CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* emails from Dr. Bruce Ivins … Dec 2006-Jan 2007

Posted by DXer on August 3, 2010


The FBI’s case against Dr. Ivins is bogus: no evidence, no witnesses, an impossible timeline, science that proves innocence instead of guilt. So what really happened? And why? The “fictional” scenario in my novel CASE CLOSED has been judged by many readers, including a highly respected official in the U.S. Intelligence Community, as “quite plausible.”

* buy CASE CLOSED at amazon *








8 Responses to “* emails from Dr. Bruce Ivins … Dec 2006-Jan 2007”

  1. DXer said

    The Department of Justice says:

    “We are marshaling a great deal of resources on this [WMD preparedness] issue.”

    These are the words. But the reality is that it takes 2 years to produce a simple stack of emails written by the person the FBI concluded was responsible for the anthrax mailings. Results speak louder than words. It would take Lew 1 day to produce them all — and he would be attending classes at Oxford during business hours.

    It’s failure to be able to efficiently process FOIA requests has demonstrated that the government has proven itself too inefficient to keep the country safe. Throwing more money at the same establishment is not the answer. Good management practices is the answer. If expedited processing meant hiring part-time office help or having someone else (like Cryptome, which could have done it overnight) upload them, or just making the redactions without repeatedly typing (b)(6), then the Colonel should have taken the management initiative to see that was done.

    Is it awkward to get to the emails after November 2007 when the enforced social isolation by someone superior to him in the organization led to his suicide? (see November 2007 email ordering everyone to not to communicate with him by any means). Sure. But all fair-minded people should be in favor of both efficiency and transparency in the matter, regardless of their view on the whodunnit.

    The Justice Department also has struggled with placing a single authority in charge of its WMD preparedness efforts, officials told the subcommittee.

    A report from the Justice Inspector General Office, released in May, faulted a lack of leadership in the department for handling WMD defenses, although it generally praised the FBI for its preparedness activities.

    Overall, the Justice Department is ill-prepared to carry out its responsibilities to lead federal law enforcement activities in response to a WMD attack, said Inspector General Glenn Fine.

    “In contrast to the FBI, however, we found that the department as a whole did not have adequate policies or plans for responding to a WMD attack. We concluded that the management of the department’s response program was uncoordinated and fragmented. In addition, we found that department personnel other than in the FBI received little training in the unique requirements associated with responding to a WMD incident,” Fine reported.

    The Justice Department has responded to the findings by organizing a committee to examine issues raised in the report. The department must “aggressively and expeditiously address deficiencies” highlighted in the report, Fine insisted.

    Associate Deputy Attorney General James Baker said officials were doing just that.

    “We are marshaling a great deal of resources on this issue. Further, we will put into place an organizational structure and oversight mechanisms to ensure that we maintain a proper state of readiness as long as the WMD threat persists,” he stated. “Unfortunately for all of us, we expect that to be a long time.”

  2. DXer said

    All those FBI agents and CIA analysts who did not know that the documentary evidence shows that Ayman Zawahiri used “school” and “Green Team” to refer the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, should accept the real world challenge of deciphering this code.

    The prize is 10,000 in buried gold coins.

    It takes no skill to accuse a dead guy, have a US Attorney make central misstatements, and then withhold the relevant documents for 2 years to cover up how screwed up the FBI’s intelligence analysis has been.

    • DXer said

      Go ahead. Try solving the clues without the benefit of the open source information available at the link below.

      Stumped? The contest provides ready proof of the value of sharing information. It demonstrates that compartmentalization imposed prevented from dots being connected.

      Agent Lambert was right that compartmentalization would prevent the Task Force investigators from connecting the dots. The one squad was limited to reading Dr. Ivins emails and hyperventilating that he uses different screen names on the internet to cloak his identity. And, gasp, they found he edited Wikipedia and used a computer at the public library!

      If it takes USAMRIID two years to produce a stack of emails, how long do you think it would have taken USAMRIID or employees at sister agencies to find 100 red balloons dispersing anthrax?

  3. DXer said

    For a reportedly riveting read from a USAMRIID author set in my neck of the woods, see BIOHAZARD 9-1-1

    Biohazard 9-1-1 [Paperback]

    Mark Kortepeter (Author)

    Product Description

    Will Denton, a former Army doctor, reluctantly assumes his father’s small town medical practice in the Adirondack Mountains while his father recuperates from a stroke. Small town medicine quickly becomes more challenging than he had anticipated when local children begin dying of a horrific disease. Panic grows as the epidemic spreads. Fearing that he and others may already be infected, Dr. Denton teams up with his father’s nurse and a former Army colleague from USAMRIID, the Army’s biological warfare defense labs. Together they race to investigate the cause and attempt to control the spread before the disease causes a global crisis.

