CASE CLOSED … what really happened in the 2001 anthrax attacks?

* DXer responds to USA Today’s comment that “the anthrax case has not been closed because the lead suspect committed suicide”

Posted by DXer on October 6, 2009

CASE CLOSEDCASE CLOSED is a novel which answers the question “Why did the FBI fail to solve the 2001 anthrax case?” … click here to … buy CASE CLOSED by Lew Weinstein

Here’s what readers say about CASE CLOSED  …

“CASE CLOSED takes headline events and weaves a credible scenario around the anthrax scare and government departments working under the radar.”

“Lew Weinstein is a meticulous researcher and a determined storyteller. CASE CLOSED  will keep you up at night — reading, then worrying.”


USA Today reports (10-6-09) …

“Although the anthrax case has not been closed because the lead suspect committed suicide, the FBI blames the attacks on a lone government scientist, Bruce Ivins of the United States Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. The Ivins case showed that this is now something that an individual can do.”

DXer comments …

Of course, if there were persuasive evidence Bruce Ivins was the processor and mailer, or involved at all, it would make it EASIER to close the case, not harder. All the evidence tends to establish is that his flask was the original source of the stream of isolates from which the attack anthrax could have been accessed.

To date, the most compelling data point relates to the method of concentrating anthrax using silica in the culture medium developed by the DARPA-funded researchers who shared a suite with Ali Al-Timimi, whose eminent defense counsel has said in a brief filed with the federal district court is an “anthrax weapons suspect.”

The Silicon Signature does not point to the method that Dugway was using in 2001. It points away from that method. Instead, aside from pointing to the confidential patent co-invented by Dr. Al-Timimi’s suitemates, it may point to the experiments Ivins and others were doing as part of vaccine research and, for example, the growth medium they used containing a high iron content. (Whether that was shared with or accessible by others has not yet been disclosed). Lab Notebook 4010 will reveal much because it will make plain the reason for the lesser Silicon Signature in flask 1030 (as distinguished from flask 1029).


12 Responses to “* DXer responds to USA Today’s comment that “the anthrax case has not been closed because the lead suspect committed suicide””

  1. DXer said

    1,000 more pages of Dr. Ivins emails are currently being released by USAMRIID.

  2. DXer said

    LA Times reports that the MI5 “found samples and equipment in the luggage of a Pakistani microbiologist, Rauf Ahmad, who had attended a conference on pathogens in Britain.”

    Advance press of new authorized history of MI5 by history professor on 100th anniversary addresses infiltrator Rauf Ahmad. Posting the URLs prevents me from avoiding moderation and so let me just quote.

    –“[I]n the summer of 1999, MI5 reported: “Intelligence suggests that while UBL is seeking to launch an attack inside the US, he is aware that the US will provide a tough operating environment for his organisation.”

    Unknown to MI5, Britain had already been targeted by al-Qaeda. It was only after September 11 that officers discovered that a Pakistani microbiologist called Rauf Ahmad, also known as Abdur Rauf, who traveled to a conference in Britain in September 2000 to try and buy pathogens from fellow delegates, was a high-ranking member of al-Qaeda.

    –The book says that in 2000, MI5 — without realizing it at the time — foiled a plot by al-Qaida to obtain biological weapons when it found samples and equipment in the luggage of a Pakistani microbiologist, Rauf Ahmad, who had attended a conference on pathogens in Britain. U.S. intelligence later revealed that Ahmad had been in touch with al-Qaida’s No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

    Suspect and A Setback In Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case
    Author: Joby Warrick
    Publication: The Washington Post
    Date: October 31, 2006

    “Rauf’s name was first publicly associated with the documents by Ross Getman, a New York lawyer who maintains a Web site devoted to the 2001 anthrax attacks.”


    A very accomplished historian, once said by the Times to be the leading unofficial historian of British intelligence and now perhaps could be said to be the official historian insofar as he was given access to 400, 000 pages from the files of MI5 on their 100the anniversary. This is billed as the first ever authorized history of an intelligence agency. According to the LA Times, in a forthcoming book he reports that the MI5 seized samples and equipment from Rauf Ahmad’s luggage in 2000 coming from the UK conference where he had gone to buy pathogens from fellow attendees. This was a conference Bruce Ivins attended, by the way. USAMRIID took over sponsorship of the conference in 2001 and Bruce Ivins was planning the conference.

