* Deposition Excerpt of USAMRIID Scientist Stephen Little: Bruce Ivins would not have had skill, equipment, or ability to decontaminate equipment
Posted by Lew Weinstein on July 16, 2011
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Posted by Lew Weinstein on July 16, 2011
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This entry was posted on July 16, 2011 at 12:29 am and is filed under Uncategorized. Tagged: *** 2001 anthrax attacks, *** Amerithrax, *** Dr. Bruce Ivins, *** FBI anthrax investigation, Dr. Stephen Little, Stevens v. United States. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.
Ralph said
The animated video attached clearly shows that a man of Ivins’s build who was wearing overalls would need the assistance of another person to move a refrigerator-sized piece of equipment and any other items used in the manufacture of anthrax spores. If Ivins was guilty, then it was clearly a conspiracy.
DXer said
That’s fallacious reasoning given that there is no reason to assume a lyophilizer was used for drying or that the location of the drying was at USAMRIID.
But on the narrow issue you raise, it would be interesting to look up the spec and ascertain the weight of that make and model of lyophiizer.
Two men last week took out of my kitchen the old refrigerator, which was very heavy. The new refrigerator is the same size but not nearly as heavy.
Materials submitted to the US Government Accountability Office, to determine if there is any credible evidence of a connection,
between a foreign entity and the attacks on the United States in, 2001 involving anthrax,
April 07, 2011
http://www.blurb.com/books/2327692
DXer said
These documents — withheld by the DOJ along with the other lab notebook pages they are withholding — show what Dr. Ivins was doing in the lab on the dates that the DOJ speculated, without any basis, that he was making a dried powder.
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/07/20/the-pulitzer-may-go-to-the-definitive-write-up-on-the-issue-of-what-dr-ivins-was-doing-on-the-nights-in-september-and-early-october-2001-that-the-department-of-justice-speculated-without-any-basis/
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/06/03/dr-ivins-lab-notebook-establishes-that-there-were-lots-of-dead-mice-and-dead-rabbits-on-the-precise-dates-that-the-prosecutors-and-investigators-speculate-without-basis-that-dr-bruce-ivins-was/
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/05/14/the-newly-released-lab-notebook-pages-demonstrate-dr-bruce-ivins-was-tending-to-dead-animals-on-the-nights-he-alleged-was-preparing-dry-anthrax-in-light-of-an-ivins-theory-being-demolished-by-suc/
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/06/03/there-is-a-protocol-to-follow-in-the-handling-of-animals/
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/8464/
http://caseclosedbylewweinstein.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/dxer-the-key-premise-of-the-dojs-ivins-theory-unexplained-time-in-the-b3-was-always-unmitigated-crap/
Richard Rowley said
This is a great find by Lew Weinstein. It’s an example of how an investigation can ignore all the warning signs that their scenario of how a crime went down is totally at odds with reality.
Lew Weinstein said
Thanks for the praise, but DXer found it.
DXer said
Boston Herald -
Justice Department lawyers contradict FBI findings in anthrax case
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/south/view/20110718justice_department_lawyers_contradict_fbi_findings_in_anthrax_case/srvc=home&position=recent
anonymous said
This is excellent testimony. Drilling right down to the details of the lypholizer that the FBI claimed Ivins may have used to dry the spores.
The FBI’s claim was as childish as their claim that a plastic box found in a lake was a biocontainment box.
DXer said
If the US Army strain was used, then, and if we posit arguendo that a supporter of the militant islamists was responsible, how did they gain access to the Ames strain? And was weaponized product stolen or was it weaponized by the perp? Was a lyophilizer (freeze drying method) used? Was it milled? Was it spraydried? In June 2001, a conference was held at Aberdeen Proving Ground for small businesses that might contribute to the biodefense effort — and it showcased APG’s world class facillities that had the full range of relevant equipment, as well as the range of activities and research featured by presenters at such conferences. It was called”Team APG Showcase 2001″ APG built a Biolevel-3 facility and, according to a Baltimore Sun report, by October 2002 had 19 virulent strains of anthrax, including Ames. The US Army and other agencies would promote small business innovation under a program (SBIR) that required that a small portion of R&D appropriations be made available for innovative projects. An example would be the 2001 grant issued DOD/Army for $70,000 titled “Wet-Vacuum Sampler For Surface Biocontamination Detection,” which was awarded November 2000 to Rocky Mountain Resource Labs, Inc. of Jerome, Idaho (now named “Microbial-Vac”). Some work under that grant was subcontracted.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument the processor used a Buchi 290 mini spraydryer, used a novel method to concentrate the spores, and then mixed the product with silica. ABC News, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Kenneth Alibek have all suggested a spray dryer could have been used; moreover, that without more, could explain why there was a static charge. The US Technical Applications engineer for the Buchi spraydryer (at Brinkman) reports that “some of our products come out so electrostatically charged that we want to ‘zap the charges out’ and never are able to.”
The Buchi Product Manager for the spray dryer in Switzerland says that it “is with great probability possible to do a coating of spores on silica particles in a lab-bench spray dryer. Two reasons for this assumption: i) The systems can be used with small amount of samples and thus intended to be used with biological systems; ii) the spray drying process is used for heat sensitive products due to short retention time and mild evaporation conditions in the spraying chamber.” He explained “that biological application and spray drying has quite a broad range of overlap.”
There are an estimated 200 mini spray dryers in the US (when you include the 190 and 191 models, which had basically the performance parameters). There really is no competitor –the smallest Niro model is far bigger. Notwithstanding all the containment and safety features available as accessories to the Buchi 290, the processor needed to be wearing a protective suit (or at least gloves and mask). The Product Manager for the spray dryer in the US (at Brinkman) reports: “There are not really any safety features to prevent breathing of the final product. Once you are done, you remove the vessel and proceed to remove the powder from the vessel. If you don’t want to breathe it in, then you would have to use a gas mask of some sort which is obviously not provided by us or Buchi.”
Siloxane reportedly was detected — pointing to use of a hydrophobic treated fumed silica. Would it be observable by SEMs? Is that why Meselson and Alibek didn’t see any silica?
The product manager for the US reports that there would also be some contamination of the spray cylinder:
“Also keep in mind that the glassware does become coated with whatever you are spray drying, so you also have “containment issues” when cleaning the glassware. If it is water soluble, then we always just take the glassware to the sink and wash the product off and let it go down the sink. Some of the product on the glassware is heat destroyed product and is not viable ”
Under this proposed scenario, the perp needed (1) access to Ames, (2) access to a Buchi mini spraydryer, (3) protective suit or at least mask and gloves, (4) a means of inserting the product into the envelope, and (5) he likely was a supporter of Ayman Zawahiri’s goals and recruited by him, Atef, KSM, Hambali or an intermediary. A Buchi mini spray dryer would cost up to $45k with accessories and, thus, if indicated, is quite limiting.
Although I’ve suggested that the smallest Niro spraydryer was not used here — and that a smaller laboratory model is indicated by the small batch used — early in the investigation the FBI did contact Niro in Denmark about its spraydryers (according to a news report). Niro has sold over 2000 units of its Mobile Minor laboratory scale Spray Dryer — nearly one a week for 50 years. Niro maintains a Drying Technology Center at its Columbia, MD and Copenhagen, Denmark sites, with spray dryers, fluid bed dryers, flash dryers and its fully equipped analytical lab.
The processor here likely would not only have expertise using a laboratory or pilot spray dryer in such applications that use fumed silica , but he or she would have experience with using the additive with bacteria. Without such experience, for example, one likely would render it unviable by not knowing the appropriate inlet temperature or not know the right flow velocity to get the right particle size. A perpetrator would not want to have to be on a learning curve such as accusers of Hatfill or Berry may imagine began after 9/11 — when, they imply, the idea occurred to the mischief maker. When dealing with a deadly pathogen, you don’t suddenly grab the bacteria, open up a laboratory manual, and power up a spray dryer for experiments — super patriot or not. The perp necessarily — prior to 9/11 — had experience with a spray dryer and use of silica (or some other means of drying). Notwithstanding any teach-ins with William Patrick, had Dr. Berry or Dr. Hatfill or Dr. Ivins ever even used a mini-spray dryer with fumed silica and an anthrax simulant? Had they ever even used a fluid bed dryer?
In one report of an experiment involving biodetection equipment, after noting that “Silica is a common material for aerosolizing Anthrax spores, and would likely be found in a weaponized biological agent mixture,” the researchers then add it to bacillus thuringiensis in order to test their equipment. Biodetection is the key mission of the biodefense community — Edgewood maintains a database of simulant properties. The info and equipment, including spraydrying equipment, is available to participants in the SBIR — promoting small business innovation. So might it require learning of a state? Well, to get that, all you needed to do was go to the program that shares such research for the purpose of innovation in the area of biodefense. But in yesterday’s filing by the Department of Justice, the DOJ’s position is that it was not foreseeable that the anthrax might be obtained from a US lab. Thus, access to know-how through infiltration of US biodefense was not on the priority list of DOJ either.
Amerithrax is Ali Mohammed all over again. As head of intelligence for Dr. Ayman’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, he infiltrated the US Army, CIA and FBI. He taught Dahab how to make lethal weapons and they told Osama Bin Laden that they had recruited 10 Americans for future operations.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Mohamed
Now I know previously critics had claimed that DOJ could not foresee infiltration of US biodefense and use of stolen liquid anthrax as a weapon. But now DOJ is embracing the argument as its own when it thinks its litigation goal of “winning” on this civil claim.
The American public would benefit instead from a sound analysis of the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings.