CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* DXer says … Amerithrax can be understood as a case study as to whether the FBI DC Field Office is “master of its domain” … do you think the FBI has demonstrated mastery in the anthrax investigation? … or did they, like Kramer, simply take the easy way out?

Posted by DXer on June 2, 2010


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The FBI’s case against Dr. Ivins is bogus: no evidence, no witnesses, an impossible timeline, science that seems to prove innocence instead of guilt. So what really happened? And why? The “fictional” scenario in my novel CASE CLOSED has been judged by many readers, including a highly respected official in the U.S. Intelligence Community, as “quite plausible.”

* buy CASE CLOSED at amazon *

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23 Responses to “* DXer says … Amerithrax can be understood as a case study as to whether the FBI DC Field Office is “master of its domain” … do you think the FBI has demonstrated mastery in the anthrax investigation? … or did they, like Kramer, simply take the easy way out?”

  1. DXer said

    Is the Washington Field Office master of its domain? We shouldn’t judge the Field Office based on the individual agent who recently was getting high on the heroin in evidence. Nor should we judge it based on the Field Office head Persichini who led the Amerithrax investigation who the year the Ivins Theory was found to have cheated an open book examination on how to conduct a national security investigation. He resigned after it was discovered that he and his assistants had been texted answers by the lawyer. (That doesn’t bear much on whether they did good work otherwise). Nor should we judge it by the lead AUSA who was lambasted by the federal district court for cheating in the prosecution in the Blackwater prosecution — resulting in the dismissal of all those indictments. No. (That doesn’t bear much on whether he did good work otherwise). None of us are perfect.

    But isn’t the important thing that we correct our mistakes on the merits of the issue at bar?

    Isn’t the problem that the Washington Field Office investigators STILL haven’t gotten basic investigative details right and checked their work — for example, with regard to the claim that there was no animal experiment in the first week of October 2001? If the investigators had acknowledged that the rabbit formaldehyde experiment explained why he came into the lab on nights and weekends, the Ivins Theory could have been discarded years ago.

    Isn’t the failure to correct missteps the problem?

    For example, consider Dr. Majidi’s failure to correct his treatment on the two-person rule — which was central to understanding the issue of the pattern of hours.

    Is it really so hard to correct mistakes?

  2. DXer said

    Mr. Valencia and Steve K. have suddenly pulled into Pulitzer contention along with Ed Mahony for cracking the Guarente/Gentile connection. Steve advises me that Elene isn’t saying who the other person on the hunting trip was.

  3. DXer said

    Note from this blog post in March 2012 that in addition, her daughter L, and then son-in-law, Sgt. Gordon is a possible interview. Moreover, the police report and court file might have relevant background. Marty Leppo likely has a copy of the court file but he likely is not predisposed to share.

  4. DXer said

    My notes show that I was given 100+ 302s rather than just 40. I would have scanned only 40 to get above a blurb.com minimum for creation of an uploadable book. Let me rummage around for the other 60 or so and get them uploaded.

  5. DXer said

    Now to follow-up on Mr. Mahony’s landmark story in the Hartford Courant, let’s consider where Mr. Guarante was living in the early 1990s. He was in Maine by the time the paintings would need to be hid. Right? In fact, he faced charges that might be lodged against Mr. .Gentile if he is unlucky (possession of firearms by a felon). Marty Leppo of Randolph, Esq. was hist attorney.

    So the $64,000,000 question is this: Were Mr. Guarante and Mr. Murray fishing buddies?

    Source:
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff v. ROBERT F. GUARENTE, Defendant
    Criminal No. 92-25-B (1993)

  6. DXer said

    The late Mr. Guarante lived in Madison, ME.

    We would camp at Belgrade Lakes and departing from near Joe Murray’s summer home, paddle (for fun) to offshore the small (not big) island east of Point A.

    http://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en&tab=nw

    We could bring an inflatable kayak or a larger inflatable raft.

    Ay, matey, there’s treasure out there.

    Billy and Charlie can walk the plank while we load the dubloons.

  7. DXer said

    A former KGB handler had written a book about the Russian illegals program involving married couples and even explained that they had a spy had Ft. Detrick.

    Similarly, Ayman Zawahiri announced he planned to use anthrax against US targets.