    Professor Andrews says Rauf was a high-ranking member of Al Qaeda (according to the LA Times article). The former DIA anthrax analyst last night tells me that the Professor is mistaken on both counts. (This fellow interviewed Sufaat’s lab techs at Gitmo, for example and taught an intelligence seminar at Yale and so I don’t take what he says lightly).

    I haven’t seen the book and so don’t know what precisely the book says. Maybe something got lost in the translation. Or maybe the MI5 did not tell the DIA all that it knew. I don’t know how DIA can exclude the possibility that the US (at least the DIA) just was not told. Amerithrax did not share at all with DIA so why would they expect the MI5 not to let something fall between the cracks. As for Rauf Ahmad himself, Joby Warrick informed us that the ISI was controlling the flow of information and shut the CIA/FBI down in early 2003. (I first named Rauf in 2002 based on local press accounts in Pakistan upon a raid of the Khawaja complex).

    There are lots of possibilities. Was Rauf working for intelligence after 2000? Did he lead them to the compound with numerous high-level EIJ folks?

    Or maybe the MI5 in this book wants to release what it knew as part of claiming credit for foiling a bioterror attack — and not be the target of blame for actually allowing one to happen. Certainly the first question raised is what strains were seized? Who supplied them to Rauf?

    I’ve asked Professor Andrews for the underlying MI5 memo but he referred me to the publicist who will be back in the office today. Then I asked her for a copy of the excerpt in the book so at least we know exactly what is said. In his other books, he has copious footnotes. I picked up his KGB at a garage sale yesterday, co-authored with a high level defector, and it is voluminous and amply sourced. Most of the information in KGB is well, historical, dating back many years (e.g., WW I, WW II etc).

    So it will be fascinating to square the report with the correspondence between Rauf and Ayman where his motivation seemed just to be money.

    And I’ve always though that I that was corresponding with him — with him just learning more from me than me from him. But in a day of Man-in-The-Middle (Janus) computer hacking or in simple miscommunication between people who have a different native language, I don’t rely on my conclusions from the email correspondence. It dropped off every time I indicated I had no money to give.

    Personally, I credit the professor that samples were taken from Rauf Ahmad’s luggage and am just looking to see the passage in the book itself. Characterization of him as a high-level Qaeda member is a relatively soft issue relating mainly to whether he swore the al Bayat. He certainly had a confidential and secret relationship with Zawahiri and his focus on money (his grousing about the pay being inadequate) is there on the face of his correspondence from 1999. I don’t see the new report — about the 2000 conference — as inconsistent… and am fascinated.

    What samples did he have? What pathogen? What strain? Who did he get them from? What labs did he visit in 1999? (The second one had thousands of virulent pathogens and his first line was telling Zawahiri he had achieved the targets.

    Hey, Rauf, there is a $2.5 million reward in Amerithrax. If you have been subject to leverage by the MI5 since 2000, you may have keener insights than most people give you credit. In fact, heck, you may have been a penetration agent, with Zawahiri never imagining how deeply his organization has been penetrated.

    Off-topic –
    On the off-topic subject of the art heist for which there is a $5 million reward, there was a press conference yesterday announcing that the pair claiming the theft were suspects.

    • DXer said

      We are advised for the first time — 8 years after the fact — that samples were seized from Rauf Ahmad’s luggage after a UK 2000 conference on pathogens.

      USAMRIID released some emails by Bruce Ivins discussing the difficulties of planning the Fourth International Conference on Anthrax in Annapolis. The first of the emails was from September 1998, upon his return from the conference at Plymouth. In June 2001, the good ship anthrax sailed in Annapolis, Maryland, the “sailing capital of the world.” The 4th International Conference on Anthrax was held at St. John’s College in historic Annapolis, Maryland, June 10 – 13, 2001. The conference was organized by the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and managed by the American Society for Microbiology. The 74-foot classic wooden schooner was named WOODWIND. Martin Hugh-Jones had convened the conference along with Peter Turnbull, the Porton Down scientist who had led the UK conferences attended by Ayman Zawahiri’s scientist, Rauf Ahmad. Reports of livestock and national park outbreaks were followed by a summary by Dr. Turnbull. Other anthrax notables who spoke included senior USAMRIID scientist Dr. Ezzell, who had one of the first looks at the Daschle product, and Dr. Paul Keim, who would play a key role in the genetic investigation.

