, the former special forces officer in the Egyptian army and former US Army Sergeant. The modus operandi of these militant supporters of the blind sheik was known to be planes and booby-trapped letters.

          The Al Hayat reporters and editor were not expressing an opinion — though the owner did lay out various possibilities (e.g., Iraq, Iran etc.). The owner of the paper had commanded Saudi forces during the Persian Gulf War, when Bin Laden was so upset about American troops on the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, al Hayat had recently opened up a Bureau in Jerusalem, giving it a dateline of Jerusalem rather than al Quds, which some thought blasphemous. But none of the possibilities would plausibly explain why the letter bomb was sent to Leavensworth where three of the WTC 1993 defendants were imprisoned, including Ramzi Yousef’s lieutenant who had asked that his mistreatment be avenged. (That was the criminal genius who returned to Ryder to reclaim his deposit after blowing up the truck at WTC). Egyptian security officials argued that the letters were sent from outside of Egypt, the stamps were not available in Egypt, and that the postmark was not Alexandria as reported. Whatever the place of mailing, the sender likely was someone who was upset that KSM’s and Ramzi Yousef’s associates had been imprisoned, to include, most notably, the blind sheik. Whoever is responsible for the anthrax mailings, it is a very good bet that they are upset the blind sheik is detained. That should be at the center of any classified profile of the crime.

          On December 31, 1996 Mohammed Youssef was in Egypt — having gone to Egypt months before. The al Hayat letter bombs related to the detention and alleged mistreatment of the blind sheikh and the WTC bombers were sent 10 days earlier — on the Day of Measures. In 2006, he was named as co-defendant with Hassoun, Daher, Padilla and Jayyousi. Youssef was born in Alexandria. Do authorities suspect the “Florida cell” of being involved in the al Hayat letter bombs? Kifah Jayyousi’s “Islam Report” over the years — distributed by Adham Hassoun in Florida and Kassem Daher in Canada — expressed outrage at detention/extradition due to terrorism law and also what he perceived as attacks on his religion by some newspapers. His headlines on the internet groups blazed “Just In! First Muslim Victim of New Terrorism Law!: US Agents Arrest Paralegal Of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman Without Charge Prepares To Hand Him To Egyptian Regime,” soc.religion.islam, dated April 27, 1996 and “Islam Report (Newspaper Attacks Our Religion! Act Now!,” soc.religion.islam, Apr. 16, 1996

          In connection with the January 1997 letter bombs, Ayman got the know-how to send sophisticated electronic letter bombs from Iraqi intelligence according to one item from the highly controversial Feith memo. In the al Hayat letter bombings, Ayman allowed the finger to be pointed at Libya. In the Amerithrax letters, he allowed the finger to be pointed to a United States biodefense insider by the prosecutor who would have presented to any indictment to the grand jury. Born in Haifa in 1948, the man’s daughter then came to represent microbiologist Al-Timimi pro bono.

          After the Al Hayat letter bombs to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions, in January 1997, both the Blind Sheikh and his paralegal, Sattar, were quoted in separate articles in Al Hayat (in Arabic) denying that they or their supporters were responsible. The Blind Sheikh commented that al Hayat was fair and balanced in its coverage and his supporters would have no reason to “hit” them. The same sort of counterintuitive theory was raised in connection with the earlier letter bombing of newspapers to DC and New York City and people in symbolic positions. Sattar noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. This time, Mr. Sattar did not need any help making the argument with respect to the anthrax letters. Numerous people with political agendas rushed to do it for him to include counsel for Bosnia and Herzogovina and legal advisor to the PLO, professor Francis Boyle. In accusing Dr. Ivins on the occasion of his death, the FBI embraced the same sort of theory — that is, when it was not grasping at other untenable theories relating to college sororities, incorrectly perceived anti-abortion news, or perceived financial motive.

          In September 2006, in a Sahab Media production called “Knowledge is for acting,” there is a clip in which Al Quds editor Atwan refers to his visit with Bin Laden in 1996 (see also his 2006 book The Secret History of al Qaeda). He says that Bin Laden was planning to attack America “and America prisons in particular.” That was an apparent reference to the Al Hayat letter bombs sent to newspapers and prisons in January 1997. There were recurrent references to Abdel-Rahman in the tape.

  10. DXer said

    “(S//NF) Detainee assisted senior al-Qaida member and deputy to UBL,
    Aiman al-Zawahiri in leaving Yemen. In 1997, detainee met Zawahiri in Sanaa,
    Yemen, at the house of Ahmad Maqalih. Also accompanying Zawahiri was
    Mohammed Showki Islambouli along with two unknown Egyptians. The group
    arrived from Sadah and was hosted by al-Qaida sympathizer and Sadah region
    tribal leader Qaed Shaweet. Detainee advised that he was tasked to facilitate the
    group’s travel from Yemen to Sudan. Detainee and a PSO convoy escorted
    Zawahiri and Islambouli to the airport. 48 (Analyst Note: Islambouli was the
    Political leader of al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya [IG] and is the brother of Khalid
    Islambouli, who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.)”

    Abd al-Heela Detainee Assessment

  11. DXer said

    Dr. Saathoff writes:

    “We know from emails to female confidantes that in 2000 Dr. Ivins drank
    heavily and hid empty bottles from his wife, but this period of alcohol
    abuse appears to have been temporary and did not result in the type of
    severe impairment he exhibited in the last six months of his life.”

    I’m getting tired of hearing about these female confidantes — Patricia Fellows and Mara Linscott.

    Dr. Saathoff may not be aware that Tarek Hamouda, who is a former associate of Ayman Zawahiri, thanked Pat and Mara for technical assistance in connection with the virulent Ames that Bruce Ivins supplied.

    Coincidence? Maybe. But it is enough for me to think the contemporaneous documents are more important than spinning Bruce as someone who hides bottles from his wife and doesn’t like Gary the journalist.

    If Dr. Saathoff hasn’t consulted with Tarek Hamid, author of the lucidly written INSIDE JIHAD, who consults with the CIA, he really should. (They are in the same field and so I imagine they know each other).

    Tarek lucidly describes his own recruitment by Ayman Zawahiri while in medical school with his lifelong friend, Dr. Hamouda.

    The early October 2001 profile that came out of FBI’s Quantico did not evidence any learning on the subject of Ayman Zawahiri’s plans to use charities and universities to infiltrate US biodefense whatsoever.

    It was just pulled from the file from a study that had recently been done on “lone wolves.”

    And now the DOJ is withholding key contemporaneous documents.

    It’s almost as if some agents are worried about being sued for driving Ivins to suicide by testing the semen on the panties — for no reason other than to upset him even though they knew he was suicidal.

    • Anonymous said

      “Dr. Saathoff may not be aware that Tarek Hamouda…..”.

      There is no evidence whatsover that “Tarek Hamouda” was involved in the anthrax attacks any more than Bruce Ivins. If you have evidence state it. Otherwise you are no better than Saathoff at constructing unsubstantiated fantasies connecting dots that don’t connect.

      Bruce Ivins was not seeking revenge against Jane Pauley. That is a complete fantasy.

      Bruce Ivins did not send anthrax to the National Enquirer because he once wrote in a private email “Tell Matsumoto to kiss my ass” after getting pestered by scores of FOIA requests. Another complete fantasy.

      Similarly, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Tarek Hamouda, Ali-Al-Timimi, J’Dey the Pilot, Mohammed Begg or any other muslim-sounding name, was involved in the anthrax attacks. It is all innuendo based on fantasy.

  12. DXer said

    Dr. Saathoff testified before Susan Collins’ committee on radicalization in prisons:

    “In fact, terrorism is a team sport. Social bonding is not only the magnet but also the glue that holds these groups together, rather than concepts like brainwashing that are simple, attractive and wrong.
    The most effective terrorists are team players, who play different positions on a radicalized field. Our overcrowded prisons provide an opportunity for a deep bench. Even more importantly, para- radicalization and recruitment occurs in prison. In this exploitative environment, inmates, visitors and even prison employees can be unwitting players who can be cajoled, bribed or coerced into transmitting messages and materials without being aware of their real purpose.

    It is not enough to understand terrorism in prison by learning only about inmates. One must also have an understanding of those who visit and volunteer in prisons. Studies have suggested that terrorist recruitment methods are not always expected to yield a high number of recruits. Even if the radical message resonates with only a few inmates, they could then be targeted for more intense one on one instruction. The impact and destructive potential of a prison- directed terrorist cell is enormous.

    There is a difference between a radicalized prisoner, who holds radical religious or political beliefs, and a prisoner who has been recruited by a terrorist group and who has chosen to commit violence. An important resource for combating terrorism might be to determine which factor or factors influence some radicalized prisoners to make that specific leap from radical beliefs to violence in the name of those beliefs.

    Because radical religious violence can occur within prisons, we have an obligation to inmate populations certainly, but also to those who are charged with maintaining safe prisons.

    Just as we seek to protect our soldiers by providing them with the most up-to-date intelligence, we are also obligated to use our enhanced knowledge to safeguard the lives of our correctional officers. A compelling case can be made for a review of our prison system, particularly at the state and local levels.

    Chairman Collins, in order to defeat a networked opponent our prisons need to be “networked” through information technology systems that are truly integrated. When serious symptoms present, it’s tempting to try to reach for a treatment before we have a diagnosis. History reveals that government works best when it first shines light rather than heat upon concerns that involve religious questions and conflict.

    Government must be proactive. We must base our operations on real intelligence, rather than gut reactions. Unless we understand the nature and extent of the problem of religious radicalization in prison, we are likely to first neglect it, and then over-react in a way that unnecessarily antagonizes and polarizes our prison population. In addition to being an assault on civil liberties, an aggressive over-reaction by government in the absence of good intelligence would lose hearts and minds to radicalization and recruitment, playing into the very hands of those who would want to subvert our system.”

  13. DXer said

    A 2005 report on unconventional weapons drafted by a commission led by former Sen. Charles Robb, Virginia Democrat, and federal appeals court Judge Laurence Silberman concluded that al Qaeda’s biological weapons program “was extensive, well organized and operated two years before the Sept. 11” terror attacks in the U.S.

    • DXer said

      Pres. Bush, Charles Robb & Laurence Silberman on WMD Intelligence Report

      Pres. Bush, Charles Robb & Laurence Silberman on WMD Intelligence Report

      Video Playlist
      • FROM THURSDAY, MARCH 31: Watch Now
      Washington, DC

      Thursday, March 31, 2005

      Pres. Bush remarks on the report on pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMDs issued today by the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities. He is joined by commission co-chairman Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, who take questions following the President’s comments. Pres. Bush formed this nine-member panel in February 2004.

    • DXer said

      “Psychological Responses to Bioterrorism: It’s About Time”

      The second speaker, Dr. Greg Saathoff, serves as the Executive Director of the Critical Incident Analysis Group at the
      University of Virginia. Saathoff sought to distinguish the critical difference between bioterrorism and other forms of
      terrorist attacks using more conventional “NICE weapons” (Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical, and Explosive). Unlike
      NICE weapons, which are self-limiting in impact by the nature of the weapons materials themselves, bioterrorism
      weapons can be deployed without victims knowing they are under attack. Further, some of these weapons have the
      capacity to reproduce. Bioterror weapons, therefore, are not limited (or fixed) in time. Bioterror carries on, and can
      advance substantially before we are even aware of a problem.

      Saathoff echoed the concerns of Bresnitz, stating that we do not yet have an establishment for dealing with
      bioterroristic infectious disease. Not only do we lack models and studies, but we already know we have “limited surge
      capabilities,” generally defined as the ability to provide emergency care for situations resulting in mass injuries or mass
      casualties. Further, vaccine availability and response protocols may be insufficient.

      The psychological response to such insidious attacks, and to the fear created by them, depends on a number of factors
      articulated by Saathoff: leadership response; medical resources; media; law enforcement; communications; individual
      responses; community responses; and governmental emergency responses.

      Saathoff indicated that there are seven elements to the leader’s response that would help determine the psychological
      response of the public. First, the leader must have clear and effective communication skills. Second, the existing level
      of trust in the leader at the time of the response is vitally important. (Similarly, Saathoff stated that the leader’s
      charisma was critical, which he defined as the leader’s ability to be trusted and be followed.) Third, the leader’s
      relationship with, and understanding of, the media is important. The leader must understand that the media’s critical
      role is not adversarial, but one which more rapidly fosters solutions. The fourth element is the leader’s previous training
      and experience dealing with bioterrorism. Fifth, the leader must have a thorough understanding of the interaction and
      availability of local, state and federal response systems. Sixth, the leader must be able to transcend partisanship and
      lead the entire group or entire society. And finally, the leader must be able to express what Saathoff calls “vigilant
      hope,” an ability to deal with the uncertainty presented by the situation and move forward.

      Some of the other factors Saathoff mentioned rather briefly. The “medical resources” factor, he said, will turn on the
      following: experience of clinicians, especially in managing disasters and working with incomplete information;
      relationship of medical institutions with the government, the media and public alliances; having and using a
      communication network to disseminate information about the bioterrorism event; and adequate mental health
      resources, not just for victims, but also care providers. For the “media” factor, the critical elements are: their own
      leadership; the level to which the community trusts them; their bioterrorism knowledge and training; their prior
      experience with disasters; their relationship with medical service providers; their local and national perspective, and
      ability to see the relationship between the two arenas; and their ability to recognize their role as one which fills an
      important information void for the public. For “law enforcement”, the key elements are: prior experience with disasters;
      bioterrorism training; relationship with the media; and sensitivity to their own medical and other needs. For
      “communications,” Saathoff identified the critical elements as: the level of overlap or redundancies; prior disaster
      experience; and surge capability.

      In closing, Saathoff remarked that although predicting the psychological response of the public to bioterrorism attacks
      should be sought after, the ability to do so will depend largely on the aforementioned factors.

      • DXer said




        GREGORY B. SAATHOFF, M.D., Executive Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group, Associate Professor Of Research, School Of Medicine, University Of Virginia.

        • DXer said

          Gregory Saathoff
          Executive Director
          Critical Incident Analysis Group
          University of Virginia

          Areas of Interest
          1) critical incident response
          2) religion and violence
          3) pathologic groups

        • DXer said

          Holstege, Neer, Saathoff, and Furbee, Criminal Poisoning: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives (with foreword by Edwin Meese)

        • DXer said

          Int J Emerg Ment Health. 2002 Fall;4(4):245-52.
          Psychological challenges of bioterror: containing contagion.

          Saathoff G, Everly GS Jr.

          University of Virginia School of Medicine, USA.

          In this article, we have introduced the concept of shielding as a public mental health intervention. Shielding addresses the core elements of bioterrorism when we consider that bioterrorism is best understood as terrorism, i.e., psychological warefare, which merely employs biologic agents, not to kill, but to terrorize. It is, therefore, to some degree dependent upon widespread contagion. Shielding is not a panacea. It is one aspect of an overall response plan. Nevertheless, it represents a potentially useful “antidote” for the bioterrorist assault. Perhaps most significant among its putative mechanisms of action appears to be controlling contagion, both physical and psychological. In the final analysis, in the wake of a terrorist attack, physicians can physically immunize and treat those who require such attention. Engineers can reconstruct buildings and roads. But who rebuilds the essence of humanity which has been violently ripped away from those who suffered the terrorist attack? How do we reconstruct a belief in justice and safety in the wake of a mass terrorist attack? Without attention to mental health, i.e., the “psychological side of terrorism,” we run the risk of rebuilding a nation without a spirit, without a vitality, without a sense of humanity.

    • DXer said

      Dr. Greg Saathoff will be at the podium tomorrow morning.

      • DXer said

        Gregory B. Saathoff, M.D.

        Gregory Saathoff M.D. is Associate Professor of Research in Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sciences, and Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at the University of Virginia’s School of Medicine. He also serves as Executive Director of the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). In this capacity, he directs the operation of the group, which operates as a “ThinkNet” that provides multidisciplinary expertise in developing strategies that can prevent or mitigate the effects of critical incidents. To that end, he has developed a series of case reviews relating to critical incidents and the Constitution, the terrorist threat abroad, protecting symbols of democracy, the threat of bioterrorism, the relationship of domestic intelligence collection to terrorism, the sniper event in the National Capital Region, hostage taking in Iraq, The Colombia Hostage Rescue, Cyber Incursions, and Somali Piracy. In 1996 he was appointed to a Commission charged with developing a methodology to enable the FBI to better access non-governmental expertise during times of crisis. In that regard, Dr. Saathoff has since 1996 served as the Conflict Resolution Specialist to the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group. In this role, he consults with the Crisis Negotiation Unit and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. He serves as a Senior Fellow of the GWU Homeland Security Policy Institute and a IIIA Fellow at James Madison University. In 2003, he served as a Visiting Professor at James Madison University. Over the past twenty years, he has taught medical students and consulted to the Virginia Department of Corrections, where he assesses and treats violent and nonviolent offenders who are diagnosed with major mental illness.

        During the 1st Gulf War, Dr. Saathoff was called from reserve duty and deployed as a medical corps psychiatrist overseas, earning the Army Commendation Medal in 1991. Dr. Saathoff retired from the Army Reserves with the rank of Major. A member of the University of Virginia’s Kuwait Project, he studied societal trauma in Kuwait subsequent to the Iraqi occupation. Dr. Saathoff has served on the faculty of the Saudi-U.S. Universities Project located at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In addition to the Middle East, his work has taken him to projects in the former Soviet Union, Western Europe and Australia. He was privileged to assemble and lead a University of Virginia medical team as the U.S. component of the international medical group charged with diagnosis and treatment of the poisoning of President Viktor Yushchenko in 2004. He has served as an expert witness in cases brought by the U.S. Government in Federal Court relating to violent crime, terrorism, and treason. Oak Ridge Associated Universities has named Dr. Saathoff to expert panels in behavioral science and infrastructure. Regarding radicalization in U.S. prisons, Dr. Saathoff has testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs as well as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

        From 2000-2005 he served as the Chair of the Committee on International Relations for the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. In March of 2006, he was appointed to the Research Advisory Board of the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. He has written The Crisis Guide to Psychotropic Drugs and Poisons for the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit, and was a co-author of the FBI’s threat assessment monograph: The School Shooter. In addition to this, he has published in the areas of the personality disorders, police psychiatry, post-traumatic stress disorders, public response to weapons of mass destruction, and personnel reliability and its relationship to biosecurity and national security. He has co-authored Criminal Poisoning: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives, published in 2010. Dr. Saathoff serves on the Board of ParadeRest, which helps dedicated communities work together to welcome home and express their gratitude to local military personnel, veterans, and their families through tickets to entertainment, arts and sports events. Dr. Saathoff is married and has three grown children.

      • DXer said

        Most of all, you may recall Dr. Gregory Saathoff as co-author of the chapter on MICROBIAL FORENSICS in which the FBI presented the science underlying Amerithrax. In 2009-2010 he served as Chair of the Amerithrax Expert Behavior Analysis Panel.

        • DXer said

          Gregory B. Saathoff


          In 1996 he was appointed to a Commission charged with developing a methodology to enable the FBI to better access non-governmental expertise during times of crisis. In that regard, Dr. Saathoff has since 1996 served as the Conflict Resolution Specialist to the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group. In this role, he consults with the Crisis Negotiation Unit and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime.

          During the Gulf War, Dr. Saathoff was called from reserve duty and deployed as a medical corps psychiatrist overseas, earning the Army Commendation Medal in 1991. Dr. Saathoff retired from the Army Reserves with the rank of Major. A member of the University of Virginia’s Kuwait Project, he studied societal trauma in Kuwait subsequent to the Iraqi occupation. Dr. Saathoff has served on the faculty of the Saudi-U.S. Universities Project. In addition to the Middle East, his work has taken him to projects in the former Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Australia.

          Dr. Saathoff has served as an expert witness in Federal cases involving treason and terrorism. Oak Ridge Associated Universities has named Dr. Saathoff to expert panels in behavioral science and infrastructure.

          Dr. Saathoff has written The Crisis Guide to Psychotropic Drugs and Poisons for the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit, and he was a co-author of the FBI’s threat assessment monograph: The School Shooter. In addition, he has published in the areas of the personality disorders, police psychiatry, post-traumatic stress disorders, public response to weapons of mass destruction, and biologic psychiatry. He has recently co-authored Criminal Poisoning: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives with U.Va. Chief of Toxicology, Christopher Holstege, M.D. In March of 2006, he was appointed to the Research Advisory Board of the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. In 2009-2010, Dr. Saathoff served as Chair of the Amerithrax Expert Behavior Analysis Panel. Dr. Saathoff is married and has three children. He resides in Charlottesville, Virginia.

        • DXer said

          The report will be made available online tomorrow.

        • DXer said

          In his expert opinion for the Department of Justice in the Aafia Siddiqui prosecution, he wrote:

          “One of the benefits of constant observation is that it allows for a comprehensive, yet specific
          description of behaviors. In a detaiIed and comprehensive review of the MDC logbook, I found
          no evidence of marked deterioration based upon those documented behaviors that included
          eating, sleeping, crying, reading, engaging in personal hygiene, praying and the like.
          In fact, Ms. Siddiqui was noted to be crying less in September (2.1% of total time) compared to
          August (3.2% of tutai-dme). Writing behavior increased2from 1 .I% in August to 1.2%in
          September. Reading time increased by 20% in September compared to August. Her time spent
          eating also improved from August to September, with an increase of seven hours .compared to
          the previous month. She was noted to be praying 36% more in September and reading 20% more
          in September compared to August. Her sleep increased by 1% during the month of September.
          The amount of time spent attending to personal hygiene increased from 2.8% to 3.8%. In
          addition to increased attention to personal hygiene in September, she was also noted to clean her
          cell much more in September, spending 1.2% of her time in September compared .to 0.3 % in
          August. While compulsive cleaning can be a symptom of Obsessive Compulsive disorder, or as a
          manifestation of other anxiety disorders, there is no indication that Ms. Siddiqui is obsessed with
          cleaning, based upon my interviews with mental health staff at FMC Carswell. Her pacing
          behavior, at less than 1% of total time, remained essentially constant.
          There were some decreases in time spent in activities in September compared to August. Her
          lack of cooperation is reflected by a 25% decrease in time speaking with officers, mental health
          personnel and legal personnel. Her 56% decrease in time spent with medical services is
          reflection of both her lack of cooperation as we’ll as decreased need for wound care as she
          continued to heal.”

        • DXer said

          I asked Patrick Walsh who was funding the report tomorrow and he declined to say. He said a press release and the report would be released tomorrow.

        • DXer said

          I hope that the previously unreleased documents they provide includes a copy of his notes written on the 5 days he was in the lab and the September 17, 2001 email Dr. Ivins wrote to Mara Linscott (which USAMRIID says was not written on his work computer as the DOJ claims). We need more in the way of contemporaneous documents and less in the way of “expert opinion”.

        • DXer said

          About Research Strategies Network

          Established in September 2008 as a non-profit 501(c)3-certified professional services organization, the Research Strategies Network (RSN) provides advice, performs research, and develops solutions for operational and policy challenges facing a full range of public and private sector partners whose missions support the national security of the United States and its allies.

          RSN focuses on Resilience, Public Service, and National Security.

          RSN exists as a research and educational organization, focusing on issues in national security, international affairs, counter-terrorism, and public safety. The Network is focused on improving governments’ and the public’s understanding of and response to critical incidents and crises, as well as governments’ and the public’s capacities to anticipate, prevent, and manage these incidents effectively.

          Studying these incidents behind closed doors is insufficient. The existing threat of terrorism, for example, frequently involves organizations with boundaries limited to ideals which motivate its participants toward destructive acts against innocent civilians. Such threats must be examined with candor, by a range of professionals including experts who are actively encountering the threats.

          The Network is multi-disciplinary in nature, comprising itself of experts from academe, the media, government, military, law enforcement, industry, and the behavioral and medical sciences. RSN is nonpartisan and has an international focus, which allows it to analyze crises through candid and multiple perspectives, using tactics of rigorous debate and honesty. RSN performs analysis of such crises through methodologies adopted from leading scholars and practitioners on an international platform.

          RSN, therefore, is an interdisciplinary applied research and advisory body that combines the abilities of sciences and the humanities to understand and serve the population as a whole.

  14. DXer said

    Senate legislation threatens key anti-terrorism tools
    By Michael V. Hayden and and Michael B. Mukasey, Wednesday, March 9, 8:22 PM

  15. DXer said

    Egypt rearrests brother of Al-Qaeda number two
    (AFP) – 1 hour ago

    CAIRO — Egypt has rearrested Mohammed al-Zawahiri, brother of Al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri, just days after he was freed under an amnesty for political prisoners, security officials said on Sunday.

    The officials were not immediately able to give a reason for his detention overnight.

    Mohammed al-Zawahiri was freed on Thursday, one of dozens of political prisoners who have been released by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces since it took over when veteran president Hosni Mubarak was forced from office on February 11 by a wave of mass protests.

    He had been in jail since 1999 when he was transferred into Egyptian custody by the United Arab Emirates after his arrest there.

    An Egyptian court handed down a death sentence against him in his absence in 1998 on charges of undergoing military training in Albania and “planning military operations” in Egypt.

    Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.

    Comment: Dr. Ayman is going to be very angry — more than usual. Cairo Medical microbiology professor Heba, one of Mohammed’s sisters on the faculty, is going understandably to also be distraught. Not hearing news after his initial rendition caused her and her mom untold grief and worry. I hope there is some principled justification offered publicly — it otherwise just seems mean. What does Tarek Hamouda, the Ann Arbor scientist who studied for his PhD in microbiology in Heba’s department, who was supplied virulent Ames by Bruce Ivins, think about the rearrest of Mohammed?

    • DXer said

      Brother of Al-Qaeda’s Zawahri re-arrested
      Just two days after being released from jail, the brother of Al-Qaeda’s number two man has been re-arrested
      Sherif Tarek, Sunday 20 Mar 2011

      Mohamed Al-Zawahri, brother of Al-Qaeda number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahri, has been arrested Sunday just two days following his release, says his lawyer, Mamdouh Ismail.

      The jihadist organisation member was released after the ruling military council had decided to gradually free all political detainees, who are understood to be several thousands.

      Ismail told Reuters that a large number of security personnel, including plain-clothed policemen, arrested Mohamed at home in a Cairo suburb.

      He also said the whereabouts of his client, who had spent ten years in prison, remain unknown.

      The General Human Rights Committee, affiliated with the lawyers’ syndicate, denounced Mohamed’s detention.

      “Citizen Mohamed Rabie Al-Zawahri should have been officially informed of any reason for the arrest, even if it was under the emergency law,” read a statement made by the committee.

      “His attorney should have been notified of the arrest as well as his current location, which hasn’t happened up until now. His family and lawyer have no idea where he is.”

      “The committee hopes” the statement continued “the law and human rights are better preserved [by the authorities] in the new era.”

      Comment: His attorney takes the same position as I do on this need for fair treatment and due process.

      His attorney, Mamdouh Ismail, himself was arrested as a conduit between Zawahiri and jihadis in Egypt, Yemen and Iraq. He was an associate of Al Qaeda spymaster who wrote that insightful account of Amerithrax.

      Attorney Ismail had sought to form a political party in 1999 with attorney Montasser Al-Zayat to promote shariah but the Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman nixed the idea and attorneys Ismail and Al-Zayat deferred. (The reasoning was that a salafist cannot operate within a democracy because the majority will might undermine or conflict with shariah.)

      The IANA writers (IANA is an Ann Arbor-based charity for which Ali Al-Timimi was the main speaker) also sought to form a political party promoting democracy. IANA writer Kamal Habib was the founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The other, Mr. Sultan, thought the rolling hills of Pittsburgh reminded him of the rolling hills of Kandahar.

      Ali Al-Timimi, Andrew Card’s one-time assistant years earlier, was IANA’s top speaker and coordinated with Anwar Awlaki. In 1996, Ali spoke alongside the blind sheik’s son at the annual IANA conference. Ali shared a suite with leading Ames researchers, Battelle consultants Ken Alibek and Charles Bailey. One was a former Russian bioweaponeer and the other was the top biothreat assessment person.

      At the end of the day, if and when Ayman Zawahiri succeeds in his quest to destroy the United States — or at least succeed in a mass attack on DC and NYC — it will because of a failure of intelligence. Amerithrax represents the greatest failure in intelligence in United States history.

      And a failure of intelligence begins or is allowed to continue due to one attorney’s or government worker’s failure to comply with FOIA.


      • DXer said

        Lawyers Syndicate Calls for Clearing the Ministry of Interior and Dismissal of Mahmoud Wagdy

        The Human Rights Committee in the Lawyers Syndicate called on the Supreme Council for Armed Forces to completely change the staff in the Ministry of Interior statring with Minister Mahmoud Wagdy, to the strategy of dealing with citizens and respecting the people and their rights.

        Sunday, February 27,2011 10:34

        The Human Rights Committee in the Lawyers Syndicate called on the Supreme Council for Armed Forces to completely change the staff in the Ministry of Interior statring with Minister Mahmoud Wagdy, to the strategy of dealing with citizens and respecting the people and their rights.

        In its statement, the committee condemned the fact that not a single policeman was tried, especially the leaders of the State Security apparatus which have used all possible means against the people under the Emergency law and arrested thousands for long years and tortured them. They have also used live ammunition against the protesters of 25 January and killed and injured thousands all over Egypt.

        Mamdouh Ismail, rapporteur of the committee, stated that the Ministry of Interior should have announced a new campaign to change the way it works and to clear it from corrupt and bad leadership. It should also have made a press conference to the whole world, announcing the truth about the killings which took place in the revolution of 25 January, 2011.

        He added that news is spreading about the possibility of the returning the police to bring security to the streets and that his committee does not have a problem with that, but everyone knows that there were a group of policemen who were mainly responsible for the incidents in Egypt by exerting all their efforts to protect the ruler and his supporters only.

        Comment: When protesters entered security offices, they were faced with mountains of shredded material. In the United States, GAO has jurisdiction to sanction the destruction of documents (to include the deletion of emails on a government computer after a GAO investigation has been announced).

  16. DXer said

    Who does Michael Scheuer think was responsible for the anthrax mailings?

    Colbert Report Book: Osama Bin Laden by Michael Scheuer

    Episode: #07029: Aired: 02/28/2011

    Listen to Michael Scheuer in “On Osama Bin Laden” from WNYC Radio’s Leonard Lopate Show (February 10, 2011).

    This propulsive biography is not bin Laden for beginners, but its central point is clear. Scheuer (Imperial Hubris), chief of the CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit from 1996 to 1999, argues that the West chronically underestimates bin Laden’s “piety, generosity, personal bravery, strategic ability, charisma and patience.” In creating a cartoonish enemy, the U.S. has “mindlessly” played into bin Laden’s plans to provoke a war on Muslim soil to catalyze a jihad to “obliterate America from within, by making it economically weak, until its markets collapse.” The depiction of bin Laden’s evolution from devout student to militant leader is deeply detailed and dense, and readers unable to keep up with a dissection of Islam’s diverse creeds and doctrines will feel overwhelmed at times, but Scheuer’s project is lucid and important. Bin Laden “anticipated a war of attrition that might last decades” and has planned ahead. He has cultivated a multigenerational cadre of between 5,000 and 7,000 loyal warriors, many from the educated upper classes. The conflict with al-Qaeda will, by bin Laden’s design, likely be multigenerational, and Scheuer takes a crucial step in revealing how the West keeps itself vulnerable by persisting in demonizing rather than understanding its formidable opponent.

  17. DXer said

    Al-Qaeda calls for new attacks on West

    2011-02-25 09:53

    WASHINGTON, Friday 25 February 2011 (AFP) – In a message released Thursday, Al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri encouraged extremists everywhere to dream up new ways to attack the West, as the September 11 bombers did nearly 10 years ago.

    The 35-minute message — a video containing only a still picture of Zawahiri in which he can be heard delivering a speech — was the second in a series titled “A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to the People of Egypt.” It was produced by Al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab.

    “If we are not able to produce weapons equal to the weapons of the Crusader West, we can sabotage their complex economic and industrial systems and drain their powers, which fight without a cause, until they run away fleeing,” Zawahiri said in the audio message, according to the US-based SITE monitoring service.

    He complained that the Muslim world trails behind the West in technological know-how and military weaponry.

    “Therefore, the mujahideen (holy warriors) must invent new ways, ways that never dawned on the minds of the West,” Zawahiri continued. “An example of this brave and courageous thinking is the use of airplanes as a mighty weapon, as happened in the blessed invasions in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.”

  18. DXer said

    Answers in 2001 anthrax attacks are still elusive

    Thursday, February 17, 2011; 7:18 PM

    RESOLUTION OF THE 2001 anthrax attacks continues to prove elusive.

    The Justice Department and the FBI identified Maryland scientist Bruce E. Ivins as having single-handedly carried out the attacks that killed five people and seriously sickened 17 others. The department was on the verge of seeking an indictment in 2008 when Mr. Ivins took his own life.

    Doubts lingered about Mr. Ivins’s guilt, in part because the FBI had had its sights on a different Maryland scientist for several years before admitting he was not the culprit. Now, a report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) raises new questions about whether Mr. Ivins has been wrongly accused.

    The lengthy report cites several instances in which the Justice Department appears to have overstated the strength of the scientific evidence against Mr. Ivins. For example, the department concluded that anthrax spores derived from the RMR-1029 vial in Mr. Ivins’s lab were used in the deadly attacks. The report takes exception. “We find the scientific evidence to be consistent with their conclusions but not as definitive as stated,” said Lehigh University President Alice Gast, who led the NAS committee. The report insinuates throughout that FBI failure to perform more tests or to be more precise could have erroneously eliminated other suspects or prematurely settled on Mr. Ivins as a suspect.

    Yet the report itself is at times misleading. Take, for example, the FBI’s assertion that Mr. Ivins deceived investigators by providing a sample purported to be from RMR-1029 but that the FBI concluded could not have come from that particular batch. “The genetic evidence that a disputed sample submitted by the suspect came from a source other than RMR-1029 was weaker” than stated by the Justice Department, the committee said. How much weaker? The NAS panel concluded that there was a 1 percent chance that the sample came from the key vial; that answer could only be found deep in the bowels of the document.

    The NAS committee should not be blamed for nitpicking over the test results; that is essentially what it was tasked to do by the FBI, which commissioned its report. But the result is not satisfying – nor is it conclusive.

    Congress should convene a nonpartisan commission staffed with individuals experienced in law enforcement to probe all of the evidence in the case, including that which the FBI claims shows Mr. Ivins had the opportunity and the wherewithal to carry out the 2001 attack. The inquiry should explore why and how the Justice Department eliminated other scientists who had access to RMR-1029 as suspects, and it should examine the security protocols at repositories for biological weapons. The exploration also should focus on the country’s preparedness to deal with such an attack in the future.

  19. DXer said

    The FBI and NAS deserve a lot of credit. They have arranged for a highly efficient, very reasonably priced means of distributing these voluminous documents. Because it is a CD submission by the FBI, the cost to non-reporters is $5.

    Ms. Wolfe writes:

    Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine

    PROJECT: Review of the Scientific Approaches used During the FBI’s Investigation of the 2001 Bacillus Anthracis Mailings
    PIN# BLSX-K-08-10-A

    RE: the project listed above and the FBI materials submission you requested –
    The Public Access Records Office can provide you with the requested documents on (1) CD.
    Your fee is: $5.00


    1-20 files burned to cd’s: $12.00
    21-50 files burned to cd’s: $20.00
    51 or more files burned to cd’s: $50.00

    We do not transmit files by email.
    There’s no charge for postage.
    Only checks or money orders are accepted for payment.


    #1 – Send a check or money order only; we cannot accept credit cards or cash.

    #2 – Pay to the order of: The National Academies
    (do not put my name on the check)

    #3 – Put PARO on the memo line of the check.

    #4 – Enclose mailing instructions with the check as to where the materials are to be sent.

    # 5 – Mail to:
    Shelly Wolfe
    The National Academies
    500 Fifth Street NW, WS-202B
    Washington DC 20001


    #1 – Follow steps 1-3 as seen above.

    #2 – Mail check or money order in a FedEx Overnight envelope.

    #3 – Inside your FedEx envelope, enclose a FedEx Airbill for me to use to rush the CD to you – overnight. The Airbill should be self addressed and your FedEx account number or your credit card number should be entered in the Airbill’s payment section.

    Thank you for your interest in The National Academies.

    Shelly Wolfe
    Public Access Records Office (PARO)
    Office of News and Public Information


  20. DXer said

    Let me know what documents people would like emailed to them.

    BATCH 1
    Module 1: Technical Review Panel Meetings
    Technical Review Panels
    1. November 5, 2001 WFO Anthrax Expert Panel Review (pp. 2-27)
    2. December 7, 2001 External Technical Review Panel (pp. 28-39)
    3. December 12, 2001 External Review of Analytical Plan (pp. 40-46)
    4. June 11-12, 2002 Progress to Date Review (pp. 47-65)
    5. August 8, 2005 Chemistry Review Panel (pp. 66-195)

    • DXer said

      Module 2: USAMRIID
      Initial examination of the letter spore preparations for physical characteristics (microscopy and
      electron microscopy) and spore viability studies.
      1. 18 Oct 2001 SPS02.57 (Daschle) CFU Report (p. 3)
      2. 21 Oct 2001 EM Report of Dasch1e Letter (pp. 4-19)
      3. 24 Oct 2001 SPS02.88.1 (NY Post) CFU Report (pp. 20-21)
      4. 25 Oct 2001 EM Daschle “Si” Report (pp. 22-25)
      5. 25 Oct 2001 Simons Letter re NY Post (pp. 26-28)
      6. 28 Oct 2001 EM/CFU Report of NY Post (p. 29)
      7. 27 Nov 2001 Report on Isolates from Daschle and NY Post Letters (p. 30)
      Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory Analytical Test Reports: Results of Analysis of Letter
      8. SPS.02.88 NY Post Powder 10/22/2001 (pp. 32-33)
      9. SPS.02.44 Brokaw Envelope 11/4/2001 (pp. 34-35)
      10. SPS.02.57 Daschle Letters and Powders 11/9/2001 (pp. 36-45)
      11. SPS.02.266 Leahy Powder (pp. 46-53)
      Microbiological examinations and identification of phenotypic variants (Morphotypes) which
      appeared different than the predominant “Ames” phenotype
      12. Report #1 Analysis of Evidentiary Material (pp. 55-68)
      13. Report #2 Analysis of Repository Samples (pp. 69-79)
      14. Report #3 Analysis of Environmental Samples – AMI (pp. 80-90)
      15. Report #4 Examination of Repository Spore Preparations: Screening for the
      Hemolytic B. subtilis Contaminant (pp. 91-95)
      16. Report #5 Analysis of Repository Samples (pp. 96-99)
      Isolation of Morphological Variants from FBI Repository Samples FBIR 049 004 (Leahy)
      PowerPoint Photos
      17. Isolation of Morphological Variants from FBI Repository Samples FBIR 049 004
      (Leahy) PowerPoint Photos (pp. 101-109)

      • DXer said

        Module 3: Ames Strain Identification
        1. Forensic Analysis of Putative Anthrax Samples, Batch E0001 v02.01.02
        (MLVA-8) (pp. 3-10)
        2. MLVA-15 Molecular Typing (Batch E0001) 4/16/02 (pp. 11-14)
        3. Laboratory Reports NAU-0001 (May 30, 2002) to NAU-0038 (May 5, 2008)
        (pp. 15-167)
        Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures
        4. Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures for Forensic Analysis V09.2303
        (pp. 168-204)
        5. Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures for Forensic Analysis: Real-
        Time PCR species Specific, Canonical and Strain Specific SNP Genotyping of
        Bacillus anthracis and Francisella tularensis V11.03.04 (pp. 206-231)
        6. Real-Time PCR species Specific, Canonical and Strain Specific SNP
        Genotyping of Bacillus anthracis V04.11.07 (pp. 232-272)
        7. Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Analysis (pp. 273-280)
        8. “Multiple-Locus Variable-Number Tandem Repeat Analysis Reveals Genetic
        Relationships within Bacillus anthracis” (Keim et al., 2000,
        182:2928-2936) (pp. 282-291)
        Progress Reports
        9. NAU DNA-Based Strain Typing of Anthrax Samples (pp. 293-649)25

        • DXer said

          Module 4: Analysis for Evidence of Genetic Engineering
          1. 19 October 2001 LANL Receipt letter (pp. 3-4)
          2. Laboratory Reports (pp. 5-55)
          3. Analysis of the Amerithrax B. Anthracis Ames Isolates for Evidence of Genetic
          Engineering (pp. 57-79)

        • DXer said

          Module 5: Genomic Sequencing
          1. “Global Genetic Population Structure of Bacillus anthracis,” M. Van Ert et al.,
          (2007) PLoS ONE 2(5); e461. doil- . 1371/jpornal . pone.0000461 (pp. 2-11)
          2. “The Complete Genome Sequence of Bacillus anthracis Ames ‘Ancestor,’” J.
          Ravel et al, J. Bacteriology, Jan 2009, Vol 191, No. 1, p . 445-446 (pp. 12-13)
          3. Genomic Analysis of Bacillus anthracis Isolates Relevant to the Amerithrax
          Investigation, June 1, 2004 (Morph A, B, C, D, Wild type) (pp. 17-75)
          4. Genomic Analysis of Bacillus anthracis Isolates Relevant to the Amerithrax
          Investigation, June 4, 2005 (Morph E (Opaque, Post/Leahy B.s.) (pp. 76-159)
          5. Multiple Locus PCR-based Assay for the Direct Comparison of unknown
          B. subtilis isolates to B. Subtilis, New York Post, May 15, 2006 (pp. 160-220)
          TIGR Progress Reports
          6. TIGR Progress Reports (pp. 221-458)

        • DXer said

          Module 6: Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
          1. Sandia National Laboratory Final Report (pp. 3-42)
          Historical Literature
          2. “Distribution of Calcium and Other Elements in Cryosectioned Bacillus cereus
          25 The FBI did not assign a name to this document. The descriptor was assigned by the committee.
          T Spores, determined by High-Resolution Scanning Electron Probe X-Ray
          Microanalysis,” M. Stewart, A.P. Somlyo, A.V. Somlyo, H. Shuman, J.A.
          Lindsay, W.G. Murrell, J .Bacteriology, July 1980, Vol 143, No. 1, pp. 481-491
          (pp. 44-54)
          3. “Scanning Electron Probe X-Ray Microanalysis of Elemental Distribution in
          Freeze-Dried Cryosections of Bacillus coagulans Spores.” M. Stewart, A.P.
          Somlyo, A.V. Somlyo, H. Shuman, J.A. Lindsay, W.G. Murrell, J .
          Bacteriology, Aug. 1981, Vol 147, No. 2, pp. 670-674 (pp. 55-59)
          4. “Automated Analysis of SEM X-Ray Spectral Images: A Powerful New
          Microanalysis Tool,” P.G. Kotula, M.R. Kennan, J.R. Michael, Microsc.
          Microanal., 9, 1-17, 2003 (pp. 60-76)
          5. Silicon Summary Bibliography of Select Publications (pp. 77-81)
          PowerPoint Files of Individual Sample Results
          6. PowerPoint Files of Individual Sample Results (pp. 82-532)

        • DXer said

          Module 7: Chemistry Unit, FBI Laboratory
          FBI Laboratory Reports
          1. 020322006 April 15, 2002 Q13 SPS02.88 (Post) (pp. 3-4)
          2. 020605001 June 18, 2002 Q12 White Powder (Leahy) (pp. 5-6)
          3. 020110004 August 26, 2002 Q12, Bc 14579, Bs/Ba+/ (pp. 7-10)
          4. 020605001 October 16, 2002 Q13 SPS02.88 Elemental (pp. 11-12)
          5. 040624018 June 28, 2004 Leahy Powder Elemental (pp. 13-14)
          6. 030519001 October 15, 2003 Culture Media Elemental (pp. 15-22)
          7. 031008001 October 30, 2003 Burans 12 Elemental (pp. 23-25)
          8. 031124029 December 11, 2003 10 DPG growths Elemental (pp. 26-28)
          9. 030819015 June 29, 2004 Commercial Media (pp. 29-34)
          10. 050321004 April 18, 2005 Media Salts and Spores (pp. 35-37)
          11. 050118006 April 18, 2005 19 DPG Stubs SEM (pp. 38-54)
          12. 050408005 May 18, 2005 2 DPG Stubs SEM (pp. 55-67)
          13. 050408005 July 6, 2005 2 DPG Stubs SEM (pp. 68-91)
          Elemental Analysis Summary
          14. 1 Elemental Analysis Summary Table (pp. 93-94)
          15. Comparison of results from 2 different instruments (by 2 different FBI
          examiners, 2 years apart in 2 different Labs (HQ VS Quantico)
          Envelopes and Particle Transport
          16. FBI Laboratory Electron Microscopy of Envelope surfaces and particle
          transport thru envelopes (pp. 96-111)

        • DXer said

          Module 8: Carbon-14 (14C) Dating
          Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (CAMS), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
          1. CAMS background information (pp. 3-14)
          2. Proposal (pp. 15-16)
          3. Quantitating Radiocarbon Concentrations in Isolated Samples of Biological
          Origin: Standard Operating Procedures for FBI Measurements of Natural 14C
          (pp. 17-23)
          4. LLNL Report 10/14/02 (pp. 24-29)
          5. LLNL Report 1/16/04 Addendum (pp. 30-33)
          6. LLNL Data Table 3/30/04 DPG Samples (pp. 34-39)
          7. Scientific References (pp. 40-50)
          National Ocean Sciences Accelerator Mass Spectrometry Facility (NOSAMS), Woods Hole
          Oceanographic Institute
          8. NOSAMS background information (pp. 52-55)
          9. General Statement of C-14 Procedures (pp. 56-57)
          10. Amerithrax Sample Handling Procedures (pp. 58-72)
          11. Final Report (pp. 73-83)
          12. Scientific References (pp. 84-112)

        • DXer said

          Module 9: Stable Isotopes
          Stable Isotope Reports
          1. Isotopic Characterization of Water Samples 3/14/03 (pp. 3-10)
          2. Isotopic Characterization of Anthrax Samples 7/30/03 (pp. 11-19)
          3. Isotopic Characterization of Water Samples 10/15/03 (pp. 20-25)
          4. Isotopic Characterization of Spore Samples 1/5/04 (pp. 26-31)
          5. Stable Isotope Characterization of Anthrax Sample SPS 02.266 2/22/04
          (pp. 32-44)
          6. Isotopic Characterization of Microbial Spore Samples 5/20/04 (pp. 45-53)
          7. A Report on the Stable Isotope Ratios of Envelope Samples 9/17/04 (pp. 54-58)
          8. A Report on the Stable Isotope Ratios of Treated and Untreated Envelopes
          11/7/04 (pp. 59-64)
          9. A Report on the Stable Isotope Ratios of Treated and Untreated Envelopes
          12/22/04 (pp. 65-77)
          10. Isotopic Characterization of RMR 1029 5/6/05 (pp. 78-80)
          11. A Tabulation of Stable Isotopes of Tap Water Samples Analyzed for the FBI
          3/23/05 (pp. 81-247)
          Proposals and SOWS
          12. Proposals and SOWS (pp. 248-269)
          Kreuzer-Martin Publications
          13. Kreuzer-Martin Publications (pp. 271-310)
          Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms PowerPoint
          14. Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms PowerPoint (pp.

        • DXer said

          Module 10: Agar and Heme Analysis
          Agar Assay University of Maryland
          1. Unsolicited Proposal SOW (pp. 3-8)
          2. Progress Reports (pp. 9-55)
          3. Summary of Chromatograms (pp. 56-72)
          4. Final Agar Report (pp. 73-94)
          5. Reductive Hydrolysis Procedure Steps (pp. 95-96)
          6. Reductive Hydrolysis Literature References (pp. 97-118)
          7. ASMS Abstract Poster (pp. 119-120)
          Agar Assay Validation – BMI
          8. Task 4 Spot Report 27 Aug 2002 (pp. 122-126)
          9. Task 4 Interim Report 17 Sept 2002 (pp. 127-136)
          Heme Assay (UMD)
          10. SOW (pp. 138-149)
          11. Progress Reports (pp. 150-182)
          12. Analysis of Heme by MALDI Procedure (pp. 183-190)
          13. Filter Sterilization Validation (pp. 191-192)
          14. Heme Final Report (pp. 193-216)
          15. Heme A.C. publication (pp. 217-222)
          Heme Assay Validation – ECBC
          16. Interim Report (ECBC) (pp. 224-238)
          17. Analytical Test Report (ECBC) (10 Aug 2005) (pp. 239-246)
          Agar Overview
          18. Agar Overview (pp. 248-251)

        • DXer said

          Module 11: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
          1. Residual Agar Determination in Bacterial Cultures by ESI/MS, DHS Final
          Report (pp. 3-99)
          2. Detection of Agar, by Analysis of Sugar Markers, Wunschel et al., J.
          Microbiol Methods, 74, (2008), 57-63 (pp. 101-107)
          3. Residual Agar Determination in Bacterial Cultures by ESI/MS, K.L. Wahl et al.
          submitted for publication (pp. 108-141)
          4. FBI Samples Data Summary PowerPoint (pp. 143-197)

        • DXer said

          Module 12: FBI Laboratory Renocal Assay
          1. FBI Lab Report 070829018 (pp. 2-3)
          Standard Operating Procedures
          2. Meglumine Diatrizoate Analysis by LC/MS/ESI (pp. 5-26)
          3. Performance Monitoring Protocol (QA/QC) for the Finnigan LTQ LC/MS
          (ESI) Instrument (pp. 27-45)
          4. Detection of Trace Amounts of Meglumine and Diatizoate from Bacillus Spore
          Samples Using Liquid Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry; submitted to
          Anal. Chem. (pp. 47-74)

        • DXer said

          Module 13: DPG Production Methods
          Test Plan
          1. Test Plan (pp. 3-24)
          Project Overview PowerPoint
          2. Project Overview PowerPoint (pp. 26-60)
          Final Report Dated 2/1/06
          3. Final Report Dated 2/1/06 (pp. 62-118)
          SEM Photos of Production
          4. SEM Photos of Production (pp. 120-255)

        • DXer said

          Module 14: Preparation of B. anthracis Ames on Commercial and Prepared Media
          1. Preparation of B. anthracis Ames Spores on Commercially Prepared Media and
          Media Prepared at USAMRIID (pp. 3-6)
          BATCH 2
          Module 1: B. Subtilis Contaminant
          1. Report of isolation of contaminant from Brokaw letter in “Summary of
          Microbiological Analysis 19 Oct 2001” (pp. 3-5)
          Centers for Disease Control
          2. Report of identification of contaminant submitted by BMI as B. subtilis
          including morphology, hemolysis, gram staining, antibiotic resistance and 16s
          rRNA sequence match (pp. 7-19)
          3. Identification of the NY Post contaminant as B. licheniformis (p. 21)
          Applied Biosystems
          4. Identification of the B. subtilis isolated from the Brokaw and NY Post letters by
          16s ribosomal RNA gene sequence analysis (pp. 23-32)
          Genomic Analysis of Bacillus anthracis Isolates Relevant to the Amerithrax
          Investigation, June 4, 2005 (Morph E (Opaque), Post/Leahy B.s.) (see Batch 1, Module 5,
          Document 3)
          Multiple Locus PCR-based Assay for the Direct Comparison of Unknown B. subtilis
          Isolates to B. subtilis, New York Post, May 15, 2006 (see Batch 1, Module 5, Document
          Module 2: Whole Genome Assembly of B. subtilis Isolate
          Technical Proposals and SOW
          1. Microbial Genetic Services in Support of the Amerithrax Investigation (FBI
          SOW) (pp. 3-42)
          2. Whole Genome Assembly, Closure Annotation of Bacillus subtilis GB22 (TO1)
          (pp. 43-57)
          3. Multiple Locus PCR-Based Assay of the Direct Comparison of One Unknown
          B. subtilis Isolate to B. subtilis New York Post (TO3) (pp. 58-74)
          4. Training for Use of Affymetrix Comparative Genomic Hybridization Arrays
          (TO4) (pp. 75-91)
          5. Develop an Annotation File Specific to the FBI B. Subtilis Comparative
          Genomic Hybridization Arrays (New TO5) (pp. 92-101)
          Progress Reports
          6. Whole Genome Assembly, Closure and Annotation of Bacillus subtilis GB22
          12/07-4/08 (TO1) (pp. 103-106)
          7. Multiple Locus PCR-based Assay of the Direct Comparison of One Unknown
          B. subtilis Isolate to B. subtilis New York Post 1/08-4/08 (TO3) (pp. 107-114)
          8. Multiple locus PCR-Based Assay of the Direct Comparison of One Unknown
          B. subtilis Isolate to B. subtilis New York Post 5/08 (TO3) (pp. 115-122)
          Standard Operating Procedures
          9. Affymetrix GB22 Tiling GeneChip SOP (pp. 124-136)
          Final Reports
          10. Whole Genome Assembly, Closure and Annotation of Bacillus subtilis GB22
          (TO1) (pp. 138-142)
          11. Multiple Locus PCR-Based Assay of the Direct Comparison of One Unknown
          B. subtilis Isolate to B. subtilis New York Post (TO3) (pp. 143-166)
          12. Genome MTV Manual (TO4) (pp. 167-185)
          Module 3: Genetic Diversity and Phylogenetic Characterization of B. subtilis
          Statement of Work (SOW)
          1. Genetic Diversity and Phylogenetic Characterization of B. subtilis (pp. 3-14)
          Progress Reports
          2. 8 Monthly and 1 Quarterly Report 12/06-11/07 (pp. 16-79)
          Standard Operating Procedures
          3. Allele-Specific Oligonucleotide (ASO) Typing Assay for Bacillus subtilis (pp.
          Final Reports
          4. Genetic Diversity and Phylogenetic Characterization of B. subtilis 11/30/07
          (pp. 84-124)
          Module 4: B. subtilis Screening
          Standard Operating Procedures
          1. Bacillus subtilis Analysis by Singleplex Real-Time PCR Standard Operating
          Procedure (pp. 3-10)
          Synopsis of Assay Development
          2. Synopsis of Assay Development (pp. 11-55)
          Standard Operating Procedures
          3. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 40 (pp. 57-104)
          Analytical Plans
          4. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 46 (pp. 106-115)
          5. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 47 (pp. 116-183)
          6. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 57 (pp.184-187)
          7. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 58 (pp. 188-193)
          8. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 62 (pp. 194-239)
          9. Analytical Plan, Acceptance of Work (AOW) 68 (pp. 240-244)
          Assay Validation
          10. Serial Dilution/LOD NBFAC.061117.001 (pp. 246-253)
          11. Assay Validation NBFAC.061019.002 (pp. 254-259)
          Laboratory Reports
          12. Location Searches NBFAC. 061113.001 (pp. 261-279)
          13. Repository Screening NBFAC.070215.0001, NBFAC.070314.0001 to
          NBFAC0.70314.003 (pp. 280-359)
          14. Environmental Samples NBFAC.070723.0001 (pp. 360-380)
          15. Location Searches NBFAC.070727.0001, NBFAC.071102.0001,
          NBFAC.080828.0001 (pp. 381-440)
          Module 5: Molecular Analysis of Pathogen Strains and Isolates and Genetic Mutations A1
          and A3
          Technical Proposal and FBI SOWs: Genetic Discrimination of Bacillus anthracis Isolates Using
          Molecular Biological Techniques
          1. Technical Proposal and FBI SOWs: Genetic Discrimination of Bacillus anthracis
          Isolates Using Molecular Biological Techniques (pp. 3-65)
          Assay Development Morph A1-A3
          2. Progress Reports: May 2002-Jan 2004 (pp. 67-499)
          Assay Development Morph A1-A3
          3. Final Report (pp. 501-603)
          4. Validation Study Morph A-1 Protocol (pp. 604-712)
          5. Validation Study Morph A-2 Protocol (pp. 713-820)
          6. Validation Study Morph A-3 Protocol (pp. 821-932)
          Assay Development Morph A1-A3
          7. Morph A Overview PowerPoint (pp. 934-957)
          Repository Screening Morph A1 and A3
          8. Progress and Final Reports, March 2004-Oct 2007 (pp. 959-1295)
          Module 6: Genetic Mutations B and D (CBI)
          Assay Development: Technical Proposals
          1. DNA Assays for Minor Genetic Variants of Bacillus anthracis (pp. 3-76)
          2. Task 1 Technical Proposal Morph B SNP (pp. 77-94)
          3. Task 2 Technical Proposal Morph D Deletion (pp. 95-114)
          Assay Development: Progress Reports
          4. Morph B (pp. 116-160)
          5. Morph D (pp. 161-222)
          Assay Development: Standard Operating Procedures
          6. Morph B Protocol (pp. 224-268)
          7. Morph D Protocol (pp. 269-310)
          8. Appendix 1-10 (pp. 311-867)
          Module 7: Genetic Mutations B and D (IITRI)
          Assay Development: Technical Proposals
          1. Technical Proposal (pp. 3-51)
          2. Task 1 DNA Assay Development – Morph B SNP (pp. 52-97)
          3. Task 2 DNA Assay Development – Morph D Deletion (pp. 98-137)
          4. Capabilities Brief (pp. 138-176)
          Assay Development: Progress Reports
          5. DNA Assays for Minor Genetic Variants Meeting Minutes 2/23/05 (pp. 178-
          6. Task 1 Morph B SNP Progress Reports (pp. 180-215)
          7. Task 2 Morph D Progress Reports (pp. 216-251)
          Assay Development: Validation
          8. Validity Test Reports B SNP (pp. 253-408)
          9. Validity Test Report D Deletion (pp. 409-661)
          Assay Development: Standard Operating Procedures
          10. Standard Operating Procedure Real-Time PCR Assay for the Detection of the
          Morph B SNP (pp. 662-686)
          11. Standard Operating Procedure Real-Time PCR Assay for the Detection of the
          Morph D Deletion (pp. 687-710)
          Repository Screening Morph D: Progress Reports
          12. Monthly Status Reports (pp. 711-800 and 803-955)
          13. FBI Kick-Off Meeting (pp. 956-996)
          14. B. anthracis Morph D DNA Screening Progress Reviews (pp. 997-1016)
          Repository Screening Morph D: Final Reports
          15. Technical Repository Screening Final Reports (pp. 1018-1134)
          16. Option Period I, II, III Final Reports (pp. 1135-1212)
          Module 8: Genetic Mutations B and D (MRI)
          Assay Development: Technical Proposals
          1. Volume 1 Technical Proposal (pp. 3-57)
          2. Task 1 DNA Assay Development – Morph B SNP (pp. 58-80)
          3. Task 2 DNA Assay Development – Morph D Deletion (pp. 81-102)
          Assay Development: Progress Reports
          4. Task 1 Morph B SNP Progress Reports (pp. 104-170)
          5. Task 2 Morph D Deletion Progress Reports (pp. 171-242)
          Assay Development: Validation
          6. Morph B SNP Assay Validity Test Report (pp. 244-260)
          7. Morph D Deletion Assay Validity Test Report (pp. 261-272)
          Assay Development: Standard Operating Procedures
          8. Extraction of DNA from Bacillus anthracis Cultures (pp. 274-281)
          9. PCR-Based Assay for the Detection of Morph B SNP (pp. 282-315)
          10. PCR-Based Assay for the Detection of Morph D Deletion (pp. 316-350)
          Assay Development: Final Reports
          11. Task 1 Morph B Final Administrative Report (pp. 352-358)
          12. Task 2 Morph D Final Administrative Report (pp. 359-366)
          13. DNA Assay Development Morph B SNP (pp. 367-380)
          14. DNA Assay Development Morph D Deletion (pp. 381-396)
          Repository Screening Morph D: Technical Proposals
          15. Volume 1 Technical Proposal (pp. 398-435)
          Repository Screening Morph D: Progress Reports
          16. DNA Screening of Ames Strain Anthrax Samples for Morph D (pp. 437-628)
          Repository Screening Morph D: Final Reports
          17. Technical Repository Screening Report (pp. 630-670)
          18. Technical Repository Screening Report Addendum 1 (pp. 671-675)
          19. Technical Repository Screening Report Addendum 2 (pp. 676-680)
          Module 9: Genetic Mutation E (TIGR)
          Assay Development: Technical Proposals
          1. LL19 Detection Assay: Validation Study Analysis Plan (pp. 3-7)
          2. LL19 Detection Assay: Analysis Plan for 1060 Blind Samples (pp. 8-13)
          Assay Development: Progress Reports
          3. June 2004 thru Sept/Dec 2005 (see Batch 1, Module 5)
          Assay Development: Standard Operating Procedure
          4. Opaque Assay Development SOP (pp. 16-58)
          Assay Development: Validation
          5. B. anthracis LL19 Detection Assay: Validation Study (pp. 60-123)
          Assay Development: Final Report
          6. Genomic Analysis of Bacillus anthracis Isolates Relevant to the Amerithrax
          Investigation, June 4, 2005 (Morph E (Opaque, Post/Leahy B.s.) (see Batch 1, Module
          Repository Screening Morph E: Final Report
          7. Analysis of a Repository of Bacillus anthracis for the Presence of the LL19
          Opaque Deletion Genotype (pp. 126-323)
          Module 10: Statistical Analysis
          Technical Proposal and SOW
          1. Determination of the Significance of the Markers Discovered in the Evidentiary
          Material of Amerithrax Investigation (pp. 3-21)
          Final Report
          2. Statistical Report of Amerithrax Data (Sept 30, 2008) (pp. 23-135)
          Module 11: Cross Contamination
          1. “Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters,” Defense R&D Canada,
          Technical Report DRES-TR-2001-048, September 2001 (pp. 3-36)
          2. “Forensic Application of Microbiological Culture Analysis to Identify Mail
          Intentionally Contaminated with Bacillus anthracis Spores,” D.J. Beecher,
          Applied Environmental Biology, Aug 2006, p. 5304-5310 (pp. 37-43)
          Module 12: Declassified Reports
          Technical Review Panel Meetings (NAS-1)
          1. November 14, 2001 Technical Review Panel Meeting (pp. 3-13)
          Agar and Heme Analysis (NAS-1): Agar Assay Validation – BMI
          2. Statement of Work B-Task-04 Chemical Process Troubleshooting (pp. 14-20)
          3. SPOT Report on B-Task-04 Technical Progress Summary (pp. 21-27)
          Chemical and Physical Characteristics (NAS-2) (see Batch 2, Module 13)
          Module 13: Chemical and Physical Properties
          1. Determination of Concentration of Culturable Bacteria in Sample 02.57.03(Daschle)
          Oct 17-18, 2001 (pp. 3-7)
          2. Preliminary SPOT Report on Particle Size Analysis Oct 18, 2001 (pp. 8-22)
          3. SEM Images Sample A (Daschle) Oct 19, 2001 (pp. 23-28)
          4. Summary of Microbiological Analyses Oct 19, 2001 (pp. 29-31)
          5. Preliminary SPOT Report on Sample Analyses Oct 22, 2001 (pp. 32-57)
          6. Preparation Steps and Associated Equipment Oct 25, 2001 (pp. 58-61)
          7. Analysis of Silicon and Silica in Powder Samples November 21, 2001 (pp. 62-74)
          8. Analysis of Silicon and Silica in Powder Samples SEM/EDS Analysis Nov 26,
          2001 (pp. 75-88)
          9. The Analysis of Surrogate Dry Powder Bacillus Spore Product December 28, 2001
          (pp. 89-98)
          10. Analysis of SPS02.266.02C (Leahy) Feb 12, 2002 (pp. 99-144)
          11. Summary of Sample Analysis (SPS02.266.02C) 28 Feb 02 (pp. 145-178)
          Module 14: ASM Bio Defense Meeting Presentations
          CBI, Mr. Thomas A. Reynolds
          1. The Science Behind the Amerithrax Investigation: Morph A1 and A3 Assays
          (pp. 3-11)
          2. Morphotype D Assay Development and Validation (pp. 13-33)
          NAU, Dr. Paul Keim
          3. The Ames Strain: Frequency, Distribution, and Forensic Analysis (pp. 35-51)
          SNL, Dr. Joseph R. Michael
          4. Elemental Microanalysis of Bacillus anthracis Spores from the Amerithrax
          Case (pp. 53-71)
          TIGR, Dr. Jacques Ravel
          5. The Genomics Behind the Amerithrax Investigation (pp. 73-106)

        • DXer said

          BATCH 326
          1. Amerithrax Science Update – 04-26/2002 – 11/25/2005 (271 pages)
          2. EC dated 2/8/2005 – Technical Review Panel Meeting Agenda, Anthrax Review Panel,
          Amerithrax Panel Summary 11/14/2001; 12 page PowerPoint (17 pages)
          3. EC dated 12/21/2001 – Meeting of Analytical Chemistry Expert (279A-WF-222936-LAB
          serial 37 and 1A 579) (7 pages)
          4. EC dated 2/11/2002 – Proposed Lab Analysis and R&D Strategy Analytical Flow Chart
          (279A-WF-22936-LAB serial 65) (5 pages)
          5. EC dates 11/14/2005 – Case Agent Meeting (attached WFO Forensic & Investigation update
          meeting 11/05/2001) (279A-WF-22936-LAB serial 1308 and 1A 6553) (30 pages)
          6. EC dated 11/14/2005 – Scientific Review Panel Meeting June 11-22-2002 (279A-WF-22936-
          LAB serial 1310 and 1A 6554) (22 pages)
          7. EC dated 12/21/2001 – External Expert Review of Analytical Plan (279A-WF-22936-LAB
          serial 25 and 1A 533) (7 pages)
          8. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Reference Material Receipt
          Record (1 page)
          9. 279A-WF-222936-BATTELLE Serial #9127
          10. 279A-WF-222936-SC118 Serial #3 (8 pages)
          11. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/BEI Serial #19 (7 pages)
          12. 279A-WF22936-USAMRIID Serial #1418 (2 pages)
          13. Dr. Ivins USAMRIID Laboratory Notebook #4010 (30 pages)
          14. Incoming Shipment Records for the 8 Positive FBI Repository Samples (origin is FBIR
          Database) (19 pages)
          15A. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-524-M-01
          (33 pages)
          15B. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-525-M-01
          (27 pages)
          15C. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-526-M-01
          (28 pages)
          15D. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-527-M-01
          (28 pages)
          15E. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-528-M-01
          (28 pages)
          15F. United States District Court Search Warrant Application and Affidavit Case#07-529-M-01
          (39 pages)
          16. FBI Repository Shipment Records28 (32 pages)

    • DXer said

      NOTE: You can’t have this one. It is classified.

      279A-WF-222936-BATTELLE Serial #9127

    • DXer said


      1. AFIP Materials related to USAMRIID Specimens October 2001 (41 pages)
      2. Preparing and Shipping TSA Slants for B. Anthracis Ames (1 page)
      3. FBI WFO [Washington Field Office] Report on Samples from an Overseas Site Identified by
      Intelligence30 (18 pages)

      • Anonymous said

        So they only handed over the AFIP report in the December 2010 document dump? Is that what this means?


        1. AFIP Materials related to USAMRIID Specimens October 2001 (41 pages)
        2. Preparing and Shipping TSA Slants for B. Anthracis Ames (1 page)
        3. FBI WFO [Washington Field Office] Report on Samples from an Overseas Site Identified by
        Intelligence30 (18 pages)

  21. DXer said

    The recent NAS report states:

    “At least three sample collection missions were conducted by the FBI and/or partners from
    the intelligence community at an overseas site because of information about efforts by Al Qaeda
    to develop an “anthrax program” (FBI/USDOJ, 2011). In May 2004, the FBI and partners from
    the intelligence community visited an overseas location at which they had been told an anthrax
    program had been operating, and brought back swab and swipe samples to the United States.
    None of the samples grew B. anthracis after incubation in culture media. However, three swab
    samples were reported as positive for B. anthracis and for B. anthracis Ames-specific sequences
    by PCR, including swabbings from the outside of an unopened medicine dropper package, a
    sink, and a sink drain hose. Repeat testing of these three positive samples as part of a group of
    15 blinded samples, including soil samples, water blanks and non-Ames Bacillus species, again
    yielded positive results for two of the three same samples (and for none of the other samples).
    However, not all replicates of the DNA extracts from the positive samples gave positive results.
    Apparently, an earlier collection mission to this site, prior to May 2004, by others in the
    intelligence community had also yielded samples with positive PCR results for B. anthracis
    DNA and negative culture results. As a result of these findings, a third collection mission was
    conducted in November 2004 and this time large portions of the site were returned intact to the
    United States, including the entire sink, drain, and associated plumbing that had been the source
    of the positive March 2004 samples. These items were extensively sampled, and again tested for
    both viable B. anthracis and for B. anthracis DNA. This time, according to the June 2008
    declassified document, all the tests were negative (FBI Documents, WFO Report).

    • DXer said

      The recent NAS report continues:

      “The committee was provided only fragmentary information about and limited primary
      data from this work and received them very late in our study. We consider these data to be
      inconclusive regarding the possible presence of B. anthracis Ames at this undisclosed overseas
      site. Several scientific and technical issues should be explored in more detail, such as the
      performance characteristics of the assays, whether or not the assays were validated for use with
      these sample types, the degree to which samples or sample locations gave repeatedly positive
      results, interpretation of inconsistent positive results, whether or not the Ames genetic mutations
      in the anthrax letters were detected in any of these overseas samples, and the natural distribution
      of B. anthracis strain types in this overseas geographic region.”

  22. DXer said

    Mr. Greenwald’s new column would be worth featuring.

    Roscoe Bartlett told the Frederick News-Post that the NAS report validates his concern and support for the independent Congressional review.

    Senator Grassley, similarly, tells AFP that there is no excuse now not to move forwward with the Congressional review contemplated by Congressman Holt’s bill.

    What does Senator Leahy say?

  23. DXer said
    Anthrax report casts doubt on scientific evidence in FBI case against Bruce Ivins

    By Jerry Markon
    Washington Post Staff Writer
    Wednesday, February 16, 2011

    And officials criticized what they characterized as the science-paper type approach of the report, which took aim at some FBI methods it said were “not optimal” and lacked scientific rigor. They said they balanced proper science with the demands of a fast-moving criminal investigation.

    “It’s somewhat disingenuous that they can use the word ‘theoretical,’ ” said one investigator involved in the case, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid about the report’s findings. “They’re talking about hypotheticals. We didn’t have that luxury. We were trying to solve a crime, and we didn’t know if the mailer would strike again.”

    • Lew Weinstein said

      What fast-moving criminal investigation? The attacks occurred in the fall of 2001. Ivins wasn’t charged until after he had committed suicide in August 2008. 600,000 man hours and no arrests for 7 years!!! It almost makes one think there was a reason NOT TO SOLVE the case.

  24. DXer said

    The DNA remains identifiable even after the bacillus is not viable. There was inconsistent evidence of B. anthracis Ames DNA in environmental samples that were collected from an overseas site. Why on earth would the FBI withhold all the data that the NAS needed to reach a conclusion on the DNA evidence?

  25. DXer said


    1.  Analog clock, not digital, showing the time as 8-08 (the month and year RAW began)

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