“Nonetheless, skepticism persists, as is evident not only from the forthcoming NAS review but also during the plenary session, “The Science behind the ‘Anthrax Letter’ Attack Investigation,” convened as part of the 7th ASM Biodefense & Emerging Diseases Research Meeting, held in Baltimore, Md., last February, and during the news conference that followed.”

Scientists are very careful what they say publicly. It is obvious from the above statement that the pulse amongst the scientific community even in early July was one of skepticism over the FBI’s scientific claims in Amerithrax. That skeptisism can only be worse to-day given that there is still no closure to any of this saga.

Making things even worse for the FBI is that the reverse engineering studies of the spores have now been revealed. All attempts to “innocently” introduce silica onto the spore coats found nowhere near the level of silica found in the mailed spores. It is obvious from this data that Ivins alone at Detrick could not have made such a product.

Of course, it has already been demonstrated in this blog that it would have been impossible (even if the silica wasn’t an issue) for one person to have made the quantity of spores required in the attack under the circumstances that the FBI paint for Ivins. They claim he did it in a few evenings without any of his co-workers noticing. It would have required Ivins concealing at least 55 (probably in fact over 100) flasks of prep material. THis would have taken weeks of full-time work and it would have been impossible to conceal from his co-workers.

“I’ m a microbiologist, and was not involved in the seizure of evidence.”

Was he involved in his earlier role from the other side — as a collections scientist in the ATCC Bacteriology Division involved in responding to the subpoena that called for any Ames … which related to the access of “anthrax weapons suspect” Ali Al-Timimi?

http://gateway.nlm.nih.gov/MeetingAbstracts/ma?f=102267626.html

Here is a presentation from September 2002 by Dr. Bannan and other ATCC authors.

Nosocomial Strain Relationships Assessed by Genotyping and MALDI-TOF Mass Spectrometry.
PENNELLA TD, TANG Y, STRATTON CW, MCKENNA T, BANNAN JD; Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (42nd : 2002 : San Diego, Calif.).

Abstr Intersci Conf Antimicrob Agents Chemother Intersci Conf Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 2002 Sep 27-30; 42: abstract no. K-1381.
American Type Culture Collection, Manassas, VA.

BACKGROUND: Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) has become a standard method of genotyping nosocomial bacterial isolates such as Vancomycin Resistant Enterococci (VRE). Other genotypic methods and a new phenotypic typing method were assessed for their ability to discriminate VRE isolates.

Virulent Ames is BEI NR-411

http://www.beiresources.org/Catalog/tabid/248/Default.aspx

BEI Resources is managed under contract by American Type Culture Collection (ATCC). A seven-year contract to manage BEI Resources was awarded to ATCC in September 2003. The BEI Resources program reflects a coordinated effort between NIAID, CDC, USDA, and ATCC.

ATCC is a global bioscience organization that houses the world’s largest and most diverse archive of biological materials. ATCC serves as a biological product supplier and an industry service provider, offering technical services and educational programs to private industry and academic organizations. “The Prince William Campus shares half of Discovery Hall with ATCC.”
http://princewilliam.gmu.edu/comm.html

Dr. Bannan who has taken the lead in arguing that the science does not exonerate Dr. Ivins — and is merely inconclusive — was a collections scientist at ATCC’s Bacteriology Division while Ali was at Discovery Hall.

Where was Dr. Bannan’s office while he was at the Bacteriology Division of ATCC in Manassas at the George Mason University campus when Al-Timimi first arrived. Was it in 10801 or 10900 University Blvd.?

http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.atcc.org/

The joint venture was an effort to maximize research efforts by combining the academic and applied approaches to research. The School’s first activity was to teach an ATCC course in DNA techniques adapted for George Mason students. The ATCC is an internationally renown non-profit organization that houses the world’s largest and most diverse archive of biological materials. ATCC moved to its current state-of-the-art laboratory at Discovery Hall (Prince William II) in 1998. ATCC’s 106,000-square-foot facility has nearly 35,000 square feet of laboratory space with a specialized air handling system and Biosafety Level 2 and 3 containment stations. The ATCC bioinformatics (BIF) program carries out research in various areas of biological information management relevant to its mission. BIF scientists interact with laboratory scientists in microbiology, cell biology, and molecular biology at ATCC and other laboratories throughout the world. ATCC has strong collaborations with a large number of academic institutions, including computational sciences at George Mason University. Through these partnerships, the George Mason Prince William Campus offers George Mason microbiology students an opportunity for students to be involved in current research and gain access to facilities and employment opportunities at ATCC and other partner companies.

Before coming to GMU, Al-Timimi’s increasing computer skills had got him a job at SRA International where Ali worked as a “bioinformatics software architect” providing information technology to the government. Some of his jobs required that Ali obtain a high-level security clearance. One job resulted in a letter of recommendation from the White House. He previously had been the assistant to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card (for two months in 1996). Ali then enrolled in a PhD program in computational biology at George Mason University. In 1999, Battelle consultant and former USAMRIID Charles Bailey also worked at SRA By 2000, Ali Al-Timimi was already taking advanced courses at Mason in computational sciences and Dr. Bannan also was in Manassas according to the listing of him as an Associate Editor of a Antimicrobics newsletter in July 2000. Dr. Bailey became co-Director of the DARPA-funded Center of Biodefense there in the Spring of 2001.

On his resume, he mentions that he worked for a vaccine production company but the company is not named (which is unusual for a CV).

Timimi once explained his research: “I am currently a research scientist at the Center for Biomedical Genomics and Informatics, George Mason University. I am involved in the analysis of the microarray data generated by the CTRF Cancer Genomics Project. Likewise, I am developing new computational approaches and technologies in support of this project.” The webpage for Timimi’s program at the time explained: “Faculty members and graduate students in the Program in Bioinformatics and Computational Biology participate in numerous collaborative efforts including but not limited to the following Laboratories and Research Centers: Center for Biomedical Genomics and Informatics (GMU) , Laboratory for Microbial and Environmental Biocomplexity (GMU) and Center for Biodefense (GMU). Beginning the Spring of 2002, GMU hired Ali to develop a computer program that coordinated the research at several universities, letting him go only after he came under suspicion by the FBI. In Spring 2002, according to salary information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, GMU hired him for $70,000 a year. In 2002, the employment was through the School of Computational Sciences and in 2003, it was through Life Sciences Grants & Contracts.

While I’ve not yet found any reference directly confirming Timimi’s room number, the person who inherited his old telephone number (3-4294) is Victor Morozov in the Center for Biodefense. Dr. Morozov, upon joining the faculty and inheriting the phone number was in Rm. 154A, very near Dr. Bailey in Rm 156B. One faculty member who consulted with Al-Timimi suggested to me that Ali instead was Rm. 154B, in the middle of the office suite. GMU Information Services helpfully looked up the listings from 2001 directory. As of October 2001 (when the directory is published according to GMU Information Services), judging from the directory, Al-Timimi was still just a graduate student. I don’t know Dr. Bannan’s room number – or whether he was in 10801 rather than 10900 University Blvd.

Former USAMRIID Deputy Commander and Acting Commander Ames strain anthrax researcher Charles Bailey, in Rm 156B, was given a Gateway desktop computer in mid-March 2001 (upon his arrival) — serial number 0227315480. It was like the one Dr. Alibek would get the next year in 156D. One way to think of proximity analysis — a form of true crime analysis — is the number of feet or inches between 154B and 156B/156D. Another way is to think of it is in terms of the number of feet or inches to the hard drives. You can judge the distance for yourself from a First Floor plan that is available online, clicking upon 154-156 area to enlarge.

The December 2007 biodefense PhD thesis explains:

“Although computers are password protected, anyone can access the computers located throughout the labs. Research results can be recorded on lab computers. Someone wanting to access research results would first have to understand what the numbers meant. Research results are also kept in a lab notebook that is kept in the lab or office. This enables other students to repeat what was already done or to see results.”

In April 2007, at a talk at Princeton University, Dr. Alibek noted that he felt that “[u]nfortunately, the likelihood is very high” of a follow-up to the anthrax mailings of 2001. “And the agent very likely is still anthrax.” “The biggest part of my life now is devoted to cancer and cardiovascular (research). If you work in the biodefense community, good luck to you. I hope you succeed.” Dr. Alibek explained that he had been scrutinized and consulted, and given a polygraph after the anthrax mailings. He said that anthrax likely would be the pathogen favored by terrorists because it is relatively easy to grow and transport. Dr. Alibek suspects it it was “a person who knew from some source how the U.S. manufactured anthrax years and years ago.” He said, “It’s not rocket science.” More recently, he declined to say why he had left the country so abruptly in an interview by documentary makers..

Did Dr. Bannan work with Dr. Bailey while at ATCC? Did he work with Dr. Alibek? Did he teach Al-Timimi? Did he respond to the suboena in March 2002 for any virulent anthrax or any subpoena relating to access to ATCC labs?

Given he is the one saying that the scientific evidence does not necessarily point to Ivins — and yet speciously IMO points to the Tin Signature as possibly have been due to Maryland water used — we should have full disclosure of his biography so as to know of any conflict of interest. I have done a lot of water research and am eager to see published research supporting Dr. Bannan’s claim that the source of the Tin Signature could have been Maryland water. (I’ve tested a lot of water and think the claim is unfounded).

Infection and Immunity, February 2001, p. 875-884, Vol. 69, No. 2
Inhibition of Bacterial Superantigens by Peptides and Antibodies
http://iai.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/69/2/875

Did Dr. Bannan know Ali Al-Timimi?

As a collections scientist, did Dr. Bannan have personal knowledge relating to whether ATCC had virulent Ames?

What vaccine production company did Dr. Bannan then work for? His resume is here but it does not name the vaccine production company.
http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/Conferences/Presentations/CVs/JasonDBannan.pdf

One ATCC former employee felt so strongly about lax security there at the ATCC repository collection that she called me out of the blue a couple years ago and said that the public was overlooking the ATCC patent repository as a possible source of the Ames strain. ATCC would not deny to me that they had virulent Ames in their patent repository pre 9/11 (as distinguished from their online catalog which does not have it). The ATCC spokesperson emailed me when I inquired: “As a matter of policy, ATCC does not disclose information on the contents of its patent depository.” The scientist calling me had been immediately let go upon raising the issue; she had both a J.D. and BL-4 experience and so I don’t dismiss her report.

Previously, the ATCC head publicly explained that it did not have virulent Ames. This apparently was at a time when Dr. Bannan was still working at ATCC.

ATCC later (by 2003) came to formally run the Critical Reagent Program that featured virulent Ames, according to its online catalog. (FWIW, the head of the Critical Reagent Program, Peter Emmanuel, in 2001 was at Edgewood where a BL-3 was constructed that year.)

Dr. Bannan’s expertise and good faith is not in question – but it is customary that any expert’s past employment is disclosed. Before he opines further in making the public case against Dr. Ivins, the public should at least be apprised of the name of the vaccine production company that had employed him, the dates of his employment at ATCC (the sponsor of the program of the other “anthrax weapons suspect”), whether he was involved in determining ATCC did not have virulent Ames (while he was there), and whether he knew Ali Al-Timimi.

This employment in 2001 of Dr. Bannan by the sponsor of Ali Al-Timimi’s program — the largest microbiological depository in the world that then came to manage the Critical Reagent Program featuring Ames strain — reinforces my view that no one who has seen Dr. Bannan in his bathing suit in Naples, Florida in June/July 2008 should serve on the NAS Committee.

It is also worth knowing what government agencies Dr. Bannan has consulted.

Estimating aerosol hazards from an anthrax letter

Statistical analysis of bacterial spore aerosols created by opening a spore containing “anthrax letter” in an office

Ed

The frozen MS2 suspensions were then placed uncapped in freeze flasks and connected to a
Labconco Lyph-Lok 6 freeze dry system. The samples were dried for 6 days. After the samples
were completely dry, they were removed from the lyophilizer and large pieces were broken up
with a spatula. Particle size was further reduced by light grinding with a mortar and pestle. The
dry MS2 was then placed in a US Stoneware milling jar with 16 pieces of 0.5 inch milling media.
The milling jar was placed on an automated roller and the MS2 was milled for three hours. The
dry MS2 was removed from the milling jar and stored in a sterile Nalgene bottle. Final particle
size reduction was achieved using a jet mill (Model 00 Jet-O-Mizer, Fluid Energy Processing
and Equipment Company, Telford, PA) operated at 120 psig. The crude MS2 was fed to the jet
mill using an electromagnetic vibrating feeder (Model F-TO-C, FMC Technologies, Homer City,
PA). The feed material to the jet mill is entrained by the stream of circulation fluid within the jet
mill. The violent jet action breaks up individual particles through particle to particle impaction.
The jet mill is shown in Figures G-3 and G-4. After milling, the dry MS2 was mixed with
10 percent Aerosil by weight.

An early online oped issue frames these issues nicely:

“FBI Frame-up of Bruce E. Ivins Made Simple
by Michael Green

On Wednesday, August 8, 2008, the Department of Justice held a news conference announcing that Bruce E. Ivins, a former anthrax researcher for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), was the sole person responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks. Headed by U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor and FBI Assistant Director Joseph Persichini, the presentation was noteworthy for often not answering relevant questions, but instead referring reporters to several dozen court documents they had just been provided. After hurriedly reading one of these documents I decided to hedge my strong conclusion in an essay that the FBI had persecuted and framed Ivins in order to protect the actual perpetrators until determining enough facts to decide the matter. I stated, “The most important question is whether Ivins was provided with fully weaponized cutting-edge anthrax that he could use by merely drying it out as the FBI case requires. If not, then the cover-up explodes in the face of the FBI.” …. And, indeed, the cover-up had exploded in the face of the FBI and DOJ.

Richard Spertzel, UNSCOM’s biological weapons chief from 1994-199, had described an exquisitely weaponized anthrax contained in the letters to Senators Leahy and Daschle that “far exceeds that of any powdered product found in the now extinct U.S. Biological Warfare Program.”

[Comment: This is not true. Dr. Spertzel seems unaware of the study that issued on September 10, 2001 that had the same performance as the attack anthrax. It was done to study the threat of mailed anthrax after an anthrax threat was received in connection with the detention of Vanguards of Conquest #2 Mohammad Mahjoub. His bail was denied on October 5, 2001. The simulant used in the study was made at Dugway. The silica was mixed at a dairy processor after drying.]

The essayist continues:

“These included anthrax spores of 1.5-3.0 microns necessary to make a pure spore mix, a polyglass that tightly bound hydrophilic silica to each particle (to prevent clumping) and a weak electrical charge to optimize dispersion by means of repulsion with no other propellant required. Spertzel concluded:

The multiple disciplines and technologies required to make the anthrax in this case do not exist at the Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Inhalation studies are conducted at the institute, but they are done using liquid preparation, not powdered products.
Furthermore, the FBI spent 12-18 months trying to “reverse engineer” the Daschle-Leahy anthrax without success. The FBI case against Ivins gives him 7½ hours in the evening over the course of three days to prepare his first concoction sent in letters postmarked September 18, 2001 and roughly 15½ hours over eight days to prepare the Senate anthrax letters postmarked October 9, 2001. But after reading the first DOJ document, that was suggestive and not apparently made from whole cloth, I was seized by the possibility that the FBI might have been concealing that Ivins had been working with fully weaponized anthrax in order to disguise a violation of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention treaty to which the U.S. is a signatory, hence the hedge in my essay (made on the final day of OPEDNEWS window for editing one’s essays.) Direct inspection of the BTWC rules out that concern. Apparently what matters is in the heart or mind: one can make fully weaponized materials so long as the purpose in doing so is in some part defensive or prophylactic, as was Ivins’s purpose in testing the efficacy of anthrax vaccines.

The question is thus whether Ivins was working with fully weaponized materials. The answer is that he was not.”

[Comment: On this, however, we must take into account Bruce Ivins' email to Patricia Fellows recounting how someone who had inspected the attack anthrax had observed that it was closest to dry powder made by [name redacted]. In his email, which should be produced under FOI soon, it was noted that General Parker had been told that ” we did not make dry powder!” Was such dry powder made by the individual at Edgewood as opposed to Dugway or Battelle?]

The essayist continues:

“Neither the DOJ oral presentation, nor anything in any of its documents states or implies this during a public presentation whose purpose was to convince the American public that the FBI “got the right man” this time. They cannot even bring themselves to say that the spores in Ivins’s possession were of the same consistent tiny size of 1.5-3.0 microns that made them so deadly — something they would surely say were it so.”

[Comment:

"Flask 1029 was highly purified. The size of a natural spore is 1 micron. This is not an obstacle.]

The essayist continues:

“In fact, the topic is sedulously avoided even though — or precisely because — it is essential to making the case against Ivins. Better, Jeffrey Taylor, who seemed to have a weak grasp of the evidence, in his opening remarks gave away the fact that the anthrax in the letters did not come directly from the flask with the sample of spores “RMR-1029″ that Ivins monitored and that were reportedly a genetic match to the anthrax that killed its victims. Mr. Taylor advised:

As the court documents allege, the parent material of the anthrax spores used in the attacks was a single flask of spores, known as “RMR-1029,” that was created and solely maintained by Dr. Ivins at USAMRIID. This means that the spores used in the attacks were taken from that specific flask, regrown, purified, dried and loaded into the letters.

So, that’s the game and the frame-up right there. Regrown spores don’t weaponize themselves. They do not regrow super-small and covered with state-of-the-art anti-clumping silicon with a weak electrical charge for dispersion. And how do we know, aside from voluminous ongoing reports that we will soon examine, that there was such silica on the spores, and that it was cutting edge technology? Search Warrant Affidavit 07-534-M-01 (available at USDOJ:Amerithrax Court Documents), dated October 31, 2007, states in pertinent part, p.4:

Microscopic examination of the evidentiary spore powders recovered from all four letters identified an elemental signature of Silicon within the spores. This Silicon signature had not been previously described for Bacillus anthracis organisms.

This fundamental problem with the FBI case has been around for a long time, and helps us understand how covert action can take place in front of the public without being noticed. Indeed, the entire emphasis of the DOJ and FBI is focussed on proving that there is a genetic match between the letter anthrax and the anthrax batch RMR-1029 allegedly in Ivins’s possession while ignoring that RMR-1029 lacked the weaponized qualities found in the Senate anthrax letters. That focus is a deliberate red herring to make it seem possible that Ivins was the lone nutcase perpetrator. An October 2, 2002 Washington Post article by Guy Gugliotta and Gary Matsumoto underscores how committed the FBI has been to protecting the 911 plotters from the beginning, e.g., by starting with a conviction that the perpetrator had to be a lone nutcase:

A profile of the attacker issued by the FBI last November described an angry, “lone individual” with “some” science background who could weaponize the anthrax spores in a basement laboratory for as little as $2,500.

Instead, the scientists who understood the spores opined as follows:

“In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I’m one of them,” said Richard O. Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission from 1994 to 1998. “And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good.”

[Comment: This is most notable as an acknowledgement that Dr. Spertzel that he could not make it -- whereas a dairy processor in Wisconsin could. Given that Dr. Alibek and Dr. Patrick were of the view that they could make it -- and the FBI did make powder with the same performance characteristics -- it is probably best to turn to the folks who actually have made aerosolized anthrax simulants. For example, the head of the Air Force lab has told me, after doing controlled experiments shared with Dr. Bannan, that it is not so difficult. He has made anthrax simulant that performs as well and has a comparable Silicon Signature using a relatively simple method.]

There is a reconciling of views, however. Both the FBI, Alibek, Patrick and the Air Force lab have the benefit of learning of highly specialized labs and know-how. And so the fact that they find it relatively easy perhaps is a bit misleading — their point is that a relatively sophisticated product can result from a relatively simple method. It may be that therein lies the genius of the method, whatever it turns out to be.]

The essayist continues:

“Instead, suggested Spertzel and more than a dozen experts interviewed by The Washington Post in recent weeks, investigators might want to reexamine the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism, or try to determine whether weaponized spores may have been stolen by the attacker from an existing, but secret, biodefense program or perhaps given to the attacker by an accomplice. …”

[Comment: This is an important point. As Dr. Meselson has always pointed out, the know-how from a state program travels in the minds of the individuals. Such know-how can then be conveyed by email or cocktails at a conference.]

The essayist continues:

“Just collecting this stuff is a trick,” said Steven A. Lancos, executive vice president of Niro Inc., one of the leading manufacturers of spray dryers, viewed by several sources as the likeliest tool needed to weaponize the anthrax bacteria. “Even on a small scale, you still need containment. If you’re going to do it right, it could cost millions of dollars.” …

[Comment: Containment can be done on the cheap, especially if done on a small scale.]

The essayist continues:

“Several sources agreed that the most likely way to build the coated spores would be to use the fine glass particles, known generically as “fumed silica” or “solid smoke,” and mix them with the spores in a spray dryer. “I know of no other technique that might give you that finished product,” Spertzel said.”

[Comment: I had always favored a spray dryer, relying on Dr. Alibek's comments in the early years. In his draft of Biohazard 2, however, he came to favor a fluidized bed dryer. The head of the Air Force lab came to suggest that this could have been the method as well.]

The essayist continues:

According to William C. Patrick III, the former chief of product development for the U.S. Army’s now-defunct bioweapons program, U.S. government scientists made biological agents using spray dryers, but did not spray dry anthrax. …

[Comment: Yes, the now-defunct bioweapons program did not, but as I mentioned, a spraydryer was in fact used, with mixing with silica, in making the simulant used used in a biodefense study done of the jihadists' threat to use mailed anthrax. See report issued on September 10, 2001 prepared in response to the threat to use mailed anthrax in connection with the detention of Vanguards of Conquest #2 Mohammad Mahjoub. The spraydrying was done at a dairy processor.

And so if Vice President Cheney and CIA was forthcoming with all information at its disposal with the folks at Sandia, they could have tested the hypothesis that focus should include a dairy processor expert at spraydrying, who mixed with silica. One such person who worked for the charity IANA was arrested as a material witness the day that Al-Timimi's residence was searched. He lived a mile from me. I called him to ask about this and he thanked me for my concern, but he said too much was going on to talk.]

The essayist continues:

“In spray drying, a technician mixes fumed silica and spores with water, then sprays the mist through a nozzle directly into a stream of superheated air shooting from a second nozzle into an enclosed chamber. The water evaporates instantly, leaving spores and additive floating in space.
What do the DOJ and FBI offer us for how Ivins could have done all this? Silence and disinformation. The aforementioned affidavit states:
Culturing anthrax and working safely with dried anthrax spores requires specific training and expertise in technical fields such as biochemist or microbiology. It also requires access to particular laboratory equipmentsuch as a lyophilizer or other drying device, biological safety cabinet or other containment device, incubator, centrifuge, fermentor, and various protective gear, all of which Dr. Ivins had readily accessible to him through his employment at USAMRIID.
The above paragraph is a carefully worded frame-up. Yes, a special drying device is needed to coat the anthrax with silicon in the right way; it is a spray dryer — a device that works with intense heat to vaporize nearly instantly a water suspension of silicon particles that then is drawn to the anthrax. Ivins had access to a lyophilizer, but not to a spray dryer. A lyophilizer freeze dries liquid anthrax into a powder. So the affidavit slips the fact that Ivins lacks even the basic tools by including “or other drying device” and states (truly and deceptively) that Ivins had access to “all of which,” i.e., the unhelpful lyophilizer but not the essential spray dryer, let alone the specialized silicon and team of colleagues to make it work. The Post continues about the requirements:
“Surface tension will pull those little [silica] particles together onto the big one,” said California Institute of Technology chemical engineer Richard Flagan. “You will end up with some degree of coating.”

Whoever made such an aerosol would “need some experience” with aerosols and “would have to have a lot of anthrax, so you could practice,” Edwards said. “You’d have to do a lot of trial and error to get the particles you wanted.” It would also help to have an electron microscope to examine the results.

This would mean at least several hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment, several experts said. Niro’s cheapest spray dryer sells for about $50,000. Electron microscopes cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.”

[Comment: For a forensic psychologist, this essayist did a great job in his opinion piece and I hope he has continued to follow the matter and we hear from him again.]

He continues:

“In all, said Niro’s Lancos, “you would need [a] chemist who is familiar with colloidal [fumed] silica, and a material science person to put it all together, and then some mechanical engineers to make this work . . . probably some containment people, if you don’t want to kill anybody. You need half a dozen, I think, really smart people.”

The following year, Gary Matsumoto wrote an article for Science 28, November 2003, Volume 302 that stated that “a schism now exists among scientists who analyzed it for the FBI.” Initially, there was consensus:
Early in the investigation [once it took to heart the science needed to produce the spores], the FBI appeared to endorse the latter view: that only a sophisticated lab could have produced the material used in the Senate attack. This was the consensus among biodefense specialists working for the government and the military. In May 2002, 16 of these scientists and physicians published a paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association, describing the Senate anthrax powder as “weapons-grade” and exceptional: “high spore concentration, uniform particle size, low electrostatic charge, treated to reduce clumping” (JAMA, 1 May 2002, p. 2237). Donald A. Henderson, former assistant secretary for the Office of Public Health Preparedness at the Department of Health and Human Services, expressed an almost grudging respect: “It just didn’t have to be that good” to be lethal, he told Science.”

[Comment: Note that the 1 micron size perhaps was overkill. Once it gets below 2.5 microns, it can just come in and be exhaled out.]

“As the [criminal] investigation dragged on, however, its focus shifted. In a key disclosure, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft revealed in August 2002 that Justice Department officials had fixed on one of 30 so-called “persons of interest”:Steven J. Hatfill, a doctor and virologist who in 1997 conducted research with the Ebola virus at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland. (Hatfill has denied any involvement in the anthrax mailing.)

The essayist continues:

“Hatfill’s story remains instructive for many reasons. The FBI violated normal investigative procedures by leaking Hatfill’s name to the press and keeping politicians informed about the ongoing investigation. When Hatfill found a university position, the FBI forced the university to fire him. The FBI deliberately informed the press in advance of their searches of Hatfill’s residence, both when he voluntarily submitted to a search and when the search was done under warrant, in order to create a media circus and to antagonize and intimidate Hatfill. The FBI harassed Hatfill by following him everywhere under the pretext that he would strike again if let out of their sight. The wave of propaganda against Hatfill was so pervasive and effective that when Hatfill reported to D.C. police that the FBI had run over his foot while surveilling him, he was ticketed for “walking to create a hazard.” FBI sources stated that the Bureau had focused on Hatfill until 2006, but when a federal judge reviewed the case in 2008, including still-secret FBI summaries, he opined “There is not a scintilla of evidence that would indicate that Dr. Hatfill had anything to do with this.” ”

Former FBI counter-terrorism agent Brad Garrett, … is happy to tell us what went wrong with the Hatfill investigation in a June 30, 20008 “EXCLUSIVE: How the FBI Botched the Anthrax Case.” According to Garrett:

The anthrax investigation, almost from the beginning, was hampered by top-heavy leadership from high ranking, but inexperienced FBI officials, which led to a close-minded focus on just one suspect and amateurish investigative techniques that robbed agents in the field the ability operate successfully.

Garrett ignores the obvious implications of the fact that there was not a scintilla of evidence against Hatfill, viz., that the FBI modus operandi against Hatfill — and Ivins as well — was “frame ‘em and break ‘em.” Garrett notes that “The original complaint accused several government officials, including Ashcroft, of deliberately leaking information about the criminal probe into Hatfill in order to harass him and to hide the FBI’s lack of hard evidence,” but he also states that the $5,825,000 settlement included no such admissions without seeming to understand that so much money was paid to avoid having to make that admission or having a jury so find. ”

[Comment:

Attorney General Ashcroft did not leak anything. He was vilified for using the term "Person of Interest" after the massive press. The person who pled the Fifth Amendment regarding the Hatfill leaks came over from the CIA in late September and headed the criminal investigation at the DC Field Office. His daughter recently withdrew as pro bono defense counsel for the other anthrax weapons suspect, Ali Al-Timimi. That proceeding is ongoing and involves highly classified ex parte briefing on warrantless NSA wiretapping that apparently began by at least on or about October 7, 2001. Not even the federal district court's clerk has been allowed to assist the judge; "ex parte" means that the defense counsel, who is a regular on the Olberman and Maddow shows, has a high security clearance, was not allowed to see the briefing.]

The essayist continues:

“One wishes for more hard facts, but instead of taking the convenient route that the FBI investigation of this crucial act of domestic terrorism was hamstrung by stupid, incompetent and inexperienced high-ranking officials, the better interpretation in this case is that the FBI’s wild goose chase was grand political theater to keep the public confused and distracted from the actual terrorists.”

Green has offered an informed and lucid essay. But let’s turn now to certain additional hard facts and figure out some possible alternatives:

(1) Did Ayman Zawahiri succeed at infiltrating US biodefense as the documentary evidence shows was his aim? What does Rauf Ahmad say? Why doesn’t one of these reporters call him?

(2) Were the anthrax mailings financially motivated?

(3) Were they an effort by a mentally troubled individual to sound the alarm?

(4) Was it an intelligence operation designed to sound the alarm over what was known over Ayman Zawahiri’s anthrax planning?

(5) Or was it a combination of one or more of the above.

I honestly don’t know.

But I would urge to Mr. Spertzel this one hard fact: the performance parameters were comparable to what had been prepared for the study done to assess the threat of mailed anthrax that was issued September 10, 2001 in connection with a threat made related to the detention of Vanguards of Conquest #2 Mohammad Mahjoub. That threat was reported in the Presidential Daily Briefing in early February 2001. CIA Director Panetta and President Obama need only open that PDB to see Amerithrax in entirely new eyes. The method used in making that simulant involved a spraydryer and mixing with silica AFTER drying.

Edgewood’s jet mill is on page 168 of this document: http://origin.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/researchprojects/pdfs/CR-085Gardner.pdf