      Other talks focused on cell structure and function such as the S-layer, exosporium, and germination. Theresa Koehler from the Houston Medical School gave a talk titled “The Expanding B. anthracis Toolbox” while Timothy Read from The Institute of Genome Research summarized research on The B. Anthracis Genome. Houston Medical School, the UK’s biodefense facility Porton Down, and Pasteur Institute each fielded three presenters. UK scientists presented on the characteristics of the exosporium of “the highly virulent Ames strain.” Researchers from Columbus, Ohio and Biological Defense Research Directorate (BDRD) of the Navy Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, assisted by Porton Down scientists from the UK, demonstrated that inoculated mice survived a challenge with b.anthracis spores. Researchers used b.anthracis containing a plasmid with a mutated lethal factor. The mice were “immunized via gene gun inoculation with eucaryotic expression plasmids encoding either the protective antigen (PA), a mutated form of lethal factor (LF) or a combination of the two.” Dr. Phil Hanna from University of Michigan was there and presented, as he had been in the UK at the conference attending with Rauf Ahmad.

      A Kazakhstan Ministry of Health scientist presented on the re-emergence of anthrax in Kazakhstan. Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union the first job offer Ken Alibek fielded was the position of Minister of Health in Kazakhstan. He protested when he realized that his new employer’s job description shifted to “you know the job,” and he realized that they just wanted to do what the Soviets had been secretly doing in an illegal and massive bioweapons program he had supervised as its First Deputy. After the KGB asked to meet with him, he asked to schedule the meeting in two weeks, so that he might visit his parents, and then found a secret expedited way of coming to the United States.

      Pakistan Rauf Ahmad had been the predator looking for the Ames strain and consulting on weaponization techniques at the UK conference. Did the Amerithrax perp attend this conference or work on any of the research presented? Ali Al-Timimi had a high security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy. Why? When? What did his work involve? In January 2002, FBI Assistant Director Van Harp told the 40,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology that it was “very likely that one or more of you know this individual.” They very likely did.

      • DXer said

        The report that MI5 seized samples from Rauf Ahmad’s luggage in 2000 should be put in a fuller context.

        George Tenet in his May 2007 In the Center of the Storm says: “Al-Qa’ida spared no effort in its attempt to obtain biological weapons. In 1999, al-Zawahiri recruited Pakistani national Rauf Ahmad, to set up a small lab in Khandahar, Afghanistan, to house the biological weapons effort. In December 2001, a sharp WMD analyst at CIA found the initial lead on which we would pull and, ultimately, unravel the al-Qa’ida anthrax networks. We were able to identify Rauf Ahmad from letters he had written to Ayman al-Zawahiri. … We located Rauf Ahmad’s lab in Afghanistan. We identified the building in Khandahar where Sufaat claimed he isolated anthrax. We mounted operations that resulted in the arrests and detentions of anthrax operatives in several countries.”

        Delivering the James Smart Lecture, entitled “Global Terrorism: are we meeting the challenge?” at the headquarters of the City of London Police, Ms. Manningham-Buller, the head of MI5, said: “Western security services have uncovered networks of individuals, sympathetic to the aims of al-Qa’ida, that blend into society, individuals who live normal, routine lives until called upon for specific tasks by another part of the network.” She concluded: “The threats of chemical, biological and radiological and suicide attacks require new responses and the Government alone will not achieve all of it; industry and even the public must take greater responsibility for their own security.”

        Milton Leitenberg wrote in a chapter on evolving threats in Wenger and Wollenmann’s 2007 Bioterrorism: Confronting A Complex Threat: “The first significant and meaningful information on what Al-Qaida may at some point have hoped to achieve in the area of bioweapons appeared on a single page in the journal SCIENCE in mid-December 2003, and then in declassified documents that were obtained in the last week of March 2004. … Appended to the single page in SCIENCE via the internet address was a list of thirty-two items: eleven books and twenty-one professional journal papers nearly all dating from the 1950s and 1960s dealing with pathogens or bioweapons.” He explained: “They were found in Al Qaida training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 2001. Half of the books dealt with historic or general aspects of bioweapons and would be of little practical use in an effort to produce bioweapons agents. However, at least some of the journal papers and the remaining half of the books might have been useful in such an effort. They were found only a few kilometers from the site near the Kandahar airport that confirmed the rudimentary equipment also procured by Al-Qaida.”Most important of all, the documents indicated that “al-Qaida’s BW initiative included recruitment of individuals with PhD-level expertise who supported planning and acquisition efforts by their familiarity with the scientific community.” Mr. Leitenberg concludes: “If it should turn out, as is currently assumed, that the Amerithrax perpetrator came from within the US government’s own biodefense program, with access to strains, laboratories, people and knowledge, then all previous conceptions about the significance of the events would be substantially altered.” He observes that “Al-Qaeda has actively recruited educated college graduates and … specifically sought individuals with particular knowledge and training. … Such recruiting patterns do not automatically translate into either an interest or capability in bioweapons, but they would be a key advantage should the interests of such a group turn in that direction, as Al-Zawahiri’s [1999] memorandum quoted above suggests they may.”

        In 1999, a scientist from Porton Down had reported to sfam members on a conference in Taos, New Mexico in August that included a talk by Tim Read, (TIGR, Rockville, USA) and concerned the whole genome sequencing of the Bacillus anthracis Ames strain. The Ames strain may have been a mystery to many after the Fall 2001 mailings, but not to motivated Society for Applied Microbiology (“SFAM”) members, one of whom was part of Ayman Zawahiri’s “Project Zabadi.” As described by Dr. Peter Turnbull’s Conference report for SFAM on “the First European Dangerous Pathogens Conference” (held in Winchester), at the September 1999 conference, the lecture theater only averaged about 75 at peak times by his head count. There had been a problem of defining “dangerous pathogen” and a “disappointing representation from important institutions in the world of hazard levels 3 and 4 organisms.” Papers included a summary of plague in Madagascar and another on the outbreak management of hemorrhagic fevers. Dr Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University presented a paper on multilocus VNTR typing, for example, of Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis. There were more than the usual no-show presenters and fill-in speakers. In his report, Dr. Turnbull looked forward to a second, fully international conference in 2000 focused on the ever increasing problems surrounding hazard levels 3 and 4 organisms and aimed at international agreement on the related issues. University of Maryland researcher Milton Leitenberg reports that the conferences described in the correspondence had been in July and September 1999.

        The Sunday at the start of the Organization of the Dangerous Pathogens meeting in September 2000, which the SFAM director confirmed to me that Rauf Ahmad also attended, was gloomy. Planning had proved even more difficult than the International Conference on anthrax also held at the University of Plymouth, in September 1998. The overseas delegates included a sizable contingent from Russia. The organizers needed to address many thorny issues regarding who could attend. One of the scientists in attendance was Rauf Ahmad. The Washington Post reports: “The tall, thin and bespectacled scientist held a doctorate in microbiology but specialized in food production, according to U.S. officials familiar with the case.” Les Baillie the head of the biodefense technologies group at Porton Down ran the scientific program. Many of the delegates took an evening cruise round Plymouth harbor. The cold kept most from staying out on the deck. Later attendees visited the National Marine Aquarium — with a reception in view of a large tankful of sharks. Addresses include presentations on plagues of antiquity, showing how dangerous infectious diseases had a profound that they changed the course of history. Titles include “Magna pestilencia – Black Breath, Black Rats, Black Death”, “From Flanders to Glanders,” as well as talks on influenza, typhoid and cholera. The conference was co-sponsored by DERA, the UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency.

        Les Baillie of Porton Down gave a presentation titled, “Bacillus anthracis: a bug with attitude!” He argued that anthrax was a likely pathogen to be used by terrorists. As described at the time by Phil Hanna of University of Michigan Medical School on the SFAM webpage, Baillie “presented a comprehensive overview of this model pathogen, describing its unique biology and specialized molecular mechanisms for pathogenesis and high virulence. He went on to describe modern approaches to exploit new bioinformatics for the development of potential medical counter measures to this deadly pathogen.” Bioinformatics was the field that Ali Al-Timimi, who had a security clearance for some government work and who had done work for the Navy, would enter by 2000 at George Mason University in Virginia. Despite the cold and the sharks, amidst all the camaraderie and bonhomie no one suspected that despite the best efforts, a predator was on board — on a coldly calculated mission to obtain a pathogenic anthrax strain. The conference organizer Peter Turnbull had received funding from the British defense ministry but not from public health authorities, who thought anthrax too obscure to warrant the funding. By 2001, sponsorship of the conference was assumed by USAMRIID. USAMRIID scientist Bruce Ivins had started planning the conference held in Annapolis, Maryland in June 2001 three years earlier, immediately upon his return from the September 1998 conference.

        According to the Pakistan press, a scientist named Rauf Ahmad was picked up in December 2001 by the CIA in Karachi. The most recent of the correspondence reportedly dates back to the summer and fall of 1999. Even if Rauf Ahmad cooperated with the CIA, he apparently could only confirm the depth of Zawahiri’s interest in weaponizing anthrax and provided no “smoking gun” concerning the identity of those responsible for the anthrax mailings in the Fall 2001. But to know that there was no “smoking gun”, we would need to know: what samples was he caught leaving the 2000 conference with? Who did he get them from? This is the sort of thing important to learn. Not that some sorority had a storage unit in Princeton and that Ivins wrote cute poems. For starters, we would want to know whether Dr. Ivins was the source of the strains seized from Rauf Ahmad. Rauf’s only connection with SFAM was a member of the society — he was not an employee, the sfam director once took pains to emphasize to me. The Pakistan ISI, according to the Washington Post article in October 2006, stopped cooperating in regard to Rauf Ahmad in 2003.

        I have uploaded scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad noted that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptably low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical. I also have uploaded a handwritten copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ pages more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 90 of the 100 pages are the photocopies of journal articles and disease handbook excerpts.

        The Post, in an exclusive groundbreaking investigative report, recounts that the FBI’s New York office took the lead U.S. role — and its agents worked closely with the CIA and bureau officials in Pakistan in interrogating Rauf. Though not formally charged with any crimes, Rauf agreed to questioning. While the US media focused on the spectacle of bloodhounds alerting to Dr. Steve Hatfill and the draining of Maryland ponds, this former Al Qaeda anthrax operative provided useful leads. But problems began when the U.S. officials sought to pursue criminal charges, including possible indictment and prosecution in the United States. In earlier cases, such as the othopedic surgeon Dr. Amer Aziz who treated Bin Laden in the Fall of 2001, the Pakistani government angered the Pakistani public when it sought to prosecute professionals for alleged ties to al-Qaeda. In the case of Amer Aziz, hundreds of doctors, engineers and lawyers took to the streets to demand his release. In 2003, the Pakistanis shut off U.S. access to Rauf. By then, I had noticed the reporting of his arrest in a press article about the raid of a compound of doctors named Khawaja and published it on my website. According to Pakistani officials, there was not enough evidence showing that he actually succeeded in providing al-Qaeda with something useful. Since then, the Post reports, Rauf has been allowed to return to his normal life. Attempts by the Post to contact Rauf in Lahore were unsuccessful. Initially the government agency had said an interview would be possible but then backpedaled.

        “He was detained for questioning, and later the courts determined there was not sufficient evidence to continue detaining him,” Pakistan’s information minister told the Post. “If there was evidence that proved his role beyond a shadow of a doubt, we would have acted on it. But that kind of evidence was not available.” Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, if keeping with his past experience, would have kept things strictly compartmentalized — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.

      • DXer said


        You might want to watch the full run of the excellent MI5 tv series. It perhaps is available to you in a free trial of NETFLIX as it is here in the US. In this episode in which Tom is decommissioned, he is very upset that a scientist was being screwed over by the service.