    The author is expert on the subject.

    J Environ Health. 2001 Jan-Feb;63(6):21-4.
    Kortepeter MG, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen EM.
    Education and Training Branch, Operational Medicine Department, USAMRIID, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5011, USA.
    Although biological agents have been used in warfare for centuries, several events in the past decade have raised concerns that they could be used for terrorism. Revelations about the sophisticated biological-weapons programs of the former Soviet Union and Iraq have heightened concern that countries with offensive-research programs, including those that sponsor international terrorism, might assist in the proliferation of agents, culturing capability, and dissemination techniques, and might benefit in these undertakings from the availability of skilled laboratory technicians. Release of sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult demonstrated that in the future terrorists might select unconventional weapons. Certain properties of biological pathogens may make them the ideal terrorist weapon, including 1) ease of procurement, 2) simplicity of production in large quantities at minimal expense, 3) ease of dissemination with low technology, and 4) potential to overwhelm the medical system with large numbers of casualties. Dissemination of a biological agent would be silent, and the incubation period allows a perpetrator to escape to great distances from the area of release before the first ill persons seek medical care. Countermeasures include intelligence gathering, physical protection, and detection systems. Medical countermeasures include laboratory diagnostics, vaccines, and medications for prophylaxis and treatment. Public health, medical, and environmental health personnel need to have a heightened awareness, through education, about the threat from biological agents.

    Type of Work: Text
    Registration Number / Date: TX0006106727 / 2004-11-26
    Application Title: Pandemic; Index of suspicion; Differential diagnosis.
    Title: Biohazard 911.
    Notes: Cataloged from appl.
    Copyright Claimant: Mark Gregory Kortepeter, 1961-
    Date of Creation: 2004
    Date of Publication: 2004-12-04
    Previous Registration: Prev. reg. 1999, TXu 899-164.
    Basis of Claim: New Matter: revisions & additions.
    Other Title: Pandemic
    Index of suspicion
    Differential diagnosis.

  4. DXer said

    From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
    Subject: RE: TA040403 spores
    Date: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 2:50:01 PM
    Purification eliminates debris, vegetative cells, spore clumps and non-refractile spores, and it leaves
    purified spores. I have no idea why would a) make spores on agar rather than in broth, b) not
    purify them, and c) not store them in 1% phenol. Everything we’ve ever done points to doing those
    techniques (that we do in our lab) for the best, cleanest, most virulent spores.
    Bruce Ivins

    From: Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID
    Subject: RE: Ames information
    Date: Thursday, January 11, 2007 12:22:44 PM

    ___used to just “take a swath” of growth from the heaviest growth on the plate and transfer
    that. I know that by the middle to late 1980s…certainly by the time we did our Gulf War I studies…I
    was doing pure culture transfer of single colonies when I wanted to make spores, and that’s how I do it
    now when we make spores either on SBA or in Leighton and Doi broth. Taking a “swath” is a sure way
    to introduce mutants, variants and contaminants into succeeding cultures. We now have as our stock
    strain of Ames, the “Ames PSC” strain (PSC standing for primary subculture). In February of 2002 we
    took material from the final remaining “original” Ames slant and plated in onto SBA, incubating for about
    a week at 37C. Then we scraped off the growth and put it into 1% phenol, and store it at 4C. That’s our
    “Ames PSC,” which is the closes thing we have to the cow here in the division. When we want to make
    spores on SBA or L&D, we streak the Ames PSC on to SBA, then the next day take three TYPICAL (not
    variant or mutant or contaminant) colonies and resuspend them in PBS. We then add 0.1 ml to an SBA
    plate or 0.1 ml to a flask of L&D medium.

    If you’d ever like some of our “Ames PSC” material for your studies, let me know, and I can give you a
    vial. I think the vials have about 0.3 ml at 10e7 per ml.
    Bruce Ivins

    • BugMaster said

      “When we want to make
      spores on SBA or L&D, we streak the Ames PSC on to SBA, then the next day take three TYPICAL (not
      variant or mutant or contaminant) colonies and resuspend them in PBS.”

      Yet Ed Lake insists that Ivins was totally unaware of the presence of any mutants in his RMR-1029 material.

      Right, Ed!

  5. DXer said

    Patricia Worsham was Chief of Bacteriology in December 2006 (and is to the present). Did she write the December 17, 2006 email to Dr. Ivins?

    Who was the Deputy Commander?

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