    Ayman Zawahari’s plan to use anthrax against U.S. targets
    https://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2010/02/20/from-dxer-infiltration-of-u-s-biodefense-ayman-zawaharis-plan-to-use-anthrax-against-u-s-targets/

    Amerithrax makes the FBI look stupid. It makes it seem that the head of the DC Field Office would need to cheat on an open book exam. But doesn’t the Russian illegals case demonstrate that they, in fact, are good at what they do but just are really tricky? (sometimes too tricky for their own good).

    If you ever watch MI5, the BBC series, don’t you come away saying that maybe all the trickiness is counterproductive? Where is Thomas Dewey when we need him?

  8. DXer said

    christian science monitor –

    “Faulkner was the spear tip of his own plot. Generally speaking, US intelligence in the past has employed locals or other third parties for its more aggressive clandestine activities.”

    http://67.199.108.44

  9. DXer said

    EXPERTS APPROVE OF INFORMATION-SHARING BOOST IN HOUSE WMD BILL
    by Mickey McCarter
    Wednesday, 16 June 2010

    WMD bill would task DNI, DHS, others with sharing data on biological threats
    ***

    Intelligence matters

    Murch and Kadlec agreed that the bill appropriately would involve the DNI and tasking the office with top initiatives in intelligence gathering for biological agents.

    Murch acknowledged that the United States must move more of its activities to anticipation and prevention of a biological attack rather than response.

    The DNI has the authority to take a structured approach to this problem, perhaps employing systems analysis methods used by the Defense Department, Murch said.

    Any consideration of the biological threat also must consider the power of single individuals as well as state sponsors of biological threats. Therefore, the DNI must consider how to scale US intelligence capabilities, he suggested.

    The bill also would appropriately expand the list of organizations receiving DHS biological threat data, Murch said.

    Kadlec pointed out that US intelligence agencies were unaware of al Qaeda efforts to build a biological agent laboratory in Afghanistan until the United States invaded that country in 2002.

    Tasking the DNI with conducting a strategic review would set priorities and provide a unified voice to ensure that such neglect to the threat does not occur again, Kadlec recommended.

    Kadlec also prescribed making the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), established at DHS by the Implementing of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53), more useful.

    “It’s been a great idea that hasn’t worked well,” Kadlec said, largely because interagency participation in the center remains voluntary.

    The House WMD bill would mandate participation and bring together agencies from various public health, medical, and environment sources, among others.

    The current situation at the NBIC negatively impacts the ability of policymakers and responders to act in a timely fashion to biological threats, Kadlec said.

    Fischer added that participating agencies should ensure that biothreat data should be as useful as possible and that public health organizations have a presence in intelligence operations such as state and local fusion centers.

    Anthrax and Al Qaeda: Infiltration of US Biodefense
    http://www.blurb.com/books/1385387

  10. DXer said

    Dr. Ivins wrote on October 12, 2004: “I found this from some old computer files from 1997.”

  11. DXer said

    New Jersey’s new U.S. attorney, Paul Fishman, hinted there were serious national-security investigations on the verge of becoming public, though he declined to say anything more. He says “There are cases in the pipeline that are of huge significance.”

    Is the “closing” of Amerithrax part of a national security operation? Are there undercovers who have brilliantly positioned themselves? Are there scientists or professionals in place who were recruited? Is that new bookkeeper too good to be true? (see, e.g., OPERATION IMMINENT HORIZON) Will Amerithrax prove to be a huge law enforcement and intelligence success story?

    Can everything in the past two years be explained under the principle “they are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t?” Take, for example, the case of the Attorney General having been excoriated after a public search he announces that the fellow who forged his PhD certificate and worked in the building where virulent Ames was stored was a “person of interest”. Is anyone likely to be quick to take the podium after Dr. Ivins’ death and talk about remaining POIs?

    Is it time to start cutting law enforcement some slack?

    OTOH, is there ever any justification for the violation of the Freedom of Information Act that has existed in this case? If the USG cannot accomplish something as simple as producing a stack of emails, is there any reason to think they could have mounted a successful intelligence operation? Wouldn’t infiltrating a highly compartmentalized cell be a little more difficult than befriending some unsophisticated angry young men planning on travelling abroad to fight?

    * OPERATION ARABIAN KNIGHT ARRESTS at JFK Airport: 2 New Jersey Men, Mohamed Hamoud Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, were allegedly on their way to Egypt to meet up with Somalis involved with Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab (video)

    http://countusout.wordpress.com/2010/06/06/operation-arabian-knight-arrests-at-jfk-airport-2-new-jersey-men-mohamed-hamoud-alessa-and-carlos-eduardo-almonte-were-allegedly-on-their-way-to-egypt-to-meet-up-with-somalis-involved-with-al-qa/

    The arrests and planning were coordinated by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, a multi-agency group that includes agents of the FBI, state homeland security office, New York Police Department, Port Authority police and an assortment of federal security agencies. The investigation began as two separate probes after the FBI and New Jersey homeland security detectives received individual tips about the men, officials said.

    In the months leading up to their planned travel, authorities said, Alessa and Almonte saved thousands of dollars, conditioned themselves physically through tactical training and dry runs at paintball fields and acquired gear and apparel to be used once they joined up with al Shabaab in Somalia. The men boasted that they wanted to wage holy war against the United States both at home and overseas, said investigators.

    The prosecution of Alessa and Almonte is being led by New Jersey’s new U.S. attorney, Paul Fishman. In a meeting with The Star-Ledger’s editorial board last month, Fishman hinted there were serious national-security investigations on the verge of becoming public, though he declined to say anything more.

    “There are cases in the pipeline that are of huge significance,” Fishman said.

  12. DXer said

    It seems that there are daily reports where authorities have infiltrated the social circle of targeted individuals.

    SPYING BLIND: The CIA, the FBI and the ORIGIN OF 911 was about “failed adaptation” – the organizational failure of the CIA and FBI to adapt new challenges.

    Does the recent trend represent a case of successful adaptation?

    http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6550FW20100606

    Two men with militant ties arrested in NY: report

    Authorities had infiltrated the men’s social circle and said the suspects were not planning an imminent attack in the New York-New Jersey area but were believed to be intending to join with the Al Shabaab youth movement to fight against Americans in Somalia, the report said.

    One official briefed on the case was hopeful it would lead to a “web of arrests,” the newspaper said.

  13. DXer said

    Would the FBI’s senior intelligence officer been up to the challenge of ferreting out Ali Mohammed given his adherence to principles of cell security?

    Posted: Friday, 04 June 2010 6:02AM
    FBI’s senior intelligence officer details domestic terror strategy
    ST. LOUIS (KMOX) — In St. Louis this week to instruct local businesses on how to look out for domestic Islamic terrorists, the FBI’s senior intelligence officer says the key to finding a would-be attacker before he strikes, is three pronged.

    Dr. Chafiq Moummi calls it the “domestic security trinity:” federal and local law enforcement and the Muslim community. Dr. Moummi says Muslim’s have a unique opportunity to see the early stages of radicalization. “They understand the religion, they understand the tradition of Islam,” he explained in an one-on-one interview with KMOX. “So it’s easy for them to pick up if someone in the community is becoming radicalized.”

    Dr. Moummi says the most easily radicalized Muslim’s are recent converts and those who have a renewed passion for the religion. So Moummi says federal and local law enforcement have to build a trust with the Muslim community. Dr. Moummi also says that because Muslim’s are more assimilated into American culture, it is easier for law enforcement to interact with them here, than it is in Europe.

    St. Louis Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Roland Corvington says the local FBI recently met with 20 Imams and will meet with them again soon. “The FBI collectively has a very strong community outreach,” Corvington said. “We spend a lot of time engaging various communities for the sole purpose of trying to keep America safe.”

  14. DXer said

    “Mary,” one of the FBI agents undercover on the cruise ship who befriended Bruce, made a record of her findings.

    “10 a.m. – pool
    11 a.m. – game room – beat Special Agent _______ and subject at darts.

    12 a.m. – basketball court. We played Round-the-World. Dr. Ivins kept making a 3-pointer.

    1 p.m. caught Reggae Bands by the pool ; got hair braided.

    2 p.m. did jello shots with Bruce and his brother at the pool. Dr. Ivins confessed to using fake screen names on the internet , writing letters to the editor, and liking attractive women.

    Then her notes become a little illegible for the rest of the day.

    • DXer said

      Scott Shane writes today of a federal undercover involving an email correspondent of Anwar Aulaqi. I find it fascinating that the FBI so regularly engages in undercover attempts to infiltrate and yet seems entirely naive when the same tactics are applied against the United States government. In particular, if an adversary infiltrates at a level above the bureaucratic decision-maker (e.g., Aldrich Ames) — or if the implications raise questions the individuals don’t want to face — the government workers just twiddle their thumb drives as they are walked out the building. For example, former Russian expert Alibek told me in 2003, when he told me the FBI suspected Dr. Al-Timimi, that he didn’t know Ali to have ever been involved in a biodefense project. Serge told me the same thing later on. For scientists so accomplished in the deception associated with Sverdlosk — who regularly received samples frmo a spy at Ft. Detrick (Serge reports) — that is incredibly naive-sounding. If that program is truly so naive and biosecurity so lax, why did the USG throw good money after bad and invest in a BL-3 and/or BL-4 so near the country’s Capitol?

      “Texas: Man Accused of Aiding Al Qaeda
      By SCOTT SHANE
      Published: June 3, 2010

      A Texas man was indicted in Houston on Thursday, accused of trying to provide money and equipment to the branch of Al Qaeda in Yemen. The indictment said that the man, Barry Walter Bujol Jr., 29, of Hempstead, exchanged e-mail messages with the radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki starting in 2008, seeking his advice in assisting Al Qaeda. Mr. Awlaki sent him from Yemen a copy of his tract “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad,” prosecutors said. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, after learning of the e-mail messages, sent an informer posing as a member of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to contact Mr. Bujol, an American. From the informer, Mr. Bujol obtained equipment for the group, including global positioning system devices, telephone calling cards and a military compass. He was arrested May 30 after he boarded a ship bound for the Middle East with the equipment.”

      • DXer said

        “From the informer, Mr. Bujol obtained equipment for the group, including global positioning system devices, telephone calling cards and a military compass.”

        The FBI undercover gave the POI GPS, telephone calling cards and a compass. Yikes. Maybe the next time a federal undercover suggests going on a panty raid I should think twice.

  15. DXer said

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator Program, Audit Report 09-36, September 2009.

    “In part to improve its information-sharing capabilities within the greater U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI is in the process of implementing a new organizational framework and intelligence process to catalyze the production of timely and actionable intelligence reports. We found that the FBI has not formalized a method to facilitate collaboration between WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts that ensures WMD Coordinators can fully use field division analytical capabilities to plan and perform their work. Furthermore, the FBI does not require its Field Intelligence Groups to designate specific Intelligence Analysts to work with WMD Coordinators. As a result of these issues, WMD Coordinators had limited or inconsistent interaction with their Field Intelligence Group, which has hindered them from fully applying intelligence to identify specific WMD threats facing their field division.”

    The September 2009 Inspector General audit (which predates the one relating to other agencies within DOJ that is being reported this week, explained:

    “The FBI has begun using the concept of domain management to identify and prioritize the most significant WMD threats and vulnerabilities facing each of its field divisions. Domain management is the process by which WMD Coordinators work with their field division to obtain a strategic understanding, or domain awareness, of their area of responsibility by a continuous assessment of threats and vulnerabilities.”

    • DXer said

      “During the audit, officials with some Field Intelligence Groups told us that they were concerned that if Intelligence Analysts worked closely with WMD Coordinators, Intelligence Analysts would end up relegated to performing ancillary or administrative case duties such as following up with sources or electronically scanning documents.”

      This is the same type issue from a decade ago. But maybe the problem is that Intelligence Analysts think that “following up with sources” is an ancillary case duty rather than the meat of the enchilada.

      • DXer said

        “Although WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts had received various types of WMD training, the training they received was not necessarily aligned with the threats and vulnerabilities that these personnel faced at the field division-level. We believe this was, in part, due to WMD Coordinators not being involved in the field division WMD domain assessment, as well as the FBI not adequately tracking the training received by its WMD field division personnel. Without requiring that WMD personnel complete specific WMD training and subsequently tracking its completion, the FBI is not positioned to identify and mitigate knowledge gaps in WMD preparedness.”

        Let’s take the case study of FBI training in the area of the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense in Northern Virginia. Leitner has worked for DOD and has taught at the Center for Biodefense.

        Fairfax Cop Who Tipped Terror Suspect Helped Kill Training Program

        by Steven Emerson
        IPT News
        May 9, 2008

        http://www.investigativeproject.org/664/fairfax-cop-who-tipped-terror-suspect-helped-kill-training

        A Fairfax County Police sergeant who admits tipping off a terrorism suspect that he was under FBI surveillance also helped kill what had been a successful intelligence and terrorism-related training program within his police department.

        Sgt. Weiss Rasool was sentenced to two years probation on April 22 after pleading guilty to illegally accessing a police database to run license tag numbers for a friend who thought he was being followed. Those tags traced back to FBI agents who had Rasool’s acquaintance under surveillance as part of a terrorism investigation.

        The Washington Post reported that Rasool cried during his sentencing and apologized for what he called “errors of judgment. But I never intended to put anybody’s life at risk.” The Post further reported:

        “The target was arrested in November 2005, then convicted and deported, according to court filings in Rasool’s case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeanine Linehan said that the target and his family were already dressed and destroying evidence at 6 a.m. when agents arrived to make the arrest, indicating that they had been tipped off.”

        Now the president of an Arlington, Va.-based counterterrorism research center is asking Rasool’s bosses to reconsider their 2006 decision to cease using training programs offered by the center. Complaints by Rasool and an officer from another local agency that the training was anti-Islam prompted Fairfax County police to break with the Higgins Center for Counter Terrorism Research.

        In a letter to Police Chief David Rohrer written two days after Rasool’s sentencing, Higgins Center President Peter Leitner said Rasool’s complaints were unfounded and harmed his company’s reputation:

        “We were deeply disturbed and offended that the leadership of your Department sided with Rasool and essentially blackballed our non-Profit (sic) organization from teaching within your Academy. Several scheduled classes were cancelled and we were never invited back…

        We were dismissed without recourse, suffered financial and professional reputation losses, and the resulting pressures caused serious damage to our ability to function properly. All on the basis of spurious charges made by someone who later proved to be unreliable — at best.”

        Leitner said he has received no response to his letter.

        “This is precisely why Fairfax PD needs our training,” Leitner told the Investigative Project on Terrorism in an e-mail. “They need to learn about 5th column activities and penetrating agents. It also shows how ignorance and/or political correctness at the local level can jeopardize national security interests and assets.”

        Though he pled guilty, prosecutors still complained that Rasool was not playing straight with them. They originally argued that Rasool deserved a sentenced at the low end of the federal guidelines. That changed after a defense sentencing motion cast his actions as a simple administrative oversight, and that had he submitted a relevant form, “it is possible the case would not be before the Court today.” Prosecutors then argued Rasool was not taking responsibility for his actions, saying he even claimed not to remember tapping in to the federal database and that he initially denied knowing the suspect or calling him. He confessed only after hearing a recording of the call.

        “[A]s I told you, I can only tell you if it comes back to a person or not a person and all three vehicles do not come back to an individual person, so I just wanted to give you that much, uhh ok. Hope things work out for you,” Rasool said in a voice mail message to his friend that was intercepted by federal investigators.

        Rasool’s attorney argued he was responding normally to a citizen’s concern that he was being followed. “Rather,” prosecutors responded, “the evidence is that the defendant was advising the target that he was being following by government vehicles.”

        In their sentencing memo to the court, prosecutors made clear the severity of Rasool’s breach:

        “The defendant, through his experience with the police, had a basis to believe that the leasing company was used for federal law enforcement vehicles, but despite that, relayed the information to the individual. The defendant also checked his name and other names multiple times in NCIC without a legitimate law enforcement purpose to do so and to see if he or others he was acquainted with were listed on the Terrorist Watch List.

        The defendant’s actions damaged the integrity of the NCIC system and jeopardized at least one federal investigation. The defendant’s actions could have placed federal agents in danger. The FBI has had to undo the harm caused by the defendant.”

        The Higgins Center had offered courses for years without any complaint, yet in June of 2006, that all changed. In a letter dated June 26, 2006 to Academy Director Major Tyrone Morrow, Higgins Vice President Brian Fairchild indicated six officers in total lodged complaints against his programs. But the complaints did not reflect the program’s actual content, Fairchild said, noting that statements used to illustrate Islamist ideology come from the Islamists themselves. In addition, instructors repeatedly make clear that the Islamists expressing radical ideology do not reflect the general Muslim world:

        “It appears that these officers misunderstood and/or are confused by the content of our courses which is solely to educate officers about Islamist terrorists and the international revolutionary Islamist movement that creates and supports them. We are surprised by the assertions in these complaints, because, in order to ensure that such misunderstandings do not occur, we clearly define our terms in lecture supported by PowerPoint slides.

        In our seminars, we never criticize traditional Islam or Muslims. Quite to the contrary, we definitively and repeatedly state that the overwhelming majority of the 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide are fine people that have nothing to do with extremism or terrorism.” (emphasis in original)

        Rasool was under federal investigation at the time. In addition to running the license tag numbers, he admitted improperly accessing the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database 15 times in 2005-06, checking for his own name and the names of acquaintances. “The defendant did this in an attempt to determine if he or others were registered with the Violent Crime and Terrorist Offender File, which is a category of records maintained within the NCIC system,” the plea agreement states.

        In an interview, Leitner expressed frustration with the way Fairfax police officials treated him and his company. He called the complaints “nebulous,” and said he was never given a full opportunity to rebut them. “It was very star chamber like.”

        Another officer who joined Rasool in complaining about the Higgins program works for an area sheriff’s department, Leitner said. That officer claimed to be a representative from the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Leitner said.

        Despite his plea to a misdemeanor, Rasool remains a Fairfax County police sergeant although he is under an internal affairs investigation.

      • DXer said

        “To assist field divisions in their efforts to obtain a strategic understanding of their WMD threats and vulnerabilities, a team of FBI Intelligence Analysts developed a pilot WMD domain assessment program with specific steps that field divisions should follow to conduct a WMD domain assessment. In our opinion, the steps developed by the pilot WMD domain assessment program provided a useful and comprehensive initial framework by which field divisions could identify and prioritize domain threats and vulnerabilities. However, Intelligence Analysts were the only field division personnel to participate in the pilot WMD domain assessment process, which the FBI began conducting with field divisions in September 2008. As a result, we believe that the FBI has missed opportunities in these initial assessments to include directly valuable information known by WMD Coordinators resulting from their WMD investigations, outreach, and training. As potential providers of important WMD-specific information, WMD Coordinators should actively participate in future domain assessments to ensure that such information is considered in evaluating and prioritizing threats. Field divisions need to perform domain assessments continuously in order to be aware of the constantly changing state of entities within the WMD domain and to share this information with the appropriate parties.”

        • DXer said

          “Intelligence Collaboration

          In an effort to enhance its information-sharing capabilities within the larger U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI has been implementing a new intelligence framework that realigns how it handles intelligence reporting. These intelligence initiatives have required active collaboration between various FBI programs, divisions, and personnel, including the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, the WMD Directorate, and Field Intelligence Groups at each field division. Although these groups have been organized to work together in the prevention of WMD attacks, as shown by the exhibit below, the FBI has not provided a standard method by which WMD Coordinators and Field Intelligence Groups should share WMD intelligence at the field division level.”

        • DXer said

          “WMD intelligence reporting is critical for identifying information needed to achieve WMD domain awareness. We reviewed the number of WMD intelligence reports issued by field divisions as reported in the June 2008 Semi-Annual Program Review and found that 30 out of 56 FBI field divisions did not disseminate any WMD intelligence products during this period. Meanwhile, only nine field divisions disseminated five or more WMD intelligence products. The field divisions that were able to disseminate the most WMD intelligence had an established approach to guide how their personnel handled intelligence reporting.”

          The Amerithrax Task Force and Ken Kohl and Daniel Seikaly and Jeffrey Taylor screwed the pooch. But don’t the WMD personnel at the field offices also bear responsibility?

          Anthrax and Al Qaeda: Infiltration of US Biodefense
          http://www.blurb.com/books/1385387

  16. DXer said

    The DC venture firm Perseus, led by Richard Holbrooke, invested $50 million in the company led by former Zawahiri associate Tarek Hamouda, who worked alongside Bruce Ivins using virulent Ames. ($30 million of the $50 million was invested during his leadership of Perseus).

    Anthrax and Al Qaeda: Infiltration of US Biodefense
    http://www.blurb.com/books/1385387

    Ron Paul Questions Richard Holbrooke – 5/5/2009

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