  3. DXer said

    The Amerithrax Third Squad and its failure to catch the Fifth Man:

    DEFEND THE REALM author Christopher Andrew discusses the Cambridge 5, Russian spies who had infiltrated MI5 at high levels. It is the biggest known failure of MI5. What will be known as the biggest known failure of the CIA and FBI to detect infiltration? Will it be known as AMERITHRAX if things remain on their present publicly announced course?

    • DXer said

      In his book KGB: the Inside Story (1990), co-authored with Oleg Gordievsky, Professor Andrew tells the now famous ricin-in-the-umbrella assassination story:

      “The first target was a Bulgarian emigre living in England. While he was on holiday on the Continent, the DS smeared surfaces in the room where he was staying with a poison that, once absorbed through the skin, would, according to the KGB laboratory, prove fatal and leave no trace. Though the target became seriously ill, however, he survived. … Golubev returned to Sofia to work out a new plan of attack. At Golubev’s request, the KGB main residence in Washington purchased several umbrellas and sent them to the Center. Directorate OTU adapted the tip to enable it to inject the victim with a tiny metal pellet containing ricin, a highly toxic poison made from castor-oil seeds. Golubev then took the umbrellas to Sofia to instruct a DS assassin in their use. The first victim was Georgi Markov, then working for the Bulgarian section of the BBC World Service. Before he died in a hospital Markov was able to tell doctors that he had been bumped by a stranger on Westminster Bridge, who apologized for accidentally prodding him with his umbrella. A tiny stab wound and the remains of a pellet scarcely larger than a pinhead were found in Markov’s right thigh, but by the time of the autopsy the ricin had decomposed.

      A second assassination attempt a week later in Paris against another Bulgarian emigre, Vladimir Kostov, failed. This time the steel pellet failed to disintegrate and it was removed from Kostov’s body before the ricin had escaped. … Even if the DS files on the Markov case have been shredded or sent to Moscow, there are undoubtelly DS officers who know the truth about the assassination. As Bulgaria progresses toward democracy, they may well be tempted to reveal it.”

  4. DXer said

    The Anthrax Files – TIME
    In an e-mail to a friend, Ivins wrote that he sometimes felt as if he were … I ‘m a little dream-self, short and stout./ I’m the other half of Bruce — when …,9171,1830385,00.html

    Ivins kept troubles mostly hidden from friends – Wednesday, Aug. 6 …
    Aug 6, 2008 … In another e-mail, dated Sept. 26, 2001, Ivins discusses his therapy group and how all of the … “I’m a little dream-self, short and stout. ……/ivins-kept-troubles-mostly-hidden-from-friends/

  5. DXer said

    The poem Ivins wrote wasn’t nearly as probative of his guilt.

    This poem wasn’t written by Ivins. I wrote it in 2007 and posted it as some light humor, just as Ivins did in his email to his friend.

    • DXer said

      From TIME:

      “In December 2001, he wrote the most disturbing e-mail of all the messages released by the Justice Department: “I made up some poems about having two people in one (me the person in my dreams): … I’m a little dream-self, short and stout./ I’m the other half of Bruce — when he lets me out./ When I get all steamed up, I don’t pout./ I push Bruce aside, them [sic] I’m Free to run about!”

      Comment: 1,000 more pages of emails are being processed. This was a cute poem and not reliable evidence of murder. But, as TIME reports, it was the most disturbing that they released. It wasn’t disturbing. It was cute.

  6. DXer said

    In light of this award-deserving newspaper article today in the Monterey Herald, it looks like someone may collect the $5 million reward in the Pebble Beach art heist involving an insider’s theft.

    Will Dr. Ivins’ email confidant discussing mental health issues with him collect the $2.5 million reward? If so, based on what evidence? When will it be disclosed?

    Pebble Beach art heist puts collectors in spotlight, Monterey Herald 10/04/2009

    • BugMaster said

      Email confidant!? When was any of this disclosed?

      Explains why the FBI doesn’t want Fort Detrick to release some of the emails.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: