CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* Dr. Bruce Ivins on Dr. Ezzell’s making dried powder at USAMRIID (first irradiated, Ivins believes, as a liquid slurry before being dried)

Posted by Lew Weinstein on April 8, 2010

The FBI’s case against Dr. Ivins is bogus: no evidence, no witnesses, an impossible timeline. The real question is why the FBI persists in sticking to such a pathetic story. What are they hiding? I offer one “fictional” scenario in my novel CASE CLOSED, judged by many readers, including a highly respected official in the U.S. Intelligence Community, as “quite plausible.”

* buy CASE CLOSED at amazon *

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then he couldn’t find it

when it came time to submit to the FBI

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21 Responses to “* Dr. Bruce Ivins on Dr. Ezzell’s making dried powder at USAMRIID (first irradiated, Ivins believes, as a liquid slurry before being dried)”

  1. DXer said

    Now turning back to the dry powder that the FBI’s anthrax expert made for the JH-APL researchers (his assistant JJ was doing the research at JH), that research (see article by Joany Jackman and FBI consultant Fenselau) says that that they were using sonication to examine the effects on Ames spores.

    What is the effect of sonication on an Ames spore?

    That research says that they were using a Corona Plasma Discharge to examine the effects on Ames spores. What is the effect of Corona Plasma Discharge on an Ames spore?

    Dr. Jackman, before she went to JH-APL in 2000, where she continued the DARPA-funded mass spectrometry research, had been doing the work at USAMRIID with JE. Were dry powders also used in the mass spectrometry/ aerosolization experiments done at USAMRIID

    http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/ac9802372

    The Development of Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization Time-of-Flight Mass Spectrometry for the Detection of Biological Warfare Agent Aerosols
    Peter F. Scholl, Marisa A. Leonardo, Ana M. Rule, Micah A. Carlson, Miquel D. Antoine, and Timothy J. Buckley

    JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 20, NUMBER 3 (1999)
    http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td2003/scholl.pdf

    The identification of biomarkers was part of a collaboration between JH-APL and Dr. Fensalau in Maryland and Dr. Jackman at USAMRIID.

    “A MALDI-TOF-MS library containing the spectra of biological warfare simulants, authentic threat agents, interferents, and different environmental backgrounds is being constructed” an article in the JH-APL technical digest explained.

    The article continues:

    “At the USAMRIID, threat agents (anthrax, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, botulism toxin, and others) are undergoing MALDI analysis in biosafety level 3 and 4 containment facilities. Experiments involving the MADLI-TOF-MS analysis of aerosolized anthrax spores deposited on video recorder tape are currently under way.

    The bioaerosol test chamber at the JHU School of Hygiene and Public Health (1.2 m3) is equipped with a Model 3300 aerosol particle size (APS) spectrometer (TSI, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota), an AGI-30 reference air sampler (Ace Glass, Vineland, New Jersey), and the Sioutas collector (Fig. 3). A Collison nebulizer (BGI, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts) is used to generate aerosols from simulant solutions. Alternatively, aerosols can be generated from dry B. globigii spores and ovalbumin. The concentration of viable and nonviable simulants and the size distribution of these aerosols are measured using different instruments.”

    ***

    “Unlike the preparation of liquid samples, the direct analysis of dry bioaerosol particles on tape presents fundamental problems to the acquisition of MALDI spectra. While separate matrix and sample solutions are routinely mixed and spotted on a probe, a matrix solution must be applied to the inertially deposited dry particle spot. This does not allow the same intimate mixing of the matrix and sample to occur as it does when they are mixed as liquids. Sample preparation techniques such as the precoating of tapes with matrix- doped aerogels or adhesives and the co-deposition of MALDI–matrix with aerosol particles are being evaluated to address this problem.”

    • DXer said

      Here is an example of an online Jackman article in which Earl Tewksbury for generating nano-aerosols. When did Battelle first start generating nano-aerosols for the DARPA-funded JH-APL researchers?

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (MDA972-01-D-0005). We would like to thank Earl Tewksbury for generating and sampling nano-aerosols and Nathan Boggs for col- lection of samples and critical review.

      http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td2501/Jackman.pdf
      Mass spectrometry of breath for the diagnosis of infection and exposure

      Jackman, J.a , Moss, O.b c d

      a U.S. Army Med. Res. Inst. Infect. D.
      b Los Alamos National Laboratory
      c Battelle Pac. Northwest Laboratory
      d CIIT Centers for Health Research, Durham, NC

      Abstract

      The inability to distinguish among people infected by agents of biological warfare, those infected by more benign agents, and those who simply perceive relevant signs and symptoms has been a major impediment to the rapid resolution of biological warfare attacks. The initial signs and symptoms reported for infection with biological warfare agents mimic those of more common illnesses such as the flu; therefore, an attack of this ilk could go unrecognized initially, wasting valuable resources and causing major health and economic impacts. One means to reduce or alleviate the threat posed by the use of biological warfare agents would be to quickly determine the extent of actual infection. Here we describe our approach to developing a rapid, sensitive, and reliable method to diagnose pulmonary infection presymptomatically using mass spectrometry.

  2. DXer said

    Some clarifying Q and A on the dried powder made using dead spores.

    Q “Can you tell me the approximate quantities of dried spores that were made? Was it, milligrams, tens of milligrams, hundreds of milligrams, or gram quantities?”

    A “Can’t remember exactly, been a long time ago. Seem to remember respending the spores to 0.1 grams (wet weight) and adding 1.0 ml of suspension per vial. Sorry, but I don’t have records of the dry weight on hand here at my home office.”

    Q “Was any special milling performed to produce a powder? For example, a ball mill with meshes, a jet mill, spray drying or other?”

    A We did not mill the spores. The scientists from Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab wanted the spores freeze dried and dead. So that’s what we gave them.”

  3. DXer said

    The book KILLER STRAIN starts one chapter:

    Red Sky at Morning

    “June 2001
    ANNAPPOLIS, MARYLAND

    On an early summer morning, as sailors embarked from city docks and swimmers plunged into the briny water fro an annual race across the Chesepeake Bay, John W. Ezzell and about two hundred other scientists convened on a deserted college campus in the colonial seaport town of Annapolis for the Fourth International Anthrax Conference.”

    Did any of the old sailors there take warning?

    USAMRIID released some emails by Bruce Ivins discussing the difficulties of planning the Fourth International Conference on Anthrax in Annapolis. The first of the emails was from September 1998, upon his return from the conference at Plymouth. In June 2001, the good ship anthrax sailed in Annapolis, Maryland, the “sailing capital of the world.” The 4th International Conference on Anthrax was held at St. John’s College in historic Annapolis, Maryland, June 10 – 13, 2001. The conference was organized by the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and managed by the American Society for Microbiology. The 74-foot classic wooden schooner was named WOODWIND. Martin Hugh-Jones had convened the conference along with Peter Turnbull, the Porton Down scientist who had led the UK conferences attended by Ayman Zawahiri’s scientist, Rauf Ahmad. Reports of livestock and national park outbreaks were followed by a summary by Dr. Turnbull. Other anthrax notables who spoke included senior USAMRIID scientist Dr. Ezzell, who had one of the first looks at the Daschle product, and Dr. Paul Keim, who would play a key role in the genetic investigation.

    Theresa Koehler from the Houston Medica School gave a talk titled “The Expanding B. anthracis Toolbox” while Timothy Read from The Institute of Genome Research summarized research on The B. Anthracis Genome. Houston Medical School, the UK’s biodefense facility Porton Down, and Pasteur Institute each fielded three presenters. UK scientists presented on the characteristics of the exosporium of “the highly virulent Ames strain.” Researchers from Columbus, Ohio and Biological Defense Research Directorate (BDRD) of the Navy Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, assisted by Porton Down scientists from the UK, demonstrated that inoculated mice survived a challenge with b.anthracis spores. Researchers used b.anthracis containing a plasmid with a mutated lethal factor.” Dr. Phil Hanna from University of Michigan presented, as he had been in the UK at the conference attending with Rauf Ahmad.

    A Kazakhstan Ministry of Health scientist presented on the re-emergence of anthrax in Kazakhstan. Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union the first job offer Ken Alibek fielded was the position of Minister of Health in Kazakhstan. He protested when he realized that his new employerjust wanted to do what the Soviets had been secretly doing in an illegal and massive bioweapons program he had supervised as its First Deputy. After the KGB asked to meet with him, he asked to schedule the meeting in two weeks, so that he might visit his parents, and then found a secret expedited way of coming to the United States.

    Pakistan Rauf Ahmad had been the predator looking for the Ames strain and consulting on weaponization techniques at the UK conference. Did the Amerithrax perp attend this conference or work on any of the research presented? In January 2002, FBI Assistant Director Van Harp told the 40,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology that it was “very likely that one or more of you know this individual.” They very likely did.

    • DXer said

      Marilyn W. Thompson in KILLER STRAIN notes:

      “In the world of Ezzell and other anthrax specialists, the terror threat had real-life implications. For decades, scientists in the field had commonly swapped sensitive information, even shipping anthrax samples to colleagues for research. Some members of the tight-knit scientific community thought little of traveling to meetings with vials of B. anthracis samples to share with trusted colleagues as a professional courtesy.”

      Ayman Zawahiri had a scientist working with him attend these conferences on a mission to obtain virulent anthrax and the know-how to use it as a weapon.

      Among the supporters of the militant islamists were people like US scientist Ali Al-Timimi and Pakistan scientist Rauf Ahmad who blended into society and were available to act when another part of the network requested it. Two letters — one typed and an earlier handwritten one — written by a scientist named Rauf Ahmad detailed his efforts to obtain a pathogenic strain of anthrax. He attended conferences on anthrax and dangerous pathogens such as one in September 2000 at the University of Plymouth co-sponsored by DERA, the UK Defense Evaluation and Research Agency. In October 2009, historian Christopher Andrew published an official history of MI5 in which he reported that MI5 had found money and equipment in Rauf Ahmad’s luggage as he left the September 2000 conference.

      A handwritten letter from 1999 is written on letterhead of the oldest microbiology society in Great Britain. The 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces by Rauf describe the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; a conference he attended on dangerous pathogens cosponsored by UK’s Porton Down and Society for Applied Microbiology, and the need for vaccination and containment. Rauf had arranged to take a lengthy post-doc leave from his employer and was grousing to Zawahiri that what the employer would be paying during that 12-month period was inadequate. Malaysian Yazid Sufaat, who told his wife he was working for a Taliban medical brigade, got the job instead of Rauf.

      One typed memo reporting on a lab visit, which included tour of a BioLevel 3 facility, where there were 1000s of pathogenic samples. The memo mentioned the pending paperwork relating to export of the pathogens. The documents were provided to me by the Defense Intelligence Agency (”DIA”) under the Freedom of Information Act.

      What lab did Rauf Ahmad visit? What is the name of the lab director that is redacted?

      • DXer said

        Continuing her description of the June 2001 conference, Marilyn writes:

        “During an outdoor cocktail party near the quaint campus boathouse, John Ezzell cringed when his conversations with FBI was interrupted by the loud disc jockey who kicked off the evening’s entertainment with a raucous tune about drunken partying. Ezzell tapped him on the shoulder and suggested that distinguished international visitors might appreciate something subtler.”

        • DXer said

          She writes:

          “camouflage guarded the entrance of the Fort Detrick building, home of the Department of Defense’s lead laboratory for biological warfare research. Ezzell carried a high security clearance — he had been part of the a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) team sent to Iraq in 1996 to assess its biowarfare capabilities. After a long motorcycle ride, however, he could look more like a haggard Hell’s Angel than one of the army’s top experts in bioterrorism.”

      • DXer said

        Marilyn writes:

        “Ezzell had begun his anthrax work after the 1979 accident at Sverdlosk. The Russian accident’s large death toll rock the Pentagon, where leaders began to fear U.S. soldiers could be vulnerable to enemy attack. A decision was made to ramp up vaccine studies at USAMRIID, testing a product, then in limited use, that was made by the state-owned Michigan Biological Products Laboratory. Army scientists had shown that the vaccine worked well against the classic Vollum strain of anthrax that had been used in the US. bioweapons program, but it remained unclear whether it could withstand a challenge by other, more exotic strains that might be in enemies’ arsenals.”

        • DXer said

          “We wanted a strain, a wild-type strain, one that had come from a cow or a deer that had just died of anthrax,” Ezzell remembered. A wild strain would test the vaccine’s potency. Ezzell’s colleague, Greg Knudson, wrote to a U.S. Agricultural Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, seeking such a variety. When the sample came in, the USAMRIID researchers casually named it the Ames strain, not realizing until uch later that it had originated in a Texas cattle-grazing field.

          In 1988, Friedlander and a USAMRIID team published the results of the first in a series of vaccine “challenge” studies in mice, then moved up the evolutionary chain to guinea pigs. Ezzell and his longtime technician, Terry Abshire, zeroed in on the protective antigens, or antibodies, in animals that were vacinated, important work that would help to make the vaccines more effective.”

          “Next came monkey studies….”

        • DXer said

          “Monkey studies were difficult for Franz, trained as a veterinarian, because the primates looked human and glared with sad eyes from their cages.

          For USAMRIID’s vaccine challenge studies, researchers used a liquid spore preparation of the Ames strain of B. anthracis. the spores were suspended in a clear watery solution. The monkeys were anesthesized in their cages inside a BL3 lab. Once quieted, they were moved to BSL4 for administration of an anthrax aerosol, Friedlander said. Their heads were pushed through tight ruber nozzles into a sealed compartment attached to a nebulizer that turned liquid anthrax into a fine aerosol. Helpless, the monkeys breathed in the deadly mist. Using advanced equipment, the researchers were able to calculate how many spores had made it into their lungs.

          USAMRIID’s monkey studies gave researchers their first plausible estimates of how many spores would constitute infectious and lethal doses of anthrax in humans.

          “In the 1990s, we hired a contractor to go through all that old data to try to help us with things like what really is the dose that it takes to make you sick, to infect you,” said Franz. Researchers finally arrived at estimates of at least 2,500 spores to become infected and from 8,000 to 50,000 spores for a fatal dose. These quantities could easily be inhaled in a single breath. “There’s a lot of holes in that data; for example, we didn’t go down to see the low doses,” Franz said. “What if you get a hundred spores? Would any monkeys die, or get infected?”

    • DXer said

      Let’s get some easy questions out of the way: What lab did Zawahiri’s infiltrating scientist Rauf Ahmad visit on his second attempt at a lab to acquire virulent Ames (reflected in a typewritten letter and not the handwritten letter some news accounts and analysts mistakenly assumed). Did he visit the lab of the FBI’s anthrax expert which had made a dried powder out of the Ames in Flask 1029?

      George Tenet in his May 2007 In the Center of the Storm says: “Al-Qa’ida spared no effort in its attempt to obtain biological weapons. In 1999, al-Zawahiri recruited Pakistani national Rauf Ahmad.

      As described by Dr. Peter Turnbull’s Conference report for SFAM on “the First European Dangerous Pathogens Conference” (held in Winchester), at the September 1999 conference, the lecture theater only averaged about 75 at peak times by his head count. There had been a problem of defining “dangerous pathogen” and a “disappointing representation from important institutions in the world of hazard levels 3 and 4 organisms.” Papers included a summary of plague in Madagascar and another on the outbreak management of hemorrhagic fevers.

      Dr Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University presented a paper on multilocus VNTR typing, for example, of Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis. There were more than the usual no-show presenters and fill-in speakers. In his report, Dr. Turnbull looked forward to a second, fully international conference in 2000 focused on the ever increasing problems surrounding hazard levels 3 and 4 organisms and aimed at international agreement on the related issues.

      The Sunday at the start of the Organization of the Dangerous Pathogens meeting in September 2000, which the SFAM director confirmed to me that Rauf Ahmad also attended, was gloomy. Planning had proved even more difficult than the International Conference on anthrax also held at the University of Plymouth, in September 1998. The overseas delegates included a sizable contingent from Russia. The organizers needed to address many thorny issues regarding who could attend. One of the scientists in attendance was Rauf Ahmad. The Washington Post reports: “The tall, thin and bespectacled scientist held a doctorate in microbiology but specialized in food production, according to U.S. officials familiar with the case.”

      Les Baillie the head of the biodefense technologies group at Porton Down ran the scientific program. Many of the delegates took an evening cruise round Plymouth harbor. The cold kept most from staying out on the deck. Later attendees visited the National Marine Aquarium — with a reception in view of a large tankful of sharks. Addresses include presentations on plagues of antiquity, showing how dangerous infectious diseases had a profound that they changed the course of history. Titles include “Magna pestilencia – Black Breath, Black Rats, Black Death”, “From Flanders to Glanders,” as well as talks on influenza, typhoid and cholera. The conference was co-sponsored by DERA, the UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency.

      Les Baillie of Porton Down gave a presentation titled, “Bacillus anthracis: a bug with attitude!” He argued that anthrax was a likely pathogen to be used by terrorists. As described at the time by Phil Hanna of University of Michigan Medical School on the SFAM webpage, Baillie “presented a comprehensive overview of this model pathogen, describing its unique biology and specialized molecular mechanisms for pathogenesis and high virulence. He went on to describe modern approaches to exploit new bioinformatics for the development of potential medical counter measures to this deadly pathogen.”

      Bioinformatics was the field that Ali Al-Timimi, who had a security clearance for some government work and who had done work for the Navy, would enter by 2000 at George Mason University in Virginia. Despite the cold and the sharks, amidst all the camaraderie and bonhomie no one suspected that despite the best efforts, a predator was on board — on a coldly calculated mission to obtain a pathogenic anthrax strain. The conference organizer Peter Turnbull had received funding from the British defense ministry but not from public health authorities, who thought anthrax too obscure to warrant the funding. By 2001, sponsorship of the conference was assumed by USAMRIID. USAMRIID scientist Bruce Ivins had started planning the conference held in Annapolis, Maryland in June 2001 three years earlier, immediately upon his return from the September 1998 conference.

      According to the Pakistan press, a scientist named Rauf Ahmad was picked up in December 2001 by the CIA in Karachi. The most recent of the correspondence reportedly dates back to the summer and fall of 1999. Even if Rauf Ahmad cooperated with the CIA, he apparently could only confirm the depth of Zawahiri’s interest in weaponizing anthrax and provided no “smoking gun” concerning the identity of those responsible for the anthrax mailings in the Fall 2001. His only connection with SFAM was a member of the society — he was not an employee. The Pakistan ISI, according to the Washington Post article in October 2006, stopped cooperating in regard to Rauf Ahmad in 2003.

      I have uploaded scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad noted that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptably low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical. I also have uploaded a handwritten copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ pages more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 90 of the 100 pages are the photocopies of journal articles and disease handbook excerpts.

      The Washington Post, in an exclusive groundbreaking investigative report, recounts that the FBI’s New York office took the lead U.S. role — and its agents worked closely with the CIA and bureau officials in Pakistan in interrogating Rauf. Though not formally charged with any crimes, Rauf agreed to questioning. While the US media focused on the spectacle of bloodhounds alerting to Dr. Steve Hatfill and the draining of Maryland ponds, this former Al Qaeda anthrax operative provided useful leads. But problems began when the U.S. officials sought to pursue criminal charges, including possible indictment and prosecution in the United States.

      “He was detained for questioning, and later the courts determined there was not sufficient evidence to continue detaining him,” Pakistan’s information minister told the Post. “If there was evidence that proved his role beyond a shadow of a doubt, we would have acted on it. But that kind of evidence was not available.” Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, if keeping with his past experience, would have kept things strictly compartmentalized — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.

      • DXer said

        “In the late 1990s, as public concern about anthrax’s potential as a terrorist tool heightened, John Ezzell gradually took on a new role at USAMRIID. He worked closely with the FBI to train its scientists to detect anthrax while gearing up USAMRIID’s laboratories to handle and analyze anthrax that might surface as evidence in a criminal investigation.

        Along with his Harley, he kept a four-wheel-drive at the ready at his log cabin on the banks of the Potomac. Single, with two grown children, Ezzell found peace canoeing, hiking, and ambitious gardening. He once bought three thousand flowering bulbs at a clearance sale and planted about 1,000 of them before giving in to exhaustion. He liked to putter through town with George, his chocolate Labrador, panting from the back of his 1952 Chevy pickup. But he also liked to know that he could bolt out of seclusion at a moment’s notice if the FBI called in the middle of the night with biological samples to test. He and his lab crew could speed through USAMRIID’s gates and be ready for action by the time an FBI chopper landed on the helipad outside his office.”

        • DXer said

          In the 1998 case involving Larry Wayne Harris and a sample seized in Las Vegas,

          “At USAMRIID, Ezzell and his team took the samples to his laboratory, smeared cultures of the material on glass slides, and went to work.

          Finally, toiling through the night on test after test, Ezzell had the results. He and Franz, then the USAMRIID commander, called the FBI to convey the news, which was passed upstairs to then FBI Director Louis Freeh and the office of Attorney General Janet Reno. Some of the material prepared by Larry Wayne Harris was anthrax, but in a harmless veterinary vaccine form. Ezzell heard the phone momentarily go silent at the other end of the line.”

        • DXer said

          “Over time, the top brass at USAMRIID realize they were no longer running a purely medical laboratory. Environmental samples flooded in from air testing around the sites of the Democratic and Republican national conventions, the presidential inaugural events, and other large public gathering sites where a secret bioterror attack could occur. USAMRIID’s mission had increasingly come to include handling forensic evidence with the exacting care and procedures that would allow it to stand up in court. Ezzell spent time with Special Agent David Wilson at FBI headquarters to learn how to develop a USAMRIID Special Pathogens Laboratory that could respond to the need.”

      • DXer said

        Marilyn Thompson in her chapter “Black Clouds Over Ft. Detrick” explains:

        “From crowded bookshelves, the retired scientist pulled out a thin white binder labeled “Weaponization” in blue Magic Marker. The binder’s contents were classified, but Patrick held it aloft to illustrate his point.

        “Who in the hell has seen [weaponized] anthrax against Bill Patrick, Ken Alibek, and a few other people?” he said, laughing dismissively. “Even people like John Ezzell, who are very good scientists, they’ve never seen any dried anthrax.”

        “Patrick was the creator of several patented processes used at Fort Detrick to turn germs into agents of war. More than thirty years after the program ended, the formulas remained top secret, but Patrick acknowledged that he had discussed some aspects of his work rather freely over the years in private meetings with other scientists and government officials.”

        “To be viewed with suspicion by the FBI was an indignity. As soon as the first anthrax letter surfaced in October 2001, Patrick expected the FBI to solicit his help in solving one of the most scientifically challenging case law enforcement had ever faced. Instead, special agents from the Baltimore field office strapped him for three-and-a-half hours to a polygraph machine and grilled him on names, associations, and his movements, phone calls, and consulting jobs, theorizing that he might have wittingly or unwittingly passed on sensitive knowledge to an unknown killer.”

    • DXer said

      This morning, when I first thought to ask, Dr. Ezzell confirms to me that he does not know Rauf Ahmad / Abdur Rauf.

  4. DXer said

    A February 15, 2005 interview statement by someone states:

    “The only place ____ recalled seeing Ba in an odd location was in Room ____ of Building _________. This is a lab where __________________, and _____________ were working on a John Hopkins project involving the use of aerosol samples of Ba in a study of _____________________________________________. The labeled tubes of Ba samples were
    in a refrigerator with a sliding door where _____ had intended to place ______________

    • DXer said

      With respect to the aerosol experiments on the Darpa-funded JH project for which withdrawal from flask 1029 apparently was made on 8/26/2000 (see expanded record of flask 1029 withdrawals) to make a dry powdered aerosol (see JE blog post), was the aerosol dry or wet?

  5. DXer said

    Dr. Ezzell advises me that he is in agreement with Ivins in that he knew of no plans to test dried spores in animals. “As for dried spores that [his] lab produced, the spores were sterilized using gamma irradiation before being freeze- dried. The spores were to be used by DARPA to test biothreat detection systems using mass spectrometry technology.” Dr. Ezzell also reports that he doesn’t about the “I-1 strain” and doesn’t recall a rack of tubes labeled as “I-1″.

    • DXer said

      Some additional record from the 2700 pages of documents:

      A 12/12/2003 302 Ivins interview statement refers to emails provided “regarding request to find out of USAMRIID made dried, powdered anthrax Ba spores.”

      Those emails have not been provided and should have been.

      January 9, 2008 302 interview

      “__________noted IVINS was excluded from certain ”projects,” meaning USAMRIID research that directly supported the U.S. Intelligence Community.”

      Question: Dr. Ivins had written his superior in 2006 to express concern that some of his stock might be missing due to uses that did not involve him.

      His superior told him to shut up and that everything was under control. Was that the same person who in November 2007 ordered his colleagues not to speak with him?

      4/21/2008 Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

      “After a FOX News internet news story entitled “FBI Focusing on ‘About Four’ Suspects in 2001 Anthrax Attacks” was posted on 03/08/2008, several employees of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) began to discuss the article and the ongoing AMERITHRAX investigation. CHS advised that, after reading the article, many USAMRIID employees came to the conclusion that __________ a scientist formerly employed at USAMRIID, was one of the unnamed individuals discussed in the article.”

      Who was that?

      4/11/2008 302 interview statement

      __________ reiterated again that ____ did not think it was possible for an employee at USAMRIID to have produced the anthrax powder, mainly because laboratory space was extremely crowded and therefore it would be impossible for the perpetrator to maintain anonymity while producing such a large volume of purified Ba spores. _______ described IVINS as just an “odd duck,” someone who is very benign.”

      9/25/2007 302 interview statement

      _________ AND __________ advised that back in 2001 their American Red Cross chapter held its monthly Emergency Services meetings on the third Monday of each month.

      ….

      the meetings generally began at approximately 6:30 pm and lasted approximately one and a half to two hours in length. As in prior interviews ________ and reiterated that IVINS typically attended these monthly meetings….

      NOTE: The third Monday in September 2001 fell on September 17th, the night Dr. Ivins would have had to have been on the road mailing the anthrax laden letters. He reported to work the next morning at 7 a.m.

      March 9, 2010 11:37 AM
      Anonymous said…
      Ivins had group therapy sessions scheduled on both September 17, 2001 and October 8, 2001, the dates he supposedly was mailing the anthrax letters.

      Source: October 12, 2007 Washington Field Memo

      On January 22, 2007, Dr. Ivins wrote an email:

      “Now the Postal Service people are all over RIID. … It’s very emotionally draining, (…), to know that people think that I could or would be a killer/terrorist. I didn’t mail the spores and didn’t bioweaponize them and I hope that nobody took a strain or some spores that led directly or indirectly to the anthrax mailings.”

  6. Roberto said

    Sample from Iraq?

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